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THE
HISTORY
OF THE
PUBLIC REVENUE
OF THE
BRITISH EMPIRE.

CONTAINING

An Account of the public Income and Expenditure from the remotest Periods recorded in History, to Michaelmas 1802. With a Review of the Financial Administration of the Right Honorable William Pitt.

By Sir JOHN SINCLAIR, Baronet, M.P.

IL N'Y A RIEN QUE LA SAGESSE, ET LA PRUDENCE DOIVENT PLUS REGLE, QUE CETTE PORTION QU'ON ÔTE, ET CETTE PORTION QU'ON LAISSE AUX SUJETS.

L'ESPRIT DES LOIX, l. xiii. c. 1.

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1803.

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ADVERTISEMENT

TO

THE SECOND VOLUME.

I REGRET much, that a series of ill health, prevents me from completing at this time, the great plan I had sketched out, for laying before the public, the progress and present state of the finances of the British empire; or even to do that justice, which might otherwise have been expected, to the particular articles herein discussed. The work however, as it is now printed, will, I trust, furnish the reader with some useful information, regarding the most important branches of our financial history*. The points remaining

* The History of the Revenue, as originally printed, is thus mentioned by a foreign author, who proposes giving a translation of it into French.

Extract from a work intitled, “ Essai sur le Credit Commercial, et Prospectus de la Traduction de l’Histoire des Finances de la Grande Bretagne, de Sir John Sinclair, M.P. 2 vol. in quarto. Par J. H. Marniere. A Paris, an ix. (1801.)”

“ L’Histoire

ing for consideration are, 1. The present state of the national debt, with some observations on the nature and real amount of the burden, and the means of discharging it. 2. The revenue of Scotland. 3. The income, expenditure, and debt of Ireland. 4. The income and expenditure of the three kingdoms taken as one empire :—and 5. The national resources, including some hints re-

“ L’Histoire du Revenu Public, et du Credit de la Grande-Bretagne, par Sir John Sinclair, presente le vaste tableau de toutes les opérations de finances que le gouvernement Anglois a faites depuis un siecle dans le genre des emprunts, et dans celui des impositions ; et l’auteur en démontre les avantages ou les inconveniens, sans se laisser jamais égarer par des idées systématiques, ou des opinions de parti.”—Avertissement, p. 3.

“ Son ouvrage forme sans contredit le plus grand recueil de faits intéressans sur les finances qui existe en Europe.”—p. 111.

“ L’Histoire du Revenu Public de la Grande-Bretagne, est trop connue pour que je m’arrête à en faire l’éloge ; je me contenterai de dire qu’elle donne le detail de toutes les opérations de finances, que la nation de l’Europe qui a su procurer à l’état le plus grand revenu et le plus grand credit, a faites depuis une siecle ; et que l’auteur en montre les avantages ou les inconveniens par des observations dont la sagesse et la sagacité justifient sa grande reputation.”

The reader may easily suppose, how anxious an author must be, to complete and to render as perfect as possible, any work that had the smallest pretensions to such eulogiums.

garding

garding the political circumstances of the empire in general.

His observations on these important subjects, the author will endeavour to complete, in the course of the ensuing year.

London, 10th May 1803.

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THE
HISTORY
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BRITISH EMPIRE.

PART III.

CHAP. I.

Of the Progress of the national Income since the Revolution.

AMONG the various political problems, which it would be not a little desirable to have satisfactorily explained, there is none more curious in itself, or more truly interesting to this country, than a statement of the means, which have enabled it to bear its progressive weight of taxes, but more particularly the heavy burdens to which it is now subject.

National Income since the Revolution.

National Income since the Revolution.

ject. A century has scarcely elapsed, since a revenue of about two millions, was supposed to be fully equal to its utmost ability ; nor since D'Avenant, the most intelligent writer of his time on public questions, openly asserted, that the commerce and manufactures of England would sink under a heavier load^a. Whereas now, England, alone, supplies the public treasury with above *thirty millions* ; and, till of late, any popular clamour that was heard, was more owing to the manner in which our taxes were laid on, than to the quantum that was levied.

In endeavouring to account for this singular political phenomenon, it is natural to consider, as the most efficient cause, the great addition that has been made to the general wealth and capital of the kingdom. The income of England, at the revolution, was usually calculated at forty-three millions. On that sum the inhabitants of this country lived ; and, besides furnishing themselves with every article necessary for the sustenance and comfort of life, supplied the public treasury with two millions *per annum*. Whereas at present, in consequence of the various improvements which have taken place in *agriculture, manufactures, and commerce*, the general revenue of the inhabitants of the whole island, cannot be less than 150 millions, and hence they are enabled to contribute a much greater sum than heretofore, to the coffers of the public.

^a D'Avenant's Works, vol. ii, p. 283.

Agriculture, in particular, that best and surest source of national wealth, in no country perhaps of equal extent, has been carried to such perfection. By improvements in that art, not only the fields have been made more productive, but lands, formerly waste and uncultivated, have been rendered fertile: nay, independently of other products of the earth, grain alone, to the value of nearly forty millions of pounds, has been sent to other countries. Indeed, during the space of only five years, from 1743 to 1749, no less a quantity than 3,768,440 quarters of corn of different kinds, the value of which, at the medium price of from forty to forty-five shillings, could not be less than *eight millions*, were actually exported.

National Income since the Revolution.

Formerly, England was obliged to supply itself, with various important articles from other countries, and sent hardly any commodity, of considerable value abroad, woollens alone excepted. But, since the revolution, the case has been greatly altered: valuable manufactories of silk and cotton have been established: with the assistance of Ireland, it is now almost able to supply itself with the important article of linen; and, instead of importing, it actually exports glass, paper, earthen-ware, and many other commodities, which formerly rendered the balance of trade, in particular with France, rather unfavourable to this country.

The general commerce of the nation, also, has been materially augmented. *Anno* 1697, the imports amounted to £. 3,482,586 10 s. 5 d. the exports

*National In-
come since the
Revolution.*

ports to £. 3,525,906 18 s. 6 d. and the balance in our favour only to £. 43,320 8 s. 1 d. Whereas on 5th January 1800, the imports of Great Britain, for one year, amounted to £. 29,945,808, the exports to £. 35,990,000, and the balance to £. 6,044,192. This is partly to be attributed, to the increased industry and commercial exertions of the nation; and partly to the great value and opulence of our colonial possessions, which, notwithstanding the independence of North America, still continue of immense importance. Our commerce and settlements in the East, in particular, must be the means of adding many millions to our national wealth.

At first sight, it is natural to wonder, how 150 millions of annual income, can yield a public revenue of above thirty millions *per annum*, when forty-three millions only produced two. But it should be considered, that it is from superfluous wealth alone, that a large revenue can be drawn. At the revolution, the people of England required the greater part of their income, to purchase merely the necessaries and conveniencies of life: and four shillings in the pound, must be less felt, and less liable to complaint, from the additional wealth that has been acquired since, than one shilling in the pound, taken from an income, that was little more than sufficient for the sustenance of the people.

Besides, the financial, like every other art, requires much experience before it can be brought to perfection. The ingenuity of able men must be exercised, to counteract the various artifices of those,

those, who may be desirous of evading the taxes to which they are subject; and in no country, can the public revenue be brought to the highest standard of which it is capable, until many have made it the sole, or at least the principal object of their study and attention; nor indeed until the people have been accustomed to taxes. For, however obnoxious they may be when originally imposed, yet, in process of time, when they become familiar to the public, they are paid with less reluctance, and consequently become more productive. Hence, if the general income of England had still remained at only forty-three millions *per annum*, a much larger portion of that sum would probably have been paid at present, than at first could have been expected.

National Income since the Revolution.

The advantages resulting to a public revenue, from an easy circulation, and from credit being fully established in a country, from an abundance of money, (whether paper or specie is of little consequence, where paper is received by the exchequer), and also from the establishment of public debts themselves, have already been taken notice of^b. But there are two important circumstances, namely, the enormous size of the capital, and the luxurious manners of the people, which have not as yet been considered. Wherever great multitudes are assembled together, there much wealth must be concentrated; and the government

^b See vol. i. p. 13, 14.

National Income since the Revolution.

of a country, finds it much less difficult, to draw a considerable revenue from those who are immediately under its eye, and live contiguous to each other, than from such as reside at a distance, and are scattered over the whole face of the country. Nor is it perhaps an exaggerated calculation, that the inhabitants of London and its neighbourhood, in proportion to their number, pay as much again to the public, as those who dwell at a distance from that metropolis^c.

Lastly, the luxurious manner in which the inhabitants of this country live, is not a little favourable to an increase of revenue. Where private economy reigns, no productive impost can be laid, but on property alone. That resource, however, is very limited: for few can bear, that the public should share very largely in their wealth, or should openly demand too great a portion of their income. But in luxurious ages, a considerable revenue may be raised, without hurting the feelings of the people. Taxes on consumption become efficient and productive, and the consumer, confounding the duty and the price together, furnishes,

^c The proportion paid by London and its neighbourhood, has been computed by some writers to be much more considerable. For instance, it was asserted *anno* 1692, that Yorkshire paid but 15 s. 8 d. the house; whereas Middlesex, abstracted from London, paid 21 s. and London itself £. 3 6 s. 8 d. and that the acre in Yorkshire paid but 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ d. whilst that in Middlesex paid 5 s. 11 d. See Houghton's Collections on Husbandry and Trade, vol. i. p. 84.

without

without reluctance, to the public treasury, a sum, which by any other means could hardly have been exacted. *National Income since the Revolution.*

These circumstances tend to elucidate, the astonishing increase of the revenue, within the last century. Let us next give some account of its progress since the revolution, and since the establishment of the funding system, by which that Era is so peculiarly distinguished.

W I L L I A M I I I.

The heavy debts and expences that were incurred, during the reign of William III. unavoidably introduced not only a great variety of new taxes, but also considerable additions to those duties that had formerly been laid on. ' It is not proposed, however, to attempt, giving an account of every little minute regulation, that took place during the course of this reign. The curiosity of the reader, it is hoped, will be sufficiently gratified, by stating the most important particulars.

The permanent revenue arose from the customs, the excise, and a variety of miscellaneous duties.

Many branches were added during this reign to the old subsidy of tonnage and poundage. Duties were either imposed, or, after former grants were on the eve of expiring, were renewed, on the following articles; namely, on wines and vinegar; on tobacco; on salt imported; on spices and pictures;

1. Customs.

*National In-
come since the
Revolution.*

on coals exported, or even carried coast-ways; on muslins, whale fins; on French goods, foreign liquors imported; &c. By these means, during this reign, the sum of £. 13,296,833 was raised, of net produce, besides all bounties drawbacks, and the expence of collection.

2. Excise.

Even the revenue of the Excise, though of a nature peculiarly obnoxious to the spirit and principles of the British constitution, made no inconsiderable progress during the reign of William. Excises on salt, on the distillery, and on malt, since known under the name of the malt-tax, were then first introduced. This branch of the revenue yielded during the same period £. 13,649,328.

3. Miscellaneous taxes and receipts.

The principal sources of revenue of a miscellaneous nature, were, the land tax, poll-taxes, the tax on marriages, births, burials, &c. hearth-money, the post-office, and other smaller branches.

Land-tax.

The circumstances of the country, at the accession of William to the throne, were such, that no tax could be depended upon as sufficiently productive, that was not imposed upon land, in the produce of which the wealth and income of England at that time principally consisted. That it might be rendered as efficient as possible, new assessments were taken of the property and income that each individual possessed. But the rate was far from being equal. Those who were attached to the principles established at the revolution, were forward to shew their zeal in favour of the new government, and gave in a fair statement of their real situation; whilst

whilst the secret and avowed friends of the exiled family, the sordid and avaricious, gave in a very different account, estimating their property at the lowest rate at which it could be calculated. Hence the assessments, since known under the name of land-tax, were not in any respect so productive as they ought to have been. The amount of this branch, during the reign of that monarch, was £.19,174,059.

National Income since the Revolution.

Though England, at the revolution, was in a state sufficiently flourishing to bear a considerable load of taxes; yet such were the consequences of an unsettled government, and of the factious spirit prevalent at that time, that the utmost difficulty was found in raising the money necessary for the reduction of Ireland, and for carrying on the war against France. Among the measures adopted for that purpose, recourse was had to poll-taxes; and it may be proper to give, the following state, of the last system of levying a revenue by that mode, that has been attempted in this country.

Quarterly Taxes.

Poll to be paid by all persons, except the poor, in-

cluding such as are not worth £. 50	-	£. 0	1	0
All Persons worth £. 300 reputed gentlemen		1	0	0
Tradesmen, shopkeepers, &c.	-	0	10	0
Persons chargeable with finding a horse for the militia, for each horse	- - -	1	0	0
Persons keeping a coach and horses, who do not contribute a horse to the militia	-	1	0	0
Persons keeping a hackney or stage coach, for each coach	- - - -	1	5	0
Peers of the realm, spiritual or temporal	-	1	0	0
Attorneys, proctors, and other officers of the civil and ecclesiastical courts	- .	1	0	0
				Clergymen,

*National In-
come since the
Revolution.*

Clergymen, preachers, and teachers of any kind,
enjoying £. 80 *per annum* - - - £. 1 0 0

All nonjurors in every case were to pay double.

Though, in so lax and factious a government as that of England, poll-taxes could not be very rigorously levied; yet, at the rates above mentioned, they produce the sum of £. 2,557,649.

It cannot be doubted, that by a strict exaction of the above rates, a much larger sum might have been raised: but the government was afraid to irritate the people, by levying a tax so generally obnoxious, in too harsh a manner.

*Tax on mar-
riages,
births, bu-
rials, ba-
chelors, and
widowers.*

Those taxes have ever been the most approved of, which operate as an useful regulation of police, as well as a source of revenue: and as in a political view, it is of considerable consequence, to know the number of marriages, of births and burials, that happen in a country, (because thence the state of its population may be pretty nearly calculated); and as a tax on bachelors has been accounted an inducement to marriage, or at least a penalty upon celibacy, the reader may be desirous of being informed, of the duties of that nature that were imposed during the reign of William.

BURIAL, BIRTH, and MARRIAGE RATES.

Degrees, Titles, &c.	Burials.				Births.				Marriages.			
	The party's wife or widow.		Eldest son.		Younger children.		Eldest son.		The party.		Elder son.	
A Duke or Archbishop	£. 50	s. 4	d. 0	£. 30	s. 4	d. 0	£. 30	s. 2	d. 0	£. 50	s. 2	d. 6
A Marquis	40	4	0	25	4	0	25	2	0	40	2	6
An Earl	30	4	0	20	4	0	20	2	0	30	2	6
A Viscount	25	4	0	17	4	0	17	12	0	25	2	6
A Baron and Bishop	20	4	0	15	4	0	15	2	0	20	2	6
A Barone: or Knight of the Bath	15	4	0	5	4	0	5	2	0	15	2	6
A Knight, Bachelor, or Dean	10	4	0	5	4	0	5	2	0	10	2	6
The King's Serjeant at Law	20	4	0	1	4	0	1	2	0	20	2	6
Other Serjeants at Law	15	4	0	1	4	0	1	2	0	15	2	6
An Esquire	5	4	0	1	4	0	1	2	0	5	2	6
A Gen'lman	1	4	0	1	4	0	1	2	0	1	2	6
Doctors of Divinity, Law, or Physic	5	4	0	1	4	0	1	2	0	5	2	6
Persons of £. 50 per annum, or £. 600 personal estate	1	4	0	0	14	0	0	12	0	0	12	6
Person: not otherwise charged	0	4	0	0	4	0	0	2	0	0	2	6

National In-
come since the
Revolution.

Each parish was obliged to pay for the burials of the poor, and of their families; but the births or marriages of such persons as received alms, were not liable to pay duty.

The annual taxes imposed on bachelors, above the age of twenty-five years, and upon such widowers as had no children, were as follows:

Degrees, Titles, &c.	The Party himself.			The Eldest Son.			The Younger Son.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
A Duke, &c.	12	11	0	7	11	0	6	5	0
A Marquis	10	1	0	6	6	0	5	1	0
An Earl	7	11	0	5	1	0	3	16	0
A Viscount	6	6	0	4	8	6	3	7	8
A Baron	5	1	0	3	16	0	3	1	0
A Baronet and Knight of the Bath	3	16	0	1	6	0	1	6	0
A Knight Bachelor	2	11	0	1	6	0	0	6	0
The King's Serjeant at Law	5	1	0	0	6	0	0	6	0
Other Serjeants at Law	3	16	0	0	6	0	0	6	0
Esquires	1	6	0	0	6	0	0	6	0
Gentlemen	0	6	0	0	6	0	0	6	0
Doctors of Divinity, Law, or Physic	1	6	0	0	6	0	0	6	0
Persons, of £. 50 per annum or £. 600 per- sonal estate	0	6	0	0	3	6	0	3	6
Persons not otherwise charged	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0

From this tax, all fellows, students, and scholars in the different universities of Great Britain and Ireland, and persons receiving alms, were exempted. This and the preceding tax were originally imposed for five years from the 1st May 1695, but were afterwards prolonged to the 1st August 1706. They produced, during the first five years, £.258,094 or £. 51,618 per annum. During the remaining period, they were exacted in so careless a manner, that

only

only £. 17,422 16 s. 2½ d. was accounted for. Perhaps now, when we are a little more accustomed to taxes, a similar plan might be enforced, and, with little alteration, might be contrived so as to yield at least £. 100,000 *per annum*.

National Income since the Revolution.

The remaining resources which this monarch enjoyed, arose from hearth-money, from the post-office, and from a variety of smaller branches, together with the loans of a permanent nature, which he contrived to borrow, amounting in all to £. 9,745,300 10 s. 9 d. The total sum then received by William during the course of his reign was as follows :

Customs	-	-	£. 13,296,833	14	6
Excise	-	-	13,649,328	0	5½
Land-taxes	-	-	19,174,059	8	3½
Polls	-	-	2,557,642	7	7¼
Tax on marriages, births, &c.	-	-	275,517	18	1
Various articles (including permanent loans)	-	-	9,745,300	10	9
Temporary loans unpaid	-	-	13,348,680	5	10¼
			<hr/>		
			£. 72,047,369	5	6¼

To which there is to be added £. 80,138 18 s. 10¼ d. which remained in the exchequer, and in the hands of the several receivers, on 5th November 1688.

The income of England, *anno* 1701, the year preceding this monarch's death, was as follows :

Customs

<i>National Income since the Revolution.</i>	Customs	-	-	£. 1,539,100
	Excise	-	-	986,004
	Post-office, &c.	-	-	130,399
	Land-tax at 2s. in the pound	-	-	989,965
	Various small taxes	-	-	249,737

				£. 3,895,205
Income at the Revolution				2,001,855

Total additional revenue at the death of William £. 1,893,350

During the course of this reign, it is well known that many taxes, such as the malt-tax, the tax on hawkers and pedlars, on hackney coaches, &c. were introduced. But as they are continued to the present hour, and as some observations will be made on them in a succeeding chapter, it seems unnecessary at present to enter into the subject. It may be proper, however, to mention three modes of taxation which existed at that time, and shortly to state the reasons for which they were given up.

Tax on glass
and earthen
wares.

By an act passed *anno* 1695, certain duties were granted on glass wares, and upon stone and earthen bottles, &c.^d, and a new set of commissioners was appointed for collecting and managing the duty. *Anno* 1696, another act was passed^e, by which the said duties were continued *for ever*, and extended to all sorts of wares or commodities made from earth or stone. It has been asserted, that our neighbours in Holland, who were then our great rivals in those articles, suggested that tax. But an act was afterwards passed, reciting, that the duties imposed were “vexatious and troublesome, and

^d 6 & 7 William III. chap. 18.

^e 7 & 8 William III. chap. 81.

very chargeable in the levying and collecting the same^f ;” and consequently abolishing those duties as destructive to that important manufacture. Only one-half of the duties on glass was repealed by that act. The following year, however, the remaining duties on glass were taken off, as being of small advantage to the crown, lessening the duty on coals, hindering the employment of the poor, and endangering the loss of so beneficial a manufacture to the kingdom^g. The necessities of the public have since occasioned the revival of this obnoxious and impolitic impost.

National Income since the Revolution.

By the great act of tonnage and poundage, passed *anno* 1660, on the restoration of Charles II. taxes were imposed upon the exportation of woollen manufactures, and on all corn, grain, bread, biscuit, and meal, sent out of the kingdom. During the reign of William, the wretched policy of such regulations began to be discovered; and a law was passed *anno* 1700, by which the duties on the woollen manufactures were abolished, because, in the words of the act, “ the wealth and prosperity
“ of the kingdom, doth in a great measure depend
“ on the improvement of its woollen manufactures,
“ and the profitable trade carried on by the exportation thereof^h. ” Nay, so much were the ideas of men altered in regard to matters of commerce and finance, that instead of a duty being imposed upon the exportation of grain, a bounty was given

Abolition of the tax on woollen manufactures, and on corn exported.

^f 9 & 10 William III. chap. 45.

^g 10 & 11 William III. chap. 18.

^h 11 & 12 William III. chap. 20.

when

National Income since the Revolution.

when that article was sent out of the kingdom. The intention of the legislature was, to encourage production, and to animate the farmer to industry and exertion, from the certainty of a market. The propriety of the measure has not a little been controverted, and many plausible arguments have been urged against it; but since the bounty was first granted, it cannot be denied, that grain has been more abundant than in any other era of our history, the price at any rate more equal, and less fluctuating than formerly;—an advantage of the utmost importance, and not too dearly purchased by the money that it has cost.

Tax on the joint stocks of corporations.

A measure was attempted during this reign, which, had the minds of people been accustomed to it, and had it existed at this time, might have proved a most important resource to the nation. By an act passed *anno* 1692¹, a tax of £. 5 *per cent.* was imposed upon every proprietor of India stock, according to the share and proportion thereof in which he was interested; 20 s. upon every share of the joint stock of the royal African company; and £. 5 for every share in the joint stock of the Hudson's Bay company; to be paid quarterly, and deducted from the next dividends payable to the several persons interested therein. The tax was continued only for one year. It produced £. 43,219. But the public creditors, whether incorporated or otherwise, have since taken care to have it specifically provided, that their annuities shall be exempted from all taxes and duties whatsoever.

¹ 4 & 5 William III. chap. 15.

QUEEN ANNE.

National Income since the Revolution.

The greater part of the reign of this princess was passed in carrying on an expensive war against the house of Bourbon; and as the same system that was begun under the administration of William, of borrowing money for the charges of war, and of imposing taxes merely to defray the interest, was persevered in; it was on that account necessary to make a variety of new laws and alterations every year in regard to the revenue, the detail of which would furnish little instruction or amusement to the reader. It is therefore proposed to state in this work only general observations.

The customs during this reign, produced into the exchequer, the sum of £. 15,113,811. The customs.

The revenue of excise yielded during the same period £. 14,254,567. The produce of this branch greatly increased, in consequence of a variety of duties imposed on a number of useful and necessary articles; as candles, leather, soap, paper, starch, printed linens, &c. Excises.

The land-tax, during this reign, was not a little productive, being generally kept up at the rate of 4s. in the pound, and produced in all the sum of £. 21,285,909. Land-tax.

Without entering into the particular produce of the post-office, &c. it may be sufficient to remark, that from Lady-day 1702 to Christmas 1715, the Miscellaneous taxes and receipts.

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National Income since the Revolution.

Loans.

smaller branches of the revenue produced the total sum of £. 5,261,346.

It is difficult, at present, unless the records of the treasury, and of the exchequer, were to be ransacked for that special purpose, to give an exact account of the money borrowed in the course of this reign. It would appear, however, that including the loans on temporary as well as perpetual taxes, the amount may be stated at £. 59,853,154.

The following will then be the amount of the sums received during the reign of Queen Anne:

Customs	-	-	£. 15,113,811
Excise	-	-	20,859,311
Land-tax	-	-	21,285,909
Miscellaneous taxes and receipts			5,261,346
			<hr/>
			£. 62,520,377
Loans	-	-	59,853,154
			<hr/>
		Total	£. 122,373,531

Tax on Income.

This reign was distinguished by an attempt to lay a tax upon income. Resolutions were entered into by the house of commons, that a duty of 50 *per cent.* should be laid upon the value of all stock in trade, 25 *per cent.* upon all money at interest, 4 s. in the pound upon all annuities, pensions, and yearly stipends; 5 s. in the pound upon all salaries, fees, and perquisites of office; and 4 s. in the pound upon persons exercising any profession whatsoever, whether legal, medical, commercial, or ecclesiastical; and that all persons, the poor excepted,

*4

should

should pay within one year the sum of four shillings. It was also voted, that a duty at the rate of one *per cent.* should be imposed upon the shares of the capital stock of all corporations or companies, to be continued for five years^m. But the proposed tax on income was abandoned; and a bill brought in for laying a duty upon buying, selling, or bargaining for shares in joint stocks, or corporations, was also droppedⁿ, the bank and East India Company having petitioned against it, as contrary to the public faith, and the acts by which they were established. Another attempt of the same kind, *anno* 1702, proved equally unsuccessful^o. Thus all idea of an equal pound rate, or a tax in a fair proportion to every man's yearly income, or the profits which he acquired from his estate, business, or profession, was given up.

National Income since the Revolution.

Some endeavours were made during this reign, to examine into the value of lands, and of all grants made by the crown since the 13th of February 1688, with a view of resuming the same, and of applying them to relieve the public necessities, unless they were bestowed after due consideration. A bill for that purpose was passed by the commons, but rejected by the house of lords^p. A resolution of the former, to lay a tax upon all grants from the crown since the 6th February 1684^q, of one-fifth

Resumption of crown grants.

^m Comm. Journals, vol. xiii. p. 741. 743.

ⁿ Ibid. p. 834. 894. 896. ^o Ibid. vol. xiv. p. 34.

^p History of our National Debts, part ii. p. 130.

^q Comm. Journals, vol. xv. p. 78.

National Income since the Revolution.

part of the value of the grant at the time it was made, had been previously evaded; the leading men in both houses being too deeply interested in grants of that nature, to suffer such a bill to pass into a law.

Tax on white woollen broad cloths.

By a statute in the reign of Henry VIII. the exportation of white woollen broad cloths had been totally prohibited. Such a regulation, however, was supposed to be impolitic; and it was thought to be a sufficient encouragement to the dyers of this country, to impose a duty of five shillings *per* piece upon all white woollen broad cloths when exported^r.

Exportation of rock salt to Ireland.

Among the various advantages which Ireland enjoys, from the manner in which the two countries are at present connected, there is none of so singular a nature as the right which it possesses, of having rock salt exported from England duty free; whilst (with a few exceptions) if carried from one port to another in this country, it is liable to a considerable tax. But as so peculiar a privilege was owing to neglect, and not design, it is hoped that it will not be perpetuated. By an act passed *anno* 1710^s, a duty of nine shillings *per* ton was imposed on all rock salt exported to Ireland for thirty-two years, from the 11th June 1711. Why it was not renewed when it came to expire, is not at present known; but justice to the people of Great Britain requires the revival of so equitable a regulation, or the ex-

^r 6 Anne, cap. 9.

^s 9 Anne, cap. 23. sect. 44.

tenſion of the ſame privilege to the reſt of the kingdom.

National Income ſince the Revolution.

The reign of Queen Anne is particularly celebrated for the union which was ſo happily effected between the two kingdoms of England and Scotland. As before that event took place it was neceſſary to make a very minute inquiry into the revenues of both countries, we are thereby enabled to give a very accurate ſtatement of the income of England at that memorable æra, and of the different branches from which it was derived.

Revenue of England at the union.

STATE of the REVENUE of ENGLAND at the UNION.

Civil Liſt Revenue.

The exciſe on beer (2 s. 6 d. per barrel)	-	£. 286,178
Further ſubſidies of tonnage and poundage	-	256,841
Post-office	-	101,101
Fines in the alienation office	-	4,804
Post fines	-	2,276
Wine licences	-	6,314
Sheriffs' proffers	-	1,040
Compoſitions in the exchequer	-	13
Seizures of uncuſtomed and prohibited goods	-	13,005
Revenue of the dutchy of Cornwall	-	9,869
Revenue of the principality of Wales	-	6,857
Rents of crown lands, fines, leaſes, &c.	-	2,906
Total for the civil liſt		£. 691,204

Other TAXES:

Customs appropriated to Auguſt 1710	-	£. 345,704
Impoſitions on wine, vinegar, tobacco, ditto		373,485
Carried over		£. 719,189
Ad-		

*National In-
come since the
Revolution.*

	Brought forward	£. 719,189
Additional impositions	-	39,645
Duties on coals and culm, appropriated to Sept. 1710	113,688	
15 <i>per cent.</i> on muslins, &c. ditto	-	116,475
25 <i>per cent.</i> additional duty on French goods	10,794	
5 <i>s.</i> <i>per ton</i> on French shipping	-	81
Plantation duties	-	877
4½ <i>per cent.</i> on Barbadoes and Leeward islands	6,459	
The coinage duty	-	7,350
Duty on whale fins and Scotch linen	-	10,939
¼ additional tonnage and poundage for 98 years	81,746	
½ additional ditto for 4 years, from 1708	-	160,000
9 <i>d.</i> <i>per barrel</i> excise for 98 years	-	164,828
Another 9 <i>d.</i> <i>per barrel</i> to the bank	-	155,000
Another 9 <i>d.</i> <i>per barrel</i> for 99 years, from 1692	155,000	
Duties on low wines, appropriated to June 1710	25,267	
Rent of hackney coaches	-	2,800
Licences to hawkers and pedlars	-	6,460
Stamp duty, partly to the East India Company, the rest appropriated to 1710	-	89,110
1 <i>s.</i> <i>per bushel</i> on salt, appropriated to 1710	-	54,621
2 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i> <i>per bushel</i> on salt for the East India Company	128,038	
The duty on windows appropriated to 1710	112,069	
3,700 <i>l.</i> <i>per week</i> out of the excise	-	192,400
		<hr/>
		2,352,836
The malt duty (often deficient)	-	650,000
The land tax	-	1,997,763
		<hr/>
		5,000,599
Revenues of the civil list	-	691,204
		<hr/>
	Total	£. 5,691,803
		<hr/>

GEORGE I.

*National In-
come since the
Revolution.*

Little that is material occurs, in regard to the progress of the revenue, during this monarch's reign, which, on the whole, it was a period of great tranquillity. The loans also were comparatively small, amounting only to £. 2,832,093 of which sum £. 141,093 might be charged with propriety to Queen Anne's account, as it was appropriated for the relief of the inhabitants of Nevis and St. Christopher's, who had suffered by an invasion of the French, in the war ended by the peace of Utrecht, and for whose behoof a sum was voted by parliament, for the purpose of encouraging them to resettle in these islands.

The whole sum to be charged to the exchequer of George the First will then be nearly as follows :

The customs	-	-	£. 21,632,985
Excise	-	-	30,421,451
Stamps	-	-	1,675,609
Land Tax	-	-	18,470,022
Incidents	-	-	4,800,000
			<hr/>
			77,000,067
Loans	-	-	2,832,093
			<hr/>
			£. 79,832,160

Some financial events took place about this time, which it may be proper to notice.

*Useful com-
mercial re-
gulations.*

An act was passed, *anno* 1721, abolishing all duties payable by law on the exportation of any goods

National Income since the Revolution.

goods or merchandize of the produce or manufacture of Great Britain, after the 25th March 1722, except on allum, lead, tin, coals, and some other less important articles; and all sorts of drugs and foreign goods used in dying, were permitted to be imported duty free[†]. As a farther encouragement also to the trade and navigation of the country, whale-fins and oil caught in the Greenland seas, or Davis's Straits, by British ships navigated according to law, were exempted from all duties upon importation[‡]. But this encouragement proving insufficient, it was found necessary, in the succeeding reign, to promote so useful a nursery for our seamen, by a bounty.

Tax on papists and nonjurors.

By the annual land-tax bill, the estates of papists and nonjurors are taxed double. But not satisfied with imposing that burden, parliament, *anno* 1722, laid the additional sum of £. 100,000 upon their real and personal property; and to prevent the tax from being evaded, specific sums were assessed upon each county, and upon some of the cities of the kingdom. The tax notwithstanding produced only £. 96,000^{*}.

Establishment of two companies of insurance.

The prodigality of ministers in the management of the civil list revenue, during this reign, was such, that a great debt had been accumulated. In order to procure some assistance for discharging it, without imposing any new aid for that purpose, two companies called the Royal Exchange, and London

[†] 8 Geo. I. cap. 15. sect. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.

[‡] 10 Geo. I. cap. 16.

^{*} 9 Geo. I. cap. 18.

Assurance companies, were established, agreed to pay £. 300,000 for the use of his majesty. The sum, however, was found too great, and was afterwards restricted to £. 150,000 each; “in tender consideration of the great difficulties which the said companies laboured under.”

National Income since the Revolution,

The public revenue at the time of this monarch's death produced, on a medium of four years, as follows:

Customs	-	-	-	£ 1,530,361
Excise, deducting 6 <i>d.</i> per bushel on malt				1,927,354
Stamps	-	-	-	132,665
Duty on houses and windows			-	131,011
Hackney coaches and chairs			-	9,523
Hawkers and pedlars	-		-	8,055
6 <i>d.</i> per pound on places and pensions			-	31,504
First-fruits and tenths		-	-	16,473
Post-office	-	-	-	75,545
Salt duty	-	-	-	185,505
Small branches belonging to the civil list				55,892
Taxes known under the name of the general fund				58,755

Total appropriated revenue - 4,162,643

Land-tax at 4 *s.* - £. 2,000,000

Malt at 6 *d.* per bushel - 750,000

2,750,000

Deduct deficiencies in these taxes

anno 1726

- 150,000 2,600,000

Total £. 6,762,643

National Income since the Revolution.

GEORGE II.

Refined and speculative politicians, who are too apt to imagine that the counsels of princes are uniformly regulated by some particular system; and who hold it necessary to give plausible reasons for every historical event, have endeavoured to account for the immense sums of money levied and expended during the reign of George II. by asserting that the court was fully impressed with an idea, that nothing could curb the turbulent spirit of the English, or prevent another revolution, but engaging them in perpetual wars, and loading them with the heaviest taxes. It is difficult to pry into the secret intentions of sovereigns, especially as their views must often be altered by a change in the ministers they employ, and by a variety of other circumstances of smaller importance. Nor is it to be denied that the discharging the incumbrances of the nation does not seem to have been a very favourite measure with this monarch, or his ministers. But if any political system was invariably adhered to during this reign, the purport of it appears to have been to leave things as they were, and to check any attempt that might be made to innovation, or even inquiry.

The total sum to be accounted for during the reign of George II. is as follows :

Customs	-	-	-	£. 49,838,854
Excise (including annual malt)				93,747,167
				<hr/>
Carried over				£. 143,586,021
				Stamps

	Brought forward	£. 143,586,021	<i>National Income since the Revolution.</i> <hr/>
Stamps	-	4,377,957	
Land-tax	-	49,453,323	
Miscellaneous taxes	-	19,800,000	
		<hr/>	
		217,217,301	
	Loans	59,132,472	
		<hr/>	
	Total	£. 276,349,773	

The abolition of a tax, is so uncommon a circumstance in the modern financial history of this country, that it merits particular attention whenever it has occurred. The duty upon salt had been long complained of as burdensome to the poor, injurious to many of our manufactures, and fatal to the progress of the British fisheries, so essential to our naval strength; and such, it was imagined, was the flourishing state of the revenue at the commencement of this reign, that this duty might be safely dispensed with. Accordingly, by an act passed *anno* 1729^a, both the customs and excise upon salt were abolished from Christmas 1730. But before the measure could operate beneficially to the nation, the abolished duties were revived^b; at first only for three years, though since they have been rendered perpetual. Sir Robert Walpole, who was then chancellor of the exchequer, and who had moved the repeal, was not ashamed of acting the inconsistent part of proposing the revival. His object was to ingratiate himself, by that means, with the landed interest; for it enabled him to re-

^a 3 Geo. II. chap. xx.^b 5 Geo. II. chap. vi.

*National In-
come since the
Revolution.*

duce the land-tax to one shilling in the pound. But it may be asked in the words of an author, who has given us an account of these transactions :
 “ Can we suppose that any man who is a friend to
 “ the fishery, or the naval power of this nation,
 “ will ever vote for continuing so pernicious a
 “ burden ? ”

When the salt-tax was revived, some very useful regulations were proposed, to prevent its proving so very pernicious as it had formerly been. In particular it was suggested, that all salt employed in victualling ships, in manuring land, in dressing and curing leather, and in making glass and glass bottles, should be exempted from duty. But such proposals were rejected : some favour was shewn to the fisheries ; but such is the trouble with which receiving drawbacks and bounties is attended, that nothing but a total abolition of the duty once more, or at least a commutation of it, in so far as respects Scotland, can establish that most essential branch of commerce to the extent to which it might be carried to the great advantage of this nation.

*General ex-
cise.*

The plan proposed by Sir Robert Walpole, known under the name of the General Excise, proves that minister's ability and skill in the revenue department, had he chosen to exercise it. It was a system, which, however ruinous it might be to the smuggler, yet to the fair trader would have proved infinitely beneficial. The public, it is true, would

• History of our National Debts, part iv. p. 50, also p. 38. and 64.

thereby

thereby have lost the temporary use of the money, which by the present laws must be paid whenever goods are imported, and are drawn back upon exportation. But in return it would have enjoyed this advantage, that it could hardly have suffered in the manner it has done, by frauds in the article of drawbacks. As to the plan infringing the liberties of the people, the clamours excited against it on that head were in the highest degree unjust. The laws of the excise have since been extended in a variety of instances, without making the people slaves, as the nation was taught to believe would have been the case had the excise bill passed. Nor is there any hardship in putting the dealer in exciseable commodities under such regulations, as may prevent private individuals from fraudulently enriching themselves at the public expence.

National Income since the Revolution.

It will scarcely be credited by those who maintain the impracticability of levying such additional taxes upon the public, as might have kept down, if not totally extinguished the debts of the nation, that it was not until the year 1747 that a duty was laid upon coaches, belonging to private individuals, not let out to hire. Four pounds was the original tax*, which has since been increased to £. 9 : 12 : 0. Even at that rate, it is not a little unequal : hackney coaches are now taxed at the rate of £. 26 *per ann.* In order that the proprietors, who are licensed, may be enabled to pay that sum, and to acquire sufficient profit to themselves, they are suffered to

Coach-tax.

* 20 Geo. II. chap. 2.

make

*National In-
come since the
Revolution.*

make exorbitant charges on the public. Hence it is evident, that such as are rich enough to keep carriages of their own, pay proportionably an inferior rate to those who are obliged to hire carriages from others.

Anno 1759, the year preceding this monarch's death, the public revenue produced the following sums :

STATE of the PUBLIC REVENUE, *anno* 1759.

Customs	-	-	£. 1,985,376
Excise (including annual malt)	-	-	3,887,349
Stamps	-	-	263,207
Incidents	-	-	650,000
			<hr/>
			6,785,932
Land-tax at 4 s. given for	-	£. 2,000,000	
Deduct the deficiencies as <i>per</i>			
account 1760	-	262,392	
			<hr/>
			1,737,608
			<hr/>
Total			£. 8,523,540
			<hr/>

G E O R G E III.

From 1760 to 1789, though a space of only 28 years, such sums of money were paid into the public treasury, as no former statesman would have believed, that this country could have furnished. Nothing can more clearly demonstrate, the immense wealth and resources of Great Britain ; and had any considerable portion of that money, instead of being
wasted

waisted in war, been laid out in cultivating the arts of peace, the nation would perhaps have grown too rich and powerful; and indeed might have already reached, that splendid state of seeming prosperity, which is too apt to intoxicate a nation, which is often accompanied with real weakness and debility, and has not unfrequently proved, the bitter source of calamity and destruction.

National Income since the Revolution.

As it is proposed to give, in the third chapter of this part of the work, a view of the present state of our revenue, and the particulars of which it consists, it will be sufficient, at this time, to furnish the reader with an account of the money raised by taxes, from Michaelmas 1760, (about which time our present sovereign mounted the throne), to Michaelmas 1788.

The particulars of the revenue from 1788, to the present time, will be given in a subsequent part of this publication.

PROGRESS of the REVENUE from Michaelmas 1760 to Michaelmas 1788 :

Anno 1761	}	-	-	£. 8,800,000
1762		-	-	8,950,000
1763	}	Land-tax at 4s.	-	9,100,000
1764			-	9,250,000
1765		-	-	9,300,000
1766	}	-	-	9,350,000
Carried over				£. 54,750,000
				Anno

National Income since the Revolution.

		Brought forward	£. 54,750,000
Anno	1767	-	9,200,000
	1768	-	9,250,000
	1769	-	9,350,000
	1770	-	9,500,000
	1771	Land-tax at 3 s.	9,650,000
	1772	-	9,850,000
	1773	-	10,066,661
	1774	-	10,285,673
	1775	-	10,038,061
	1776	-	10,265,405
	1777	-	10,604,013
	1778	-	10,732,405
	1779	-	11,192,141
	1780	-	12,255,214
	1781	-	12,454,936
	1782	Land-tax at 4 s.	12,593,297
	1783	-	11,962,718
	1784	-	12,905,519
	1785	-	14,871,520
	1786	-	15,096,112
	1787	-	15,360,857
	1788	-	15,572,971
Total			£. 307,807,503

The loans during this reign have been equally distinguished by the magnitude of their amount. The different periods at which they took place, and the sum borrowed or funded by each act, will appear from the following statement :

		Sums borrowed or funded.
By	1 Geo. III. cap. 7.	- £. 12,000,000
	1 Geo. III. cap. 20.	- 1,500,000
	2 Geo. III. cap. 10.	- 12,000,000
	3 Geo. III. cap. 9.	- 3,483,553
Carried over		£. 28,983,553

		Sums borrowed or funded.	National Income since the Revolution.
	Brought forward	£. 28,983,553	
By 3 Geo. III. cap. 12.	-	3,500,000	
4 Geo. III. cap. 25.	-	1,000,000	
5 Geo. III. cap. 23.	-	1,500,000	
6 Geo. III. cap. 39.	-	1,500,000	
7 Geo. III. cap. 24.	-	1,500,000	
8 Geo. III. cap. 31.	-	1,900,000	
16 Geo. III. cap. 34.	-	2,000,000	
17 Geo. III. cap. 46.	-	5,500,000	
18 Geo. III. cap. 22.	-	6,000,000	
19 Geo. III. cap. 18.	-	7,000,000	
20 Geo. III. cap. 16.	-	12,000,000	
21 Geo. III. cap. 14.	-	12,000,000	
22 Geo. III. cap. 8.	-	13,500,000	
23 Geo. III. cap. 35.	-	12,000,000	
24 Geo. III. cap. 10.	-	6,000,000	
24 Geo. III. cap. 39.	-	6,879,341	
25 Geo. III. cap. 33. and 71.	-	10,990,651	
		<hr/>	
		£. 133,753,545	

To which there is to be added :

1. From the Bank of England, by 4 Geo. III. cap. 25. - - - £. 110,000
 2. Various sums received from the East India Company for the territorial revenues and otherwise, not included in customs paid to the exchequer - - - 3,200,000
 3. Difference between the unfunded debt and other necessary expences or claims, as that debt stood *annos* 1760 and 1788 ^d - - - 5,170,273
-
- Total £. 142,233,818

^d The difference between the unfunded debt, *anno* 1760, and *anno* 1788, is calculated as follows :

National Income since the Revolution.

Hence it will appear, that the sum paid into the exchequer of George the Third, free of all charges, and without including the casual profits of a lottery, and other resources that might be mentioned, in the space only of 28 years, is as follows :

1. By taxes	-	-	£. 307,807,503
2. By loans, &c.	-	-	142,233,818
			<hr/>
			£. 450,041,321

Which is at the rate of £. 16,071,475 *per annum*.

The history of our revenue, since Michaelmas 1788, will be the subject of future discussion.

It may now be proper to give an account, of the progress of the public revenue, and an abstract of the total supply, from the 5th November 1688, to

UNFUNDED DEBT *anno* 1788.

Exchequer bills	-	-	£. 5,500,000
Navy debt on 5th January 1789	-	-	2,251,079
American loyalists, extraordinaries of the army and navy, deficiencies of land and malt, and various other claims and expences not yet liquidated, supposed in all to amount to			<hr/> 3,000,000
			£. 10,751,079

UNFUNDED DEBT *anno* 1760.

Navy Debt 13th September 1760	-	£. 3,490,806
Debt of the Ordnance (Supposed)	-	590,000
Exchequer bills	-	<hr/> 1,500,000
		5,580,806
		<hr/>
Difference		£. 5,170,273

to Michaelmas 1788, drawn up from the preceding statements.

*National In-
come since the
Revolution.*

PROGRESS of the PUBLIC REVENUE
from the Revolution, to Michaelmas 1788.

Income of James II.	-	£. 2,001,855
Increase during the reign of King William		1,893,350
		<hr/>
Income of King William.		£. 3,895,205
Increase during the reign of Queen Anne		1,796,598
		<hr/>
Income of England at the Union		£. 5,691,803
Increase during the reign of George I.		1,070,840
		<hr/>
Income of George I.	-	£. 6,672,643
Increase during the reign of George II.		1,759,897
		<hr/>
Income of George II.	-	£. 8,522,540
Increase during the first 28 years of the reign of George III.	-	7,050,431
		<hr/>
State of the public revenue at Michael- mas 1788	-	£. 15,572,971
		<hr/>

ABSTRACT of SUPPLIES since the Revolu-
tion, to Michaelmas 1788.

Supplies during the reign of King William	£. 72,047,369
Queen Anne	122,373,531
George I. -	79,832,160
George II. -	276,349,773
George III. from his accession to Mi- chaelmas 1788 -	450,041,321
Grand total	£. 1,000,644,154

National Income since the Revolution.

Having thus accumulated, with as much accuracy as circumstances would admit of, the various sums which have passed into the exchequer of this country for the space of about a century, I shall now proceed to explain, in what manner this nation has contrived, in the comparatively short period of one hundred years, to expend above a thousand millions of English money, equal to about 24,000,000,000 of French livres.

C H A P. II.

Of the Progress of the Public Expences since the Revolution.

Public Expences since the Revolution.

IN private life, when an individual finds himself involved in pecuniary distresses, from the expences he has incurred, either by carelessness or imprudence, the only mode of retrieving his affairs is, to examine into his past expenditure, to see what part of his income was properly laid out, and in what articles a saving may be practicable. After such an investigation, it will be much less difficult, to form a plan, suitable to his circumstances in life, and consistent with his real situation.

The same system, is the only mode, by which the embarrassed state of public affairs can be remedied; by which ministers can be taught wisdom; and nations, too prone to rush headlong into wars and other heedless expences, may learn to imbibe the

the principles of moderation and peace. Wars sometimes are unavoidable; for no state ought tamely to bear repeated insults, or suffer a proud and arrogant neighbour to lord over it. If a nation seems afraid of war, it only exposes itself to the incroachments of others, who, if successful in one unjust demand, are thereby encouraged in attempting to make further claims. Too pacific a system, therefore, whilst other states have either ambition or avarice in their councils, must ever be dangerous. But the great lesson, which it is hoped the present investigation will impress on the mind of every British citizen, is this, that however wars may tend to aggrandize the names, or to augment the fortunes of a few particular individuals; and though it may be sometimes necessary to check the ambitious designs of other powers; yet that no country can ever expect to be indemnified, by the conquests it may acquire, for the money which must necessarily be expended, in the course of long and extensive hostilities, in addition to all the bloodshed and calamities incident to such scenes.

But war is not the only idle expence into which modern nations, and Great Britain in particular, have fallen. Even in time of peace, wanton and unnecessary charges are too often incurred. Not satisfied with endeavouring to acquire extensive territories by force of arms, a rage for acquisition, by the mode of colonization, has become prevalent; and a nation flatters itself, to increase its riches, population, and industry, by sending a part

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

of its subjects to cultivate and improve distant regions, instead of improving and cultivating at home. The revolt of our late colonies in America, and a statement of the expence occasioned by their establishment, will probably prevent such ridiculous projects for the future.

In a former chapter, an account was given, of the particular sums raised during each reign, since the revolution, and of the total sums paid into the exchequer since that memorable era. It is now proposed, to give a general view of the manner in which that money was expended.—

By entering into minute inquiries, this work might easily be extended; but it would only have the effect of rendering it less amusing, and more obscure and unintelligible.

WILLIAM III.

In the preceding chapter, it was stated, that the money received by the exchequer during this reign, amounted to £. 72,047,369. The manner in which this sum was expended is now to be explained.

x. Civil list.

No specific sum was allotted, at this period, for the peculiar expences of the sovereign. Certain taxes, however, were appropriated for that purpose, amounting at an average to about £. 680,000 *per annum*; and the accompt that was made up of the charges of the civil list, during this reign, was as follows:

STATE of the EXPENCES of the Civil List, *Public Expences since the Revolution.*
 from 5th November 1688 to 25th March 1702 :

To the cofferer of the household	£. 1,300,130	2	2½
To the treasurer of the chambers	484,763	16	1½
To the treasurer of the chambers for the charges of the late queen's coffin, &c.	328	16	0
To the great wardrobe	319,876	8	2½
To the treasurer of the chambers for the late queen's mourning	42,844	4	5
To the robes	57,128	2	3½
Ditto to the Lord Sydney upon account of clothes furnished King Charles II. when he was master of that office	5,120	1	3
To the paymaster of the works	474,050	15	1½
To do. on account of the late queen's funeral	4,000	0	0
To Mr. Roberts, paymaster of the works at Windsor, on account of works there, over and above what has been paid thereunto out of the revenues and honour of the castle of Windsor	5,000	0	0
Gardens.—Upon account of making his majesty's gardens, over and above the gardeners' salaries payable by the treasurer of the chambers, until 1695	115,097	12	7½
On the contract for £. 4,800 <i>per annum</i> , commencing from 1695	16,800	0	0
On the new allowance of £. 2,600 <i>per annum</i> , which commenced from Christmas 1700	1,900	0	0
Stables.—For buying horses, for liveries, and extraordinaries	235,965	15	3½
Foreign ministers, for ordinaries and extraordinaries	462,753	7	2½
Fees and salaries	858,056	16	9
Carried over	£. 3,383,815	17	5½

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

Brought forward		£. 3,383,815	17	5½
Pensions and annuities	-	686,189	17	7
Queen-dowager	-	178,031	15	4
Late queen's treasurer	-	506,356	16	1½
Ditto for French protestants	-	75,000	0	0
Prince and princess of Denmark	-	638,921	15	7½
Duke of Gloucester on £. 1,500 <i>per annum</i>	-	37,500	0	0
Band of gentlemen pensioners	-	69,000	0	0
Secret services.—Secretaries of the treasury	-	616,323	7	2
Secretaries of state	-	76,963	19	6
To particular persons by his majesty's warrants under his royal sign-manual	-	82,100	0	0
Privy purse	-	483,555	0	0
Ditto for purchas- } To the Earl of Portland ing fee-farm rents. } The Lord Somers at Jewels	-	24,571	5	4
Plate	-	33,600	0	0
Bounties paid at the exchequer to several persons by his majesty's particular war- rants in that behalf	-	66,069	0	0
Monfieur Fleury for goods taken from the French at Bourbon-fort, Hudson's Bay, and given to the Hudson's Bay Company, which, by the treaty of Ryfwick, were to be restored	-	102,843	13	8
Subscribers of £. 2,000,000 for the East India trade, an allowance of £. 1 <i>per cent.</i>	-	226,823	19	1
The receivers of £. 2,000,000 in reward, and for charges in passing their accounts	-	7,086	17	0
To Mr. Stratford in part of £. 20,000 for cloth sent to Sweden	-	20,000	0	0
Earl of Ranelagh for Lord Fairfax £. 600; bounties for officers widows £. 1,670; for French officers £. 730; for liveries for Lumley's trumpeters £. 393 : 3 : 0; and for court drums and fifes salary £. 240	-	16,000	0	0
	-	12,000	0	0
	-	3,634	3	0
Carried over	£. 8,346,417	0	1½	

Brought forward		£. 8,346,417	0	1½	Public Ex-
Contingents of divers natures; viz. law					pences since
charges; liberates of the exchequer;					the Revolu-
riding charges to messengers of the court;					tion.
and receipt of exchequer rewards and ex-					
traordinary charges to receivers of taxes,					
and to several others on sundry occasions;					
surpluses of accounts, printers' bills; sun-					
dry works and repairs by the surveyors of					
the woods, the private roads, and other					
particular officers; his majesty's subscrip-					
tion of £ 10,000 to the bank of Enland;					
a like sum to the new East India Com-					
pany; as also £. 3,000 for carrying on					
the trade; bounties for apprehending					
highwaymen, traitors, and libellers; mo-					
ney paid for purchasing land to be laid					
into his majesty's park at Windsor; and					
many other accidental payments		-	534,089	1 10½	
Total		£. 8,880,506	2	9¾	

There is no reign, in which complaints were made, and to all appearance with so much justice, of neglect and inattention to the navy, as when William III. sat upon the throne. That monarch

• Another mode of stating this account is as follows:

Charges of the civil list from 5th November 1688

to Michaelmas 1689	£. 428,918	to Michaelmas 1696	£. 699,485
1690	644,145	1697	745,496
1691	657,092	1698	374,777
1692	631,988	1699	892,669
1693	696,968	1700	683,947
1694	682,436	1701	704,412
1695	764,739	to Lady-day 1702	293,919
Total		£. 8,876,995	

was

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

was a soldier and not a sailor, which partly accounts, for his having placed the direction of the naval department, in improper and unskilful hands. The engagement off Beachy-head, which happened soon after the revolution, is the only conflict, in the course of many years past, that has in the least tarnished the lustre of the British flag. The loss sustained on that occasion, is justly attributed, to a very great inequality of force between the two fleets, which was partly owing to the negligence of the English and Dutch admiralities, and partly to the superior activity of the French, by whom 30 sail were blocked up in Plymouth harbour, and prevented from joining the combined fleet until after the engagement. The issue was, that 78 sail defeated 56 ; and thus, the only victory that a French admiral could ever boast of over a British fleet, was gained without much real honour or eclat. Nay, such was the negligence of our naval rulers to the commerce of the kingdom, that when the French fleet was unable to venture out of its ports, the privateers of France, were suffered to range uncontrolled, preying upon our merchantmen, and enriching themselves with plunder, to the value of many millions sterling*.

As the following sums were appropriated by parliament for the naval department, its failure of success, could not well be attributed to any deficiency of resources. The total sum issued for naval services was £. 19,822,141.

* It is calculated, that in three years, prizes to the value of nine millions were taken by the privateers of France.

The

The naval peace establishment, for the year 1698 amounted to £. 877,455. At the same rate, the navy would have cost, during this reign, about £. 10,200,000. The difference, being £. 9,622,141, may be stated as the extra naval expences during King William's wars: Public Expences since the Revolution.

The military expences, exclusive of those for Army. Ireland, came to £. 18,166,051; and as nothing was allowed by parliament for the maintenance of guards and garrisons in time of peace, except £. 300,000 a-year, that sum during William's reign, would have amounted only to £. 3,600,000; consequently the military charges of the war came to £. 14,566,051.

So low was the establishment of the ordnance in time of peace, that *anno* 1698, only £. 50,000, and *anno* 1699, but £. 25,000 was voted for that service: £. 50,000 however may be called the peace establishment for supplying both the navy and army with military stores. During the reign of William, this would amount to £. 600,000. But as the ordnance received in all £. 3,008,535, the war, it is evident, must have produced an extra expence of £. 2,408,535. Ordnance.

The armament fitted out by the Dutch, for bringing William over into this country, occasioned a considerable expence to the United Provinces, which England thought itself bound in gratitude to repay. For that purpose £. 600,000 was voted by parliament. This probably was fully equal to the Expences of the revolution.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

*Expences for
the reduc-
tion of Ire-
land.*

the real charges of the expedition, though the bill of costs given in, came to £. 686,500.

It is hardly necessary to inform the reader, that the establishment of William's sovereignty over Ireland, met with a formidable resistance in that kingdom; and it is a circumstance of which it may not be improper to remind our brethren in Ireland, at this time, that for the purpose of establishing the revolution there, the following sums were issued from the exchequer of this country, namely:

To Mr. Harbord	-	£. 1,073,288	12	7½
Mr. Henley	-	4,560	0	7½
Mr. Fox and Lord Conningsby	-	2,773,806	7	9½
		<hr/>		
		£. 3,851,655	1	0½

Besides naval expences, which were far from being inconsiderable.

*The recoin-
age.*

The miserable state of the coin, and the charges necessary to bring it to its proper standard, were some of the greatest difficulties, that William and his ministers had to struggle with. The following sums were expended for that purpose:

To the mint out of the coinage duty	£. 259,584	0	0
Deficiency on the recoinage (of which how- ever £. 184,656 was repaid)	-	2,599,797	14 10
New money in part of £. 1,122,584 old mo- ney recoinced, paid the navy and army	84,963	0	0
To the commissioners of excise in new money	56,988	0	0
Exchequer bills delivered for money <i>annæ</i> 1695	-	158,589	0 0
		<hr/>	
Carried over	£. 3,159,921	14	10
			To

	Brought over	£. 3,159,921 14 10	<i>Public Ex- pences since the Revo- lution.</i>
To the treasurer of the navy, being old money new coined	-	4,422 0 0	
To the paymaster of the forces for £. 13,000 in old hammered money	-	6,497 0 0	
		<hr/>	
		£. 3,170,840 14 10	

In payment either of the capital, or of the interest of the various debts which the public at that time owed, the following sums were issued :

*Interest of
the public
debts, and
repayment
of the prin-
cipal.*

Interest to several of the public creditors for temporary loans	-	£. 5,216,530
Interest to the bank of England	-	875,880
Annuities on the million act	-	1,079,809
Annuities on the tonnage act	-	287,059
Annuities for 16 years	-	1,049,776
To the malt lottery office, part of £. 1,200,000 principal and interest	-	760,142
To satisfy tallies on the excise and post-office	-	467,000
Interest to the East India Company	-	429,960
Expence of circulating exchequer bills	-	254,119
Money advanced to King William <i>anno</i> 1688	-	4,000
Principal money lent in the time of James II.	-	138,412
Debts due to the servants of King Charles II.	-	60,000
Interest of the bankers debt	-	466
		<hr/>
		£. 10,619,555
Principal money repaid more than borrowed for several years	-	3,341,903
		<hr/>
		£. 13,961,458

The remaining expences during this reign were
as follows :

*Miscella-
neous ex-
pences.*

• Redemption

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

Redemption of captives	£. 1,000
Privy purse of the late King James at the exchequer	200
To receivers of taxes in rewards for extraordinaries	5,466
To Patrick Hume, gentleman, to be paid as his majesty should direct	5,200
To rewards for bringing in plate to be coined	3,846
To the treasurer of Greenwich hospital	19,500
To the commissioners for forfeited estates in Ireland	3,133
To the commissioners for stating the public accounts	3,500
	<hr/>
	£. 41,845

It now only remains, in order to give a distinct view of the state of the public expenditure during this reign, to furnish the reader with an abstract, first, of the total sum expended; secondly, of the peace establishment; and thirdly, of the charges of the war that was terminated by the treaty of Ryswick.

GENERAL VIEW of the EXPENCES of King William's reign.

The civil list	£. 8,880,506
The navy	19,822,141
The army	18,166,051
The ordnance	3,008,535
The Dutch expences for the revolution	600,000
Expences for the reduction of Ireland	3,851,655
Charges of recoinage	3,170,840
Principal and interest of public debts	13,961,458
Miscellaneous expences	41,845
Balance of account ending at Ladyday 1702, and various small sums	624,477
	<hr/>
Total	£. 72,127,508*

* Instead of £. 72,047,369 as stated in p. 38, the total supplies in King William's reign amounted to £. 72,127,508 including £. 80,238 18s. 0½d. which remained in the exchequer on 5th November 1688. See p. 13.

STATE of the PEACE ESTABLISHMENT.

Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.

The civil list	-	-	£. 680,000	-----
The navy	-	-	877,455	
The army	-	-	300,000	
The ordnance	-	-	50,000	-----
			£. 1,907,455	

The charge of the war which William carried on against Lewis XIV. amounted to the following sums :

Extra expences of the navy	-	-	£. 9,622,141
Ditto of the army	-	-	14,566,051
Ditto of the ordnance	-	-	2,408,535

			26,596,727
Expences for the reduction of Ireland			3,851,655

			£. 30,447,382

Thus it appears, that the extraordinary expences of the war, which lasted nearly ten years, amounted only to about thirty millions; and consequently did not much exceed three millions *per annum*.

But this expence, which was then considered to be not a little burdensome, was far from being entirely thrown away. The war, it is true, was neither successful, nor, (the battle off La Hogue excepted), attended with any brilliant consequences. Yet still it shook the power of Louis, who affected to domineer over Europe, and rendered it easier, in the following reign, to control, and

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

and to reduce within proper bounds, the proud and aspiring monarchy he governed: and it must likewise be considered, that this war was essentially necessary, to protect, to extend, and to confirm the liberties of Britain, which were in danger of falling a sacrifice, to religious bigotry, and civil despotism.

QUEEN ANNE.

It has often been remarked, notwithstanding all the plausible objections which have been urged against the government of women, that no two periods in the history of this country, shine with more distinguished lustre, than those of Elizabeth and Anne. During the reign of the former, this island had the glory of humbling the too powerful monarchy of Spain; and, during the government of the latter, of checking the growth of the imperious house of Bourbon: and had not Anne been unfortunately prevailed upon to change her ministers, and to dismiss the invincible Marlborough from the command of her troops, it is more than probable, that Europe would have had as little reason to dread the future enterprises of France, as of Spain. Nor would the latter have been the only example in modern Europe, of an extensive monarchy reduced within proper limits, after vainly attempting to tyrannise over its neighbours.

But though the reigns of the two queens resemble each other in success, yet with regard to the charges

charges by which that success was acquired there is no similitude. The moderate expences of Queen Elizabeth have been already stated, in a former part of this work; and it is now proposed, to give some account of those, which took place, whilst Anne sat upon the throne.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revo-
lution.*

The sums received under the head of civil list revenues, amounted to £. 7,604,848, which, at a medium, was about £. 586,900 *per annum*. But there was also voted, on 27th June 1712, the sum of £. 500,000, to discharge the debts due on account of the civil government.

The general estimate, of the whole expence of the civil government, during this reign, was as follows:

In the cofferer's office	-	-	£. 85,000
In the treasurer of the chamber's office	-	-	30,000
In the great wardrobe	-	-	20,000
In the office of the robes	-	-	3,000
In the office of the works	-	-	39,000
For buying coaches, horses, liveries, &c.	-	-	10,000
For ordinary entertainments, &c. and the extraordi- naries of the queen's foreign ministers	-	-	75,000
Salaries payable to the exchequer	.	.	80,196
Pensions and annuities	-	-	42,898
Annual pensions and bounties per warrants	-	-	87,495
Secret services to the secretaries of state	-	-	6,000
Her majesty's secret services	-	-	27,000
Privy purse	-	-	30,000
Jewels, plate, and presents to foreign ministers			15,000
Contingencies	-	-	33,846
Total			£. 584,435 ^f

^f Commons Journals, vol. xviii. p. 84. In the same journal there are particular accounts, of the different pensions and annuities that were granted during this reign.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revo-
lution.*

The navy.

The civil list revenues amounted to about £.700,000 a-year; but the queen devoted £.100,000 *per annum*, to the public service, for carrying on the war; and at her death, the debts of the civil list came only to £.345,912, whereas she left funds belonging to her own revenues, amounting to £.379,448^s.

How glorious soever victories and conquests at land may be accounted, yet, to an island, great territorial acquisitions can never be of essential importance; whereas achievements at sea, when properly improved, may be peculiarly useful. In that respect, the reign of Queen Anne was not a little deficient. The chief, nay almost the only exertions of the allies, seem to have been dedicated to armaments at land; and any ideas of destroying the commerce and maritime strength of the enemy, were unfortunately unattended to, or abandoned.

The naval charges, at the same time, during this reign, were not inconsiderable, amounting to £.23,484,574.

The peace establishment, for the year 1714, came to £.765,700. At that rate, the naval estimates, during Queen Anne's reign, would have amounted to £.9,571,250; and consequently, the war cost,

^s Commons Journals, p. 113. It is said, in a memorial at the bottom of this account, that £.150,000 was due to the French Protestants; and £.42,000 was claimed for work carried on at Blenheim; but even with these additional demands, the receipts and issues were very nearly equivalent to each other.

in addition to the ordinary establishment, the sum of £.13,913,323. *Public Expences since the Revolution.*

The above sum was far from being contemptible. But nothing can ever render a nation successful at sea, unless its maritime force is not only a great, but the principal object of its attention. Naval strength embraces so many objects, that it suffers by the smallest neglect. If there is any failure in collecting the stores necessary for building ships of war; if the shipwrights are not properly looked to; if the provisions necessary for the sustenance of the sailors are not calculated for that purpose; if every care is not taken, to have the fleet manned by bold and able seamen; if its officers are not valiant and skilful in their profession, and promoted according as they deserve; if discipline is not maintained; and if the fleet is not directed to practicable objects; but instead thereof, if its strength is wasted in conflicting with the elements, and not with the enemy, it is in vain that money is given. Parliament may vote its millions, but to no purpose: a failure in any one of those articles, is sufficient to blast every hope of victory, and of that success which might otherwise have been expected.

Many have affected to doubt, the capacity of the natives of this country, for military achievements. Their valour, it is true, is universally acknowledged: but the sea, it is said, is their natural element; their experience in military operations is too confined, and without practice, no consummate general can be formed. We must not, we are told, go so far back as the reigns of the Henrys and the Edwards,

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

Edwards, because the art of war was then in its infancy, and their victories may be attributed, to mere brutal force, and not to the superiority of their military talents. Fortunately we can produce, in the person of the Duke of Marlborough, an example of a British subject, equal to the greatest warriors of antiquity, or of modern times, in genius and valour; a hero, who never besieged a town that he did not gain, or fought a battle in which he did not conquer. It was not, however, at a moderate expence that his conquests were acquired, for the military services, during Queen Anne's reign, came to £. 32,975,331.

The peace establishment, voted *anno* 1713, was only 8,232 men, and two companies of invalids, amounting to £. 386,427; and the forces in the plantations, exclusive of Gibraltar and Minorca, cost only £. 39,478, making in all but £. 425,905 *per annum*, which, in the space of twelve years, is £. 5,140,860. Deducting this sum from the total of the military charges, (those from Lady-day to Michaelmas 1702 only excepted), there would remain £. 27,104,691 for the extra expences of the war.

Half pay.

It was during this reign, that the charges of the half-pay list, both naval and military, and of Chelsea and Greenwich hospitals, began to be exorbitant. The original reason assigned for granting half-pay to the land officers, was because a greater arrear of pay was due to them, which could not immediately be provided for. It was also contended, that many officers had thrown themselves entirely out of other business, and had spent a great

part of the prime of their lives in the service of their country. But *anno* 1713, when £. 17,000 was voted for half-pay to naval officers, it was restricted to those who had served *well* during the war, and should be out of employment, both by sea and land, in time of peace^b.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

27th May.

Perhaps there could not, in a political light, be a better regulation. Every officer who claimed half-pay for his services in war, ought to prove, in the words of the above-mentioned vote of the house of commons, *that he has served his country well*. The very apprehension and terror of such an enquiry, might be productive of the best of consequences; and the disgrace of not being thought entitled to the bounty of the public, might occasion the greatest exertions. Some difference ought also to be made, between those who have served long, and who have been but a short space of time in the army: for it is to be considered, that the half-pay of the army and navy, is at present considerably more than the whole peace establishment of the army in the reign of William III. Nor is it a circumstance unworthy of attention, that, *anno* 1717, the demand for half-pay to land officers, amounted to £. 120,000, but upon a thorough enquiry into the matter, it was reduced to £. 80,000.

The whole expence of the ordnance, came to £. 2,100,676. The peace establishment may be

Ordnance.

^b See Abstract of all the public Debts remaining due at Michaelmas 1722; by Archibald Hutchinson, Esq. p. 25. Also Commons Journals, vol. xvii. p. 186 and 382.

Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.

stated at £. 58,000 *per annum*, or, in twelve years, £. 696,000, consequently the extra expence of the ordnance amounted to £. 1,404,676.

Transport
service.

The expence of conveying the troops, which at this time made a separate article, amounted in all to £. 796,220.

Sufferers of
Nevis and
St. Christo-
pher's.

Among the expences incurred in consequence of Queen Anne's wars, may be included the sum of £. 141,093 voted to the inhabitants of Nevis and St. Christopher's, who had suffered by a French invasion. Such, however, as did not resettle their plantations, were not entitled to any share of the bounty, and the debt was not fully liquidated till the reign of George I.

Building
churches.

During this reign £. 480,000 was granted for repairing Westminster abbey, and building new churches in the capital; and £. 2,500 was voted to be remitted to Rotterdam, for a similar purpose.

Equivalent
to Scotland.

The adjusting the treaty of union between England and Scotland, was attended with this peculiar difficulty, that the taxes of Scotland were small, and its public debts were very inconsiderable. Whereas England was subject to heavy taxes, and its incumbrances were at that time accounted enormous. To remove so fatal an obstacle, it was agreed upon between the commissioners appointed by both nations, that all distinctions between their debts and taxes should be abolished, and that Scotland should receive an equivalent, amounting to £. 398,085 10 s. for the burdens to which it was thus subjected. And to indemnify the city of
Carlisle,

Carlisle, and the Musgrave family, whose tolls were taken away by the sixth article of the treaty, the sum of £. 7,641 was granted by parliament.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

The coinage expences during this reign, were in some degree increased, in consequence of that article of the union, by which it was declared, that the specie of the two kingdoms should be the same in future. This branch of the public expenditure amounted in all to £. 81,934, of which about £. 4,130 was laid out in the mint of Scotland¹.

Recoinage.

No idea was then entertained, of the heavy charges with which our colonial settlements would be attended. Indeed, so far as can now be traced, £. 37,100 is the whole that can properly be stated to the account of their civil establishments. Nor were the expences they occasioned, of a military nature, in any respect so considerable as they have since proved.

*Colonial ex-
pences.*

A singular article appears in the accounts of this reign, of £. 20,095 11 s. 7 d. paid to Francis Stratford, Esq. *for making good treaties with Sweden.* The words may be interpreted in different ways; but their meaning probably is, that the sum was paid, for the purpose of fulfilling or making good, the engagements we had come into with that power, and not as a reward for having made a good or a beneficial treaty.

*Treaty with
Sweden.*

Some charges of a miscellaneous nature were also incurred: £. 5,579 was paid to compensate losses sustained by tumultuous and rebellious pro-

*Miscella-
neous ex-
pences.*

¹ Commons Journal, vol. xvii. p. 8.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

*Repayment
of loans and
interest of
the national
debt.*

ceedings; £. 64,629 was granted to commissioners for examining the public accounts, and for stating the equivalent due to Scotland, &c. The whole might possibly amount to about £. 200,000.

It could furnish no useful information at this time, to enter into any minute discussion, of the various temporary loans which took place during this reign, or any account of the interest paid on the public debts of a more permanent nature, which varied almost every year. It may be sufficient to observe, that this important article of expenditure amounted in all to £. 52,184,527, of which about £. 31,661,176, was laid out in repaying money borrowed upon the land and malt taxes, and other temporary securities; and the remainder, to wit, £. 22,523,351 was for interest paid to the bank, and other permanent creditors.

The total expences during this reign were then as follows :

The civil list	-	-	£. 7,604,848
The navy	-	-	23,484,574
The army	-	-	32,975,331
The ordnance	-	-	2,100,676
Transport service	-	-	796,220
Building churches, &c.	-	-	482,500
Equivalent to Scotland	-	-	398,085
Recompence for tolls	-	-	7,641
Coinage expences	-	-	81,934
Expence of governments in the West Indies	-	-	37,100
Money sent to Sweden	-	-	20,095
Various miscellaneous services	-	-	200,000
Carried over			£. 68,189,004

	Brought over	£. 68,189,004	Public Ex- pences since the Revolu- tion.
Temporary loans repaid	-	31,661,176	
Interest of the permanent debts of the nation	-	22,523,351	
		<hr/> £. 122,373,531	

The peace establishment may be thus stated:

The civil list	-	£. 700,000
The navy	-	765,700
The army	-	425,905
The ordnance	-	58,000
Miscellaneous services	-	16,000
		<hr/> £. 1,965,605

The expences of the war, terminated anno 1712, amounted to the following sums:

Extra expences of the navy	-	£. 13,913,323
Ditto of the army	-	27,104,691
Ditto of the ordnance	-	1,404,676
Ditto of the transport service	-	796,220
Sufferers of Nevis and St. Christopher's	-	141,093
		<hr/>
Total		£. 43,360,003 ^k

As the war lasted for ten years, this amounts to £. 4,336,000 *per annum*.

* Two states of the expence of this war have been published, both of which make it more considerable. The commissioners of the public accounts appointed by the tory administration, who came into power about the close of Queen Anne's reign, calculate the whole expence at £. 65,853,799, and only deduct £. 12,930,461 for the peace establishment; and consequently estimate the expence at £. 52,923,338. See Chandler's Debates (Commons), vol. v. p. 100. Even the whigs, in the view they printed *anno 1712* of the taxes, funds, and public revenues of England, state the expence of the war at £. 48,513,773. But then they calculate the army at £. 350,000, and the pay at £. 120,000 *per annum*, which is by far too low an establishment.

Great

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

Great as the sum may appear, it was not entirely wasted. It was an expence hardly to be avoided; for, after Louis XIV. had thought proper to interfere in the internal government of this country, by acknowledging a prince for its sovereign, whom both the parliament and people of Great Britain had renounced, it was impossible not to declare war against him. Besides, the nation received some recompence for the charges it was put to. It enjoyed the satisfaction of repeated victories over the enemy; and it acquired by the peace, the honourable, though not very lucrative, acquisitions of Gibraltar and Minorca.

GEORGE I.

Since the reign of Queen Anne, the national accounts are far from being distinguished for their regularity or precision. No complete statement has ever been made up, of the total income and expenditure of the country. Accounts are annually laid before parliament, of the grants and services: but they include only what is called the unappropriated revenue. The appropriated taxes are perpetually varying in their amount, and were, until lately consolidated, a mass of disorder and confusion; and though the surplusses and deficiencies were stated to parliament, yet it was difficult to discover, without a variety of calculations, what was the
total

total sum that was paid to, or expended by, the exchequer each year. From such a chaos, it is easy to perceive, that exactness cannot be expected; but, considering the immense sums which have been expended since the accession of the house of Brunswick, it is not easy to commit a mistake that can be of essential importance.

Public Expences since the Revolution.

By an act passed at the commencement of the reign of George I¹. £. 700,000 a year was appropriated to the expences of his majesty's civil government; and £. 77,694 of unappropriated money, was directed to be applied, towards discharging such extraordinary expences, as might be incurred at his accession to the throne. Nor was this all; for different sums were afterwards voted by parliament in aid of the civil list. The total of the money received on that account, during this reign, will be as follows;

1. £. 700,000 <i>per annum</i> for twelve years and a half	£. 8,750,000
2. Vote at the accession	77,694
3. By 7 Geo. I. chap. 27. in full of the sums to be paid by the two assurance companies	300,000
4. By 7 Geo. I. chap. 27. and 11 Geo. I. chap. 17. money borrowed for the use of the civil list on the 6 <i>d</i> per pound deduction from pensions	1,000,000
5. Paid the Prince of Wales £. 40,000 <i>per annum</i> for twelve years and a half, and the Queen the sum of £. 6,250 out of the customs	504,820
Total to the royal family	£. 10,632,514

¹ 1 Geo. I. sess. 2. chap. xii.

Consequently

Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.

The navy.

Consequently the charges of the civil list, and the whole establishment of the royal family, came to about £. 850,000 *per annum*.

The sums granted for naval services, amounted to £. 12,923,851.

The ordinary of the navy was then about £. 740,000, which, multiplied by twelve and a half, amounts to £. 9,250,000 to which £. 370,000 may be added for incidental charges, making in all £. 9,620,000, and there would still remain, £. 3,303,851 for extra expences of the navy, in consequence of the hostile operations which took place during this reign.

The army.

The military expences during the same period, are estimated at £. 13,842,467.

The peace establishment of the army, including the forces in the plantations, the half pay, Chelsea hospital, and other services, might be about £. 900,000 *per annum*, amounting, during the space of twelve years and a half, to £. 11,250,000. This sum being deducted from the above total, leaves £. 2,592,467 as the extraordinary expences of a military nature, to which this country was put during the above period.

The ord-
nance.

The peace establishment of the ordnance, was about £. 73,000 *per annum*; which, multiplied by twelve and a half, produces £. 912,500. As £. 1,064,449 was voted for ordnance services, the extra expences may be stated at £. 151,949.

Miscella-
neous ser-
vices.

The miscellaneous expences were not very considerable : £. 30,000 was voted for the expence of the

the mint; £. 23,935 as the damage incurred by burning two merchantmen from the Levant, in order to prevent infection; £. 11,659 to make up losses sustained by rebellious and riotous proceedings in different parts of the country. Other particulars might be mentioned; but they cannot exceed in all £. 150,000.

Public Expenses since the Revolution.

The burden of the national debt, was greatly lessened during this reign, by lowering the rate of the interest paid to the public creditors. But still this article, including two millions discharged, and the usual deficiencies of the land-tax, amounted to about £. 41,218,879.

Interest of public debts, &c.

The whole expences of this reign, may be thus stated :

The civil list	-	-	£. 10,632,514
The navy	-	-	12,923,851
The army	-	-	13,842,467
The ordnance	-	-	1,064,449
Miscellaneous services	-	-	150,000
			<hr/>
			38,613,281
Interest of the public debts, loans repaid, and			
land-tax deficiencies	-	-	41,218,879
			<hr/>
Total			£. 79,832,160

The peace establishment was as follows :

The civil list	-	-	£. 850,000
The navy	-	-	740,000
The army	-	-	900,000
The ordnance	-	-	73,000
Miscellaneous services	-	-	20,000
			<hr/>
Total			£. 2,583,000
			The

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

The inconsiderable warlike operations, which took place during this reign, cost the following sums :

Extra Expences of the navy	-	£. 3,303,851
Ditto of the army		2,592,467
Ditto of the ordnance	-	151,949
		<hr/>
Total		£. 6,048,267
		<hr/>

GEORGE II.

The first part of the government of this monarch, was distinguished by every appearance of tranquillity, though not unaccompanied with a considerable degree of rancour on the part of Spain, and of jealousy on the part of France. During that whole period, the public expences were not very considerable, and the nation was in so prosperous a state, that it was able, with any tolerable management, to have carried on a successful war. But so prevalent was the spirit of faction at the time, that it was not conquests abroad, but victory in the cabinet, and in the senate-house, to which our statesmen aspired. That spirit prevailed not only in the first, but in the second war in which this monarch was engaged: and both might have proved equally unfortunate, had not the nation at last united as if it were one man; and at an expence till then unheard of, and unparalleled, convinced the enemy, what the resources of Great Britain were capable of effecting, when exerted to the utmost.

By

By an act passed at the commencement of the reign, the duties known under the name of the civil list revenues, were continued during the life of the new sovereign^m. It was at the same time specifically provided, that if those revenues did not yield £. 800,000 *per annum*, the deficiency should be made up by the public; but that any surplus should belong to the crown. At first they did not yield the income that was expected: for, *anno* 1728, £. 115,000 was granted on account of arrears in the civil list revenue: and *anno* 1746, the sum of £. 456,773 additional for the same purpose. An account was laid before the house of commons, of that branch of the revenue, from Midsummer 1727 to ditto 1760, amounting to £. 26,784,715ⁿ.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

Civil list.

^m 1 Geo. II. chap. i.

ⁿ Commons Journals, vol. xxviii. p. 965, 9th December 1760. It is not printed in the Journals: but the following is an abstract of the account:

ABSTRACT of the CIVIL LIST Funds from Midsummer 1727 to Midsummer 1760.

Hereditary and temporary excise	£. 8,173,166	3	7 $\frac{1}{4}$
Subsidy of tonnage and poundage	9,599,267	19	10
By Act 1 Geo. II. from aggregate fund	3,960,000	1	0
By 4 Geo. II. from ditto	61,647	1	0 $\frac{1}{2}$
By 9 Geo. II. from ditto	1,662,500	0	0
By 12 Geo. II. from ditto	47,764	18	4
Revenue of post-office	1,191,613	17	9 $\frac{1}{2}$
Fines of alienation-office	102,480	13	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
Post fines	75,108	0	0
Wine licences	216,870	17	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
Sheriffs' proffers	20,663	9	10
Carried over	£. 25,111,083	1	11 $\frac{1}{4}$

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

To this must be added, £. 247,543 granted by parliament, as portions with the princesses of the royal family: and *anno* 1746°, £. 25,000 *per annum* was settled on the Duke of Cumberland, for his important services in quelling the rebellion. Upon accumulating these different sums, they may be calculated in all at £. 27,382, 258, or £. 829,795 *per annum*.

The navy.

The sums granted for naval services, during this reign, amounted to £. 71,424,171.

Such were the immense grants for naval services. But great as they may seem, they were not entirely thrown away. In both the wars which took place, during the reign of this monarch, our naval exertions were attended with success. Twice was the maritime power of the house of Bourbon almost totally annihilated;—a circumstance which this

	Brought forward	£. 25,111,083	1	11 $\frac{1}{4}$
Compositions in the exchequer	-	218	8	6
Seizure of prohibited and unaccustomed goods	-	876,127	13	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
Rents of lands	-	44,136	19	11
Fines of Leases	-	142,126	18	5
Sale of lands	-	9,293	16	8
		£. 26,182,981	17	6 $\frac{1}{4}$
By Act 2 Geo. II. cap. 18. out of the supplies for the year 1729	-	115,000	0	0
By Act 20 Geo. II. cap. 36. out of the supplies 1747	-	456,733	16	3 $\frac{1}{4}$
		£. 26,784,715	13	10 $\frac{1}{4}$
	Total			

• 19 Geo. II. cap. 29.

country

country can hardly too dearly purchase, and to secure which no expence ought to be regretted.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

The army during this reign cost £. 73,911,521.

The ordnance expences, in so far as respected the land service, and the purchasing of ground for the purposes of fortification, amounted to £. 6,706,674.

*The army.
The ord-
nance.*

Other expences were also incurred in consequence of the war. £. 5,000, included in the grants for 1739, was paid to Solomon Morrett and others for the loss of the ship *Isabella*, taken by the Spaniards; £. 10,000 was voted to the town of Glasgow, which had been extorted from that city in the rebellion; £. 13,869 was granted to the owners of the money and effects taken in the Spanish ship *Anna Maria St. Felix*, by grant *anno* 1756; making in all £. 28,869.

*Other mili-
tary ex-
pences.*

The money paid during this reign, for building churches, for repairing Westminster Abbey, and the churches of St. Margaret's and St. John's Westminster, came to £. 152,240.

Churches.

For building Westminster Bridge, and opening a way from thence to Charing Cross, there was voted in all £. 216,500. Nay, the sum of £. 45,000 was granted for rebuilding London Bridge, though, considering the greatness of the thoroughfare, and the immense income enjoyed by the corporation of London, that work might have been executed without any public assistance.

Bridges.

During this reign, a military road was formed across the island, from Newcastle upon Tyne to Carlisle; for which purpose £. 24,000 was granted.

*Military
roads.*

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

As to the roads in the Highlands of Scotland, they were for many years included among the extraordinary expences of the army, and were not separately voted.

Harbours.

For finishing the harbour of Rye, there was granted £. 23,360 ; and the sum of £. 20,000 for Milford harbour in Wales.

Public re-
wards.

Sir Thomas Lombe, had, at a great hazard and expence, introduced into this country, the art of making fine organzine Italian filk, or thrown filk, out of raw filk, by an engine, which is erected in the town of Derby, and a model of which is preserved with great care and attention in the tower of London. As a reward for so important a discovery, the sum of £. 14,000 was given him by parliament. *Anno* 1738, £. 5,000 was also voted as a reward to Mrs. Stephens, for communicating to the public her remedy for the stone ; and *anno* 1755, £. 3,000 to Thomas Stephen, for discovering the proper mode of making pot-ash.

Public mo-
nument.

Anno 1756, £. 3,000 was granted for the purpose of erecting a monument to the memory of Captain Cornwall, who had died fighting gallantly in the service of his country. The public money could not be better expended. It was by such encouragements, that the free states of antiquity rose to eminence and to glory. It is by such inducements, that individuals are best animated to great and magnanimous exertions. To recompense military achievements, by pecuniary rewards alone, or to make money the great object of gallant men, is in
the

the highest degree impolitic ; for none are to be accounted truly brave, or in great emergencies are to be depended upon, but such as are inspired by honour, and not by interest, and who prefer fame to fortune.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

At the union, the feudal system existed in full force in the remoter parts of Scotland. In those wild and mountainous districts, the chieftains of the different clans, enjoyed almost full power over the persons and property of their vassals. But so tyrannical a system could not continue for ever. It was at length discovered, that whilst it remained, no improvements could be expected in that part of the country. To break the power of these barons, parliament resolved to purchase the rights and privileges which they claimed ; and £. 152,037 was granted for that purpose. In a pecuniary view alone, perhaps the compensation was adequate. But it is difficult to estimate the ideal value, that might be attached to such important prerogatives, by persons accustomed to exercise them *.

*Heritable
jurisdictions
in Scotland.*

The rebellion that broke out in Scotland, *anno* 1745, was principally supported by persons of desperate fortunes, who expected to retrieve their affairs in the midst of bustle and confusion. The estates of such as possessed landed property, were forfeited to the crown ; and parliament wisely determined, to appropriate the income they produced, to the purpose of improving the Highlands and Islands of North Britain. But such at the same

*Scotch for-
feited es-
tates.*

* The author's father, got about £. 3000, for the heritable Sheriffship of the county of Caithness.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

time were the incumbrances due by their former possessors, that though they hardly yielded a clear rent of £. 8,000 *per annum*, government paid, *anno* 1759 and 1760, £. 72,410, and in the succeeding reign £. 110,553 more, in order to discharge the debts by which they were affected.

The mint.

The extra expences of coinage, during this reign, in addition to the ordinary charges of £. 7,000 *per annum*, amounted to £. 31,364.

*Horned cat-
tle.*

Among the many advantages which this country enjoys from its insular situation, there is none more truly important, than the facility with which infectious distempers, whether affecting the human species, or their cattle, can be prevented. In Holland, above 500,000 cows, worth at least £. 10 each, have perished within the space of 20 years; and hence, in that short period of time, the States have lost above five millions by diseases among their cattle^p. The avarice of some English tanners, who brought over infected hides, introduced the disease into this country; and at different times, £. 208,123 was granted by parliament, to prevent so fatal a distemper from being extended.

*Foundling
hospital.*

During this reign, there was granted to the Foundling-hospital, the sum of £. 128,277.

*Lisbon
earthquake.*

Some nations of antiquity are justly celebrated, for sending presents to the island of Rhodes, when, by an earthquake, its renowned colossus was thrown down, and other damage was sustained. Great

^p This is a very moderate estimate. I have heard the loss calculated at forty millions sterling.

Britain

Britain displayed equal, if not superior generosity, on a similar occasion; for no sooner was intelligence received of the fatal earthquake at Lisbon, (which in 1755 almost buried that proud metropolis in the earth), than the British parliament unanimously voted £. 100,000 to relieve the unhappy sufferers; —perhaps the only instance, in modern times, of such extensive liberality from one state to another.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

As the expence of maintaining the British forts on the coast of Africa, and in full satisfaction to the Royal African Company for their charter, lands, &c. £. 420,173 was voted during this reign.

*African
forts.*

The charges which this country has been put to, on account of its settlements in America, are hardly to be credited. As far back as the reign of James I. of England, the sum of £. 29,000 was raised by lotteries, for the purpose of establishing the colony of Virginia^a; —a considerable sum in those days, and which, if accumulated at compound interest, since the year 1620, would have paid no small share of the national debt. But, without going to such remote periods, it may justly be asserted that the two last wars, and all the enormous expences with which they were accompanied, may be traced to the same source. Even the war of 1739, partly originated from the clamours of the North Americans, and their resentment against Spain, for attempting to prohibit the intercourse they held with the colonies of that country. The

*American
expences.*

^a See Chalmer's Political Annals of the British Colonies, vol. i. p. 32. and 41.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

war of 1755, it can hardly be denied, was owing to the anxiety of the inhabitants of Great Britain, to protect their brethren in America from the intrigues of the French, and the attacks of Indian savages. The war preceding the present, was purely American, and would never have been carried on, and so anxiously persevered in, had it not been imagined, that a great majority of the people of that country, were desirous of preserving a connexion with the parent state, and apprehended the fatal consequences of which a separation would be productive. Nor was any expence ever spared, that could contribute to the good government, that could promote the industry, that could insure the safety, that could mitigate the misfortunes, or could animate the exertions of the people of that country, even for their own security and protection.

Anno 1729, the sum of £. 22,500 was voted by parliament, to the proprietors of Carolina, that the inhabitants of that province, instead of being oppressed under an aristocratical government, might enjoy all the blessings of liberty and of legal independence. And, *anno* 1741, when a fire happened at Charlestown, £. 20,000 was granted to be distributed among the unhappy sufferers.

The expences of Georgia, during this reign, amounted to £. 117,110; and those of Nova Scotia to £. 637,972.

By

By votes to the different provinces in America, to indemnify them for the expences they were put to in the expedition against Cape Breton, and to encourage them in the following war to exert themselves with vigour in defence of his Majesty's rights, and for their own security, there were granted, during this reign, the sum of £. 899,842^r.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

These sums joined together amount to £. 1,697,424.

The following are the only other miscellaneous expences:

1730. For the purchase of the wardenship of the Fleet prison	-	£. 2,500
1741. To the sufferers by the failure of Mr. Henry Popple	-	8,716
1754. For the office of marshal of the Marshalsea prison	-	5,200
For rebuilding the Marshalsea prison		7,800
1759. To Dr. Long, for discharging a mortgage on an estate devised for the endowment of a professorship at Cambridge		1,280
		<hr/>
		£. 25,496
		<hr/>

The mode of making good to his majesty, money voted pursuant to addresses from the commons, was first introduced in the year 1758. In this manner, £. 31,000 was granted during this reign. It was principally intended for the expence of

*Money paid
pursuant to
addresses.*

^r In this sum is included a part of the expence of the garrison of Cape Breton *anno* 1749.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revalu-
tion.*

printing the journals of the house ;—a measure of great public utility, and which has been the means of making known much material information. But this is a mode of voting money, which ought to be discountenanced as much as possible, if ever it is intended, that a real spirit of economy should pervade our financial system.

*Interest of
public debts,
&c.*

It seems unnecessary to enter minutely, into the various sums paid during this reign, to the different public creditors, either in payment of the principal or interest of their debts. It may be sufficient to state, that they amounted in all to about £.93,347,134.

The total expenditure, during this reign, will then be as follows :

The civil list	-	£. 27,280,000
The navy	-	71,424,171
The army	-	73,911,521
The ordnance	-	6,706,674
Other military expences	-	28,869
Ecclesiastical expences	-	152,240
Westminster Bridge	-	216,500
London Bridge	-	45,000
Military roads	-	24,000
Making harbours	-	43,360
Public rewards	-	22,000
Public monument to Captain Cornwall	-	3,000
Heritable jurisdictions in Scotland	-	152,037
The debts due on the Scotch forfeited estates	-	72,410
Charges of the mint at £.7,000 <i>per annum</i> for		
33 years	-	231,000
Extra expences of the mint	-	31,364
Horned cattle	-	208,123
Carried over		£.180,552,269

	Brought over	£. 180,552,269	Public Ex-
Foundling hospital	-	182,277	pences since
Earthquake at Lisbon	-	100,000	the Revolution.
African forts and settlements	-	420,173	
American Expences	-	1,697,424	
Miscellaneous expences	-	25,496	
Money paid pursuant to addressees	-	25,000	
		<hr/>	
		£. 183,002,639	
Interest of the public debts, and repayment of the principal	-	93,347,134	
		<hr/>	
Total		£. 276,349,773	
		<hr/>	

The peace establishment, towards the conclusion of this reign, may be thus stated :

	Per annum.
The civil list	£. 836,000
The navy	900,000
The army	900,000
The ordnance	80,000
Miscellaneous expences	50,000
	<hr/>
Total	£. 2,766,000
	<hr/>

This reign is distinguished by two wars. The first began *anno* 1739, and was concluded by the peace of Aix la Chapelle *anno* 1748; the second began *anno* 1755, and was concluded by the treaty of Paris in February 1763. The expences of each war, it may be proper to state separately.

Some account has already been given, of the first war entered into during the reign of George II. It unquestionably arose from the turbulent spirit of
 8 the

Expences of
the war
1739.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

the English, who, tired of a long peace, engaged in hostilities with Spain for very frivolous reasons. The trifling sum of one or two hundred thousand pounds, was the original subject of contest. But the opposition to the government at the time, knew well that the power and administration of Sir Robert Walpole, could only be shaken by such an event: And such was the clamour raised by our merchants at home, and by our colonies in the West Indies and America, against the treatment our ships had received from the Spaniards, that, however cautiously a nation ought to enter into war, little deliberation was made use of in commencing it upon that occasion. The dispute afterwards became of a nature more general and extensive.

In a former chapter, it was stated, that the addition which this war made to the national debt amounted to £. 31,338,689. But this was far from being the total expence. The following sums may also be placed to the same account:

1. Eight years land tax at 4s. in the pound	£. 16,000,000
2. Ditto malt - - -	6,000,000
3. Taken out of the sinking fund - -	7,800,000
	<hr/>
	£. 29,800,000
Deduct eight years expence in time of peace	14,720,000
	<hr/>
	£. 15,080,000
Add the debt contracted - - -	31,338,689
	<hr/>
Total expence of the war	£. 46,418,689 ^a

^a See the Present State of the Nation, printed anno 1748.

The war with Spain alone lasted about four years; and the extraordinary expences which it occasioned, may be estimated at £. 3,000,000 a-year. The remaining four years, of more general hostilities, cost about £. 8,500,000 *per annum*.

Public Expences since the Revolution.

It is natural for the reader to demand, what advantage did the country reap for so enormous an expence? and were the terms either lucrative, or honourable, on which the peace was concluded? The history of that war, and the manner in which it was terminated, are too well known to require any particular detail in this place. We had the honour, it is true, of supporting the house of Austria, when on the very brink of destruction; and it is to be hoped, that some time or other, we shall receive grateful returns for such generous assistance. We were fortunate enough to capture or to destroy, no inconsiderable part of the fleet of the house of Bourbon, which ought ever to be considered as an important object in the eyes of Britain. But as to any acquisitions, calculated to indemnify us for the expences we were put to, they are to be sought for in vain; and at the very instant when our enemies were reduced to the utmost necessity by famine, a peace was concluded, on such disadvantageous terms, that the ministers had not confidence sufficient to move for a vote of approbation in parliament.

The war concluded by the treaty of Paris, has this circumstance in its favour, that during the greater part of it, the nation was triumphant; and though

Expence of the war 1755.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

though the peace by which it was terminated, was perhaps hardly adequate to the expectations of the public, yet it was the most lucrative treaty, in point of territorial acquisition, that is recorded in the annals of this country. With regard to the charges of the war, they have been thus estimated: The supplies for the year 1753 (which was the last peace establishment) amounted to £. 2,797,916. Every addition to that sum, until the burden of the war was entirely settled, may be stated to its account. The sums voted were as follows:

Voted anno 1754	£. 4,073,779	1761	£. 18,299,153
1755	7,229,117	1762	13,522,040
1756	8,350,325	1763	7,712,562
1757	10,486,457	1764	7,763,090
1758	12,749,860	1765	8,273,280
1759	12,503,564	1766	8,527,728
1760	19,616,119	1767	8,335,746
		<hr/>	
		£. 150,442,820	
		<hr/>	

Hence the total expence may be thus calculated:

Sums voted	-	£. 150,442,820
Peace establishment for 14 years at £. 2,797,916		39,170,824
		<hr/>
Total charges of the war		£. 111,271,996
		<hr/>

As it only lasted for seven years, the expence *per annum* amounted to £. 15,895,999¹.

Great

¹ The extraordinary expence in France on account of this war has been stated as follows:

1756

Great as our success was, it was dearly purchased at such a rate.

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tion.*

Nor are distant and foreign acquisitions always of such utility as may at first be imagined. The war now alluded to, was principally distinguished by the acquisition of some West Indian islands, and by the resignation of the whole province of Canada by the French. But neither proved serviceable to Great Britain. It is a fact which, however incredible it may appear, is beyond all doubt, that in order to procure a right to the soil of the islands thus ceded to us by the French, namely, Grenada, Tobago, and St. Vincent's, no less a sum than three millions, was paid by British subjects to French proprietors, with which the remaining possessions of the French in that hemisphere were improved, and brought to that beneficial state of cultivation and produce, which they have since boasted of. The sinking of so enormous a sum, was attended with very pernicious consequences, in regard to our original possessions in the West Indies, to our public and pri-

1756	£. 5,377,778
1757	6,044,444
1758	6,000,000
1759	8,652,924
1760	11,186,431
1761	5,364,034
1762	7,076,924
<hr/>	
Total	£. 49,702,535

vate

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

vate credit, and to our circulation at home". As to the acquisition of Canada, it was prophesied at the time, that it would necessarily occasion, what we have lived to see, the independence of our colonies. When the retention of Canada was first proposed, that able statesman, the Duke de Choiseul, declared, that he could not object to a plan, which would necessarily prove so ruinous to the enemies of France : for he wisely foresaw, that our American colonies, when once relieved from the terror of such a neighbour, when once freed from all apprehension of being made subject to the house of Bourbon, would soon begin to consider Great Britain, as the only power of whom they ought to be jealous.

Meditating on these events, who can avoid breaking out into just exclamations against the madness of war? The taxes which necessarily arise from extended and frequent hostilities, every warlike nation must lay its account with : it must also put up with all those dreadful scenes of misery and bloodshed, which are their sure concomitants. But a wise nation will also take into its consideration, the uncertainty of any recompence being procured, for the expences that it must sustain ; and that acquisitions which are at first accounted of the most essential importance, may in the end prove fatally destructive.

■ It materially contributed to the failures *anno* 1772.

G E O R G E III.

It is hardly possible, to write the history of our own times with sufficient impartiality. Notwithstanding the most anxious desire, to give a fair representation of the circumstances which have occurred, some lurking prejudices, either adverse or favourable to particular parties in the scene, will in all probability appear, however cautiously guarded against. An author, at the same time, cannot avoid making some observations, on the character, the principles, and the conduct of individuals, when endeavouring to explain, the various facts which it is necessary for him to bring forward. In general it may be remarked, that the history of the present reign, in the page of some future historian, will form the subject of a curious and important narration; and it will then probably be stated, that a great and powerful empire, in consequence of internal divisions, was, at different periods, on the brink of falling from the highest elevation of strength and power, into an abyss of misery and weakness; and thence it will become a curious subject of political speculation, whether that corruption, which is inherent in a despotic government, or that factious spirit, which so often prevails in a free state, is the most unfortunate circumstance to a country.

The first act that was passed after the king's ac-
cession to the crown, granted to his majesty the
Civil list.
sum

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the Revolu-
tion.*

sum of £. 800,000 *per annum*, subject to the several annuities of £. 50,000 a-year to the Princess Dowager of Wales, £. 15,000 to the Duke of Cumberland, and £. 12,000 to the Princess Amelia. This, in the space of twenty-eight years, amounts to £. 22,400,000 but is far from being the total sum laid out during this period in the expences of the civil government ; for on 28th February 1769, £. 513,511 was granted to discharge certain arrears of the civil list, contracted prior to the 5th January 1769. And on the 16th April 1777, the sum of £. 620,000 was again voted for a similar purpose, together with an additional £. 100,000 *per annum*, to the income of the crown. £. 120,000 was also given as the marriage portions of the princesses Augusta and Matilda. The annuity of £. 25,000 to the late William Duke of Cumberland was continued during his life ; and annuities out of the aggregate fund, at the rate of £. 8,000 each, were granted to their Royal Highnesses the Dukes of York, Gloucester, and Cumberland, commencing 5th January 1767*. The following then, is a pretty accurate statement, of the sums paid to the royal family, by the public, during the present reign, up to Michaelmas 1788.

The original civil list revenue of £. 800,000 *per annum* from the accession to Michaelmas 1788 £. 22,400,000

The additional £. 100,000 from 5th January 1777 (12 years) - - -

1,200,000

Carry over £. 23,600,000

* 7 Geo. III. cap. 19.

	Brought over	£. 23,600,000	<i>Public Ex-</i>
Civil list debts paid <i>anno</i> 1769	-	513,511	<i>pences since</i>
1777	-	620,000	<i>the Revolu-</i>
1784	-	60,000	<i>tion.</i>
1786	-	30,000	
Exchequer bills due on civil list, paid off <i>anno</i>			
1786	-	180,000	
Marriage portions	-	120,000	
Additional income to William Duke of Cumber-			
land for five years	-	125,000	
To the Dukes of York, Gloucester, and Cum-			
berland, being the amount of the annuities			
paid to them out of the aggregate fund	-	360,000	
For enabling his Majesty to make a separate esta-			
blishment for his Royal Highness the Prince of			
Wales	-	60,000	
For discharging the debts of the Prince of			
Wales, and for the works at Carlton House		181,000	
		<hr/>	
		£. 25,849,511	
		<hr/>	

This during the space of 28 years, amounts to
£. 923,196 *per annum*.

But great as this sum may appear, it would not
have proved sufficient, had not other additions been
made to it*, and had not some attempts been
made

* In Almon's Parliamentary Register, *anno* 1777, vol. vii. p.
p. 57, there is an exaggerated account of the total of the
royal income. It is there asserted, that exclusive of the addi-
tional votes above mentioned, it could not be less, *communibus*
annis, than £. 1,400,000 a-year. The sum is thus made out:

Civil list	-	£. 800,000
Revenue of Hanover after paying all charges		100,000
		<hr/>
	Carried over	£. 900,000
		Ireland

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

made, to establish a system of economy, in this branch of the public expenditure. Indeed such is the profusion inherent in the very nature of courts, that nothing but fixed and unalterable rules, to be steadfastly and inviolably adhered to, and on no account to be departed from, can possibly prevent the income of the crown from being perpetually deficient.

Here it may be proper, to give some account, of the applications made to parliament, for paying the

	Brought over	£. 900,000
Ireland	-	90,000
Wales	-	10,000
Lancaster	-	20,000
Cornwall	-	70,000
$4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. duty in the West Indies	-	50,000
Coal-pits of Louisburg	-	12,000
Interest of the debts due to the late king	-	150,000
		<hr/>
	Total	£. 1,302,000
		<hr/>

The remainder is made up, from—the quit-rents in North America, which it is said amounted before the war to £. 15,000 *per annum*;—the $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. duty in North America, which produced about £. 50,000 *per annum*;—the money procured from the sale of Somerset House, which is stated at £. 100,000;—and presents from eastern princes, which are calculated at a million. But every one must perceive that these sums are not a little exaggerated; and with some of them, the surplus revenue of Hanover in particular, this country has no connexion.—In the accounts produced to parliament (Ditto, p. 59.), it is acknowledged that there was received, between 5th January 1769 and 5th January 1777, from the dutchy of Cornwall, &c. the sum of £. 205,422 18 s. $6\frac{1}{4}$ d. making in all about £. 25,677 *per annum*.

civil

civil list debts, and of the various regulations which have been established, in regard to that important department.

Public Expences since the Revolution.

The first application for public assistance, to discharge the debts of the civil list, which took place *anno* 1769, met with some opposition, but was carried on a division by a considerable majority*.

But the next application, *anno* 1777, not only for a considerable sum of money to pay arrears, but also for an additional income of £. 100,000, occasioned violent debates. The crown was as usual successful in parliament; but the attempt was universally odious to the people, and excited a clamour, which rendered the government at the time not a little unpopular. In a succeeding session, the table of the house of commons was covered with Petitions, praying for a reform in this branch of the national expenditure. On the 11th February 1780, Mr. Edmund Burke, in one of the most splendid orations ever delivered in a public assembly, introduced his bill for the better regulation of his majesty's civil establishments; and on the 6th of April following, on the motion of Mr. Dunning, the house came to the following important resolutions:

1. That it is necessary to declare, that the influence of the crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished.

2. That it is competent for parliament to examine into, and to correct abuses, in the expendi-

* 248 voted in favour of the motion; 135 against it; majority 113.

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lution.*

ture of the civil list revenues, as well as in every other branch of the public revenue, whenever it shall appear expedient to the wisdom of parliament so to do^a.

It was not however until the year 1782, that any effectual step was taken to reform these expences. By Mr. Burke's original system, the annual savings were calculated at £.75,343, without including the board of police in Scotland; and it was stated, that it would detach from the influence of the crown, nine members in the house of lords, and thirty in the house of commons. By the plan of 1782, the following savings were proposed:

	Annual Savings.
By abolishing the office of third secretary of state	£. 7,500
Board of trade	12,600
Lords of police in Scotland	6,600
Board of works	7,462
Great wardrobe	3,506
Jewel office	2,000
Treasurer of the chamber	3,000
Cofferer of the household	3,000
Board of green cloth	8,000
Masters of the harriers and of the stag-hounds	3,000
The establishment of the mint	13,000
Paymaster of pensions	2,700
Total	£. 72,368 ^b

But schemes, however plausible in theory, are difficult to reduce into practice. The savings actually carried into effect (by 22 Geo. III. cap. 82.)

^a Commons Journals, vol. xxxvii. p. 763.

^b *Ibid.* vol. xxxviii. p. 971.

were below even £. 50,000, and from that sum above £. 18,000 must be deducted for some time, being the compensation to which various persons, whose offices were suppressed, were found to be intitled; and the public has since been under the necessity of discharging the arrears, for which those very savings were appropriated. The merit, however, of the honourable gentleman who brought forward the regulations contained in that act, ought not to be forgotten. By his exertions, the payments of the civil list expences, have been arranged in a manner, which will probably prevent any material excess in future. Pensions, (except in certain cases specified in the act), are restricted to a sum not exceeding £. 95,000 *per annum*; and the constitution is protected from any risk of injury, by the wise and salutary rules which are established, respecting the distribution of the secret service money with which the crown is intrusted. These are material points, for which the thanks of the country are due to the citizen who achieved them. In regard to other particulars in the bill, opinions may vary: for one, I do not hesitate to declare, that, in my judgment, the jealousy of the crown, so manifest in the act above alluded to, was carried too far. However much secret corruption ought to be reprobated, the avowed influence resulting from the disposal of employments, necessary for the splendour of the court, or the carrying on of the public business of the country, ought not to be too bounded. In political, as well as in other lotteries, there

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the Revo-
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*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

ought to be an adequate proportion of smaller, as well as of greater prizes; and unless some method is adopted, by an increase of patronage, of attaching a greater number of individuals to the crown, than at present look up to it, from the places they enjoy, it is not difficult to foresee, that the government must either become weak and fluctuating, or that the balance of the constitution will be overturned, nay, the spirit and morals of the people endangered, by too numerous and wealthy a peerage, which has already been increasing with too rapid strides, since other means of influence were abolished^c.

This branch of the subject may be concluded with the following abstract of the actual disbursements of his majesty's civil government, for the year 1785, being the latest account that appears on the Journals; and by examining which, the reader will find the different particulars he may wish to be acquainted with, fully detailed.

ABSTRACT of a particular ACCOUNT of the
DISBURSEMENTS of the CIVIL LIST for
the Year 1785.

First class.	The pensions and allowances to the royal family	£. 192,000
Second class.	The lord chancellor, judges, &c.	32,955
		<hr/>
	Carried over	£. 224,955

^c This was originally written *anno* 1790, and has since been amply verified, in so far as regards the increase of the peerage.

The

	Brought over	£. 224,955	Public Ex-
The foreign ministers	-	75,543	pences since
Approved bills for his majesty's service	-	138,641	the Revolution.
The menial servants of the household	-	85,799	Third class.
Pensions and compensations for suppressed offices	-	125,757	Fourth
Various other salaries payable out of the civil list	-	82,187	class.
The salaries of the board of treasury	-	13,822	Fifth class.
Occasional payments	-	147,764	Sixth class.
		<hr/>	Seventh
		898,468	class.
			Eighth class.
			Ninth class.
To cancel exchequer bills for paying the arrears on the civil list, but which were since dis- charged by parliament	-	50,000	
		<hr/>	
		£. 948,468 ^d	

The real expences of the civil list, thus amounted to £. 898,468, and there is too much reason to believe, that it will require attention and economy, to confine the charges, in future, to the sum allotted for that purpose, namely, £. 900,000; particularly considering the increasing price of every article of consumption, and other circumstances that might be mentioned.

Only two other particulars remain, which it seems necessary to take notice of, as connected with the income and expenditure of the royal family; namely, 1st, That by 15 Geo. III. cap. 52. Buckingham-house was settled on her majesty, in room of Somerset-house, granted by a former act. The original price of the queen's royal palace, as

^d See Commons Journals, vol. xli. p. 639; and another account of the same nature, vol. xliii. p. 328.

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penses since
the Revolu-
tion.*

it has been since called, was £. 28,000. But from Lady-day 1762, to Christmas 1774, £. 72,627 was expended in enlarging and improving it, making in all £. 100,627*. In the event of surviving the king, her majesty will be entitled to an annuity of £. 100,000 *per annum*, being £. 50,000 in addition to her present allowance.

In regard to the settlements on the other branches of the royal family; by 18 Geo. III. cap. 31. £. 60,000 *per annum* is settled on his majesty's sons, and £. 30,000 *per annum* on the princesses of the family, payable on the king's demise; together with £. 8,000 *per annum* on the son, and £. 4,000 *per annum* on the daughter of his royal highness the duke of Gloucester, commencing at his death†. These provisions are surely moderate, but are equal perhaps to what a nation so loaded and embarrassed as this is, can well afford.

The navy.

The naval charges of this reign, to Michaelmas 1788, may be thus stated:

<i>Anno</i> 1761	£. 5,072,602	<i>Anno</i> 1766	£. 2,680,683
1762	5,688,012	1767	1,400,409
1763	1,975,661	1768	1,238,883
1764	2,053,200	1769	1,828,057
1765	2,886,876	1770	1,580,467
		<hr/>	
		Carried forward	£. 26,304,850

* Commons Journals, vol. xxxv. p. 320.

† By 25 Geo. III. cap. 53. an annuity of 9,000 *per annum*, payable to the Duke of Gloucester during his life, is transferred from the $4\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* Leeward Island duty, to the aggregate-fund

Anno

Brought forward 26,304,850 £.

<i>Anno</i> 1771	£.2,967,409	<i>Anno</i> 1780	£.6,777,632
1772	1,813,164	1781	8,603,884
1773	1,833,573	1782	7,095,228
1774	2,052,917	1783	6,197,832
1775	1,599,453	1784	3,086,269
1776	3,092,967	1785	2,504,507
1777	4,053,666	1786	2,381,526
1778	4,779,151	1787	2,286,000
1779	4,106,374	1788	2,236,000

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pences since
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tion.*

	93,872,402
Navy debt funded by 3 Geo. III. cap. 9.	3,483,553
Ditto funded by 5 Geo. III. cap. 29.	1,500,000
Ditto funded by 24 Geo. III. cap. 39 and 25. ditto cap. 33 and 71	17,869,993
Total	<u>£. 116,725,948</u>

Great as our naval exertions were, and powerful as the confederacy was, against which we had to contend, during the American war, yet so enormous an expence can hardly be justified. It is asserted, that two millions are perfectly sufficient to build a very formidable fleet; and during the period above mentioned the contract price for building King's ships in the merchants' yards, was as follows :

	Rate.	Price per Ton.	No. of Tons.	Total Price.
Ships of	74 guns	£. 17 15	1650	£. 28,462
Ditto	64	16 16	1400	23,520
Frigates	36	11 5	700	7,875
Smaller ditto	16	9 11	300	2,850

At those rates, the following number of ships might be constructed, for, comparatively speaking, a very moderate sum.

Fifty

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revo-
lution.*

Fifty ships of 74 guns at	£. 28,462 each	£. 1,423,100
Twenty ditto 64	23,520	470,400
Twenty large frigates	7,875	157,500
Twenty small ditto	2,850	57,000
		<hr/> £. 2,108,000

As ships of war might certainly be built for less money in the king's, than in the merchants' yards, it can hardly be doubted, that for two millions, seventy ships of the line, and forty frigates, might have been constructed.

The army.

The following sums were granted for military services :

<i>Anno</i> 1761	£. 8,344,030	<i>Anno</i> 1775	£. 1,597,051
1762	7,657,205	1776	3,500,366
1763	4,593,805	1777	3,797,632
1764	2,267,867	1778	4,833,666
1765	1,784,856	1779	6,013,082
1766	1,910,413	1780	6,589,080
1767	1,537,314	1781	7,723,912
1768	1,472,484	1782	7,645,237
1769	1,497,921	1783	5,577,474
1770	1,547,931	1784	3,153,191
1771	1,810,319	1785	1,689,169
1772	1,551,428	1786	1,594,115
1773	1,516,402	1787	1,831,069
1774	1,549,720	1788	1,979,020
		<hr/>	
		Total	£. 96,565,762

Miserable indeed is the reflection, to what little purpose such sums were given by the public. In the year 1704 the whole of the military and naval estimates, amounted only to £. 4,647,140. Yet that

that year was distinguished, by the victories of Blenheim, and of Malaga; and the campaign was carried on in Spain, in Portugal, in the Low Countries, on the Rhine, and on the Danube. Whereas the immense treasures which were voted during the American war, even for military services alone, were not attended with the consolation of one brilliant event by land, (the gallant defence of Gibraltar alone excepted,) and far less with any important acquisition.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

The whole expence of the ordnance, from the accession, to Michaelmas 1788, may be stated at £. 17,079,011, without including such ordnance debentures as were funded, at the same time with the debts of the navy.

*The ord-
nance.*

It is not proposed, to enter into any minute detail, of the various miscellaneous expences, which occurred during this reign. They amounted in all to £. 4,466,508. At the same time, it may be proper to make some observations upon any branch of this expenditure, the nature, or the magnitude of which, more particularly entitles it to the public attention.

*Miscella-
neous ex-
pences.*

There is no branch of the national expence, at which a British patriot is more apt to repine, than the money laid out, whether for the civil or military purposes of our colonies in North America. To check that rage of colonization, which has cost this country so much, it may be proper to give a statement of the sums granted to those provinces,

*American
expences.*

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

vinces, in the course of this reign, together with a general view of the whole expence of our American colonies, since the accession of the house of Brunswick.

*Rewards and
Compensa-
tions.*

The first expences of this nature to be mentioned, are the sums which were granted to reimburse those colonies, for raising and maintaining troops, in fact necessary for their own defence, or employed in the attainment of objects, (as the conquest of Canada,) which they had particularly at heart. For this purpose, the British parliament granted, during this reign, £. 472,676.

Surveys.

The surveys made of the coasts of America, (a matter of more consequence to them than to us,) cost £. 34,296.

*Expences of
their civil
govern-
ments.*

For the support of their respective civil governments, from Michaelmas 1760, to Michaelmas 1788, there was voted as follows :

For Nova Scotia	-	-	-	£. 186,565
Georgia	-	-	-	77,303
East Florida	-	-	-	105,450
West Florida	-	-	-	102,311
St. John's	-	-	-	32,550
New Brunswick	-	-	-	22,356
Cape Breton	-	-	-	10,600
Newfoundland	-	-	-	2,365
				<hr/>
				£. 539,500

Loyalists.

One of the most splendid instances of public generosity, which the world has as yet exhibited, is to be found in the conduct of the British legislature,

lature, at the conclusion of the American war: when, undismayed by the loss of thirteen provinces, and all the enormous debts and taxes of which the war was necessarily productive, it did not hesitate to hold forth, hopes of compensation to those, who had suffered by their attachment to the mother-country, in the course of the contest. After the restoration, parliament had granted £. 60,000 to be distributed among those unfortunate royalists who had undergone a series of distress, during the civil wars by which the reign of Charles the First had been afflicted^s. But instead of voting, on the same prudent principles, a specific sum for the purpose, commissioners were appointed, upon this occasion, to make a general enquiry “into the losses and services of all such persons who have suffered in their rights, properties, and possessions, during the late unhappy dissensions in America, in consequence of their loyalty to his majesty, and attachment to the British government.”

Public Expences since the Revolution.

The reader will naturally be desirous, of having a short account of the progress of this expence, and a statement of what the whole amounts to.

The first mention of any claim of this kind, is in the account laid before parliament, of the debts of the civil list, as they stood on the 5th of January 1777. It was there stated, that £. 32,934 : 16 : 6 had been issued for the relief and benefit of sundry American civil officers and

^s. History of the Revenue, part i. p. 132.

others,

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

others, who had suffered for their attachment to his majesty's government. This sum, after a short debate, was ultimately made good by parliament^a.

Anno 1778, the sum increased to £.56,680: 2: 6; and the succeeding year to £.60,527: 3: 6, which Lord North, (then chancellor of the exchequer,) stated, in the committee of supply, was a grant that would probably diminish for the future, as several Americans who had fled from Georgia, and were supported here by the national generosity, had returned home, and consequently that any claims of that nature, could not be so great after their departure.

During the succeeding years, various grants were made by parliament, partly to American sufferers in general, and partly to those civil officers who had been driven from that country; the whole, from 1776 to 1789, amounting to £.720,873, in addition to the sums laid out under the direction of the commissioners of enquiry.

The reports given in by the commissioners are intitled to particular attention. They first stated the number of claims given in to be 2994; the gross amount of the sums claimed for loss of property £.7,261,358, and that £.90,236 of annual income was alleged to have been lost. But these claims, when examined, were considerably reduced, and the following statement was drawn up by the commissioners, discriminating the various descrip-

^a Parliamentary Register, vol. vii. p. 356.

tions of loyalists, and the losses of property, or of income, sustained by each : *Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

	Number.	Property.	Income.
		£.	£.
1. Loyalists who have rendered services to Great Britain -	204	596,092	25,085
2. Loyalists who had bore arms in the service of Great Britain	481	254,988	6,503
3. Loyalists zealous and uniform	626	590,424	38,871
4. Loyal British subjects resident in Great Britain -	20	89,371	1,070
5. Loyalists who took oaths to the American states, but afterwards joined the British -	27	35,046	280
6. Loyalists who bore arms for the American states, but afterwards joined the British -	23	22,853	2,725
7. Loyalists sustaining losses under the prohibitory act -	3	13,971	
8. Loyal British proprietors	2	258,254	
9. Loyalists now subjects of the United States, but who have met with peculiar hardships -	25	26,549	970

CLAIMS disallowed and withdrawn :

10. {	1. For want of proof of loyalty -	7		
	2. Want of proof of loss -	250		
	3. Fraudulent -	12		
	4. For debts only	10		
	5. Withdrawn -	34		
		313		
Total		1,724	1,887,548	75,504

In

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

In addition to the above, it was stated, that there were four loyal subjects, who have relief provided for them by the treaty of peace, but cannot procure it, whose claims amounted to £. 45,363, and that the probable amount of future claims would be £. 300,000.

It is farther to be observed, that commissioners had been appointed, for the purpose of enquiring into the losses of such persons, as had suffered in their properties, in consequence of the cession of East Florida to the king of Spain; which commissioners reported, that they had received 268 different claims, whose gross amount was £. 602,765 : 1 : 7, upon examining 179 of which number, they found the sum of £. 127,552 : 14 : 3 ought to be allowed.

On the 6th of June 1788, this important subject came under the consideration of parliament. After some discussion, resolutions were come to by the committee of supply on that day, in consequence of which a bill was brought in, which has to a certain degree, ascertained the extent of those claims. By the act 28 Geo. III. cap. 40. certificates bearing an interest of $3\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* were ordered to be issued to various classes of loyalists, to the amount of £. 1,228,239, and the claims of the East Florida proprietors were admitted, to the amount of £. 113,952 : 14 : 3. Certain allowances were also made to those loyalists, whose losses of income had been proved to the satisfaction of the commissioners. But this is far from winding up the account :
for

for the commissioners appointed to examine into this business, have already received £.38,093:16:11. *Public Expences since the Revolution.*
 The East Florida commissioners £. 3,700. The fees at the exchequer, on the receipt of £.150,000, paid to the loyalists *anno* 1785, and which was reimbursed by the public out of the supplies 1786, amounted to £. 3,750:14. Lands purchased at the Bahama Islands and St. Vincent's, for the behoof of the loyalists, together with the expence of surveying and settling new establishments for them in Nova Scotia, and other parts of North America, will probably require in all at least £. 250,000^f. and the estimate originally given in of the half-pay of the American forces, was at the rate of £. 60,000 *per annum*.

The following account, will then give some idea, of the magnitude of this branch of our American expenditure.

STATE of the probable Amount of the EXPENCE resulting from the Compensation and Relief given to American Loyalists, and the Proprietors of East Florida :

1. Sums paid prior to, or since the appointment of the commissioners of enquiry, exclusive of the sums distributed under their direction - £. 720,873
2. Loyalists certificates, by 28 Geo. III cap. 40. 1,228,239

Carried over £. 1,949,112

^f £. 50,000 was voted *anno* 1787, for victualling the loyalists in their new settlements in Nova Scotia. See Parliamentary Register, vol. xxii. p. 134.

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pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

	Brought forward	£. 1,949,112
3. East Florida loyalist's certificates, by ditto	-	113,952
4. Unliquidated claims (calculated at)	-	300,000
5. Annual incomes of the loyalists, if reduced to £. 35,000, at ten years purchase	-	350,000
6. The half-pay of American forces, (£.60,000 <i>per annum</i>) at eight years purchase	-	480,000
7. The expence of the commissioners before their enquiry is concluded, will probably amount to	-	50,000
8. The East Florida commissioners	-	3,750
9. Lands purchased for the loyalists in the West Indies, and expence attending their new settle- ments in Nova Scotia	- -	250,000
10. Fees at the exchequer	-	2,750
		<hr/>
		£. 3,500,564

Thus the whole cannot be calculated at less than three millions and a half.

It must yield no small degree of satisfaction, to every citizen of this country, to be able to produce so unparalleled an instance of national liberality and spirit; and the business being now in some measure concluded, the most penurious can hardly wish it undone, notwithstanding the expensive consequences of which it has been productive. It is to be hoped, however, that some caution will be exercised for the future, in giving way to similar claims. It will not be difficult, if any other rebellion should arise in the foreign possessions of Great Britain, to practise a thousand frauds upon the public, if such a principle is to be adopted in future. The timid and the wealthy, under the pretence of loyalty, will naturally

naturally fly from the scene of war, and shelter themselves in a country, by which their property will be restored, if it proves successful, or who will recompense them for their losses, if otherwise. The leaders of the rebellion will engage with more spirit in the cause, from the hopes of confiscation and plunder; and enriched with the spoils of those who have fled, will undergo any extremity sooner than relinquish them: and thus Great Britain may subject itself to an enormous expence, for the purpose of rewarding the attachment of those, who never could be of any material service to it, whilst the war is rendered at the same time more difficult to make up, and more inveterate.

Public Expences since the Revolution.

The particulars above stated, however, are far from including the whole of our American expences. But the naval, military, and ordnance charges of the colonies cannot be accurately made up, in consequence of their being involved in the accounts of other services; and in particular from the indistinctness with which the extraordinaries of the army are laid before parliament. But it would be well worthy the attention of any really patriotic minister, to have all obscurity on this subject removed, and an accurate statement drawn up, for the satisfaction of the public, of the sum which each of our foreign possessions has cost us for this century past. In the mean while, the following general view of our American expences, is submitted to the reader.

Warlike expences in America.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

STATE of the EXPENCES of our American Colonies, from the Accession of the House of Brunswick, to Michaelmas 1788 :

1. For settling and securing, and for defraying the expences of the civil governments of the American colonies	- - -	£. 1,294,582
2. For compensation and rewards to the said colonies for exertions in their own defence, or for assisting in warlike operations calculated for their own immediate advantage		1,372,518
3. For bounties granted on the importation of American commodities	- -	1,609,345
4. To the proprietors of Carolina, for purchasing their title to that province	- -	22,500
5. To the sufferers by the fire at Charles Town, anno 1740	- - -	20,000
6. Expence of American surveys	-	34,296
7. From 1714 to 1775, the money voted by parliament for the forces employed in defence of the colonies, amounts to	-	8,779,925 ^s
8. Ditto from 1775 to 1788 (both-inclusive) at the rate of 100,000 <i>l.</i> <i>per annum</i>	-	1,400,000
9. Extraordinary Expences of forts, garrisons, ordnance stores, presents to Indians, &c.		10,500,000 ^b
10. Expences of fleets and naval stations, established for the defence of America	-	12,000,000
11. Compensation and relief to American loyalists	- - -	3,500,000
Total		£. 40,533,166

^a See the Rights of Great Britain asserted against the Claims of America, written by Sir John Dalrymple anno' 1776, who was the first that attempted to open the eyes of this country to the magnitude of its expences in America.

^b In the Parliamentary Register anno 1776-7, vol. vi. p. 80. there are estimates of the yearly expence in North America, in so far as respects merely the extraordinaries of the army, according to the usual estimates prior to the late war, the total of which amounts to £. 57,122 : 2 : 8½ *per annum*. But the detail takes up 68 pages in 8vo.

Thus,

Thus, the whole expences we have been put to, in consequence of our possessing colonies on the continent of North America, may be estimated at *forty millions* in addition to the charges of at least two wars, which cost us above 240 millions more, and which were entered into principally on their account.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

It is the more necessary to bring forward inquiries into this branch of our expenditure, as the rage for colonization has not as yet been driven from the councils of this country. We have lost New England ; but a New Wales has since started up. How many millions it may cost, may be the subject of the calculations of succeeding financiers, a century hence, unless by the exertions of some able statesman, that source of future waste and extravagance is prevented.

Our colonies in the West Indies, are possessions attended with this advantage, that in addition to a very lucrative commerce, they have also in general yielded a revenue, adequate to their civil establishments. Indeed, the following are the only sums in our public accounts, which can be stated against any part of our insular dominions in that quarter of the globe :

*West India
expences.*

For the Bahama Islands	-	-	£. 21,340
Bermuda	-	-	3,832
Chief justice of Dominica	-	-	600
			<hr/>
			£. 25,772

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

For assisting the colony of Barbadoes in rendering the harbour there more safe and commodious, £. 10,000 was granted; and in the year 1781, £. 120,000 was voted to relieve the inhabitants of that island, and of Jamaica, who had suffered by a violent hurricane: £. 10,000 was also granted, *anno* 1765, to Barbadoes, for the assistance given by that colony, to the forces under General Monkton, sent against Martinique.

*African
expences.*

The African forts, and the civil establishment at Senegambia, during this reign, have cost £. 480,990,

Convicts.

Since 1777, a new source of expence has appeared, which it is difficult to know how to remedy. Prior to the late war, it was usual to transport to America, those unfortunate individuals, who were convicted of such smaller felonies as are too frequent in a country, where, from the freedom of the government, no strict police can be established, and where the morals of the people are apt to be corrupted, by the temptations of a luxurious capital. The independence of the colonies, having put an end to that mode of punishment, it became necessary to adopt some other scheme, for the purpose of endeavouring to reform, the unhappy description of persons above alluded to, or at least to protect the public from their depredations. Various plans, with such views, were proposed to government. The one actually adopted has been, to place them on board of hulks in the Thames, where they may be of some use in raising ballast for shipping; and since their numbers became too great

great for any employment of that kind, an attempt has been made, to found a new empire, by sending them to the distant regions of New Holland. *Public Expences since the Revolution.*
Would it not be in every respect more advisable, to employ them in carrying on public works, and other improvements, in the remote and uncultivated districts of our own country¹?

It is beyond the limits of a work of this kind, however, to enter into the discussion of so extensive a subject. It is proper at the same time to remark, that even in a financial view, it is entitled to very serious attention. From 1776 to 1789, £. 220,873 was expended in maintaining the convicts on the Thames, a very large sum has already been laid out in establishing the colony of New South Wales. At the most moderate calculation, the punishment of petty felons, if the same measures are pursued, will cost above £. 100,000 *per annum*. It is surely desirable to save such an expenditure as much as possible, or to lay it out to the best advantage.

It may be proper to take notice of the expences which have been incurred in the new buildings at *Somerset House.*

¹ It appears, from the 28th Report of the Committee of Finance, that the expence of the settlements at Botany Bay, for 12 years, ending in 1797, amounted to no less a sum than £. 1,037,230, besides about £. 30,000 *per annum* for the Hulks. The effects of such an expenditure, in the northern parts of Scotland, in making roads, harbours, &c. and other improvements, would have been infinitely more advantageous.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

Somerſet Houſe, were it only for the purpoſe of warning the public, againſt giving way to plans, which, however moderate they may at firſt appear, yet in general turn out very different from the original eſtimate. When theſe buildings were propoſed to parliament *anno* 1775, it was ſtated, that the expence would not exceed £. 135,700, whiſt the repairs neceſſary at the ſeveral offices propoſed to be removed, the rents paid annually for the ſame, the value of the property and buildings thereof, and the price of the ground at Somerſet Houſe which would remain unoccupied, might be calculated at £. 99,550, conſequently the public might enjoy the ſatisfaction of poſſeſſing a magnificent edifice, and the advantage of having a number of public offices concentered together, for about £. 36,150^k, in addition to other charges that muſt have been incurred.

It is unneceſſary to detail, the various ſums, which have been paid at different times, ſince the year 1775, on account of theſe buildings. It is ſufficient to remark, that on the 19th February 1788, they amounted to £. 306,134. But the whole coſt, including the ſum of £. 100,000 paid to the crown, for purchaſing and repairing the Queen's palace^l, will probably reach half a million, before the plan is completed. The buildings are certainly uſeful, and perhaps were neceſſary. They have given employment to the poor, and

^k Commons, Journals, vol. xxxv. p. 321.

^l By 15 Geo. 3. cap. 52.

they

they contribute to ornament the capital of the country, which is rather deficient in such decorations. But the sum they are likely to require is to be regretted, not only on account of its exceeding the original estimate in so large a proportion, but also as being expended for the accommodation of offices, where less magnificence might have sufficed, at a period when we were involved in so many other enormous expences, and at a time when the palaces of the sovereign, are far from being distinguished by the splendour of their appearance.

Public Expences since the Revolution.

For some years past, it has not been unusual to appoint parliamentary commissioners, for the purpose of making various important inquiries of a public nature. The expence attending these commissions has already amounted to the following sums :

Expence of various commissions.

1. To the commissioners of public accounts	£. 57,400
2. Commissioners of American loyalists	- 38,093
3. Commissioners of East Florida loyalists	- 3,700
4. Commissioners for the woods and forests, and the land revenues of the crown	- - 7,200
5. Commissioners for inquiring into fees	- 1,603
6. Commissioners for discharging the national debt	2,061
	<hr/>
	£. 124,457

Whoever will take the trouble of perusing the accurate and able reports drawn up by the first of these boards, will not probably regret that part of the above expenditure. And perhaps more bene-

it

fit

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

fit is to be derived, by appointing occasional commissioners for specific purposes, than by forming regular establishments, which are too apt to lose sight of the purposes for which they were instituted.

Without entering into any particular detail of the various other expences, of a miscellaneous nature, which have occurred during this reign, it may be sufficient to give the following short and general abstract of the particulars of which they consisted:

An ACCOUNT of various INCIDENTAL EXPENCES, incurred in the course of the present Reign, from Michaelmas 1760 to Michaelmas 1788.

Parliamentary Expences.

1. To make good to his majesty various sums issued pursuant to addresses	-	-	£. 336,172
2. For compiling indexes to the journals of the house			15,900
3. The expence of different East India committees			2,806
4. Charges incurred by the smuggling committee			230
			<hr/>
			£. 355,108

Public Prosecutions.

1. Expences incurred in the prosecution against Sir Thomas Rumbold	-	-	-	£. 3,587
2. Trial of Mr. Hastings	-	-	-	8,058
				<hr/>
				£. 11,645

Commercial Expences.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

1. To the Levant Company, to assist them in carrying on their trade	£. 75,000
2. Surveys of the west coast of Great Britain and Ireland, and the expence of engraving the same	2,145
3. For making discoveries to the South Pole	5,000
4. To Dr. Irvine for his method of making sea-water fresh and wholesome	5,000
	<hr/>
	£. 87,145

Public Rewards.

1. To David Hartley Esquire, towards enabling him to ascertain the practicability and utility of his method to secure buildings and ships from fire	£. 2,500
2. To various persons for discovering dyes useful to our manufactures	9,500
3. To Charles Dingley for erecting a public wind saw-mill for manufacturing timber	2,000
4. To John Blake Esquire, to assist him in carrying on his scheme for transporting fish to London by land-carriage	2,500
	<hr/>
	£. 16,500

Compensations.

1. Various compensations to different individuals for ships detained for the public use and the like	£. 16,521
2. In satisfaction of losses incurred in preventing the infectious distemper among the horned cattle from spreading	£. 4,074
3. Compensation for damages sustained by powder mills	5,000
4. To Dr. Peter Swinton for damage to his estate at Chester in the rebellion anno 1745	700
5. To	

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

- | | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|--------|
| 5. To Messrs. Hodgson and Company, being the account of excise duties overpaid by them | - | 4,363 |
| 6. Compensation to persons who had sustained damage in the riots in London anno 1780 | - | 31,206 |

£. 61,864

Public Roads, Harbours, Buildings, &c.

- | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---|------------|
| 1. Scotch roads | - | £. 111,429 |
| 2. Repairing roads in Durham, and building the bridge at Coldstream | - | 4,000 |
| 3. For making a road on Penmaenmawr in Wales | - | 2,000 |
| 4. To the foundling hospital | - | 368,679 |
| 5. London Bridge | - | 37,000 |
| 6. Rebuilding Newgate | - | 30,000 |
| 7. Paving the streets of Westminster | - | 20,800 |
| 8. Westminster Bridge | - | 6,000 |
| 9. Making a commodious passage to the House of Commons | - | 12,000 |
| 10. Catwater harbour at Plymouth | - | 3,000 |
| 11. The British museum | - | 39,750 |

£. 634,651

Various Expences.

- | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|------------|
| 1. The extra expences of the mint | - | £. 573,089 |
| 2. Debts due on the forfeited estates in Scotland | - | 110,553 |
| 3. Lands purchased for extending the fortifications at Portsmouth and at Plymouth | - | 30,358 |
| 4. General James Murray (late governor of Minorca), to indemnify him against the verdict obtained by James Sutherland, and the expences attending the same | - | 5,489 |

£. 719,489

There

There was received by the public creditors, in the course of this reign, up to Michaelmas 1788, in payment either of the principal or of the interest of their respective debts, to the amount of about £. 189,354,581.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

*Public
Debts.*

The total expences of this reign until Michaelmas 1788, may be thus stated:

The civil list	£. 25,849,511
The navy	116,725,948
The army	96,565,762
The ordnance	17,079,011
Miscellaneous expences	4,466,508
	<hr/>
	£. 260,686,740
In payment of the principal and interest of the public debts	189,354,581
	<hr/>
Total	£. 450,041,321

The peace establishment on an average of four years, ending 1770, was as follows:

Average of Navy	£. 1,573,422
Army	1,513,412
Ordnance	227,907
Miscellaneous services	108,231
	<hr/>
Total	£. 3,422,972

The peace establishment being thus ascertained, it is evident that any expence exceeding that sum, from the commencement of the American war *anno* 1775, to this time, may be stated to its account.

The

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

The following supplies (including votes of credit for seven years) were granted since that period :

<i>Anno</i> 1775	-	-	-	-	£. 3,584,955
1776	-	-	-	-	8,187,486
1777	-	-	-	-	9,649,795
1778	-	-	-	-	11,585,409
1779	-	-	-	-	12,365,645
1780	-	-	-	-	5,749,199
1781	-	-	-	-	19,189,187
1782	-	-	-	-	17,709,055
1783	-	-	-	-	13,694,102
1784	-	-	-	-	7,154,568
1785	-	-	-	-	4,773,377
1786	-	-	-	-	5,038,344
1787	-	-	-	-	4,448,495
1788	-	-	-	-	4,943,883

The navy debt, funded *anno* 1784 and 1785, amounted to - - - 17,869,993

The unfunded debt *anno* 1788 may be stated at - - - £. 10,750,000

Anno 1774 was only about - 3,000,000

Difference 7,750,000

£. 163,693,484

By the mode pursued of giving the public creditors a great additional capital when any debts were funded, the public has incurred an artificial debt of about - - - 23,400,000

£. 187,093,484

The peace establishment, at the rate of £. 3,422,972 *per annum* for the space of 14 years, would amount to - - - 47,921,608

There remains the expence of the American war, being - - - £. 139,171,876

When

When this statement is considered, it is difficult to conceive how the war could have proved so unsuccessful. One would imagine, that it was hardly possible to contrive the means of wasting such enormous sums of money, to so little purpose. The naval victories of Rodney, and the gallant defence of Gibraltar, are almost the only circumstances, that can afford us any consolation, for such a fruitless waste of the national wealth. But it was in vain to expect success abroad, while a factious spirit triumphed at home, preying on the stamina of the country, and consuming its vitals and its strength^m.

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.*

It may now be proper, to give some general statements of the total of our public expences since the revolution, to Michaelmas 1788.

I. EXPENCES of the CIVIL LIST during the Reign of

William III.	-	-	-	£. 8,878,230
Queen Anne	-	-	-	7,604,848
George I.	-	-	-	10,632,514
George II.	-	-	-	27,382,258
George III. to Michaelmas 1788	-	-	-	25,849,511
				<hr/>
				£. 80,347,361

^m Justly it is observed by Shakespear,

———“ O ! England, England !

“ Thou little body with a mighty heart ;

“ What might’st thou do,

“ Were all thy children kind and natural !” —

*Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolu-
tion.*

2. NAVAL EXPENCES during the Reign of

William III.	-	-	-	£. 19,822,148
Queen Anne	-	-	-	23,484,574
George I.	-	-	-	12,923,851
George II.	-	-	-	71,424,171
George III. to Michaelmas 1788	-	-	-	116,725,948
				<hr/>
				£. 244,380,685

3. MILITARY EXPENCES during the Reign of

William III.	-	-	-	£. 22,017,706
Queen Anne	-	-	-	32,975,331
George I.	-	-	-	13,842,467
George II.	-	-	-	74,911,701
George III. to Michaelmas 1788	-	-	-	96,565,762
				<hr/>
				£. 240,312,967

4. ORDNANCE EXPENCES during the Reign of

William III.	-	-	-	£. 3,008,535
Queen Anne	-	-	-	2,100,676
George I.	-	-	-	1,064,449
George II.	-	-	-	6,706,674
George III. to Michaelmas 1788	-	-	-	17,079,011
				<hr/>
				£. 29,959,345

5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENCES during the Reign of

William III. (incidental expences)	£. 41,825	
Dutch expences, recoinage, &c.	4,389,991	
		<hr/>
		£. 4,431,816
Queen Anne (incidental expences)	£. 200,000	
Transport service, building churches, &c.	1,823,575	
		<hr/>
		2,023,575
		<hr/>
Carried forward,	£. 6,455,391	

	Brought over	£. 6,454,391	Public Ex-
George I.	-	150,000	pences since
George II.	-	3,651,404	the Revolu-
George III. to Michaelmas 1788	-	4,466,508	tion.
		£. 14,723,303	

6. INTEREST of the PUBLIC DEBTS, LOANS repaid, &c. during the Reign of

William III.	-	£. 13,971,458
Queen Anne	-	52,184,527
George I.	-	41,218,879
George II.	-	93,574,134
George III. to Michaelmas 1788	-	189,354,581
		£. 390,276,579

7. GENERAL VIEW of the PUBLIC EX- PENCES from the Revolution to Michaelmas 1788.

The civil list	-	£. 80,347,361
The navy	-	244,380,685
The army	-	240,312,967
The ordnance	-	29,959,345
Miscellaneous expences	-	14,723,303
		609,723,661
Principal discharged, and interest of the public debts paid, since the Revolution	-	390,276,579
Grand total		£. 1,000,000,240

8. PROGRESS of the PEACE ESTABLISH- MENT since the Revolution.

During the reign of King William	-	£. 1,907,455
Queen Anne	-	1,965,605
		George

<i>Public Ex- pences since the Revolution.</i>	During the reign of George I.	-	£. 2,583,000
	George II.	-	2,766,000
	George III. (<i>anno</i> 1770, in- cluding the civil list)	-	4,322,972
	Estimate of the peace establishment in future	-	4,937,274

The latter sum consists of the following particulars:

Civil list	-	-	-	-	£. 900,000
Navy	-	-	-	-	1,800,000
Army	-	-	-	-	1,600,000
Ordnance	-	-	-	-	348,000
Militia	-	-	-	-	91,000
Miscellaneous services	-	-	-	-	74,274
Increased plantation expences, and Hessian subsidy	-	-	-	-	124,000
					£. 4,937,274

But this estimate is greatly exceeded every year, particularly under the heads of naval, military, and miscellaneous services.

9. EXPENCES of War since the Revolution.

Expences of war during the reign of					
William III.	-	-	-	-	£. 30,447,382
Queen Anne	-	-	-	-	43,360,003
George I.	-	-	-	-	6,048,267
Expence of the war begun <i>anno</i> 1739	-	-	-	-	46,418,639
Ditto of the war begun <i>anno</i> 1755	-	-	-	-	111,271,996
Ditto of the American war	-	-	-	-	139,171,876
Ditto of the Dutch armament ^a	-	-	-	-	311,385
Total					£. 377,029,598

It

^a The merit of the revolution in Holland, which re-established the Stadtholder, was pretty generally-attributed, in this country, to the wisdom and spirit

It seems scarcely necessary, to remind the reader, <sup>Public Ex-
pences since
the Revolution.</sup> that minute exactness, in accounts of such magnitude, is not to be looked for. But the above statements, it is believed, are sufficiently accurate, to give him a general view of the nature of the public expenditure for this century past.

It is impossible for any one to consider for a mo- ^{Conclusion.} ment the preceding accounts, without demanding in what respects the nation is bettered, and what objects it has attained, in consequence of such enormous expences. True it is, that we retain some provinces in North America, some colonies in the West Indies, some settlements on the coast of Africa, the fortress of Gibraltar, and extensive possessions in the East. But these acquisitions,

spirit of *our* cabinet ; and particular credit is taken, on account of the small sum, which our exertions on that occasion are supposed to have cost. But the Prussian minister (the Count de Hertzberg) tells us a different tale. We are informed by him in his Memoire “ sur le vrai caractère d’une bonne histoire, et sur la seconde année du regne de Frederic Guillaume II. Roi de Prusse ; lu dans l’assemblée publique de l’Academie des Sciences de Berlin le 21 Août 1788.” “ C’est ainsi que *Le Roi* a eu la gloire et la satisfaction, “ d’avoir operé une des plus grandes revolutions, dans un etat voisin, en “ quatre semaines de tems, sans grande effusion de sang, par des resolutions “ promptes et vigoureuses, executées par la conduite sage et valeureuse du “ Duc de Brunswic, de ses generaux, et d’un petit corps de troupes Prussiennes.” Thus attributing the whole merit (in which he certainly went too far) to the Prussian government. With regard to the expence, when the Hessian subsidy of £. 36,093: 15 for four years, together with the sum of £. 100,000 *per annum* of additional establishment for protecting our West India islands, are considered, it will not appear so very insignificant. The subsidy amounts in all to £. 144,375, and the addition to our establishment is equal to the interest of £. 2,500,000 at 4 *per cent*. To this, the increased half-pay of the naval and military officers promoted upon the occasion, must be added. It is farther to be considered, that the manning of the fleet was almost universally defective, which greatly curtailed the expence of that department.

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however great or valuable, can never compensate for the waste of treasure and of blood, which has taken place, in consequence of that system of political conduct, which, since the Revolution, has been pursued.

The system to which I allude, had two objects in view. First, to check the power of the House of Bourbon, which seemed to threaten Europe in general with subjection. Next, to acquire, to establish, or to preserve, colonial settlements for the purposes of commerce. As that system has not proved very beneficial, it may be worth consideration, whether by altering it either in whole or in part, by abandoning all jealousy of France, and commencing a friendly intercourse and connection with that country; or by emancipating our American and West Indian colonies, we might not prevent such enormous expences for the future, and be enabled, honourably to discharge the incumbrances we have already incurred.

1. Connec-
tion with
France.

The situation of France has lately been represented to the world, in a manner that is sufficient to impress the strongest sentiments of jealousy in the minds of its neighbours. We are told by a minister of that country, who had every access to authentic information, that it boasts twenty-six millions of inhabitants; that it possesses above ninety millions sterling of circulating specie; and that the balance of commerce in its favour, is about three millions *per annum*. Allowing for some exaggeration, it cannot be doubted that
France

France is possessed of such population, industry, and wealth, as to render it not a little dangerous; and if it were to aim at new conquests and fresh acquisitions, it is to be hoped that a formidable confederacy would arise against it, sufficient to check its progress, and control its power. But if, on the other hand, the court of France is satisfied with the territories which it enjoys, and is determined to persevere in a pacific system; if the human and beneficent principles of a Necker, have sunk deep into the minds, and made a lasting impression on the sovereign of that country and his ministers; if the court of Versailles, instead of being the fatal source of intrigue and of war, is anxious to prove itself the spring of peace, and of happiness to mankind; and if, as the prelude to that system, it is desirous of entering into a close and intimate connection with the crown and people of Great Britain, undoubtedly there are terms on which such an intercourse may be safely concluded^o.

As the first step to remove that rancorous jealousy which subsists between the two countries, it would be necessary to conclude a treaty of commerce and alliance on terms mutually advantageous^p. Such a treaty, founded upon liberal principles, would contribute to augment the wealth and

^o Two able political authors, Monsieur de Calonne, and the famous Mirabeau, have inculcated the advantages of such a connection between France and England, with great ability.

^p The reader will please to remark that this was written *anno* 1785.

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increase the prosperity of both ; and would soon abate, if not totally remove the enmity that subsists between them.

It should be an indispensable article of such an agreement, that the two contracting parties should guarantee to each other the possessions they now enjoy, in whatever part of the world they may be situated, and should assist each other in defending such possessions, if attacked : and perhaps it ought to be understood, that in future Great Britain was to be the preponderating power in the East, and France in the West Indies. Indeed were our India islands, (Jamaica alone excepted), exchanged for the French possessions in the East, both nations might find it for their advantage.

Lastly, in order to remove all cause for jealousy, it might be proper to enter into distinct stipulations, in regard to the fleets and armies they are reciprocally to maintain. A superior force by land, is necessary for a continental power like France ; but that it should keep up an inferior navy, is an article that cannot be dispensed with. Britain is not safe in the neighbourhood of so warlike and so powerful a nation, if it is not mistress of the seas ; and unless France will assent to the justice of this principle, an intimate connection with that country must be avoided, as dangerous in the extreme².

² If the port of Cherburgh is not annihilated, and the navy of France restricted to forty, or fifty sail of the line, and a proportional number of frigates, the friendship of that country is not to be depended upon.

Such

Such are the terms which ought to be kept in view, whenever an alliance between the two countries, of a permanent nature, is proposed.

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Every one must perceive, from the preceding observations, that to enter into a safe and intimate connection with France, is a matter attended with many difficulties; that many obstacles must be removed, and many prejudices got the better of: and as the greater part of our past expences, has been owing to our colonial possessions in the West Indies, and in North America, which never yielded a revenue to compensate for the charges which they have occasioned; and as a war might always be carried on by this country, without much difficulty or expence, unless it became burdensome by providing for their protection, it is proper to consider, if the preceding system is found impracticable, whether it would not be politic, to propose to the different nations of Europe, and to the new states of North America, *a general colonial emancipation*.*

2. General colonial emancipation.

Such a measure, it is evident, would prevent the enormous expences, to which, in the course of future wars, this country will otherwise be subject, for the preservation of its colonies. Perhaps the very next war may see those colonies torn from us; and in the very act of losing them, we may add millions to our debts. Nay, if they are preserved,

* The author suggested this plan, in a little tract printed *anno* 1783, intitled *La Crise de l'Europe*. It was published in the French language, to make it more generally known on the continent.

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tion.*

they will cost us more in the course of a single war, than all the advantages to be drawn from them will ever compensate.

But a saving of expence, is not the only circumstance to be considered. If the French, the Portuguese, and Spanish settlements, were emancipated, as well as ours, from the monopolising spirit, and restrictive regulations, of the countries to which they belong, an unbounded tide of wealth and commerce would flow into this country: our present burdens would then seem light and easy, and we should be enabled to discharge, with little difficulty, no inconsiderable part of them.

Were this country convinced of the advantages of such a measure, it would not be difficult, with any tolerable management, to form a confederacy, sufficiently strong to bring about such an emancipation, with little hazard or expence.

The weakest and most unskilful politicians must perceive, that since the British colonies have been successful in throwing off the yoke of their mother country, it is to the highest degree dangerous, to suffer one family, united by the closest ties, or more properly speaking, the one branch dependent on and subservient to the other, to hold so preponderating a weight and influence in the American hemisphere.

Neither could France nor Spain, with any degree of reason, complain, should such a system be enforced by the united efforts of Europe. How can they justly object to the confirmation of South
American

American and West Indian independence? they, *Public Expenses since the Revolution.* who so liberally contributed their assistance, to enable the British colonies to establish themselves as sovereign states. The same natural rights and privileges, which they supported in one part of America, every other district, and every other inhabitant of that continent, and of the islands in its neighbourhood, are equally entitled to; and if it was not a generous spirit for protecting the oppressed, but a mean and contemptible jealousy, or a desire of avenging ancient injuries, by which they were actuated, and which made them resolve to take advantage of the difficulties in which a neighbour was involved, with whom they were at peace, for whom the greatest friendship was professed, whose possessions in those parts they have guaranteed, and whom they were bound indeed not to oppose, but to assist: how can they imagine, that the other nations of Europe, are not intitled to adopt the same line of conduct towards them, for whom they have reason to entertain a still higher degree of jealousy; from whom every one of them has received, either in former, or in recent times, still greater and more sensible injuries, and whose subjects pant for freedom, and an exemption from their yoke?

Every art will undoubtedly be made use of, by the partizans of the house of Bourbon, to prevent any ideas of this nature, from being attended to by the different powers of Europe. France, in particular, has long boasted of the dexterity, with
8 which

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which she enters into the counsels of her neighbours, and renders their conduct subservient to her views. On this occasion, when a plan is proposed, that would at once put an end to the most valuable branch of her commerce, and the principal source of her wealth, every artifice will be used, to ridicule it as visionary, to pronounce it impracticable to execute, and to load it with a thousand other objections, which despairing ambition will invent.

With regard to Spain, it is much to be wondered at, that the indignation and resentment of Europe has not long, ere now, burst forth against that imperious country. The feelings of mankind must be callous indeed, to have suffered the most fertile and valuable provinces in the world, to be so long subjected to her stern and detestable domination. With what indignation ought not every nation to be filled, by the arrogant claims of a single monarchy, pretending to engross such an extent of empire, and to prohibit every other nation in Europe from approaching its shores! Had it not been for its oppressions and misgovernment, what myriads of new inhabitants might not have been flourishing at this time in those distant regions; and how much would not the enjoyments of Europe have been increased by an intercourse with them! It is full time therefore, that its tyrannical system of oppression should be abolished, and that its colonies should at last taste some share of liberty and good fortune.

But it is surely unnecessary to dwell longer upon this subject, or to point out the advantages which
Europe

Europe in general would receive, were such an *Public Ex-*
important alteration to take place, in the situation *pences since*
and circumstances of the most fertile and valuable *the Revolution.*
provinces which the world contains. My breast
glows at the idea, that a time may possibly soon
arrive, when the ships of Denmark, of Sweden,
and of Russia, of Holland, of Austria, of France
itself, and of Great Britain, shall no longer be de-
barred from sailing to the coasts of Chili and of
Peru, or be precluded by any proud monopolist,
from exchanging the commodities of Europe for
the riches of America; and when every state, in
proportion to the fertility of its soil, and to the in-
dustry of its inhabitants, may be certain of procu-
ring all the necessaries and the conveniencies of life.
With such a new and extensive field opened to the
exertions of mankind, what discoveries might not
be expected, what talents might not break forth;
to what a height would not every art and science
be carried? The mind of a philanthropist, must
be overpowered with the magnitude and import-
ance of the ideas which present themselves to his
view; when he can figure for a moment, mankind
united together by mutual interest, and bound by
the ties of an unfettered commercial intercourse,
to promote the general happiness of the species*.

* This was originally written *anno* 1790, and it was thought proper to preserve it in this edition of the work. The observations which have occurred to the author, in consequence of the changes which the French revolution has introduced, will be the subject of future discussion.

TO THE READER.

THUS far had the work proceeded on the 1st of July 1801, when I found it necessary to stop its progress, both because the expences of the late war could not then be ascertained, and as business of considerable importance, (the improvement of several extensive tracts of country) rendered it necessary for me to visit Scotland. Indisposition prevented me from engaging in so laborious an attempt in the course of 1802: but I trusted that every obstacle to the completion of it would be removed in the following year, and with that view came to London towards the end of January 1803. Complaints, however, with which I have long been troubled, again returned; upon looking over the materials collected as a basis for the work, I found that several important documents were missing; the obtaining information and accounts from the different public offices, was attended with difficulty, (more owing at the same time, to the hurry of the different departments, during the sitting of Parliament, than any unwillingness to furnish them,) and in short there were many inducements to relinquish the undertaking altogether; but after fully deliberating on the subject it appeared to me on the whole better, to send an imperfect work to the press than none at all, being fully persuaded

persuaded that every candid reader would excuse defects which in the circumstances of the case could hardly be avoided, and which want of health rendered it impossible to supply. I trusted, at all events, that the subjoined review of the financial administration of the late minister, however hastily written, might be of some use. It would prove at any rate the anxiety of the author, to be the instrument of as much public good, and the means of preventing as much public mischief, as lay in his power.

London, 1st March 1803.

C H A P. III,

Review of the Financial Administration of the Right Honourable William Pitt^a, containing an Account of the Progress of the national Income and Expenditure, from Michaelmas 1788, to Michaelmas 1802, of the Sums borrowed during the late War, and the extraordinary Measures of Finance carried on during that Period.

THE financial history of this country, for the space of fourteen years prior to Michaelmas 1802, whether we consider the immense sums levied by various taxes,—the greatness of the public expenditure,—the magnitude of the loans borrowed,—or the variety of new measures which were brought forward, certainly contains more interesting and extraordinary particulars, connected with questions of revenue, than ever occurred in the annals of any other country, during so short a period. To enter into any minute detail, on subjects of so extensive a nature, regarding which so many volumes have been already published, would render it necessary far to exceed the boundaries to which a work of this nature must be limited. I trust the reader, therefore, will be satisfied with a general view, or

^a Mr. Pitt's administration began *anno* 1783, but the progress of the income and expenditure of the country, till Michaelmas 1788, has been already stated in the former part of this work.

summary of the whole, divided into four great heads or branches, namely, 1. The national income or revenue raised. 2. The loans borrowed. 3. The expenditure : And, 4. The extraordinary operations of finance which took place during that period. For more minute information, the debates in Parliament, and the numerous pamphlets which have been published respecting these memorable transactions, must be consulted.

It is certainly difficult to write regarding matters which have happened so recently, and in which the author himself bore some part. It is the more difficult, as it is impossible not to admire the splendid talents and superior powers of eloquence, by which that minister was distinguished, who presided over the councils of this country during that eventful era^b, whilst at the same time it may be necessary,

^b Some are inclined to think, that in the preceding edition of this work, the observations made on the administration of Mr. Pitt were too severe. The following is the opinion of an impartial foreigner regarding this point.

L'Histoire des Finances de la Grande-Bretagne par Sir John Sinclair, m'a présenté la réunion de tous ces avantages : elle en offre un plus rare encore chez cette nation. La plupart des Anglois qui ont écrit sur la politique, dirigés par l'esprit de parti, ont mis l'exageration des faits, et le sophisme, a la place de l'exaëtitude et du raisonnement, et ont souvent propagé des erreurs dangereuses, au lieu d'enseigner des vérités utiles. John Sinclair ne merite presque Jamais ce reproche ; il est ennemi du principal ministre, et cependant il le critique rarement, et ne le critique qu'avec sagesse.

Essai sur le credit commercial, et prospectus de la traduction de l'Histoire des Finances de la Grande Bretagne de Sir John Sinclair. Par J. H. M. à Paris, an 1801, p. 110.

in various respects, to question the system, and line of conduct he pursued. Complete impartiality and fair statement, however much it may be wished for by an author, cannot always be commanded, let his anxiety to attain them be ever so great. But the most likely means of doing justice to all parties, doubtless is, on questions of peculiar importance, to state the principal arguments which have been urged on both sides, and to leave the reader himself to draw the result.

Without dwelling at greater length on general topics, we shall now proceed to consider the particular articles proposed to be treated of in this chapter.

S E C T. I.

The national Income.

THIS general head of inquiry may be considered under two branches; namely, 1. The produce of the old revenue; and, 2. The amount of the new taxes imposed during the late war. In regard to the nature and effects of those taxes, that subject will be discussed in a subsequent part of the work, when the present state of the national income, and the different articles of which it consists, are explained.

I. Pro-

I. Produce of the old taxes.

From an examination of the state of the finances of this country during the American war, there was reason to believe, that no material defalcation had taken place in the permanent taxes of the country, even during that war, though it was unfortunately distinguished by many disasters. Nor is this to be wondered at; for the very expences of war itself must, to a certain extent, increase the revenue, by increasing the income of numbers of individuals, who are thereby enabled to consume a greater variety and quantity of articles liable to taxation. If the supplies were raised within the year, this would not be the case, for the revenue of one individual would be diminished in proportion to the increase of the other; but where the expences of war are defrayed by borrowing money, and in fact creating new capitals, and new incomes, the case is otherwise. When ten millions for instance are raised for the public service, at a high interest, not only a new capital is in a great measure formed, arising from the profit of contractors, the pay given for labour that otherwise would not have existed, &c.; but even where old capital is lent, from the increase of interest, the income of the lender is augmented; and the ten millions circulated amongst sailors, soldiers, farmers, merchants, manufacturers, &c. not only furnish them, but even those with whom they happen to have any dealing or connexion, with additional means of paying taxes to

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the Exchequer, the effect of which, is sooner or later felt, throughout all the sources of revenue.

In the course of the late war however, the old taxes increased in produce, not only in consequence of an increased expenditure, but also from an unexampled series of commercial and of general prosperity. In former wars, it never was expected, that the trade and manufactures of the country could equal their extent in peace; but during the late war, various circumstances contributed to render Great Britain the emporium of Europe, and almost of the universe. At home, the great increase of population, (which recent inquiries have put beyond doubt,) enabled the country to have in pay, a greater number of seamen and of soldiers, than at any former period of our history, and at the same time there was no want of hands to carry on, to a greater extent than ever, agriculture, manufactures, and commerce^c. Great Britain also acquired abroad many valuable possessions belonging to the French, the Dutch, and the Spaniards; by the greatness of its maritime power held the complete dominion of the sea; and whilst it possessed these advantages, the continent of Europe was convulsed with war, unable to direct its attention to commercial industry, and had no other market but England from which it could procure the productions of both the Indies. It is not to be wondered at

^c In this respect, the improvements of machinery were of great use, enabling us to carry on more extensive manufactures with fewer hands.

therefore,

therefore, that with such circumstances in its favour, the wealth and income of the nation should increase, and consequently that the old taxes should become more productive.

It is also proper to observe, that the minister anxiously brought forward several judicious regulations, which materially tended to increase the amount of the revenue. The consolidation of the customs, the checks on smuggling (which the war itself contributed to render more efficacious), and transferring the duties on wine and tobacco from the customs to the excise, all tended to enrich the Exchequer, notwithstanding the enormous burdens of additional taxation.

The following is a progressive state of the net produce of the old taxes from Michaelmas 1788 to Michaelmas 1802, estimating the land tax at £.1,972,000, and the annual malt tax at £.586,000 *per annum*^a.

Produce in the year ending Michaelmas

1789	-	-	-	£. 15,565,642
1790	-	-	-	15,985,068
1791	-	-	-	16,631,000
1792	-	-	-	17,382,435
1793	-	-	-	17,674,955
1794	-	-	-	17,193,171
1795	-	-	-	16,737,366
1796	-	-	-	16,286,647
1797	-	-	-	15,745,804
1798	-	-	-	15,820,848

^a For the progress of these taxes during the preceding part of this reign, see p. 32.

Produce in the year ending Michaelmas

1799	-	-	-	£. 16,833,487
1800	-	-	-	18,144,504
1801	-	-	-	16,752,539
1802	-	-	-	15,779,682

These taxes occasionally fell off, in consequence of the scarcities with which the country was sometimes afflicted; but on the whole it is evident, that the average produce during these fourteen years, considerably exceeded the average of the fourteen years immediately preceding.

II. Produce of the new permanent taxes.

The immense expences incurred during the late war, necessarily occasioned an unexampled addition to the old taxes, to defray both the interest of the money borrowed, and gradually to repay the principal, according to the provisions of a general law to that effect; and this independent of those extraordinary sources of revenue, as the income tax, &c. intended for the purpose of raising a part of the supplies within the year, the nature and amount of which will be the subject of future discussion and inquiry.

The following is an account of the produce of the new permanent taxes created since the year 1793.

Produce <i>anno</i> 1794	-	-	-	£. 247,638
1795	-	-	-	547,524
1796	-	-	-	2,007,229
1797	-	-	-	2,923,121
				Produce

Produce <i>anno</i> 1798	-	-	£. 4,697,392
1799	-	-	6,774,458
1800	-	-	8,205,290
1801	-	-	8,079,076
1802	-	-	9,187,287

It is a curious and interesting subject of inquiry to ascertain, how a nation, previously so heavily burdened, was capable of bearing such an additional load as the one above enumerated, of permanent taxes, besides the income tax.

1. It was certainly in a great measure owing to a circumstance already hinted at, namely, that the wealth of the country was rapidly increasing notwithstanding the pressure of a bloody and expensive war. Of this important event there cannot be a stronger evidence, than the variety and number of internal improvements, which were carried on during that period: and fortunately also, the progress of the revenue, even since the return of peace, is a sufficient proof that the wealth acquired was not of a fleeting or transitory nature.

2. The general alarm felt at the horrors resulting from the French Revolution, and the terror lest similar scenes might take place in this country, induced the people at large, and more especially those in the higher classes of society, to submit, without hesitation or reluctance, to any burden that might be imposed upon them. Whether that alarm was or was not carried to a height beyond what the circumstances of the case justified, and whether it was prudent for a free nation, to surrender its whole wealth to the discretion of one indi-

vidual or set of men, are questions which impartial posterity will be better able to determine than can be done in these times; but however that discussion may terminate, the alarm that was propagated, certainly enabled the minister to impose a quantum of taxation, far beyond the contemplation of any of his predecessors.

Lastly, the skill of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer in imposing taxes*, and carrying on the most intricate operations of finance, cannot be questioned. The authority also which he had acquired in the House, the ability with which he proposed measures in parliament, and the eloquence and dexterity in debate with which he defended them, enabled him to overcome financial difficulties from which most other men would have shrunk,

* The great object which the minister must have in view, when he proposes new taxes, is to raise a sum sufficient to defray the interest, and gradually to redeem the capital of the loan of the year; but not to burden the nation to a greater extent than is really necessary. This requires considerable knowledge of finance, great information regarding the political circumstances of the country, and sound political judgment. When it is known that taxes are to be imposed, the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the time being, is generally overwhelmed with such a multitude of projects of taxation, that it is often difficult to discriminate the good from the bad, or rather the less exceptionable from those which are more so, for there is hardly any tax that is not productive of some disadvantages. The produce of taxes, of a nature entirely new, are the most difficult to estimate. Where they have been already tried, and are not too heavy, the amount of any additional duty, may be pretty nearly calculated. There is every reason to believe, considering

S E C T. II.

Loans during the late War.

THERE is no political phenomenon that has puzzled more either the theoretical politician, or the practical statesman to account for, than how Great Britain has been enabled to raise the enormous sums which it has obtained at different periods, more especially during the late war. I shall endeavour therefore, previously to any statement of the money recently borrowed, briefly to explain, first, the general foundations of the public credit enjoyed by this country, and secondly, the actual sources whence the money it got was supplied.

1. British
loans.

Such loans could not have been borrowed, unless there had been a great mass of solid wealth in the country itself; for the money remitted from abroad, at any one period, was never very considerable, though the total sum due to foreign creditors, may have gradually accumulated to a large amount.

Not only a great mass of solid property is essential, but it is also necessary to have a considerable quantity of circulating wealth, which can easily be transmitted from any part of the kingdom into the

considering the greatness of the sums borrowed during the late war, and the taxes necessary in consequence thereof, that the produce of the different funds, were greater in point of amount, and came nearer to their original estimate, than could possibly have been expected.

Exchequer, and thence sent wherever the public exigencies may require it: and it is of little consequence, whether the circulating medium consists of paper or of specie, provided the paper is not discredited, and that there is a sufficient quantity of coin or of bills of exchange, to answer for foreign expences.

It is also necessary, that this circulating wealth, should be easily accessible, or in a great measure be concentrated in a large metropolis. Indeed as the strength of a country depends so much on its financial resources, which are most available when a great mass of circulating wealth is accumulated in the coffers of opulent individuals, constituting what is called a moneyed interest, and residing contiguous to each other, it is evident that the power of a nation rests in a considerable degree on the size of its capital; hence, as in ancient history, the contest properly was, between the cities of Rome and of Carthage, and not the countries they governed. So in modern times, the rivalry is not in fact between France and England, but between London and Paris, which places this country, in addition to its insular situation, more on an equality with France, (notwithstanding the disparity in regard to population and extent of territory), than is commonly imagined.

The power of borrowing money, must likewise depend on the belief, that there are resources sufficient to defray with punctuality and good faith, the interest of the sums borrowed, and its credit must
be

be still higher, if it can furnish resources gradually to extinguish the capital, so as to prevent an inordinate accumulation of public debt.

In the last place, it is also necessary, that the form of its government should be calculated to preserve the rights and privileges, and to protect the property of its subjects, and that the administration at the time, should be entitled to the confidence of the public, either from their abilities, the respectability of their private character, or their success.

We shall next proceed to explain the actual funds or sources whence the money borrowed by the public may be supplied.

1. Loans may sometimes be furnished, from money that has lain dormant or inactive, for want of proper means of employing it, and is called forth, by the high interest, and other advantages arising from lending money to the public, more especially, according to the modern system of borrowing, by the sale of a certain quantity of 3 *per cent.* stock, at a low price, which it is probable will afterwards rise considerably in its value, on the restoration of peace.

2. The second source is, the transfer of capital from other objects, to that of public loans; for instance, persons of opulence may have it in view to build for themselves new houses, to purchase pictures, furniture, and other expensive articles, or to enter into various speculations in agriculture, manufactures, commerce, mining, &c. which plans may be given up, from the greater expence which

war

war must necessarily occasion in carrying on such undertakings, and from the prospect of employing their money to much advantage in public loans.

3. In every industrious state, there is an annual accumulation of capital, from the industry of the nation alone, which may neither lay dormant as in the first case, nor be employed in domestic improvements as in the second, but may be invested in foreign speculations, or devoted to the purchase of various articles of foreign produce. This fund also, in time of war, is naturally applied to domestic public purposes, and in particular to public loans.

4. In consequence of the many valuable colonies belonging to Great Britain, more especially in the East and West Indies, considerable sums are remitted to the mother country, which are generally invested in the public funds, until the proprietors return home, and determine on some other means of employing their wealth, for instance, investing it in land or otherwise. This source was certainly extremely considerable during the late war, more especially in consequence of the high prices which the West India productions fetched in the markets of Europe.

5. The accumulation of capital, from the expences of war itself, more especially when they are principally laid out at home, is unquestionably one of the principal sources of future loans; and indeed the greater the loan is in one year, and the more the nation is imposed upon in its bargains, the greater is that resource during the ensuing year.

For

For example, if thirty millions are raised by the public, of which twenty millions are paid to contractors for purchasing naval stores, supplying the army with ammunition or with bread, forage, &c. if these contractors contrive to make a profit of five millions, they are enabled to lend the whole of that sum to the public, deducting merely what is necessary for their own subsistence. This fund is also increased by the wealth of those, whose income these contractors may have been the means of augmenting beyond their expenditure, and consequently who have additional capital to place in the funds^f.

6. Another great source of public loans arises from the savings of the interest paid to the public creditors. It is generally understood, that a large proportion of the public debt is due to individuals, who do not expend the interest they receive, either living parsimoniously, or having other funds arising from commerce, &c. by which they are maintained. Any surplus they can spare, it is natural for them to reinvest in the public funds, more especially in time of war, when the profit is so considerable. There is reason to believe, that out of eighteen millions now annually paid to the public creditors on the debt funded and unfunded, a sum little short of one fifth part, is annually reinvested in the funds, which increases rapidly their value in time of peace, and is one of the most important

^f Another resource connected with war, is prize-money, whether acquired by the army, the navy, or private ships of war.

resources for obtaining money in time of war, which the public possesses.

7. Another resource arises from money transmitted by foreigners to this country, and employed in our public loans. The amount however, at no period was so considerable as many have imagined, though foreigners were naturally desirous of having some property in our funds, on account of the regularity with which the interest was paid, the facility with which it could formerly be converted into specie, and the high credit which the British government had so long invariably maintained.

8. The last resource is, from the surplus of the public revenue, or the interest of any fund appropriated for the extinction of the national debt. The plan of borrowing, in time of war, from the commissioners appointed to pay off the national debt, the money annually entrusted to them for that purpose, was a part of the original system when a sinking fund was recently established. But that regulation has since been altered from the idea, that daily or weekly purchases made by the public, tended to keep up the price of the stocks, or at least had the effect of preventing any great depreciation. This is a question which nothing but experience can determine. It seems at first sight an absurd idea, to borrow with one hand, and to pay with the other. It is natural to suppose that the smaller the loan, the better would the terms be, on which it could be procured. At any rate, though a certain sum might be of service in preventing

venting too great a depression of the stocks, say a million per annum, or about £.20,000 weekly, yet beyond that amount it would be adviseable to direct the commissioners appointed for the redemption of the national debt when loans are necessary, to lend the whole of the fund entrusted to them to the public, so as to diminish, to that extent, the loan of the year.

Such are the sources whence public loans are in general supplied, from the consideration of which, it will not be wondered at, that such large sums could be procured by this country, more especially during the late war; and the following observations will explain, how the interest could also be raised with equal facility.

For in the first place, the whole income of a great and opulent nation may, to a certain extent, be pledged for that purpose; and if done step by step, which is always the case, where the interest, and not the principal is demanded, the hardship gradually increasing, is less felt, and the ancient possessors of the landed property of the kingdom, are ruined, before they are aware of it.

In the second place, the loan itself furnishes a new source of revenue. If the interest of the loan requires a fund for instance of £. 1,600,000 *per annum*, one fourth of that sum, or £. 400,000 a year, is paid either directly or indirectly into the Exchequer, in consequence of the various taxes on consumption, &c. to which public creditors residing at home, are liable. The nation is in this case like

like a private proprietor, who borrows £. 40,000 from his tenants, for which he agrees to pay them £. 2000 a year, but who contrives at the same time to add £. 500 *per annum* to his rent-roll, to be paid by the self same individuals.

It is certainly impossible to say, to what height this system may be carried, but there is every reason to believe, that it might be continued for many years, without any material public detriment.

In addition, however, to the sums borrowed for the service of England, two new sorts of loans for the first time appeared in our public accounts, namely, loans for the use of his Imperial majesty and for the service of Ireland. There was also a considerable difference between the unfunded debt of 1793, and of 1803, which is a sum also to be added to the loans of the late war.

2. Austrian
loans.

It had not been an unusual practice in former wars, for the British government to subsidize foreign powers, and when done with prudence, it is the cheapest way by which an opulent, can assist a poorer country. For instance, during the seven years war, a subsidy was granted to the king of Prussia of £. 600,000 *per annum*. If instead of money, we had sent men equivalent to that amount, the aid would have been of little consequence, because the expence of transportation, of feeding them at such a distance, of recruiting their number from time to time, &c. would have been very great, and perhaps our troops would not have cordially agreed with the Prussians, and could not have been

been easily marched to those places where their services might be the most useful. Whereas by sending money to the Prussian monarch, it might be employed in the manner the most likely, to be useful to the common cause, whether it was judged best to appropriate it to the paying of his troops, purchasing arms, collecting provisions, fortifying towns, obtaining intelligence regarding the motions of the enemy, &c. as the exigences of the case might require. During the late war however, the wants of the Emperor were so great and urgent, that no common subsidy could answer his purpose^a; and according to some, a subsidy was not reckoned perfectly consistent with the imperial dignity. It was therefore thought more expedient, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer of Great Britain, should raise money for the Emperor of Germany, in London, at the same time with the British loans. It was natural to suppose, that there would be less parliamentary difficulty in sending a large sum of money to Vienna, under the name of a loan, than that of a subsidy. The strongest assurances were given that the money would be faithfully repaid^b; but hitherto any engagement to that effect, whatever

^a It is said that the Emperor applied for a loan, a year before it was granted, and that the disasters in Flanders would have been prevented, had his request been earlier complied with.

^b So strongly was the idea of repayment either believed, or politically inculcated by the friends of the late administration, that in Mr. Rose's pamphlet, p. 18. we find the following observation. " Nothing but a direct and flagrant breach of national

whatever may be the case in future, has not been complied with.

The following is the amount of Loans borrowed in Great Britain, for the service of his Imperial majesty, during the late war.

Year.	Sum raised.			Capital created.			Interest.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
1795	4,600,000	0	0	3,833,333	6	8	115,000	0	0
1796	1,620,000	0	0	3,669,300	0	0	110,079	0	0
	6,220,000	0	0	7,502,633	6	8	225,079	0	0
Annuity for twenty-five years on the first loan							230,000	0	0
Management on stock and annuity							-	5,963	13 8
Fund of 1 per cent. on the last loan .							-	36,693	0 0
Total annual charge							-	£. 497,735	13 8

It was also proposed to grant another loan to the Emperor *anno* 1797, but that plan was given up, when his Imperial majesty was reduced to the dreadful necessity of submitting to the terms dictated to him by France.

3. Irish
loans.

It was during this war also, that a new practice was introduced, that of borrowing money in England, for the service of the Irish government, of funding it in England, where the interest was made

“ tional faith, and the most positive denial of justice, in the
 “ ordinary distribution of it at Vienna, can fix upon this coun-
 “ try ultimately, the charge incurred by the two imperial
 “ loans: the possibility of such an event cannot be admitted
 “ till the fact be established.”

able, but under the express stipulation that the money should be remitted from Ireland for that purpose. The loans necessary for the service of Ireland had formerly been raised at Dublin; but it was probably found, that in consequence of the heavy expences incurred during the late rebellion, that system was no longer practicable to the extent that was necessary, and the wealth of England furnished the only resource whence any additional sum could be obtained.

This plan evidently tends to make a confusion and intricacy in the public accounts of the two countries. It would be extremely desirable therefore, that both the capital of the debt, as well as the payment of the interest, could be transferred to Ireland.

The amount of loans borrowed in Great Britain, for the service of Ireland, was as follows.

Year.	Sum raised.	Capital created.	Interest, &c.
	£.	£.	£.
1797	1,500,000	2,925,000	126,775
1798	2,000,000	4,000,000	167,340
1799	3,000,000	5,250,000	212,314
1800	2,000,000	3,140,000	127,001
1801	2,500,000	4,393,750	188,000
1802	2,000,000	2,639,250 ¹	106,125
	13,000,000	22,348,000	927,555

¹ In this loan, £. 139,250 consists of what is called *deferred Stock*, the interest of which does not commence till the 5th of January 1808.

4. Unfund-
ed debt.

The nature of this debt, does not require to be explained to any person at all acquainted with the finances of this country. It consists of sums borrowed on Exchequer bills, and other public securities, for paying the interest of which, no particular tax has been imposed, *or fund provided*, hence it is known under the name of unfunded debt.

The amount of that debt, on the 5th January 1793, was £. 8,925,422. At Michaelmas 1802 it was at least nineteen millions and a half, making an addition, during the war, of £. 10,500,000, the annual interest of which, stating it only at three *per cent.*, cannot be estimated at less than £. 315,000 *per annum*.

We shall now proceed to give a general view of the loans during the late war, deducting the Austrian and Irish loans, and adding the surplus of the unfunded debt, so that the reader may be enabled to form an accurate idea of the whole debt incurred. It is proper at the same time to observe, that a part of that debt has been already paid, by the operation of the various sinking funds appropriated for that purpose; and if the taxes imposed are found to produce the sums at which they were originally estimated, the burdens of the late war, however grievous, will gradually melt away.

LOANS

LOANS during the late War.

Year when borrowed.	Sum borrowed, including the Amount of Navy and Exchequer Bills funded, also the Irish and Austrian Loans.	Stock created.	Annual Interest, Management, and 1 per cent. of Sinking Fund.	Rate of Interest on the Money borrowed.
1793	£. 4,500,000	£. 6,250,000	£. 252,812	£. s. d. 4 3 4
1794	12,907,452	15,676,525	773,324	4 10 9
1795	19,490,646	25,609,897	1,227,415	4 15 8
1796	31,726,796	41,303,699	1,850,373	4 13 5
1797	54,112,824	70,012,667	3,368,219	6 0 5½
1798	17,000,000	34,000,000	1,260,441	6 4 9
1799	18,500,000	32,699,250	1,112,207	5 8 8½
1800	20,500,000	32,185,000	1,089,933	4 14 2
1801	28,000,000	49,210,000	1,994,544	5 5 5
1802	25,000,000	44,328,637	1,552,927	3 18 3
Deduct the Austrian loans	231,737,718 6,222,000	351,275,675 7,502,633	14,502,195 497,735	<i>Note.</i> Mr. Morgan adds to the above capital the value of the long annuities, which, strictly speaking, may be right, but as there is evidently a great artificial capital in the amount of the stock created, it does not seem necessary to swell it more by such a conversion.
Deduct Irish loans	225,515,718 13,000,000	343,773,042 22,348,000	14,004,460 927,555	
Add surplus of unfunded debt	212,515,718 10,500,000	321,425,042 10,500,000	13,076,905 315,000	
Total during the war, after all deductions	223,015,718	331,925,042	13,391,905	

The specific terms on which these loans were raised, were extremely various, the particulars of which cannot be detailed in a work of this nature. They are contained in the different acts which were passed regarding them, and an historical abstract of the particulars thereof, will be found in a short, but useful treatise; dedicated to that special purpose ^k.

S E C T. III.

Expenditure.

EVER since the reign of king William (whose income and expenditure was ascertained with uncommon minuteness, and during whose government particular attention was paid to matters of finance ^l), the public accounts of this country have had little pretension to accuracy or precision. The receipts have been confused by votes perpetually deficient, (as in the case of the annual taxes on land and malt), and the expences, by sums first appropriated for one purpose, and afterwards transferred to another, and various sums stated as belonging to one service, which ought properly to

^k See the terms of all the loans, by J. J. Gnellier, 2d edition, octavo, printed *anno* 1802.

^l It will appear from a view of the income and expenditure of king William (which will be printed by way of appendix to this work), that the whole was accounted for to a single farthing.

have been placed to the account of a very different department. Much confusion also has of late years arisen, from votes of credit, anticipations of the revenue, funding bills of various descriptions, the intermixture of Austrian and Irish loans, discharging the civil list debts, the payment of various sums in consequence of addresses from Parliament, and other sources of perplexity. In short, from these circumstances, joined to the magnitude of the sums received and expended, it was at last found necessary on the 10th of March 1797, to appoint a select committee, “with full power to form and digest a plan for controlling the public expensiture, and to report upon the best and most practicable means of obtaining a diminution thereof.” The mode of stating the public accounts has, by the measures recommended by that committee, been greatly improved. In regard to our expences for some years preceding that period, it would require the unceasing labour of an intelligent committee for several weeks, with full power over all the departments of the Exchequer, to draw up such an account as ought to be given of them. The reader therefore cannot expect any very accurate detail, but we shall endeavour briefly to state (with as much precision as the nature of the case, and the information that could be procured will admit of), the expences 1. of the civil list; 2. of

“ See Mr. Pitt’s speech, 10th March 1797. Parliamentary Debates, vol. 2. p. 2.

the navy ; 3. of the army ; 4. of the ordnance ; 5. the miscellaneous expences ; and lastly, the charges of the late war, including the sums expended in consequence thereof, both in Ireland and the East-Indies.

1. The civil list, and expenditure of the royal family.

The information regarding the income and expenditure of the royal family, during the above period, may be ascertained with more accuracy than any other branch of the present inquiry, a committee having been appointed to ascertain that particular point, whose report contains a variety of useful information upon the subject^a. As this important document fills seventy-three pages folio, and contains a number of minute accounts and calculations, it cannot be particularly dwelt on. For our present purpose it is only necessary to state, 1. the sums which were actually expended in the civil list department for sixteen years, ending 5th January 1802 ; 2. the amount of the debt arising in consequence thereof ; and, 3. it may be proper to give a general view of the personal income of the royal family.

^a The editor of Debrett's Parliamentary Register (vol. 17. p. 546, and 547.) contends, that there is a material error in one part of this report, to the amount of about £. 200,000.

The following is an account of the charges of the Civil List, for sixteen years prior to 5th January 1802.

Class.	Annual Average of Expenditure.			Total in sixteen years.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
1. Royal family	209,988	15	0	3,359,828	7	10 $\frac{1}{4}$
2. Great officers of state	33,279	10	0	532,472	0	1
3. Foreign ministers	80,526	0	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,288,416	3	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
4. Tradesmen's bills	174,697	13	11	2,795,163	2	3 $\frac{3}{4}$
5. Menial servants of the household	92,424	6	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,478,789	5	8
6. Pensions	114,817	6	11	1,837,077	10	6
7. Salaries to various officers	76,013	18	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	1,216,222	17	0 $\frac{3}{4}$
8. Commissioners of the Treasury	14,455	14	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	231,191	13	10 $\frac{3}{4}$
9. Occasional payments	203,964	6	0 $\frac{1}{4}$	3,263,428	16	4
Total	1,000,167	9	6	16,002,679	17	0

Such were the real charges; we shall next proceed to state the amount of the debt arising in consequence thereof.

The total annual grant to defray the expenses of his majesty's civil government, it is well known, is £. 900,000 *per annum*. The excess consequently was at the rate of £. 100,167 : 9 : 6, which, in sixteen years, amounts to £. 1,602,679 : 15 : 0 $\frac{1}{4}$. But the manner in which the sum actually voted by Parliament was made up, will appear from the following statement:

1. Excess beyond the grants in sixteen years	£. 1,602,679	15	0 $\frac{1}{4}$
2. Arrears of former civil list debt	192,500	0	0
Carry over	£. 1,795,179	15	0 $\frac{1}{4}$

	Brought over	-	£. 1,795,179 15 0½
3.	Deduct various sums applied in aid of the civil list	-	634,036 0 0
			<hr/>
4.	Deficiency on 5th January 1802		1,161,143 15 0½
5.	Deduct various balances remaining in the Exchequer, and sums payable by various persons (see Report, p. 58.)		265,174 8 10½
			<hr/>
			895,969 6 2
6.	Add various sums advanced out of the civil list, according to the particulars stated in the Report, p. 50.	-	94,084 0 0
			<hr/>
			£. 990,053 6 2

Which was the sum actually voted by Parliament, (deducting fractions) though the manner in which it was ascertained, has not hitherto been explicitly stated in any public document.

From an examination of the papers referred to them, it appeared to the committee, that the plan originally formed in 1786, for the expences of the civil list, was calculated with an expectation of the duration of peace, and that the continuance of the war alone, through so large a proportion of the time in question, sufficiently accounted for the greater part of the excess. On the whole, though the debt actually incurred may be justified, and consequently it was advisable to pay it, yet persons accustomed to such investigations, will naturally question the propriety of suffering so large a debt to accumulate, for such a number of years, without any communication to Parliament.

The income of the civil list, by the experience
4 of

of so many years, having proved inadequate, a committee was appointed, on the 16th of March 1803, to consider of the charges on that branch of the revenue, and to report the same, together with their opinion thereupon to the House; and as it has been found that a material deficiency has arisen for several years past, the inquiry will probably terminate, in transferring such a number of articles from the civil list, to the consolidated fund, as will enable a minister, with any share of prudence and economy, in future to make the income and expenditure to quadrate.

On the subject of the civil list, it may be proper to add, that it would be extremely desirable to get rid of a number of trifling payments with which the accounts of that branch of our expenditure is at present encumbered^o; and perhaps it might be expedient, even to diminish the amount of the civil list, and to pay the judges, the foreign ministers, &c. from other funds. Ignorant people suppose, because £. 900,000 *per annum* is granted to the Crown, that all that sum is expended by the royal family, whereas the personal expences and allowances made to them, are extremely moderate, and cannot be objected to by any one who is at all aware of the advantages which necessarily result from the monarchical part of the constitution^p.

The

^o This might be done, by advancing a certain sum to the bank, on its undertaking to pay those allowances.

^p A person attached to Jacobinical principles, discussing the subject of government with one of very opposite sentiments, said

The following is a short statement of the allowances actually paid to all the branches of the royal family, not only from the civil list, but from the consolidated fund whence the general expences of government are defrayed.

The PENSIONS and ALLOWANCES to the Royal Family.

From the Civil List.

	Annual Sum.
His Majesty's privy purse - - -	£. 60,000
The Queen - - -	58,000
The Prince of Wales - - -	60,000
Princess Charlotte of Wales - - -	6,000
Duchess Dowager of Cumberland - - -	4,000
	<hr/>
	£. 188,000

From the Consolidated Fund.

Prince of Wales - - -	£. 65,000
Duke of Gloucester - - -	17,000
	<hr/>
Carry over 82,000	£. 188,000

said to him, in ridicule of a monarchical government, "Why the king will eat us up; he devours a million *per annum*!" "I deny that," said the other, "for the whole royal family do not cost the nation one third of the money. But if it were a million *per annum*, and more, it is well bestowed, for the king prevents his subjects from devouring one another." In fact, how can a country enjoy prosperity to any great extent, without that security and quiet, which generally accompanies hereditary monarchy; and if in addition to the advantages arising therefrom, rational liberty, and freedom from oppressive taxation, can be obtained, the general happiness of a nation must be complete.

Brought

	Brought over	£.82,000	£.188,000
Duke of York	-	14,000	
Dutcheſs of York	-	4,000	
Dukes of Clarence, Kent, Cumberland, Cambridge, and Suſſex, £.12,000 each	}	60,000	
		-----	143,000
			<hr/> £.331,000 <hr/>

The total expence of the civil liſt, for fourteen years, ending 5th January 1802, at the average rate of £. 1,000,167, the eſtimate of the committee, may be ſtated at £. 14,002,338, in addition to any ſums or annual grants paid out of the conſolidated fund to the branches of the royal family.

2. Naval expences.

The glory acquired by the Britiſh navy, during the late war, cannot be paralleled either in ancient or modern hiſtory. The expences of that department at the ſame time, have been ſo conſiderable, that Parliament has thought it adviſable to appoint a ſpecial commiſſion for the purpoſe of inveſtigating their nature and amount^p. Until the report of that commiſſion is communicated to the public, it is impoſſible to form any juſt idea of the extent of this branch of our expenditure, or whether the

^p The author ſtrongly recommended ſuch a commiſſion, in his Thoughts on the Naval Strength of the Britiſh Empire. Part II. p. 108. Edit. 1795.

grants of Parliament have in all instances been fairly and judiciously applied. In the interim it may be sufficient to lay before the reader, an account of the sums annually voted for naval services for the period to which this chapter relates.

STATE of the Naval Grants for fourteen years,
ending in 1802.

Year.	Sum.	Year.	Sum.
1789	- £. 2,328,570	1797	- 13,033,673
1790	- 2,433,636	1798	- 13,449,388
1791	- 4,008,405	1799	- 13,642,000
1792	- 1,985,482	1800	- 13,619,079
1793	- 3,971,915	1801	- 15,857,037
1794	- 5,525,331	1802	- 13,833,573
1795	- 6,315,522		
1796	- 11,883,693		£. 121,907,305

Besides the above sums, the amount of various navy and victualling bills separately funded, and that part of the ordnance expenditure, which is appropriated for the naval service, might be added.

In the course of the present war, in addition to the usual departments of the navy, a new institution was formed, under the name of the Transport Board, the nature and advantages of which it may be proper to explain, as there is a natural constitutional jealousy in this country against all novel establishments.

The

The hiring of transports by one board, (a measure Origin and advantages of the Transport Board. strongly recommended by the commissioners of inquiry in the year 1788), for the use of the other departments requiring tonnage, namely, the navy, victualling, and ordnance offices, together with the army, has prevented that competition in the engagement of shipping, which had before existed, and which during the present war, when tonnage on account of the immense extension of trade has been scarce and dear beyond example, would most undoubtedly have operated for that very reason the more, to an additional enormous expense for this part of his majesty's service.

Transports, belonging to the several boards, have been known formerly to have remained unemployed, or to have skulked in the execution of duty, for months, too much unnoticed, perhaps from the unavoidable circumstance of the pressure of other business on the several departments to which they belonged, and especially in the time of war. But if each of the three great boards, who, before the present arrangement, engaged transports, can be supposed to have permitted, on account of the employment of their chief attention to other duties, only one transport for each respective department to be unnecessarily engaged, or misemployed or unemployed; the hire of three such transports of the common size would amount to above £. 8,000 *per annum*, and greatly exceed the expense of the transport establishment, especially reduced,

reduced, as it now is, to three commissioners, since the cessation of the war. The saving, made by the board, on this head, by appropriating transports proportioned to their intended services, by keeping them with every possible strictness to their duty, and by discharging them immediately when they could be dispensed with, has been an article of the greatest consequence to the public purse.

It was the practice, and perhaps the unavoidable one, of the boards, who formerly engaged transports, to devolve the examination of them, respecting size, fitness, &c. to inferior officers serving under them. None are now employed, who have not, over and above the superintendence of the shipwright, officer, and an agent who is a commissioned officer in the navy, passed under the particular examination of one of the sea-commissioners of the transport board, and approved by certificate under his hand. Very serious and expensive abuses are prevented by this measure.

For the conveyance of troops on short services, the officers commanding regiments, or detachments of regiments, were formerly accustomed to hire vessels; but as these gentlemen could not be expected to know much of shipping, and particularly with respect to the two very important points of size and price; their engagements were generally attended with an extravagant charge, and often with
an

an unnecessary duration of hire by demurrages, through inadvertency or mismanagement. Since the transport board has carried on the business, idle tonnage has been greatly avoided, many accommodations afforded to the troops, and heavy charges saved ; all which could not have been effected, if left to the army ; nor performed with equal advantages, if committed to other departments, embarrassed with duties of different kinds.

The transport board have also been engaged in the execution of frequent orders of a miscellaneous kind, committed to them by the Lords of the Treasury, in the discharge of which, and the other duties entrusted to their care, there is every reason to believe that, by their probity and economy, they have saved their country several hundred thousand pounds, or, in other words, more money, than the expense of the establishment could amount to for a century.

It would appear too that the transport board has afforded no small convenience to the treasury, by the investigation of various memorials regarding naval matters, and in other respects has been the means of saving great sums to the public, by enforcing subordinate arrangements ; by investigating the expenditure and return of stores, by checking the times and places in which transports are employed ; by mulcting defaults ; by close examination of log-books and papers in tracing abuses ;

abuses; by resisting false claims on various pretences, which seamen only can detect; by rigidly exacting musters of complements; and by many other articles of detail, too numerous to mention.

It is necessary only to add, upon this head of the transport-service, that the various duties above-mentioned, must be executed, either by one board, or by several other departments: If by several departments, the disadvantages and expences would be such as have been already considered, and would remain such probably without a remedy; but, if by one board instituted for the sole purpose, the whole charge (as was before observed) may be comprized most certainly within the expence of hiring of three transports at the utmost, with the advantage of precluding many expensive inconveniences and irregularities.

Charge of
prisoners of
war.

About a year and a half after the institution of the transport department, the care of prisoners of war in health was taken from the commissioners for the sick and wounded, and confided to the transport board. Two additional commissioners were appointed, and the clerks, who had been formerly employed on that duty, were removed to the transport office.

Nothing detracting is meant against the board for sick and wounded seamen, consisting almost entirely of medical men, when it is observed, that their habits do not lead them to understand the management of seamen made prisoners, and to the engagement of proper

proper vessels for cartels, &c. with an advantage equal to sea officers, who compose the majority of the transport board, and who are accustomed, from the nature of their profession, to understand the methods of dealing with and managing, people of their own way of life, in preference to gentlemen of any other description. It may truly be said, that much benefit, upon this ground alone, has arisen to the public from their employment.

There are also other benefits. By fixing upon some principal depôts for the reception of prisoners, and by abolishing twelve smaller establishments of the kind which appeared to be unnecessary, a saving was made, for the first year, in salaries, rents, removals of prisoners, &c. of full £. 3000 *per annum*.

Six establishments for prisoners in the West Indies were also, by arrangements, rendered unnecessary and abolished, by which means the sum of £. 10,057 : 19 : 10 sterling *per annum* was saved in salaries, and the hire of prisons and prison-ships, and above £. 1000 more in extra charges.

Many other inferior expences have been spared to government, through frequent visits of the commissioners at the several depôts, in the correction of abuses, the reduction of unnecessary people, the institution of more minute and exact regulations, and many other circumstances of an inferior kind, which cannot be detailed without prolixity, but by which a great variety of charges have been either lopped off, or prevented to accumulate.

Only one point more shall be added. The accounts for prisoners during the American war have not hitherto been liquidated: Those which have occurred for the last war, are in such a train of adjustment, that the home-business is already duly balanced, and, in a few months, the foreign will be completely brought up and settled.

These observations, certainly place in a very favourable point of view, the advantages of this institution.

3. Military expences.

The late war, though not so successful by land, as by sea, yet was distinguished by a number of important acquisitions, as Minorca, Malta, and Egypt, besides various valuable settlements belonging to the Dutch, the French, and the Spaniards, in Africa and both the Indies. Our greatest efforts, however, were naturally bent to the naval service, and we relied too much on the exertions of our allies for triumphs on the continent of Europe. It certainly would be desirable to ascertain, the circumstances which occasioned a disappointment in the expectations we were naturally led to entertain, of the success of so powerful a confederacy. It might have been occasioned by three causes, either want of force, or want of arrangement, or want of skill and honesty in carrying the plans against the common enemy into execution.

In regard to the first, when the confederacy against France was formed, there certainly was
force

force sufficient, if not to crush the new republic, at least to keep it within its ancient limits. As to the second point there seems to have been many unfortunate errors. It was impossible for so many powers, remote from each other, to co-operate by means of negociations, carried on at each different court. The Austrian monarchy has found it necessary to dissolve the Aulic council of war, though sitting at Vienna, as a plan utterly incompatible with the management of a war; but during the late contest, there was a species of European council of war, the members of which sat at each of the capitals of the confederacy, the consequence necessarily was, that the plans were ill arranged, too late in being carried into execution, and almost uniformly discovered by the enemy. In the subjoined note, a plan is mentioned, which, had it been adopted, would probably have given a different turn to the contest on the continent¹.

As

¹ In March 1793, I drew up a paper to the following effect, which I transmitted to the British cabinet. "Great Britain is more interested in the present war than any other country in Europe. If it is unfortunate, the other powers will make peace with France, and leave England in the lurch. Then it will have to fight with a warlike and desperate enemy, who, from necessity, must carry on an offensive war against this country, by means of invasion. Great Britain therefore ought to endeavour to unite all the powers now confederated together, in a joint and regular system of attacking France; that the war may speedily be brought to a conclusion, and may not ultimately be pointed against her alone, without any co-operation or assistance.

As to skill in managing the war, and I am sorry to add, even honesty in executing the plans resolved on, there is reason to believe, that the Auf-

“ But with that view it is absolutely necessary, that there should be an executive cabinet council stationed at a central place ; for the purpose of directing the execution of a regular system of attack, and that no time should be lost in adopting that measure.

“ A moment’s consideration must satisfy any one, that if there is no concert among the confederates, or if it is essential, on all occasions, to send messengers to every Court in Europe, for their opinion and consent ; it must be impossible to expect success against an active enemy, who takes its resolutions one instant, and executes them the next.

“ It is therefore submitted to the consideration of the British cabinet, whether it would not be a prudent measure, to propose to the confederated powers, that each of them should send a confidential minister to some central spot, such as Cologne, Franckfort, &c. who should always be within one or two days march from the grand army, and who should be invested with unlimited powers of directing the operations of the armies, both on the Rhine, and on the frontiers of Holland and Flanders. That cabinet to be responsible for the activity of the troops, and the general success of the campaign. In such a council, Great Britain would necessarily have a considerable influence, as it is only by its assistance that the confederates can expect to make any real impression upon France.

“ At present, it is certain, that though the powers confederated against France, are, to all appearance, united together in the same measures and system, yet each unquestionably has particular objects in view, fully as much as the success of the common cause ; nothing but such a general cabinet, which will banish petty views from their councils, will ever make them enter into the war with that zeal and activity, which the importance of the interests they have at stake certainly requires.

“ It

trian monarchy was not so well served as it ought to have been, and that many of the defeats and losses which it experienced, were occasioned, either by the vilest mismanagement, or the grossest corruption. Indeed when assertions to that effect were so generally circulated, it would have been prudent for us, either to have insisted upon a change of the generals appointed, or to have quitted an ally, whose fate, the consequence of its own imprudence, might easily be foreseen.

The military expences during this period may be stated as follows.

ACCOUNT of MILITARY EXPENCES for fourteen years, ending in 1802.

Year.	Sum.	Year.	Sum.
1789	- £. 1,917,062	1797	- £. 15,488,088
1790	- 1,809,574	1798	- 12,852,814
1791	- 2,062,548	1799	- 11,840,000
1792	- 1,819,460	1800	- 11,941,767
1793	- 3,993,715	1801	- 12,117,039
1794	- 6,641,060	1802	- 10,211,795
1795	- 11,610,008		
1796	- 11,911,899		£. 116,216,829

It has often occurred to me, that the nation was in some degree indemnified for the expences of the late contest, however enormous, by the experience On the military establishment during the late war.

“ It is supposed that the confederated armies may amount to perhaps 200,000 men. The force is great, *and sufficient for every object in view.* But unless they have provisions in abundance, able generals, and above all, unless they act in unison, they can do nothing effectual.”

which it acquired in the art of war, and by the military skill and spirit which it was the means of spreading from one end of the kingdom to the other. The extension of this military ardour does much credit to the zeal and talents of the war minister at the time, (Lord Viscount Melville), to whose exertions it may in a great measure be attributed. The system he established, I shall endeavour briefly to explain, as it furnishes a model, for any future period of similar danger and alarm.

When the successes of France on the continent, had terrified all the powers of Europe, and there was reason to imagine, that Great Britain would soon be obliged to contend, single handed, against the new republic, it could hardly be doubted, that such a force *by land* was necessary, to protect this country against any risk of invasion, as had never been requisite before. For however powerful we were at sea, yet a descent was certainly not impracticable, and we had a desperate government at the moment to contend with, who regarded little what it did, and would not hesitate to sport with the lives of its subjects, for even a remote chance of its success. In that critical emergency, a force was called forth, unparalleled in the history of this country: It consisted of, 1. the regular army; 2. a militia; 3. fencibles; 4. volunteer corps receiving pay; and, 5. volunteers without pay, including that excellent institution, the yeomanry cavalry.

The

The regular army of Great Britain, exclusive of ^{1. Army.} Ireland, amounting, *anno* 1800, to about 105,000 men, certainly contained as large a proportion of *soldiers for life* as the population of this country could well admit of; and as to the idea of having the army filled with men enlisted for temporary service, nothing seems to me more ill judged. In almost all other professions, a person who enters into them, continues for life. What good reason then can be assigned, why the army should be an exception? The public certainly cannot be benefited by having a raw recruit to pay a fresh bounty to, in room of a trained and veteran soldier; and in regard to the men, if after they become unfit for service, they are maintained at the public expence, during the remainder of their lives, they can have no just ground for complaint. Indeed, if another plan were adopted, and if soldiers were enlisted during a term of years, the state of this country might become in the highest degree alarming, if the period terminated in the midst of a war; or if in that case it could be prolonged till hostilities were concluded, yet an artful enemy might avail itself of that circumstance, by patching up a treacherous peace, and when all our veteran troops were disbanded, renewing unexpectedly the war. Such a system at least is perfectly inconsistent with any power having colonial possessions; for it would not be worth while to be at the expence of transporting soldiers to the East or West Indies, for the service of a year or two, and then to be under necessity

of bringing them back again ; and yet one half of every regiment might consist of persons of that description. In fact, soldiers who enter into the regular army are, as it may be figuratively stated, married to the drum, and no divorce ought to be admitted but in circumstances of a very peculiar nature. If there are any who wish for temporary service, let them enter into the fencibles or the militia. And when we consider the nature of a military life, so inconsistent with the ties of marriage, with the rearing up, and education of children, and with returning to a life of useful industry and labour, it is certainly not desirable to have a single individual of that description beyond what is really necessary, or than the population of the country can easily spare.

2. *Militia.* A militia may be properly defined, *a body of men, collected from all the different districts in the kingdom, serving by rotation, raised merely for the internal defence of the country, and not subjected, unless when actually embodied, to the duties of a soldier*.*

The advantages attending such an institution are very great.

By establishing a body of men who are never to be sent out of the kingdom, officers may acquire a certain degree of military knowledge and experience, who would never think of enlisting into a standing army, or would not choose to run the risk

* See Considerations on Militias and Standing Armies, a tract written by the author anno 1782.

of being sent to contend with the frigid regions of Canada, or the sultry climes of Indostan.

By collecting such a corps from every district in the kingdom, military spirit and skill, is not confined to any particular spot, but it is proportionally extended throughout every corner of the country.

Such soldiers also; not being totally dedicated to military objects, except in cases of urgent necessity, can never be accounted such a burden upon a nation, as standing forces necessarily become in a period of long tranquillity.

It is by such a system alone, that a wealthy and industrious nation can keep up, for any length of time, a military spirit; without which, of what avail is all the wealth and industry it can amass. They can only serve to render a country more liable to the attacks of an enterprising enemy, and perhaps more likely to submit to the invader.

Such are the general advantages attending the militia establishment as it exists at present; which I thought it necessary shortly to state, as suggestions have been thrown out that it would be politic to overturn the system entirely, and to have an addition to the standing army in its stead. I trust however that any attempt of that nature, will be defeated. If the militia is too numerous, diminish the number, but do not destroy the whole institution. If raising men for that service, interferes with recruiting for the regular army, prevent substitutes as much as possible, or allow a certain number of militiamen, annually to be recruited into

into the line. In regard to the difficulty of procuring officers, two modes might be fallen upon. The first is, that of having only two officers for each company of 100 men, encreasing at the same time the pay of those who are retained. It is evident, that those whose service is only of a temporary nature, require to be rather more amply paid, than a body of men who are perpetually kept in pay, and on this plan it might be done without any additional expence to the public. The other mode occurred to a very respectable country gentleman, (Sir Cecil Wray), several years ago. His idea was, that the gentlemen of the kingdom should be divided into two classes. 1. Those who were possessed of estates from £ 500 to £.1000 *per ann.* and upwards, and 2. Those whose incomes were under either of those sums : that the former should ballot for the higher commissions, and the latter for the inferior ; and that all in their turn should serve in person for three years, or find proper substitutes, or pay a certain fine, varying according to circumstances, whether they were single or married, &c. This idea is well worthy consideration, as the most likely means of procuring an effective body of officers, according to the true principles of a constitutional militia.

3. *Fencibles.* By the old laws of Scotland, (whence the term *Fencible* has been derived,) no possible pains was spared to rouse and to maintain a military spirit in the kingdom. Every individual was obliged, in proportion to his rank and fortune, to have certain kinds

kinds of arms in his possession^a, and at certain stated periods to produce them to the public^b; it was also enacted, that on Sundays and other holydays, every man should be trained in the arts and exercises of war, under the direction of an able officer, called, *the Captain of the parish*^c; a certain select body of men under the name of militia, which, in the reign of Charles the II. amounting to 20,000 foot and 2,000 horse, were raised by certain proportions throughout the different counties, on principles somewhat similar to the present militia of England, and were ordered always to be in readiness for the public service, whenever it might be necessary: the remainder, in the words of an old Act of Parliament, comprehended “*every man able of person to bear arms,*” and being only intended for the defence of the country, thence got the name of *Fencibles*^d.

^a 9 Jac. I. c. 120, 121, &c. 11 Jac. III. c. 80.

^b 2 Jac. I. c. 44. 3 Jac. I. c. 60, and many other acts in the succeeding reigns.

^c See 1 Jac. I. c. 18. 6 Jac. V. c. 91. Sunday was then included in the general term of Holyday. This constant attention on the part of the legislature, accounts for the great military spirit which prevailed in Scotland, and enabled the Scotch soldiery, under the standard of Gustavus Adolphus, to make so distinguished a figure against the veterans of Germany.

^d 6 Jac. V. c. 86. and 11 Act of the Convention of Estates 30th March 1689. See also the famous act of Security which passed Anno 1704, by which the whole protestant heritors, and all the boroughs within the kingdom, were ordered, forthwith to provide themselves with fire arms, for all *the Fencible Men* who are protestants, within their respective bounds, &c.

When

When a militia was established in England, it is well known, that the measure was confined to the Southern part of the kingdom, the policy or justice of which, it is unnecessary now to dwell on, as the distinction has happily been removed; but Scotland being thus left without any adequate defence, it was thought adviseable to raise some regiments of men, under the name of Fencibles, to serve in the room of a militia^{*}, and on the same principle not to march out of Scotland. The number varied. During the war that ended *anno* 1760, there were two, the Argyle and the Sutherland: During the American War they were increased to four, and at the commencement of the present war seven battalions were raised.

For reasons to be afterwards explained, I was always partial to that sort of service, and being convinced that it might be greatly extended, and rendered much more efficient, I proposed to raise a corps of Fencibles for the service of Great Britain, (which was the first of that description) and soon after another battalion for the service of Ireland. The number of Fencible corps, both cavalry and infantry, were afterwards greatly augmented.

The advantages to be derived from such an establishment, the reader will be able to appreciate, from a consideration of the following cursory observations.

Advantages
of Fencible
corps.

I. There are many men who will enlist for limited service, and for a limited time, (as the

^{*} In the public accounts of 1760, &c. they are included in the militia estimates.

duration

duration of a war), who will not engage for life, nor subject themselves to be sent to any climate however unwholesome. The number of men of this description may easily be ascertained, from a return of those who were lately disbanded as Fencibles, notwithstanding every inducement to enter into the line. Including both the old and the new Fencibles, the number will probably amount to above 10,000.

2. There are many gentlemen, who may be led on the spur of an occasion, to engage in the military line, for limited service in point of time and place, who are too old to enter into the army, and to pass through all the gradations of its different ranks, and who cannot be rapidly promoted without disgusting the officers of the regular forces, yet who may make excellent officers.

3. The militia of Great-Britain and Ireland, as now constituted, is certainly an admirable institution for national defence; but in some respects it is surely in point of principle inferior to the Fencible system, where the men are all volunteers, instead of being ballotted, and where no qualification in point of property is required from the officers, which can never be considered as a proper test of military merit.

4. Having different descriptions of troops, often excites a very useful spirit of emulation. Fencible corps naturally wish to emulate the line, and the line to maintain a superiority. This circumstance, it is probable, contributed to that excellent state
of

of good order and discipline which the Fencibles in general, more especially those in Ireland, maintained during the late war.

5. It is contended that *disposable troops*, as they are called, are the only description of corps of essential service to the public; and it is evident, that the more disposable an army is, it is the better for general service. But if either owing to a scarcity of population, or to the temper and circumstances of the people, you cannot raise beyond a certain number of men of that description, is it not politic and prudent, to take the assistance of others, though their service should be of a more limited nature, since thus you would have a complete command over all your disposable force, a considerable proportion of which must otherwise be retained for home defence. Besides, during the late war, a body of men volunteered into the line, from the Fencible service, without whose aid, the glorious expedition against Egypt, could not have been attempted, nor other enterprises carried on.

6. Another argument in favour of the Fencible service is, that on the whole it is rather cheaper than the regular. The bounty given may be less, there is no half pay attached to it, (though in future no Fencible regiments will be raised without some remuneration to the officers at the termination of the war), and being always at hand, there is nothing to prevent an immediate reduction as soon as peace is concluded, which might not be the case, if the whole force of the country consisted of
regulars,

regulars, unless the youngest regiments were always kept near home, in which case there would be little difference between them and Fencibles.

7. It is a great inducement to persons of large property, more especially in the northern parts of Scotland, to keep up a great, and otherwise useless population on their estates, for the satisfaction and credit of assisting government with great bodies of men in times of difficulty and danger, who may be inclined to follow a different system, and materially to impair the military force of the country, if they have reason to believe, that the sovereign and his ministers, do not consider the possession of such a force of any material consequence to the nation.

The idea of establishing Volunteer Corps originated during the late war, and in case an invasion had actually taken place, would have been found a most important and useful establishment; enabling the government to employ the whole regular and militia force then in the kingdom, against the enemy, in consequence of its thus having a large body of men, trained to arms, capable of carrying on the more subordinate operations of war.

4. Volunteers receiving pay.

The original system by which volunteer corps were established, was certainly, in some respects, defective, and is capable of several improvements: but on the whole it was an excellent idea, and it is a fortunate circumstance for the country that it was adopted.

Advantages of Volunteer corps.

1. It kept up a great body of men, trained to arms, at a very moderate expence.

2. It spread a military spirit, and military skill, over the whole kingdom, from one end of it to the other.

3. It attached numbers to government, and kept down disaffection.

4. On many occasions such corps were of great service in preserving the police, and the quiet of the country.

5. In the northern parts of Scotland they tended much to prevent a spirit of emigration, and such corps are the best means of furnishing those remote districts with some military protection.

6. They enabled government to send greater numbers of other troops out of the kingdom: without which Ireland could not have been preserved, nor Egypt conquered.

Lastly, A large proportion of the pay of the Volunteers was spent in purchasing articles liable to heavy duties, and which they would not otherwise have consumed. The exchequer therefore was repaid a considerable share of the money expended in their maintenance.

On these grounds, many intelligent individuals are anxious, that the volunteer corps should be established on the following principles.

1. That they should serve one day in the week in time of peace, and two days in time of war.

2. That they shall be formed into companies of 60, and divided into three squads. As in country places such corps must consist of farmers and their servants, it would be impossible to call them all

away at once, particularly in seed time and harvest, unless in a case of the most urgent necessity: But one third of each company, under one of the officers, might easily be spared for garrisoning the forts, &c. then another squad, and lastly the remaining third, in case of real danger.

Let us suppose that 60,000 men are kept up on this establishment. During peace, the utmost expence would not exceed 3*l.* per man, or 120,000*l.* per annum, of which at least one third would be repaid to the exchequer by taxes on their consumption: but if that were not the case, is the whole sum any object, compared to the satisfaction of having so great and so useful a force constantly at command. As to the objection that these corps may interfere with the militia and the regular forces, it is easily obviated, let them, if thought necessary, be restricted to married men, and let them be liable to be balloted for into the militia, and permitted voluntarily to enlist into the army, in which case they will be no impediment to the former, and may be a resource for recruiting the latter in any critical emergency⁷.

Some respectable individuals are of opinion, that in a free country like Great Britain, the whole nation ought to be armed. I am much inclined however to doubt the policy of that measure; for in the first place, the training of large bodies of

^{5.} Volunteers without pay.

⁷ Perhaps also volunteer corps might be attached to regiments of militia, in cases of emergency, and thus the militia might always be rapidly augmented.

men living contiguous to each other, in manufacturing towns, and still more in a luxurious capital, might possibly be found a dangerous experiment, if the people imagined, that they had any reason to be dissatisfied with their rulers, on account of any partial stagnation of trade, or any temporary scarcity of provisions, and still more, if their passions were inflamed, and their principles subverted, by the popular harangues of intriguing demagogues. In the second place, such a plan, universally extended, might prove fatal to industry, as it would be extremely difficult to make the same individual an active soldier and an industrious mechanic; in the third place, it is much better to make a distinction between those who voluntarily step forward, are willing to be trained at their own expense, and are ready to serve when necessary, from those who would only act from compulsion; and in the last place, when every individual is a soldier, from the greatness of the number, the discipline must be neglected, and many are obliged to appear, whose personal defects tend to render the whole system ridiculous. Whereas when a few only are trained, there is an audience as well as actors, and those who do appear upon the military scene, are led by emulation, to exert themselves to exhibit their parts to the best advantage, and to display a military superiority over their neighbours.

On these grounds, I have ever considered the plan of establishing Volunteer corps, serving without pay, and corps of Yeomanry cavalry, as infinitely

preferable to the plan of arming the whole body of the people, which some have recommended.

Such was the military system adopted during the late war. The subordinate regulations may in some respects be improved, but the general outline cannot be too much recommended to the attention of future ministers.

This is in a great measure a new head of expenditure since the commencement of the present war. Barrack department. Some barracks certainly had formerly existed; but they were looked upon with a very jealous eye, and considered by many as in the highest degree unconstitutional. Various circumstances, however, which are shortly explained in a pamphlet already alluded to², rendered it necessary to extend the system, and fortunately the plan has been found to answer even in an economical point of view. Indeed the saving by keeping men in barracks, on the great establishment maintained for the internal defence of the country, during the greater part of the last war, was extremely considerable, amounting it is calculated to above 400,000l. per ann.

4 Ordnance Expenses.

The charges of the Ordnance department exceeded all former calculations, as might well be expected from a war of such long continuance, and so generally extended. The following is an abstract of the grants for that service, as voted by parliament.

² See Mr. Rose's brief examination p. 57, and the table appendix, No. 5, annexed to that work.

NOTE of SUMS voted for the Ordnance Department.

Year.		Sum.	Year.		Sum.
1789	-	£459,444	1797	-	£1,643,056
1790	-	455,872	1798	-	1,303,580
1791	-	594,678	1799	-	1,500,000
1792	-	422,001	1800	-	1,695,956
1793	-	783,75	1801	-	1,639,055
1794	-	1,345,008	1802	-	1,952,274
1795	-	2,321,010			
1796	-	1,954,655			<hr/> 17,310,375

The expenses of the Ordnance are in general extremely unpopular, and indeed it is natural to suppose, that when once a country is sufficiently provided with artillery, and arms, it cannot require any great additional charge to keep up the stock. It is to be observed at the same time, that a large proportion of the Ordnance expenditure, is for the service of the navy, where the consumption of powder and other articles must be considerable. In regard to plans of fortification, when they are brought forward by the Board of Ordnance, they cannot be too narrowly watched, as they have often proved a great and useless source of public extravagance.

5. Miscellaneous Services.

It is proposed to give, first, a general view of the sums granted for miscellaneous services, and secondly to make some observations on such articles as may require any particular attention.

NOTE of SUMS voted under the head of Miscellaneous Expenses.

Year.	Sum.	Year.	Sum.
1789	- £756,309	1797	- £3,294,443 ^a
1790	- 500,598	1798	- 723,013
1791	- 691,294	1799	- 600,000
1792	- 974,950	1800	- 1,008,234
1793	- 723,830	1801	- 637,876
1794	- 741,696	1802	- 2,541,861
1795	- 1,467,750		
1796	- 3,490,289		<hr/> 18,152,143

Among the various miscellaneous expenses included in the above account, there are three of a nature entirely new, namely, the sums granted to the suffering Clergy and Laity of France, the expenses of the Board of Agriculture, and the annual grant to the Veterinary College, and two of peculiar importance, as the expense of convicts, and sums bestowed as public rewards, which it may not be improper to distinguish from the rest, and to give some explanation of them.

The Sums granted for the relief of the French Emigrants were as follows:

^a French
Clergy and
Laity.

^a Advances to the Emperor, and for the service of Ireland, are deducted from the grants for miscellaneous services, of this year.

NOTE of SUMS granted by the British Parliament for the Relief of the suffering Clergy and Laity of France.

Year.			Sum.
1794.	14th February.		27,692
1795.	23d February.	99,459	136,959
Do.	14th May.	37,500	
1796.	2d May.	129,350	269,440
Do.	21st December.	140,090	
1797.	25th April.	31,000	379,000
Do.	26th June.	180,000	
Do.	23d November.	168,000	
1798.	24th April.		12,677
1799.	_____		233,574
1800.	_____		302,798
1801.	_____		277,772
1802.	_____		173,535
			<u>£.1,813,547</u>

It is certainly creditable to the generosity and munificence of the British nation, to have granted such large sums to a number of unfortunate persons, with whom we had no particular connexion; but who were hurled by a dreadful revolution, from a state of comfort, and in many cases of affluence, to the fatal extremity of wanting the common necessities of life in a foreign country.

2. Board of Agriculture.

The basis of the prosperity and happiness of a country, must be founded on a thorough knowledge of its present state, and the means of its future improvement. It cannot be well governed, unless those who are entrusted with the administration of its affairs, are thoroughly acquainted with its real circumstances, nor can it be fertile and pro-

* In some of the latter years, the grants to the American Loyalists are included.

ductive,

ductive, unless both the landlord and the farmer have easy means of acquiring the knowledge necessary for the management of an estate, and the proper cultivation of the soil. Impressed with these ideas, I ventured to propose to the British parliament, the establishment of a board of agriculture and internal improvement, which was fortunately approved of by the House, and having been recommended to the attention of the Crown, was ultimately established.

The following are the sums which have been granted to that institution from its first formation up to Michaelmas 1802.

NOTE of SUMS granted to the Board of Agriculture.

1793	-	£. 3000	1799	-	3000
1794	-	3000	1800	-	3000
1795	-	3000	1801	-	3000
1796	-	3000	1802	-	3000
1797	-	3000			
1798	-	3000			
					<hr/>
					£. 30,000

It is evident that so trifling an annual grant, is perfectly inconsistent with the important objects for which the institution was formed, and the various measures necessary for their attainment.

In regard to the objects in view, it was intended, in the first place to lay before government, the state of the country, without a knowledge of which, laws for promoting its improvement, however well intended, were not likely to be effectual, being destitute of principle or system; but when once know-

ledge is generally spread, and a whole nation is satisfied that certain regulations are necessary for its happiness, a judicious system of legislation follows of course. It has often been remarked, that the laws of small states, are in general wiser than those of great empires. The reason is obvious, because the real situation of a small, is better known than that of a large community. But if the circumstances of a large state, by means of general and extensive inquiries, are as well known as those of a small one, the former can hardly fail to enjoy the same legislative advantages with the latter.

In the second place, ascertaining the best mode of managing landed property, is a point of peculiar importance. The proprietors of land, are properly trustees for the public, whose duty it is, to see that the territory of the country is not exhausted by improper treatment, produces all that it can for the use and benefit of its inhabitants, and that the persons who cultivate the soil, live in a comfortable manner. But how can that be expected, if every question connected with the management of landed property is not thoroughly discussed and explained?

In the third place, it is necessary to ascertain the true principles of cultivation; experiments have been tried for ages, and knowledge has been accumulated, but they have never been hitherto reduced into a regular system. That indeed is not to be wondered at, when it is stated the immense labour that is requisite to collect the necessary information,

formation, and the variety of subjects which ought to be discussed in such a work.

On the whole, the plan that was intended by the person who proposed the institution, was 1. to procure a separate report from every county in the united kingdom. 2. To obtain distinct communications from the most intelligent individuals in the science of agriculture, regarding the particular points with which they were respectively best acquainted; and, 3. on the basis of the information thus collected, to draw up a general report, which would not only explain to the legislature the state of the country, but would also point out to the landlord, the best mode of managing his estate, and to the farmer the best means of cultivating his land, and in that respect to become the future code or standard of a judicious system of cultivation.

The allowing of so small a pittance for so important an object, (which at first was very irregularly paid), and the destroying its energy from personal or political resentment, is not only an unfortunate incident for this country, but a calamity to the human race; for what could be of more importance to mankind in general, than to have the principles of judicious cultivation, and the best means of securing abundance of wholesome food, completely ascertained. Notwithstanding the checks however which this institution received, it had already produced, even before the person who had instituted it was deprived of the presidency, the following important advantages.

1. It

On the advantages derived from the establishment of the board of agriculture.

1. It had excited a spirit of inquiry, and of improvement in every part of the country.

2. It had made very considerable progress in that great undertaking, the agricultural survey of the kingdom. When that is completed, it will then be enabled to draw up a general report, for the consideration of his majesty, and of both houses of parliament, explaining not only the present state of the country, but the means of its further improvement.

3. It had spread the knowledge of local practices, from one district to another, where they were formerly unknown, and where they may be carried on to advantage.

4. It had collected much valuable information from foreign countries.

5. It had been the means of introducing beneficial laws into parliament; for instance, the general bills of inclosure; the act for regulating weights and measures; and the repeal of the duty on oil cake; and it had in contemplation to suggest others of great public importance; as regulations for repealing the duty on bricks employed in draining, on salt used for agricultural purposes, &c.

6. It had been the means of discovering an article much wanted in this country, namely, the best species of millstone, which we have hitherto been obliged to import from France, but with which we shall probably be able to supply ourselves in future.

7. It

7. It contributed essentially to save the country from distress, during the late years of scarcity; 1. by ascertaining, and circulating information, respecting the best mode of feeding the poor; 2. by recommending a great extension of the culture of potatoes, and by promoting the planting them so as to be ready earlier in the season than usual; and 3. by inculcating the necessity of sowing a greater quantity of wheat, in autumn 1795, which was attended with very happy effects in many parts of the kingdom.

8. It ascertained the best mode of draining land, and a work has been published, under its authority, which must be the means of spreading over the whole island, the knowledge of that valuable art.

9. It had proposed to ascertain, by experiment, the effects of all the different kinds of manures, on all the different sorts of plants, which would have thrown more light on the subject of agriculture than any measure hitherto tried.

10. It had promoted, in a peculiar manner, the comforts of cottagers, and the means of bettering their condition.

Lastly, When the original president was removed, it was in a course of collecting and publishing information, respecting the proper management of grass lands; the abolition of naked fallows, (an object, which if attained under the auspices of the board, would make a very considerable addition to the productions and wealth of the kingdom), the proper system to be adopted in
regard

regard to watering land ; the most useful instruments of husbandry ; the best kinds of mills ; the most profitable breeds of live stock ; the advantages and disadvantages of folding ; the state of the poor ; in short, every particular which in an agricultural point of view, could either promote the prosperity of the country, or the comforts of its inhabitants.

It is farther to be observed, that the board is a general depôt, for collecting and circulating useful information, both foreign and domestic ; that any improvement, even in the most trifling article of management, when extended over a whole kingdom, must be attended with great national benefits ; and that the effects of such an institution cannot be felt in the midst of an expensive war, to the same extent, that must necessarily be the case, when the capital of the country and the public attention, will be more directed to internal improvement, than can at present be expected.

Nor were those advantages confined to Great Britain alone. It has also been the means of establishing the cultivation of articles in the East Indies, which by the acknowledgment of the East India Company itself *is likely to be invaluable*^b, and indeed

^b In proof of this assertion, see the following extract of a letter from the Honourable East India Company to the Marquis of Willesey, dated 12th of March 1802. “ We have perused
“ the proceedings of the board of superintendance referred to
“ in your dispatches, and we are much pleased to observe by
“ those

indeed has excited such a general zeal for agriculture and a spirit of improvement, as cannot fail to be productive of the most important consequences in every quarter of the globe.

It is not to be wondered at, that I speak of this institution in such favourable terms, being inclined to attribute the greater part of the calamities experienced by this country, to the neglect paid to the suggestions of the board of agriculture. Had the recommendations of that institution been properly attended to, and acted upon with energy and spirit, the country would not have been afflicted with any of those scarcities which unfortunately took place; or at any rate they would never have been felt to the extent which the nation actually experienced. All the fatal consequence of those scarcities might thus have been prevented, namely, the heavy charge of additional pay to the army and to the navy, and the dreadful mutinies in the naval service, which were likely to have proved more ruinous to this country, than any circumstance that ever happened to it. The importation of grain also, occasioned the exportation of specie, or at least prevented the usual supply of bullion from being imported, hence the suspension of payments in cash

“ those proceedings that the lucerne and Guinea-grass thrive
“ in such a manner as to afford a reasonable prospect of their
“ becoming an acquisition to the Bengal provinces that will
“ prove invaluable.” It was through the means of the president of the board of agriculture that these articles were sent to the East Indies.

at

at the bank, and all the consequences resulting therefrom: and if the grain we imported, in consequence of deficient cultivation, cost this country twenty millions (which is the smallest sum at which it can be estimated), had we possessed such an addition to our circulating wealth, would not the commerce, the credit, and the revenue of the country been placed on a much higher foundation at the conclusion of the late war.

On this subject I shall only add, that whenever the board of agriculture is put on that respectable footing to which it is so well entitled, and is enabled to perform those public services for which it is so peculiarly well calculated, that it cannot fail to prove the most fortunate circumstance that could possibly happen to the British empire, if not to the species at large.

Vettrinary
college.

The diseases of horses, and other domestic animals, have only of late years been the subject of scientific inquiry, though every means by which the live stock of the country could be preserved from disease, or cured when infected, is an object of infinite national importance. It is calculated that in the space of twenty years, the Dutch lost cattle, by those infectious distempers which occasionally break out in Holland, to the amount of £. 5,000,000 sterling; and the value of the sheep which have been destroyed in England, by the rot alone, (without touching on other diseases), during the space of a century, is hardly to be estimated. An institution having been formed, at the expence
of

of a number of private individuals, for establishing the veterinary art in this country, it was surely a laudable measure in government, to give it some aid. The following are the sums granted for that purpose, and it were much to be wished, that the public expenditure in general, were equally unexceptionable.

NOTE of SUMS granted for the Veterinary College.

1795	-	£. 1500	1800	-	1500
1796	-	1500	1801	-	1500
1797	-	1500	1802	-	1500
1798	-	1500			
1799	-	1500			£. 12,000

The expence of convicts, both at home, and in Convicts. the new colony of South Wales, is an object, in every point of view, well entitled to the most serious attention of the British legislature. An inquiry ought immediately to be instituted regarding that important subject, more especially into the propriety of maintaining any longer the colony in South Wales, or at least whether it is adviseable to transport any additional convicts there, at an expence so enormous*. The measure of establishing penitentiary houses, according to the plan suggested by Mr. Bentham, is surely well calculated for a large proportion of those who are condemned

* Mr. Jeremy Bentham, in two letters addressed to Lord Pelham, has given very satisfactory reasons why any success in the establishment in South Wales can hardly be expected.

by the laws of their country to labour and confinement. But why might not some of these unfortunate persons be employed in works of public utility, in making new harbours, in opening new communications, and rendering the most impervious districts in the kingdom accessible to industry and improvement. The same sums which have been wasted in the settlement at Botany Bay, would have rendered the northern districts of Scotland one of the most valuable possessions belonging to the British crown.

The following is a note of sums granted for convicts at home.

Year.		Sum.	Year.		Sum.
1789	-	£. 56,598	1798	-	£. 36,863
1790	-	41,117	1793	-	72,914
1791	-	52,565	1800	-	40,353
1792	-	23,424	1801	-	45,317
1793	-	23,428	1802	-	31,024
1794	-	24,969			<hr/>
1795	-	26,903			£. 563,631
1796	-	20,757			<hr/>
1797	-	67,399			

Public re-
wards.

In examining the nature of our public expenditure it is melancholy to think, how very inconsiderable a portion of the many millions we have laid out, has hitherto been dedicated for the purpose of rewarding merit, or promoting the industry and improvement of the country. Some grants have been voted for erecting monuments to the memory of distinguished characters who have fallen in the service of their country, and annuities have been granted to those gallant heroes, who have distinguished

guished themselves during the late and former wars, but in the humbler walks of life, and for services of a civil or pacific nature, the only sums which appear in our public accounts of late years are the following :

1. To Mr. Elkington ^d for discovering his mode of draining land	-	-	£. 1000	0	0
2. To Dr. Jenner for promulgating his discoveries of the vaccine inoculation, by which a mild and efficacious mode of superseding that dreadful malady the small pox is established	-	-	10,000	0	0
3. To Mr. Greathead, boat builder, as a reward for his invention of the life boat, whereby many lives have already been saved, and great security is afforded to seamen and property in cases of shipwreck			1200	0	0
			<hr/>		
			£. 12,200	0	0*

There is a pleasure in recording such instances of legislative attention to useful discoveries; the merit of Dr. Jenner however, far surpasses that of every other competitor for public reward. Indeed whilst many who have shone in power and

^d The grant to Mr. Elkington was moved by the author in Parliament, and was not carried without considerable opposition. An ingenious agriculturist, (Dr. James Anderson), afterwards claimed the merit of the discovery, and certainly threw out, in one of his publications, a hint to that effect; but after making every possible inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the fact, it appeared to me perfectly indisputable, that Mr. Elkington had carried the idea into practice, sometime before Dr. Anderson had recommended the theory, and consequently that the former was entitled to the whole reward.

* The sum of £. 1000 was also voted to John Davies, for his discovering the means of cleaning smutty wheat.

splendour shall be forgotten, he will justly be celebrated, as one of the greatest benefactors to the human race, that any age or any country can boast of.

On the expences of the late war.

It is impossible yet to make up any accurate statement of the expences, which the late war has occasioned. It is evident that all the loans, and any addition to the unfunded debt of the nation, is in the first place to be stated to that account. The extraordinary sources of revenue arising from the contribution tax, the income tax, &c. may be placed to the same head. The expences also incurred in Ireland, and in the East Indies, ought to be included. Without pretending therefore to any accuracy, which from various circumstances cannot at present be obtained, I shall endeavour briefly to sum up the expences of the late war, from the best information which it has been possible for me to collect.

STATE of the EXPENCES of the War ended by the Treaty of Amiens.

1. Amount of principal sums received for new stock created	- - -	£. 215,015,718
2. Addition during the war to the unfunded debt of the nation	- - -	10,000,000
3. Extra contributions and resources (supposed)		22,000,000
4. Surplusses of the consolidated fund	-	15,000,000
		<hr/>
		£. 262,015,718
5. Austrian loans if not repaid	- -	6,222,000
6. Irish loans funded in England	-	11,000,000
7. Additional Irish expences (supposed)	-	12,000,000
8. Expences in the East Indies (supposed)		10,000,000
		<hr/>
Total	-	£. 301,237,718
		Such

Such are the expences occasioned by the late ^{On the late war.} war, the policy and conduct of which have occasioned so much discussion. The opinion which I have formed regarding it, I shall endeavour shortly to state with as much impartiality as possible.

1. It certainly was impolitic, reducing the peace-establishment of this country so low as it was in 1792, when from the state of France it was evident, that all Europe was likely to get into a convulsed state. Had we been better armed at that tremendous crisis, the disorders of France would not have broken out as they did, or might easily have been crushed at the commencement.

2. The war perhaps might have been *evaded* for some time longer, but could not possibly have been *avoided*, after the rulers of France had resolved to spread their revolutionary principles over Europe; and the danger of Great Britain would have been very great, if after the powers on the continent had been subdued, France had bent all its military force against this country, unarmed, inexperienced in war, and thinking of nothing but commerce:—to the commencement of the war therefore, I felt no hesitation in giving a most hearty approbation.

3. The war, in so far as regarded the naval department, and hostilities in the East and West Indies, together with the glorious campaign in Egypt, was certainly successfully conducted; but on the continent of Europe, the case was very different, which I entirely attribute to the British government not assuming that influence in the direc-

tion of the war, to which, on various accounts, it was so peculiarly well entitled. In fact, no confederacy can prosper, unless some particular power takes the lead. The combination against France, in the reign of Queen Anne, would not have succeeded, if the Duke of Marlborough had not been the soul of that confederacy, and directed the whole military operations against the enemy; and if ever another coalition is formed against the power and ambition of France, Great Britain must be the active power to form and carry it on, must use its influence to prevail upon its allies to employ its best troops and ablest officers, must employ its wealth in procuring intelligence of the plans and intentions of the enemy, (the want of which occasioned the fatal overthrow at Marengo), must encourage, by honorary, and even pecuniary rewards, the officers of its allies to make every exertion in the common cause, (which they will soon find is more advantageous than any bribe they can expect from the enemy), and in fine must act a noble and disinterested part, proving to the world, that the war is carried on, not for purposes of ambition, but with a view of protecting its own independence, and asserting the liberties of Europe.

4. It is certain that the war might have been ended sooner, and much to the advantage of this country^f. Even as late as the year 1796, France would

^f Such was the ardour for war, that any person was stigmatised who ventured to inculcate peace; of which the following verses in the Times of the 8th December 1798, may be cited as one proof, among many others.

would have agreed to the restoration of the Stadtholder, and the independence of Belgium. The rejection also of Bonaparte's first offer, in so haughty a manner, was not very politic; for if the government which he had then established was weak, the terms must necessarily have been better; and if it was strong, there was no risk in concluding a peace.

5. The peace that was concluded at Amiens, if it had been entered into with proper views by both parties, was not perhaps materially inconsistent with the relative situation of the two countries. It is unfortunate at the same time, that stipulations were not entered into, for repressing any farther spirit of aggrandisement on the part of France, and for giving Europe some chance of enjoying a little quiet and repose after so many years of calamity.

6. On the whole it is probable, that the ministers themselves who conducted the late war, would in many respects, alter their system, if they had the same scenes to react. In matters of so extensive and complicated a nature, errors are unavoidable,

Dialogue between Alexander the Great and Parmeno.

The Macedon hero to Parmeno said,

Darius ten thousand gold talents will give,
And his daughter Statira, that beautiful maid,
If peace I will grant him, as long as I live.

Parmeno—Were I Alexander, to this I'd consent.

Alexander—And were I but Parmeno, I would be content.

So if Sinclair were Pitt, for a peace he would sue,
And if Pitt was but Sinclair, the same he might do.

even with the best intentions, and where the greatest talents are employed. It is of the utmost importance however, to review and to re-consider such events, as the most likely means of preventing similar errors on future occasions. One point was certainly gained by the late war, that of preserving this country from being overrun by the arms of France^s. The other object, that of curbing the power of France, we completely failed in, and we have unfortunately seen it rise to a degree of power, which, without being of any real advantage to itself, threatens at the same time Europe, and even the world, with subjection. Our disappointment in that respect however, is in some degree compensated, by our naval triumphs, the knowledge we have acquired of our internal means of defence, the military skill and spirit that has been spread from one end of the kingdom to the other, and the glorious campaign in Egypt, which it is impossible to reflect on, without a mixture of pride, admiration, and astonishment.

Such are the observations which have occurred to me, on the subject of the expenditure of this

^s I do not give the ministers any credit for preventing French principles from becoming predominant in this country; for in the first place they did but their duty, and in the second place the French doctrines have never succeeded any where but where their arms have penetrated. Indeed no established government can possibly be overturned, but either by foreign arms, or the folly of its rulers.

country,

country, for fourteen years preceding Michaelmas 1802. It is certain that in consequence of the measures suggested by the Committee of Finance originally appointed *anno* 1797, much more accurate information has been obtained, regarding our financial system, than was formerly known. But the plan is still defective, and ought to be improved upon as much as possible. It can hardly be questioned, that a nation which pays so much, is well entitled to know how its money is really expended, and for that purpose the public accounts should be stated in such a manner, as would make them perfectly intelligible to every individual conversant in figures, or at least who had at all directed his attention to questions of finance; but with that view it would be necessary, that the votes of Parliament, sanctioned by the annual act of appropriation, should never be violated; such public accounts, as any single member might think necessary, should be presented, and no impediment attempted to be thrown in the way of information and enquiry. Above all, the public accounts should annually be referred to a committee of the house, which any member might have the privilege of attending, and the report of that committee, should contain the most accurate and distinct statement that could possibly be drawn up, of the public income and expenditure.

S E C T. IV.

Extraordinary Measures of Finance.

FROM the new scenes naturally to be expected, in the course of the great revolution that has taken place in the affairs of Europe, and the vicissitudes of a long and expensive war, some events of an extraordinary nature, connected with the Financial circumstances of the country, were to be looked for, but the wildest imagination could hardly have supposed, that they would have been either so numerous, or of so uncommon a nature, as will appear from the following general review of these transactions. The articles which I propose more particularly to allude to, are the following, namely, 1. The Loyalty Loan. 2. The Plans of raising the Supplies within the year. 3. The Aid and voluntary Contribution of 1798. 4. The Income Tax. 5. The Convoy Tax. 6. Taxes repealed or abandoned. 7. The Redemption of the Land Tax. 8. The System of Competition for Loans. 9. The Loan of Exchequer Bills, and other assistance given to the commercial and colonial interests. 10. The Bonding System. 11. The appointment of Financial Committees, and 12. The Suspension of Payments in Cash at the Bank of England; to which I propose to add some observations on the circulation and paper credit of the

the

the country, and the means of establishing them on the surest and best foundation.

There are few readers who will not begin with some reluctance, the discussion of so many important questions. What then must not the feelings of the author be, who undertakes to elucidate them, within the narrow limits of this publication?

The vast accumulation of debt, beyond all former example, which had taken place towards the conclusion of the year 1796; the difficulties which were apprehended in raising additional supplies, the unlimited confidence which the great body of the people seemed to place in the minister, and indeed the almost *vizierial authority* he had acquired, induced him to bring forward a measure, described by his friends as being, "different from former practice, but better adapted to the circumstances of the times." It was first announced to the public in a letter, a copy of which, on account of the importance of the transaction, I have thought it proper to preserve in this work.

1. Loyalty
Loan.

*Copy of a letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
to the directors of the Bank of England.*

Downing-Street, Wednesday,
30th November, 1796.

GENTLEMEN,

Under the present circumstances, it seems of peculiar importance, that a mode should be
adopted

adopted for providing for the service of the ensuing year, without incurring so heavy an annual charge, and so great an increase of capital, as would attend a loan, made in the accustomed manner, at the present price of the funds. With this view it is in contemplation to propose to Parliament, that all persons possessed of a certain income, should be required to lend a given proportion of it, say one fourth, to be repaid at the period, and on the terms stated in the inclosed memorandum.

There is great reason to hope, that many persons possessed of considerable incomes, both in the capital and in the country, will be induced, without waiting for the measure being enforced, voluntarily to contribute in a larger proportion than would be required of them, but the extent of such a contribution, will in a great degree depend upon the effect of examples, and particularly on the degree of countenance which the measure may receive from the Bank.

I will request the favour of you to lay these considerations before the court of directors, in the first instance, and after, if they think fit, before the court of proprietors, and to express my earnest hope, that from their great zeal for the public service, and their sense of the importance of the present crisis, they will not be disinclined to take the lead in a measure, which must have the most beneficial effect on public credit, and the most
evident

evident tendency to accelerate the restoration of peace, on secure, and honourable terms.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed)

W. PITT.

The Memorandum referred to in the letter, was to the following effect.

“ Every subscriber to receive for each £.100 a debenture of £.110 the interest of which is to be paid half yearly at 5 *per cent.*—And if he keeps this debenture till the expiration of four years, without assigning it, or one year after the signing of a definitive treaty of peace, he will then receive, at his option, either £.110 in money, or £.110 5 *per cents.* unredeemable for six years from this period, or the value of £110 in consolidated 3 *per cents.* at 75 *per cent.*—If he keeps it three years in the same state, he will receive £.109 5 *per cents.* to be liquidated in the same manner at the end of four years, either in money or consolidated 3 *per cents.* or to remain in 5 *per cents.* for the above term.—If he keeps it two years he will receive £.108 5 *per cents.* with the above privileges.—If he keeps it one year, or upon making the full payments (the discount allowed upon which will be about 3 *per cent.*) he will receive £.107 5 *per cents.* as above, but the debentures will not be assignable after the second payment.—They must after that period remain in the same hands till the full payments are made, either by anticipation or otherwise, when they

they will be immediately made into stock and transferable like other funds at the Bank of England, but kept quite separate from the present *5 per cents*. You will observe it is the ministers wish by this plan to give encouragement to those who can keep the subscription out of the market, to prevent it depressing the other Stocks."

The reception which this proposal met with from intelligent persons in the metropolis, and indeed the specific principles on which it was founded, will be seen, from the following extract of a letter written from an eminent banking house in London, to their correspondents in the country, dated 1st December, 1796.

" You may easily conceive, that many difficulties must occur in every plan, for raising a sum of eighteen or twenty millions, and Mr. Pitt seemed to have collected, from the various information he had received, that it could not be obtained in the usual way, without depressing the price of the other funds very materially, and that there might even be some apprehension of its not being negotiable at all. He therefore has determined, to try whether the public spirit of the great incorporated bodies, and of the country at large, may not induce a voluntary subscription to a loan, which, though not perhaps so beneficial as an investment made in the other funds, would yet, under all the circumstances, produce a very good immediate interest, and a certainty of considerable profit in a few years."

" We

“ We were about to have sent this plan by
“ yesterday’s post, when we found there was still
“ another meeting, and it was not till late last
“ night, that some of the last alterations were made.”

“ To those who will not be induced to sub-
“ scribe by public spirit, or led by a sense of their
“ own interest, to sacrifice a part of their fortune
“ to secure the rest, he means to apply, by a tax at
“ least equal to what may be supposed to be lost
“ by the voluntary subscribers, and he expects a
“ good example will be set by men of high rank,
“ and in high official situations, as well as by the
“ Bank of England, and other corporate bodies;
“ and that such a sum will be raised, as will make
“ it very easy to borrow what it may be short of
“ the sum he wants, in some other manner. Mr.
“ Pitt expects the subscription will sell at some
“ discount, but flatters himself, the Country will
“ think as he does, that a large voluntary contri-
“ bution may be the means of extricating them
“ from their present difficulties, by shewing its
“ enemies we are not without resource. All must
“ agree, that whilst the war continues, money must
“ be had to carry it on with vigour, and the more
“ unanimity and strength we shew, the more
“ willing our enemies will be to conclude peace on
“ fair and permanent conditions.”

These suggestions circulated in London, and
thence spread from the most respectable quarters,
over the whole kingdom, and aided with all the
weight and influence which government could

furnish, had, as might naturally be expected, a most powerful effect.

Indeed the measure was entered into by the public, with such spirit and alacrity, that books being opened on the 1st December, 1796, before twelve o'clock on Monday the 5th, the whole eighteen millions were subscribed: and such was the eagerness of the nation, that double the amount might have been obtained. It was certainly an unfortunate circumstance that as large a sum was not raised at once, and on the same principle, as was found necessary for the service of the year, more especially after the train had taken, and the spirit of the country was roused to carry through the measure with eclat^h.

There would have been no difficulty, if the money subscribed exceeded the sum wanted, to have made a proportionable deduction from each subscription, which would have been rather a favour or a bonus to the subscribers than otherwise. The raising of another loan, in the same year, on different principles, "*and more conformable to former practice,*" tended to depreciate the value of "*the Loyalty Loan,*" as it was nicknamed at Change-Alley, and to expose it to the contempt and ridicule of stock jobbers, who greatly preferred the loan of £. 14,500,000 afterwards raised for the

^h It would have been better also, if the threat of a *forced loan* had been avoided, for such an idea ought not to have been brought forward, unless it had been required by the most urgent necessity.

service of the same year. Nor is that to be wondered at, as they had a greater additional capital, and at the same time a much higher interest. It may be worth while to compare the two loans together, which will fully account for the unpopularity of the loyalty loan, and the strong desire which the monied interest would naturally feel, to put an end to that mode of raising money.

Comparison of the two loans raised for the service of the year 1797.

Loan.	Sum borrowed.	Capital created.	Rate of Interest.
1. The Loyalty } Loan.	18,000,000	20,124,843	5 14 1
2. The 2d Loan.	14,500,000	28,275,000	6 6 10

From an inspection of this short table, it may easily be supposed, that the discount on the Loyalty Loan would soon become very considerable, and was more felt by the subscribers, as their brother loan-mongers, in the same year, were making money by their bargain. It is well known, that many had subscribed to the first loan, without funds adequate to pay their different instalments, and consequently were under the necessity of selling at any price the article would fetch at the market. Many persons, of great political influence, were involved in that unfortunate dilemma. In order to extricate them from so unpleasant a situation, the chancellor of the exchequer was prevailed upon to bring forward a proposition altogether unprecedented, namely, that of granting an additional bonus to those subscribers, and as a premium for their loyalty, voting them

them a douceur which would have cost the public about one million sterling.

The minister was then at the zenith of his power and influence, and every proposal he made, was so implicitly sanctioned by parliament, that, any opposition to his will and pleasure was considered as so much time and labour thrown away. It was evident, however, that if this proposition were assented to, besides the heavy immediate loss which the public must have sustained, it would have been a fatal precedent for the future, and indeed would have rendered all bargains for loans, in after times, uncertain and precarious. I thought it incumbent therefore upon a person, who had applied his mind so much to financial researches, to oppose by every possible effort, so fatal an attempt, and by personal or written applications prevailed on several members to attend, who protested, at the time, that it was perfectly useless, but who could not resist the importunity with which their presence was requested. There were many objections to the measure, in consequence of its trenching on the forms of the house. For 1. it was altering an act in the same session, without authority being reserved for that purpose in the original bill. 2. The Committee of supply having decided for the smaller sum in the original proceedings, the same committee could not add to that sum, and augment the burdens of the country; and 3. it was also contended, that conformably to the rules of the house, all applications for money, for the benefit of

of individuals, should originate in a petition from them, and that the consent or recommendation of the Crown, (the act of a responsible minister,) ought to be given upon the occasion. As the measure was likely to go on, notwithstanding these objections in point of form, it was found necessary to oppose the principle; and after a long and desultory debate, when a division took place, to the astonishment of every one, the minister found himself in a majority of only one, and the votes of one or two of these who voted with him, were objected to, as being interested in the success of the application. After such an explicit declaration of the real sense of the House, it was thought most prudent not to persevere in the attempt, and this example of successful opposition, even in circumstances so extremely unpromising, it is hoped will prevent persons engaged in a public cause, when they are evidently in the right, from ever despairing of success.

In a former part of this work, (vol. i. p. 335.), some observations will be found on the plan of raising the supplies within the year; and when in 1797 and 1798, it became so difficult to procure money for the public service on the old system, such a measure came to be seriously considered, not only by the minister, but by the public at large. As in the event of another war, this expedient must probably be resorted to, I think it proper to record, in this place, some thoughts which occur-

red to me upon the subject, when that idea was more particularly under discussion.

The late minister had certainly the merit of first attempting any measure of the sort; but instead of raising only a part of the supplies within the year, and borrowing the remainder, it seems to me infinitely better, by some great and manly effort, to endeavour to raise the whole without resorting to a loan at all, unless with a view of adding to the circulating medium in a manner to be afterwards explained. For that purpose, however, it is necessary that there should be, 1. a sufficient quantum of general income or financial resources in the nation, to afford the sum that may be required; 2. a sufficient quantity of circulating medium, to carry through so great an operation without inconvenience to commerce; 3. a perfect knowledge of the state of the country, and the means the most likely to raise what may be wanted, without imposing any material hardship on any particular description of persons; and, 4. that the nation should have a complete confidence in its government at the time.

Financial
resources in
the nation.

As to the first point, there can be no doubt of the ability of the nation. Without entering however at present into minute calculations regarding the national fund for taxation, which will be treated of in another part of this work¹, it may be sufficient to remark, that the means which this country

¹ See the chapter on the national resources.

possesses for yielding a great additional revenue, is uncontrovertibly proved, by the astonishing sums which were paid by the public, for agricultural productions, during the late scarcities, beyond what it had formerly expended on the very same articles; and as this is a point of such great public importance, I have lately endeavoured, with the assistance of a most intelligent political arithmetician, (Mr. Arthur Young) to estimate the amount, on the average of the late scarcities, compared with former years of plenty.

The three principal articles to be taken into the estimate are, wheat, barley, and oats; the prices of which, according as the season is productive or otherwise, may be thus stated.

Grain.	Price in Years of Plenty <i>per</i> Bushel:	Price in Years of Scarcity <i>per</i> Bushel.
Wheat -	£. 0 6 0	£. 0 12 0
Barley -	0 3 0	0 6 0
Oats -	0 2 6	0 5 0

It is supposed that 9,000,000 of people in the kingdom, consume, at an average, one quarter of wheat each; 500,000, about nine bushels of barley, and 2,500,000 about 25 bushels of oats^k. The difference will then be as follows.

^k Oats is thus apparently the dearest grain to live on, but the reason is, that those who are maintained on them seldom eat meat, which is not the case with those who live on wheaten bread.

Grain.	No. of Consumers	Quantity consumed.	Price in plentiful Seasons.	Price in Times of Scarcity.	Difference.
			£.	£.	£.
Wheat	9,000,000	9,000,000	21,600,000	43,200,000	21,600,000
Barley	500,000	562,500	675,000	1,350,000	675,000
Oats	2,500,000	7,812,500	7,812,500	15,625,000	7,812,500
	12,000,000	17,375,000	30,087,500	60,075,000	30,087,500

Enormous as the difference is, namely, £. 30,087,500, it can only be accounted about one half of the sum actually paid by the nation. There is to be added, the additional price of barley consumed in malt liquors, (in times of scarcity the distilleries were stopped), the additional price of oats consumed by horses, the additional price of beans, and other kinds of pulse, the additional price of butcher meat, the additional price of milk, of butter, of cheese, of tallow, of hides, of hay and corn, and other articles consumed by cattle and horses. In short, the total cannot be estimated at less than from fifty to sixty millions sterling.

The whole of the sum, whatever it may amount to, is, in fact, a species of extraordinary tax, the produce of which does not go into the Exchequer, but into the pockets of individuals. It proves, however, what the nation could afford to pay, if, by promoting agricultural improvements, the price of provisions could be kept within reasonable bounds. For can it be doubted, that if from fifty to sixty millions can thus be raised on agricultural productions alone, in times of scarcity, if provisions were cheap, and if the same articles could be purchased at half the prices, that the public would be

be enabled to pay into the Exchequer, a large proportion of the sum it saved.

The proposed plan however, could not be attempted with the certainty of success, unless there was a considerable addition to the circulating medium of the country; for otherwise such large sums might occasionally be locked up in the treasury, and all its subordinate departments, as might greatly check commerce and industry. Such an augmentation might be effected in two ways; 1. by issuing Exchequer bills for small sums, as was done with similar views, in the reign of king William during the great recoinage¹, and increasing our paper currency by other means; or, 2. by calling in, and coining, the silver plate of the kingdom.

Abundance
of circu-
lating wealth
necessary.

In

¹ An ingenious author, in a paper intitled, “Two letters describing a method of increasing the quantity of circulating money upon a new and solid principle,” printed *anno* 1799, has suggested *stock notes*, or converting fifty millions of the stocks into transferable paper, as a plan entitled to consideration. It was not however a new idea, for some loans in France had been established on the same principle; and in May 1796, I had previously suggested the following plan, in a letter to the minister, of which the following is an extract,

“I have long thought that a part of the stocks might unite the advantages of funded, and of unfunded debt, and of paper currency.

“One set of men prefer permanent stock, but the demand is bounded in that as in other things, and if you increase it beyond the real demand, the value is greatly depreciated.

“Another set prefer transferable securities of all the various descriptions known in this country. There also the demand is limited, and at present the market is overstocked. Transferring

In regard to the latter, it is probably a resource of greater importance than is commonly imagined. The opulent classes in the community certainly enjoy incomes to the amount of 100 millions *per annum*, and if each of them have, on an average,

ring from the one, to the other, unless there is really a demand for permanent stock, will not remedy our present pecuniary difficulties, because the circulating medium, the thing wanted, is not increased.

“ But if you convert transferable securities, or permanent stock, into a circulating medium, the object is at once obtained, greatly to the advantage of the public.

“ Let us suppose for instance an addition of five millions to the 3 *per cents.* with an option to the creditor to take out his principal in state notes, bearing an interest of 3 *per cent.*, and at any time to replace it in 3 *per cent.* stock, there are united the advantages of permanent stock, transferable securities, and paper currency.

“ These notes would differ from bank notes as they could not be converted into specie, and on that account are entitled to interest. £. 10 at 3 *per cent.* would be sixpence *per month*, which could be easily calculated.

“ Such notes would bring the whole money of the country into circulation, as nobody would keep £. 10 in money in his coffers, if he could get such good security bearing interest.

“ Forgeries would be immediately detected, (by proper notes indeed might be rendered almost impossible), as the notes would be brought to certain public offices half yearly to receive the interest.

“ The imperial loan might thus be raised both at home and abroad, for the emperor could easily raise one half of it abroad on these notes, which would obviate the objections to the loan in this country, and prevent foreigners concerned in the loan, from being under the necessity of employing agents here and giving them a commission.”

plate

plate equal in value to the tenth part of their incomes respectively, that would amount to ten millions in all: but suppose it were only five millions, including the plate of corporations, &c. the sum itself would not only be of moment as a loan, (the only one that ought to be negociated), but it would be of still greater service when coined, from its augmenting the circulating medium, and thus increasing the industry, and augmenting the revenue of the country.

That the plate would readily be given in, if the public exigencies required it, cannot be doubted. Every individual would see that it would be much more prudent, in a period of real difficulty, to coin our plate, in order to keep danger at a distance, than to preserve it in its present form, which could only serve as an additional stimulus to the enemy, to make every possible exertion to overcome the difficulties of invasion, for the purpose of getting over to plunder it.

The only material objection to the calling in of the plate is, that the owner thereby loses the expence of the manufacture, or the *fashion*^m as it is called. But this objection is easily obviated; for if the owners of plate get in lieu thereof, 3 *per cent.* stock, at a war price, say from 50 to 55, let the stock be kept till peace is concluded, and the difference of price will enable the old proprietor to replace his plate, not only without loss, but manu-

^m A corruption of the French word *Façon*, or workmanship.

factured in the completest manner, and modelled in the most elegant form.

It is also proper to observe, that a large silver coinage is essential for this country in another point of view, namely, that silver and not gold is the metallic medium we ought to encourage. Before the use of paper this might not be the case, for, in a commercial nation, it is extremely desirable to have the medium of circulation as portable as possible, and consequently it was right to prefer gold to silver; but now, when all large payments are made in paper, it would be better to have our metallic wealth in silver, in order to check the possibility of converting our paper circulation too easily into money, on every groundless public apprehension. A thousand pounds sterling in gold, is conveyed away and concealed without much difficulty; but the conveyance or concealment of a thousand pounds in shillings, could not be so easily managed.

Knowledge
of the state
of the
country.

The next requisite essential for so great an operation would be, a perfect knowledge of the state of the country, and the means the most likely to raise so large a sum without public clamour or distress. For though there may be resources sufficient for that purpose, yet it may be extremely difficult to reconcile the minds of the people to so heavy and unusual a burden, and it will require great judgment to impose it. And as it seemed to me impossible that even the treasury, with all its means of investigation, could obtain the information

mation that was really necessary, I was thence induced, in February 1798, to suggest to his majesty's ministers, the appointment of a board, by act of parliament, consisting of seven or any other number of commissioners that might be thought most advisable, for the express purpose of ascertaining the best mode of raising the supplies within the year; such commissioners to be invested with full powers to make the necessary inquiries, to act without salaries, and to consist of men in whom the public at large was likely to place peculiar confidence. The appointment of such a board would have convinced the enemy, that we were taking every means in our power, to obtain resources for continuing the war, should their ambition or insolence render it necessary^a.

But even the efforts of such a commission, how-
ever well constituted, would have been in vain, Confidence in Government.
unless the nation was satisfied that the ministers of

^a I had even proposed at one time to have taken the sense of the House on the two following motions, namely, 1. That it is the opinion of this House, that it would be expedient to appoint commissioners, for the purpose of ascertaining the best mode of raising the supplies within the year, during the farther continuance of the present war; and, 2. That it is the opinion of this House that the said commissioners be farther empowered to ascertain the best means of reducing the public expences both civil and military.

But there was so small a prospect of succeeding in either, that I was induced to lay them aside; at the same time, in the course of some future war, some such measures will probably be found necessary.

the

the crown were also entitled to the confidence of the people, and were pursuing measures likely to promote the real interests of the country. Such a plan could not be attempted, unless public economy were enforced in all the departments of the state, and unless what was liberally given was wisely expended. I cannot however entertain a doubt, by pursuing such measures as these, when any future exigency may require it, that the supplies may be raised within the year. Let us now proceed to consider the plans which were actually attempted during the late war, with a view of partly carrying such a principle into effect, namely, first by the assessed tax bill in 1798, and afterwards by the tax on income.

3. The aid and contribution tax of 1798.

The little success which had attended the loyalty loan in 1797, rendered it necessary to try some new plan of raising the supplies for the service of the ensuing year; and on the whole the minister thought it most advisable, to obtain a considerable part of the money wanted within the year, by increasing the assessed taxes, by voluntary contributions, and by a tax on imports and exports; and to procure the remainder, by a loan in the usual way.

The nature of his plan will appear from the following statement.

To be raised by the assessed taxes	-	£. 4,500,000
To be raised by voluntary contributions		1,500,000
		<hr/>
Carry over	-	£. 6,000,000

Brought over	-	£. 6,000,000
To be raised by a tax on imports and exports		1,500,000
		<hr/>
Loan, (exclusive of two millions for Ireland)		£. 7,500,000
		15,000,000
		<hr/>
Total	-	£. 22,500,000

But of the fifteen millions borrowed, it was proposed that eight millions should be repaid by continuing the assessed taxes, &c. until that could be accomplished^{*}; consequently there remained only seven millions to be provided for by permanent taxes that year.

The propriety of multiplying the assessed taxes, is thus defended by an advocate for the late minister. “ Notwithstanding the various provisions which had been made for the gradual and speedy relief of the kingdom from the burdens unavoidably imposed upon it, the funds, by the accumulation of new loans, were brought to a state of depression which made it expedient to raise a considerable proportion of the war supply within the year; the wisdom of the Legislature, and the spirit of the people, instantly combined in a vigorous effort for this purpose; thus not only opposing to the enemy the most animated exertions for our own security, but looking with disinterested magnanimity to the ease and happiness of posterity.”

^{*} In fact the plan was similar to the measures adopted in the reign of king William, when taxes were imposed to repay the money borrowed in the space of two or three years.

“ When

“ When the means of carrying into effect this
 “ plan was under deliberation in the preceding
 “ year, a tax on capital appeared to be utterly im-
 “ practicable ; it was demonstrated in the debate
 “ in the House of Commons, that the assistance of
 “ a lawyer and a mathematician would have been
 “ necessary in almost every case of real, and in
 “ many of personal, property ; and, if that diffi-
 “ culty could have been got over, that the whole
 “ of the interests in reversionary estates (probably
 “ in value more than half the landed property in
 “ the kingdom), must of necessity have escaped ;
 “ in other instances the grossest inequalities must
 “ have occurred. A direct tax on income was
 “ next adverted to ; but it was then thought liable
 “ to many objections. Recourse was therefore
 “ had to the measure of a charge varying accord-
 “ ing to the amount of the assessed taxes paid by
 “ persons in different situations, as likely to afford,
 “ though not a certain, yet a tolerably fair crite-
 “ rion of the income of individuals, to which their
 “ expenditure was supposed in general to be pro-
 “ portioned.”

“ Under this mode, the produce was nearly as
 “ considerable as the calculation stated in the
 “ House of Commons ; and it was more owing to
 “ the evasions practised to escape the tax, than to
 “ the inefficacy of its principle that it was not
 “ more so.”

P See a brief examination into the increase of the revenue,
 &c. of Great Britain from 1792 to 1799, supposed to be writ-
 ten by the Right Hon. George Rose, 1st edit. 1799, p. 26.

The

The objections made to this measure, both in and out of Parliament were extremely numerous. The following are the most important, extracted from the speech of an intelligent member of the house, (John Nichols, Esq.) delivered on the 3d of January, 1798, and afterwards printed. 1. That the tax is unequal in the manner in which it affects the different classes of society. 2. That it is also unequal in the manner in which it affects different individuals of the same class. 3. That it will compel the higher orders of the middle class to lessen their expences, by which the employment of the artisan will be destroyed. 4. That the revenue arising from taxes on consumption will be rendered less productive, and 5. That if income is made the standard of taxation, Parliament must consent to the means necessary for investigating income, which is not consistent either with the principles of a commercial nation, or with those of civil liberty, or even with domestic happiness.

The assessed taxes, being a species of forced requisition, was extremely unpopular in every part of the kingdom; and the public feeling was so hostile to the attempt, that the minister was obliged to give way, and to modify the plan so as greatly to diminish the produce at which it had been originally estimated. But to the credit of the nation let it be recorded, that what it unwillingly yielded to power, it readily supplied from public zeal. In the words of a political author already quoted, “ the voluntary contributions of individuals poured into the public coffers by all ranks and conditions in the country, vying with each

“ each other, abundantly compensated for the de-
 “ ficiency ; the sovereign and the royal family
 “ giving very large proportions of their disposable
 “ income ; the nobility, gentry, merchants, manu-
 “ facturers, yeomanry, peasantry, and domestics,
 “ coming forward with liberality and chearfulness ;
 “ and even the gallant seamen, soldiers, and
 “ militia, in addition to their personal services for
 “ the national defence, contributed also largely to
 “ it from their pay^a.” Nothing can be more sa-
 tisfactory than to narrate such an instance of real
 patriotism. Indeed to the credit of British subjects
 in our colonies abroad, and even in the dominions
 of foreign powers, it is to be added, that very large
 contributions were sent by them, to aid their native
 country in the critical situation in which it was then
 placed.

When the plan of multiplying the assessed taxes
 was first brought forward, I had resolved to give it
 every opposition in my power, as trenching on the
 funding system, to which I had always been pecu-
 liarly partial : but a circumstance occurred at the
 moment, which induced me to alter that intention.

Great Britain was then justly considered as the
 only power in Europe, capable of resisting the
 efforts of France. The government of that
 country therefore, had determined to bend all its
 energy, not only to humble the power, but even to
 conquer these kingdoms ; and openly announced
 their intentions, in a proclamation which was pub-
 lished in the English newspapers, on the very

^a See brief Examination, &c. p. 28.

morning of that day in which I had proposed to begin a series of attacks against the financial operations of the minister ; instead of which the circumstance above alluded to, induced me to state to the House, “ that having seen the proclamation of “ the French Directory, the object of which was “ to explain to all Europe its intention of invading “ this country, as being the best mode of bringing “ the contest to a conclusion ; of establishing what “ they called the freedom of the seas, which was “ tantamount to the destruction of our naval “ power ; and to make England pay the expence “ of the contest, or in other words to make this “ country tributary to the French ; under such circumstances, I felt it incumbent upon me, as a “ member of that house, and a well-wisher to the “ country, not to press any thing that might tend “ to shew there existed at the time, any difference “ in that house regarding the raising of the supplies necessary to carry on the contest, and “ should therefore decline taking the measures in “ opposition to the proposed tax, which I had intended.” The House in general seemed to receive this sacrifice at the shrine of public spirit, with much approbation, and any indications of a contrary disposition, were amply recompensed, by the applause which that line of conduct met with, both at home and on the continent *.

Before

* A number of letters were sent to the author upon this occasion, from persons with whom he had no acquaintance, approving

Before this subject is dismissed, it may be proper to remark, that if ever the necessities of the times should render a forced loan necessary, the assessed taxes would furnish a criterion sufficiently accurate for levying the sums that might be requisite, and such a loan should only affect the more opulent classes of the community ; for there is a material distinction between a contribution by way of loan, and a contribution by way of tax. A contribution by way of loan, is a capital sum that can only be advanced by the opulent. If the taxes to be imposed for paying the interest of that loan, were also to be exacted from the opulent only, it would be absurd to talk of repayment ; but the taxes would also be paid by the middling and poorer orders of the community, and consequently those who furnished the capital to such a general contribution, would, in process of time, be in a great measure indemnified, by those who could not conveniently contribute to the principal, though they might to the payment of the interest. In the event of such a loan, if any persons liable to the contribution, could not afford to furnish the whole of the principal, they might dispose of a part, which would sell at a price conformable to the value of stocks at the time, and the general credit of the country.

proving of his conduct ; and the celebrated Mallet du Pan, then on the continent, informed a confidential correspondent, in England, that the circumstance made an impression abroad, extremely favorable to the interests of this country.

Instead

Instead however of a forced loan, to which there are so many objections, let us consider whether a plan might not be formed, by which the nation would be induced to pay the sum that might be required, without reluctance, in consideration of the advantages that might be derived from it, not only in a public, but in a private point of view; and this I am persuaded might be effected by the establishment of a general tontine. The nature of that plan I shall endeavour briefly to explain under three heads, namely, 1. The contributions to be paid; 2. The advantages to be granted; and 3. The fund whence these are to be provided for.

The eagerness with which persons of all ranks, even the humblest, enter into benefit societies, and other institutions for the relief of sickness and old age, or the advantage of widows and children, notwithstanding the risk they run of being defrauded by those to whom their funds are entrusted, sufficiently prove the little difficulty that would be found in establishing a general system for that purpose, by which the public expences might be defrayed in time of war, and the debt of the nation might be rapidly diminished, and the improvement of the country greatly promoted, during peace.

Plan of the
Contribu-
tions for a
General
Tontine.

When the assessed tax bill was under consideration, an account was laid before parliament, of the persons liable to the duties on windows and inhabited houses, of which the following is a copy:

	No. of Houses.		No. of Houses.
Houses liable to 3s. <i>per ann.</i> }	246,527	Brought over	566,213
From 3s. to 6s. -	19,679	From 9l. to 10l. -	5,060
— 6s. to 10s. -	26,342	— 10l. to 12l. 10s. -	6,767
— 10s. to 15s. -	43,367	— 12l. 10s. to 15l. -	3,387
— 15s. to 1l. -	43,280	— 15l. to 17l. 10s. -	1,907
— 1l. to 1l. 5s. -	26,557	— 17l. 10s. to 20l. -	1,155
— 1l. 5s. to 1l. 10s. -	21,974	— 20l. to 25l. -	1,182
— 1l. 10s. to 1l. 15s. -	12,826	— 25l. to 30l. -	580
— 1l. 15s. to 2l. -	14,989	— 30l. to 35l. -	320
— 2l. to 2l. 5s. -	13,628	— 35l. to 40l. -	187
— 2l. 5s. to 2l. 10s. -	10,156	— 40l. to 45l. -	131
— 2l. 10s. to 2l. 15s. -	6,203	— 45l. to 50l. -	94
— 2l. 15s. to 3l. -	8,966	— 50l. to 60l. -	84
— 3l. to 3l. 10s. -	12,955	— 60l. to 70l. -	60
— 3l. 10s. to 4l. -	10,515	— 70l. to 80l. -	29
— 4l. to 4l. 10s. -	10,297	— 80l. to 90l. -	16
— 4l. 10s. to 5l. -	8,047	— 90l. to 100l. -	9
— 5l. to 6l. -	9,487	— 100l. to 150l. -	15
— 6l. to 7l. -	7,943	— 150l. to 200l. -	2
— 7l. to 8l. -	7,613	— 200l. to 250l. -	1
— 8l. to 9l. -	5,862	— 250l. to 350l. -	1
	<u>566,213</u>	Total	<u>587,200</u>

In order to exemplify the nature of the proposed plan, we shall suppose that each person is charged, in proportion to the house he inhabits, a certain sum to be paid weekly as a contribution to the proposed tontine, and to entitle him to the advantages to be derived therefrom. The sums that ought to be charged, and the relative proportions thereof, may be altered as may be thought most expedient, after the plan has been more thoroughly digested. At present it is only necessary

fary to remark, that it is proposed to have two sorts of contributors, the first consisting of those liable to the house tax, the second, of those who are exempted from that burden, but who would cheerfully pay a small weekly contribution, in consideration of the benefits to which they would be intitled.

PLAN of a GENERAL TONTINE.

1st Class.

Persons liable to the Tax on Houses.

No. of Persons contributing.	Proposed Weekly Contribution.		Annual Contribution.		Total.	
	s.	d.	l.	s.	l.	s.
378,195	2	6	6	10	2,359,936	16
76,346	3	0	7	16	595,498	16
38,953	4	0	10	8	405,111	4
12,955	5	0	13	0	168,155	
10,515	6	0	15	12	164,034	
10,297	7	0	18	4	187,405	8
8,047	8	0	20	16	167,377	12
9,487	9	0	23	8	221,995	16
7,943	10	0	26	0	206,518	
7,613	11	0	28	12	217,731	16
5,862	12	0	31	4	182,894	8
5,060	13	0	33	16	176,028	0
6,767	15	0	39	0	263,913	0
3,387	20	0	52	0	176,124	0
1,907	25	0	65	0	123,955	0
1,155	30	0	78	0	90,090	0
1,182	35	0	91	0	107,562	0
580	40	0	104	0	60,320	0
320	45	0	117	0	37,440	0
187	50	0	130	0	24,310	0
131	60	0	156	0	20,436	0
94	70	0	182	0	17,108	0
586,983			Carried over		5,973,944	16

No. of Persons contributing.	Proposed Weekly Contributions.		Annual Contribution.		Total.	
	s.	d.	l.	s.	l.	s.
586,983					5,973,944	16
84	80	0	208	0	17,472	0
60	90	0	234	0	14,040	0
29	100	0	260	0	7,540	0
16	200	0	520	0	8,320	0
9	300	0	780	0	7,020	0
15	400	0	1040	0	15,600	0
2	500	0	1300	0	2,600	0
1	600	0	1560	0	1,560	0
1	700	0	1820	0	1,820	0
587,200					£.6,049,916	16

2d Class.

Persons exempted from the Tax on Houses.

	s.	d.	l.	s.	l.	s.
600,000	2	0	5	4	3,120,000	0
500,000	1	6	3	18	1,930,000	0
1,000,000	1	0	2	12	2,600,000	0
400,000	0	9	1	19	780,000	0
300,000	0	6	1	6	390,000	0
2,800,000					£.8,820,000	0

The following then would be the amount of this contribution.

Clafs.	No. of Contributors.	Total Sum.
First Clafs.	587,000	£.6,049,916 16
Second Clafs.	2,800,000	8,820,000 0
Total.	3,387,000	14,869,916 16

It is evident, that by this plan, about £.14,000,000 might be obtained; and if the sinking fund,

fund, now amounting to more than six millions, were added, it would make a total of twenty millions, which might be raised within the year, and which would be sufficient to carry on a naval war, conducted with any degree of prudence and economy.

In regard to the advantages to which the contributors to such a general tontine may be entitled, it is evident that they ought to be of as diversified a nature as possible, leaving it to every one to enter into that class or division for which he may entertain any peculiar predilection. For instance, some may wish that the money they pay should accumulate for their own benefit when they become old; others that it should furnish an annuity for their wives in case of survivency: others for their children, when they come of age; and so forth. In short, tables might be constructed, *that would take in almost every possible case*, by means of which the plan would become a popular measure, nor would the burthen of it be much felt, if provisions were kept at a reasonable rate, and if the circulation of the country was abundant.

Advantages
to be
granted to
the con-
tributors.

It cannot be doubted, that the Sinking Fund, which now yields six millions per annum, would be a resource much more than sufficient for all the demands to which the Contributors would be entitled for a long period of time; and if no additional loans were to take place, and if the income arising from the general tontine, were afterwards to be applied, in time of peace, to the diminution of

Fund for
payment.

the debt, the public creditors could not object to the measure, and the redemption of the debt would go on at least as rapidly as ever. The proposed Tontine therefore, and this plan of employing the sinking fund, could not be opposed by the warmest friend to that redemption.

This plan has hitherto been only considered in a financial point of view, but in other respects it might also be attended with great public advantages; for if such a measure were carried into effect, the whole nation would in a manner be combined into one friendly or amicable association, in the preservation of which the whole community would be interested; whilst every individual of that community would have a part of his income, accumulated in the manner the most gratifying to his own feelings, or the most likely to be of service to himself, or his dearest connexions.

4. Income Tax.

The plan of adding to the Assessed Taxes being found extremely unpopular, and not having answered in other respects the expectations formed of its success, it was thought necessary to try some other system, and the celebrated tax on Income was brought forward. The friend and advocate of the minister, has thus explained the general principles on which that measure was founded. “The inequality, however, of the assessment, (exclusive of that occasioned by evasion,) and still more of the contributions, was evident; but the principle of raising a large part of the supply within the year was established, and a measure was effected, which

“ which had been frequently contemplated by
 “ theorists in political economy with all that par-
 “ tiality to which its effects, in various points of
 “ view, seemed reasonably to entitle it; but they
 “ had scarcely ventured to hope for its actual
 “ adoption in a country already burdened so heavily
 “ as ours, where it might be supposed fatal to the
 “ popularity of the minister who should propose it,
 “ and adverse to the immediate interests of the
 “ people whom it was to affect. *It has been*
 “ adopted however, still more effectually by the
 “ tax on Income, and it is no less flattering to the
 “ national pride, than it is promising to the national
 “ security and welfare, to consider that the good
 “ sense, the foresight, and the resolution of the
 “ people have kept pace with, and in some degree
 “ anticipated the ideas of Government on the
 “ subject. The principle, the general proposition
 “ was recommended by the country. The question
 “ of the best mode of carrying into effect was left
 “ for the talents of the minister to propose to par-
 “ liament, where it was discussed, matured, and
 “ completed.”

As this obnoxious burden was repealed, by the
 successor of the minister who proposed it, either
 with the concurrence, or at least without any op-
 position on the part of his predecessor; and as in
 all probability it will never again be revived, it does
 not seem necessary to enter into any detail of the
 various debates, and other proceedings, which took

place in parliament, regarding this celebrated financial transaction; but having stated very fully to the house, my sentiments upon the subject, I hope the reader will excuse me, for recording, in this publication, the opinions which I then urged, more especially as I have still no reason to call in question their justness or policy. The principal debate regarding the Income tax took place on the 14th December, 1798, on which occasion the author delivered himself in the following terms,

“ Mr. Speaker,

“ I arise to oppose the motion made by the Right Honourable Gentleman, (Mr. Pitt,) for taking into our further consideration the bill which he has proposed, from the full conviction, that the present is so exceptionable a measure, that it is impossible, by the efforts of any Committee whatever, to make it entitled to the approbation of the House; and I am induced thus early to take the liberty of addressing myself to you, because I think that it is a duty peculiarly incumbent upon those, who have directed their attention to financial inquiries, to prevent, by every possible exertion, the passing of such a bill into a law. I shall endeavour, however, with as much brevity as the importance of the question will admit of, to explain what has occurred to me on this interesting subject.”

“ The House is fully aware, that for raising those extraordinary supplies which are necessary to defray the expences of war, one, of four measures, has been usually adopted. In some countries, a treasure has been accumulated for that purpose in time of peace: in others the necessary supplies have been raised within the year: according to a third plan, the sums wanted have been levied by compulsive loans, of which there was lately an instance under the directorial tyranny of France; the last plan, is that of raising money by means of voluntary loans, or through the medium of what is called *the funding system*;

system; a mode of raising money which some gentlemen are inclined to reprobate, because they only contemplate its defects, but which I have ever considered, as the climax of financial invention, the greatest of all political discoveries, the most valuable mine that ever a nation was possessed of, and, in a peculiar manner, the source of the strength, the prosperity, and the happiness of this country. Indeed, Sir, (without tiring the House by a statement of the variety of arguments that might be urged in its favour, with which I am persuaded that every individual who now hears me, must be already familiarly acquainted,) it may be sufficient to remark, that if we had attempted to carry on our wars on any other plan, in consequence of the inability of the subject to bear the pressure of additional taxes, either those wars must have been in the highest degree unsuccessful, from the want of funds to carry them on, or the people would have been driven, by oppression and despair, into a state of insurrection; nor could we have preserved, as we have hitherto been fortunately enabled to do, amidst all the calamities of war, that best source of public prosperity, the means of industry and of reproduction."

"But, we are told, that we have funded too much already; that the price of stocks is low; that money cannot be borrowed in large sums, except on very disadvantageous terms; that we ought to husband the funding system; that we must pay a salvage for the protection of our property; and, above all, that we are now under the necessity of resorting to a new financial expedient, namely, that of borrowing a part, and of raising the remainder of the extraordinary supplies by taxes within the year."

"There can hardly be, in my opinion, a more erroneous idea. If the funding system is at all to be abandoned, instead of pursuing this miserable expedient, the result of irresolution and timidity, we ought manfully to resolve to raise, not the half, but the whole supplies within the year. By following the plan that is proposed, we shall neither enjoy the advantages of the one system, nor of the other, whilst we must feel the disadvantages of both."

"If all the taxes were raised within the year, the money of the kingdom would not be collected in the metropolis, for the purposes

purposes of a loan ; so that there would be a greater quantity of wealth in the country, applicable to the payment of the extraordinary taxes to be imposed ; whereas, if we have both a loan in London, and extraordinary contributions in the country, it is absurd to imagine, that the circulating wealth of the nation will be equally divided : hence, there must be either a deficiency of money in the country, to pay the taxes, or a want of money in the capital, to furnish the loan."

" It is next contended, that the new system has already answered in practice ; and to it, we are told, ought to be attributed, the present flourishing state of our public credit, and what is called the high price of stocks. There never were more groundless assertions. During the American war, the lowest price that the funds ever reached, was in February 1782, when the 3 *per cents.* were never lower than $53\frac{1}{8}$, though no artificial means were made use of to buoy them up by means of weekly purchases. When the bargain for the loan was concluded in April last, the 3 *per cent.* consols were above 48 ; they are now at 54. Is it possible to suppose therefore, that this plan has at all materially contributed to increase the price of stocks ? The difference is 6 *per cent.* Can no other cause be assigned for that rise, but the measure now under contemplation ? Is nothing, for instance, to be attributed to the land-tax redemption bill, which, I am informed, has partially succeeded in particular districts, and the beneficial consequences of which we hear so much on other occasions ?—nothing to the astonishing increase of our commercial wealth, and the improvement of our agricultural resources ; and nothing to our naval victories ; to which, indeed, more than to the financial measures of the Right Honourable Gentleman, (Mr. Pitt,) our present prosperous situation ought to be ascribed ? In short, four causes are assigned for this rise of 6 *per cent.* as suits best the convenience of the minister. Let us give each of them a fair proportion, namely, $1\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* Let us suppose that we have occasion for twenty-five millions this year, and that we borrow the whole, instead of raising a part, on the new principle, within the year, the difference, at the rate of $1\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* is but 375,000*l.* and for that paltry and miserable sum, the whole nation

nation is to be subjected to the grievous oppression of this intolerable measure."

"Let us admit, however, for the sake of argument, that it is wise and politic, to raise a part of the supplies within the year, and that it has been found beneficial in practice; it next becomes a matter of question, whether the assessed tax bill of last year, is not as fair a mode of raising that contribution, as the new system that is suggested? And after all the arguments used in favour of that bill, and the strong language in which it was supported in both Houses, it is a circumstance hardly to be credited, that it should now be proposed to repeal that plan, and to substitute another in its stead. If the members of this House in particular, were to recollect the many strong declarations which were made in its favour, from authorities they are in general accustomed to listen to, with peculiar attention and respect, they would probably hesitate, in regard to the adoption of a new system, for raising any part of the supplies within the year."

"Indeed the question is, whether it is not better to have some criterion, than none at all? By having a criterion, you stand some chance of preventing evasion, and, above all, you render a harsh inquisitorial disclosure of property unnecessary: but if you have none, unless the most oppressive and tyrannical system is pursued, the whole income you can expect to derive from the measure, will depend on the voluntary zeal, and, unfortunately, the lax morality, of the great body of the people, who have already shown, what may be expected from them, when you appeal to their consciences on the subject of taxation."

"But if a new plan must be adopted, and if property, instead of expenditure, must be attacked, it becomes a matter of nice discussion, whether the extraordinary contribution should be raised by a tax on capital, or a tax on income, or by blending the two together, which, though the most complicated, yet being unquestionably the justest, ought to be preferred. What I mean is, that every man should pay instead of 10 *per cent.* on his income, $\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* on his capital, and 5 *per cent.* on his income, by which persons who had no capital, would be greatly relieved,

relieved, and those who were possessed of considerable property, would pay more in proportion to their opulence, than under the system that is proposed."

"Almost the only objection to this plan is, the difficulty of ascertaining the value of a man's capital. But is it not the same in regard to his income, unless it arises from some fixed and regular stipend, and is liable to no uncertainty of deduction? Let us consider this important part of the subject, in the three great lines, of a landed income, of a commercial income, and of a professional income."

"A landed income may be supposed the most certain and permanent, and in some particular instances it may be so; but, in general, a person of landed property, after deducting every public tax or imposition to which he is liable, is subject to a variety of burdens. In the first place, he is frequently under the necessity of being at very heavy legal expences for preserving his property, and he is clearly entitled to deduct those expences, as it is proposed that the public shall avail itself of that part of his income, by taxing the gentlemen of the law. In the second place, he is under the necessity of spending money in the improvement of his estates, as in draining, fencing, building, &c. And in the third place, any person of landed property is subject to a variety of deductions in consequence of the rank he holds in the state: he is obliged to act as sheriff, as justice of the peace, and other public situations, without any recompence or emolument whatsoever; and if any plan is in agitation, for building a bridge, for making a turnpike road, or forming a canal, which may ultimately prove of material consequence to the neighbourhood, a gentleman of landed property, must subscribe to all such measures, unless it is intended to check by law the progress of public improvement."

"It is still more difficult to ascertain the income of the commercial individual, whose capital and income, indeed, are in fact so intimately combined together, that it is impossible to separate them. The income of a commercial man, also, depends upon a variety of circumstances besides his capital; it depends on the situation in which he happens to be placed, the connexions which he has formed or inherited, the talents which he employs
in

in his business, and the industry with which he prosecutes it. Are we to tax situation? That was given up in the case of the famous shop-tax. Are we to tax the advantage derived from connexion? It would be the first time that any individual ever paid any demand to the Exchequer, for having a number of friends, and probably deserving them. Are we to tax talents? It would be a strange circumstance in finance, to impose burdens upon those, by whose ingenuity new arts were discovered, or the old ones improved; who contribute so essentially to enrich the nation, and who are justly accounted the surest source of its commercial prosperity. Or, above all, are we to tax industry? If so, the man that is idle and profligate will pay nothing; whereas the sober and industrious will be burdened in proportion to their exertions."

"Let us next consider how professional men can ascertain their incomes. To what a variety of casualties are they not exposed? They may be disabled by sickness? they may be injured by ill-founded personal, or even political prejudices entertained against them; or their profits may be impaired by public calamity and distress. Indeed, many of them must be ruined by this bill, which must diminish, in various instances, their professional business; and all of them will be entitled to the deduction of a full third of their clear income, which every prudent professional man does usually deduct, to form a provision for himself in his old age, and a capital for his family at his death."

"These circumstances prove, that it is as difficult to estimate income, as to ascertain the value of capital, and are strongly in favour of that blended system, which seems to be the only just principle, on which such a tax or contribution as this can be imposed."

"Indeed, how is it possible to demand, at the same rate, from a person who has an income without a capital, and from one who has both income and capital?—One person, for instance, draws his subsistence from an income of 600*l.* a year, from the profession of the law; at 10 *per cent.* he is charged with 60*l.* to the Exchequer, which he must deduct from his income. Another person has 20,000*l.* of 3 *per cent.* consolidated annuities,

annuities, producing him 600 *l.* At 10 *per-cent.* he will only pay 60 *l.* also, though, by selling only about 120 *l.* of his 3 *per cents*, according to the price of the stocks, he pays his tax, and only loses about 3 *l.* 12 *s.* *per annum* of his income. Where then is that boasted equality which is said to be so much in favour of this plan, and which renders it so infinitely superior to every other ?”

“ On these grounds, I cannot help thinking, that if the measure is at all to be adopted, it ought to be altered, on the principle which I have now taken the liberty of recommending, namely, that of laying the tax, partly on capital, and partly on income.”

“ Let us now, Sir, proceed to consider, the specific plan that is submitted to our consideration, in the present bill.”

“ The House must still recollect, the elaborate speech, in which the Right Hon. Gentleman laid before us, a general view of the income, supposed to be enjoyed, by all the various classes of the community. In some points I may differ with him; and when I heard the Honourable Gentleman, expressing himself with so much doubt, respecting various particulars, and resting on the antiquated notions of Davenant, and the guesses of modern authorities, I could not help wishing, that the Honourable Gentleman had given more assistance to an institution I had the honour of suggesting; I mean, Sir, the Board of Agriculture, by whom all these points, had it been properly supported, would have been, before this time, fully ascertained. It has ever been a favourite opinion with me, that no country could be well governed, unless its real situation was thoroughly known—“ *Ad consilium de republica dandum, caput est, nosse rempublicam.*” Indeed, had not the progress of that institution been checked, by those who were regardless of the interests of the country they governed, provided they could gratify their own personal spleen and resentment, we should now have been debating, not on loose calculations, and uncertain data, but on a general report on the state of the country, founded on authentic information, which it would have been in my power, before this time, to have laid upon the table of this House.”

“ But

“ But let us suppose, that the calculations of the Honourable Gentleman, if not perfectly just, yet are sufficiently accurate for the purposes of discussion; and that the various classes of the community, which he has enumerated, have an income of one hundred millions per annum; yet I question much, whether they really can afford to pay, any thing like so large a sum as ten millions, in the course of one year, in addition to the thirty millions (including the expence of the collection) which they already yield to the Exchequer.”

“ The persons who will be subjected to this new tax on income, may be divided into three classes.”

“ The first consists of those who already save a part of their income, and who, by this act, will be obliged, however reluctantly, to part with a portion of those savings which they were anxious to lay up. It is the principal object of this bill, to get at this description of individuals. But I do not think that this resource is any thing like so considerable as Gentlemen imagine. If we suppose that there are 3000 persons, who enjoy, at an average, 1000 *l.* each (which in these luxurious times, will include, I am persuaded, all the misers in the kingdom), the total income they possess, will not exceed 3,000,000 *l.* *per annum*, and the tax will not produce above 300,000 *l.*

“ Another description of persons, are those who formerly lived up to the full extent of their income, or perhaps beyond it, but who will now begin to save, and to reduce their establishments, in order to pay this new contribution. I am afraid this class will be a very numerous one, and that to the full amount they are compelled to pay to this tax on income, we shall lose in the excise and customs, and other branches of the revenue.”

“ The only remaining class, consists of those who will continue to live as formerly. Perhaps, indeed, they cannot retrench, owing to the largeness of their family, their professional situations, and various other circumstances. Having neither saved the money before, nor being able to save it now, they must either deduct it from their capital (if they have any), or borrow it where they can find it.”

“ And

“ And this leads me again to allude, to the great disadvantage of blending the two systems together, namely, that of borrowing money for the public service, and of raising the supplies within the year. The consequence of a public loan is, that all the money of the kingdom, not only flows into the metropolis, but also into the hands of a particular set of individuals who job in the funds. What follows? It is evident that any private person cannot borrow money almost on any terms. Whereas, if there were no loan, the circulating wealth of the kingdom, would be spread over the whole surface of the country; the loan-mongers of London, would be glad to lend their money on respectable private securities, and less difficulty would be found, in raising the whole of the supplies within the year, than the proportion which it is proposed, by this bill, should be levied.”

“ We shall suppose, however, that the nation is able to pay the proposed tax of 10 *per cent.* on income; yet, when I consider the various objections which may be urged against it, some of which go to the very root of the measure, and others, which, though they affect only particular branches of it, yet are almost of equal moment,—I can scarcely think that the House will be disposed to pass such a bill into a law.”

“ The radical objections are three; namely, that the measure in question will promote emigration, will diminish the produce of the old taxes, and will raise the price of all the necessaries of life.”

“ There is no circumstance, so likely to be apprehended from this measure, as the emigration of the industrious classes of the community. If, in addition to all the usual taxes to which the people of the country are subjected, and which are in general reckoned tolerably oppressive, persons are also made liable to a compulsive disclosure of property, which has ever been accounted so odious and vexatious a measure, and also to have that property severely taxed, it must induce great multitudes of individuals, to desert a country, where they are subjected to such grievous oppression, and to find out some quiet asylum, where they may escape such rapacity. If such a circumstance were to take place, and it is evidently not impossible,
for

nor in my opinion, improbable, it would be the source of infinite mischief to this country. If the ingenious mechanic, the industrious artisan, the adventurous manufacturer, the hardy seaman, the intelligent merchant, and the skilful husbandman, oppressed by financial exactions, are driven from this formerly happy island, what will become of the boasted power and opulence of the British nation? Some are already gone; and others are perhaps preparing to follow their footsteps. The passing of such a law as this, must confirm any resolution they have taken, and may banish for ever from this country, some of the most valuable subjects it can at present boast of."

"Another material objection is, that it will occasion a very fatal reduction in the produce of the old taxes. Many luxurious gratifications, which furnish an ample revenue to the Exchequer, must be curtailed or abandoned. Many people are already considering, whether they ought, or ought not to replenish their pipes and snuff-boxes, on which depends a branch of revenue (that on tobacco), yielding to the amount of 700,000*l. per annum*. Other articles must suffer in proportion. If the national income, as stated by the Right Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Pitt), is one hundred millions, we pay about thirty millions of that sum to the Exchequer at present; for which some allowance ought to have been made in his statements: and if we are reduced to the private expenditure of sixty instead of seventy millions, there must be a considerable defalcation from the thirty millions formerly paid: and if the spirit of economy is once introduced into the establishments of private families, which I think is likely to be the result of so violent a measure, that *cold economy* may continue; in which case we shall lose a permanent for a temporary advantage; and those taxes, on the produce of which depend the payment of our public creditors, and the subsistence of our fleets and armies, may become inadequate to the purpose. This is a point, in which many persons who now hear me, are deeply interested, who are thinking little at present, how much they are personally concerned in these discussions."

"A third radical objection is, the effect that this tax will have, in raising the price of all the necessaries of life; insomuch,

that the middling and lower orders of the community will find it difficult to subsist under it. Several articles of general consumption, as salt, sugar, coals, &c. are already exorbitantly high, and must become still more so. Indeed, if we severely tax those who raise or produce the necessaries of life, and those who deal in them, it is evident, that they will endeavour to throw the load off their own shoulders, and will contrive to make the unfortunate consumer, pay tenfold, for the taxes to which they themselves are subjected."

" I shall now proceed, to state some objections of a less important nature, because they are capable of being removed ; but which, at the same time, unless they can be obviated, ought to prove fatal to the measure."

" The first point I shall touch upon, under this head, relates to the taxing of the funds, which must alarm every one, attached to the old financial system and doctrines of this country, in opposition to the new political dogmas, which, in these days, are so boldly inculcated. By the laws, as they now stand, the interests or dividends paid to the public creditors, are protected against all charges and taxes whatsoever ; but, for the first time, they are now introduced into the budget of the Chancellor of the Exchequer."

" It is said, that there is no direct tax upon the funds ; that we do not intercept the money, as it goes into the pocket of the creditor ; but that we only put our hands into his pocket afterwards, and inform him, whether he consents or not, he must, *at his peril*, (the words of the precept of the commissioners are, ' thereof fail not at your peril') deliver over to us, a tenth part of that sum of money, which we assured him, when he lent the principal, was to be exempted from all taxes and charge, whatsoever. What a miserable evasion ! Indeed, if this principle of indirect and involuntary taxation, is once admitted in regard to the funds, there is no saying to what height it may be carried. What is the remedy ? The remedy is an easy one, and has been practised on all occasions, when the principal or the interest of the public creditor has been affected—let books be opened for receiving the names of all the creditors, who assent to this new mode of holding their property, and let it go no farther

farther than to the persons who subscribe. I trust that a very large majority of the creditors, if not the whole of them, would agree to the proposal, and voluntarily subject themselves to the new tax. At any rate, no consideration whatever, ought, in my opinion, to induce this House, to countenance any paltry evasion, by which its solemn faith, pledged to the public creditors, can, to the smallest possible extent, be violated."

"The next point I wish to allude to, can also be remedied in the committee, on the bill. It relates to the idea of taxing persons residing in this country, for the property, which they possess in other parts of his Majesty's dominions; for instance, in Ireland and the West Indies. This seems to me unjust in its principle; and, so far as my information reaches, without example in the financial history of this, or of any other country. Both in Ireland and in the West Indies, there are separate legislatures, who enjoy the privilege of imposing taxes, on the property of those who are subject to their respective jurisdictions;—a privilege which they exercise to a considerable extent. Taxing property in other places, by the authority of the British Parliament, is reviving the old and exploded doctrines, which laid the foundation of the unfortunate war with America. But, Sir, I doubt, first, the right, and, secondly, the policy of this measure. In regard to the right, taxes are described to be '*a portion which each subject contributes of his property, in order to secure the remainder.*' If this definition is a just one, and it is Judge Blackstone's, we have no right to take the produce of the property of Ireland, except to defend Ireland; nor the produce of the property of Jamaica, except to defend Jamaica. In regard to the impolicy of the attempt, it is, if possible, still clearer. The effect of imposing so heavy a burden upon persons residing here, with their property elsewhere, must be, not only to drive them out of this country, but also to prevent others from coming into it; in which case, we shall not only lose the proposed exaction, but also the taxes which they pay in various other ways; and also, all the advantages we derive, from the circulation of from five to six millions *per annum*."

"The only other point I wish to touch upon at present, relates to the new inquisitorial power about to be established."

“ That some regulations are necessary, in order to prevent evasion, can hardly be questioned; but that they should be so very strict, or rather so boldly tyrannical, as those which are pointed out in this bill, seems to me completely inadmissible. To tempt a man to perjury, and to subject him, at the same time, to an inquisitorial power, in order to make him condemn himself, is the height of cruelty and injustice. For my part, I think it infinitely preferable, that we should lose some money, than run the risk of establishing principles, abhorrent to that free constitution which this country has hitherto boasted of. This is a part of the subject, however, which will require to be discussed, with peculiar anxiety, in a future stage of our proceedings.”

“ But, Sir, it may be said, that this is certainly a harsh measure, and liable to endless objections; at the same time, What can be done? Some great measure of finance is now essential for the public safety, and if you oppose this measure, you ought to suggest something else that may answer in its room.”

“ I cannot possibly subscribe to that doctrine. No Member of the House, is bound to do more, than to deliver his sentiments on public measures, as they are respectively brought forward. No private individual, can have access to that minute information, without which it is impossible to judge, whether a measure can be prejudicial to the public interest, or otherwise. But if there is any doubt regarding the best mode of raising the supplies, let a select Committee of the House be appointed for the investigation of that subject, armed with authority to send for persons, papers, and records. The House and the Public may be assured, if a proper select Committee were appointed, that all the financial difficulties we are involved in would be removed; and surely, since we had out-of-door committees, gravely deliberating on the best mode of levying taxes, and who have favoured us with their public declarations on the subject of finance, there can hardly be any well-grounded objection to the measure I have suggested; and I hope, from the gesture of the Right Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Pitt), that he approves of, and will support the idea.”

“ It will naturally be expected, that on such an occasion, I should again take the liberty of recommending to the attention of the House, that most valuable of all resources, I mean economy. We are told by a celebrated statesman of antiquity, whose orations the Right Honourable Gentleman has so frequently perused, and so closely imitates, I mean Cicero, “ *optimum, & in privatis familiis, & in republica vestigium est, parsimonium* ;” and I am perfectly satisfied, there would be no difficulty, instead either of borrowing the sum in question, or raising it by means of an extraordinary and harsh contribution, to save a large proportion of it, by a rigorous spirit of retrenchment, in all our establishments both of income and expenditure.”

“ With a view of ascertaining the disposition of the House towards economical arrangements, I thought it advisable, to embrace the happy opportunity, which our late glorious naval successes had furnished, of suggesting a very moderate reduction in our favourite service of the navy; because I was fully persuaded, that, if it could be introduced there, it would not be difficult to extend it afterwards, to all our other establishments. I knew well it would be an unpopular suggestion, but I could not hesitate, from any apprehension of that sort, to recommend a measure, which seemed to me so necessary and so useful to the public; and which, if the war should continue much longer, must, sooner or later, be adopted.”

“ Indeed, in my opinion, nothing could raise more the character of the nation abroad, or give more satisfaction to the people at home, than our enforcing a system of economy. It is well known, that in private life that individual is alone independent and respectable, who, without being too parsimonious, is yet attentive to his expenditure. The same is the case with nations. In regard to the people at home, the minister may suppose, as they have submitted quietly to so many burdens, that they will continue patient under more: he may find himself mistaken. By a profuse expenditure of the public money he may secure the cry of those, who are preying on the vitals of the public, and perhaps, for the moment, the assistance of corrupt and profligate men; but he will soon lose, what

every wise minister would prize above all other acquisitions, the satisfaction of his own mind, the confidence of a generous Sovereign, and the support of a great country."

"I shall now, Sir, state some additional considerations to the House, which seem to me decisively hostile to the measure in question."

"The first is, the great tendency that the passing of such a bill will have, towards perpetuating the war, and promoting public profusion. As soon as it is ascertained, that ten millions of additional revenue can be raised upon the public, it will be considered as a fund for borrowing, and at 5 *per cent.* would pay the interest of two hundred millions of money. What a temptation to continue the war, when perhaps peace might be obtained on reasonable terms, and to carry it on with the most unbounded extravagance and profusion!"

"Besides, Sir, is it possible to imagine, if this tax is once imposed, that we shall ever get rid of it? Whilst the war continues, it is certain we cannot; and if peace were to be proclaimed to morrow, it is at least questionable, whether such an addition to the public revenue, would not be necessary, from the enormous peace establishment, which the circumstances of the times may occasion, at least in the opinion of those, with whom cold economy is no particular favourite. And indeed, if it should not be found necessary on account of our peace establishment, such an addition to the public revenue, will be extremely convenient, to assist in discharging the national debt, as a commutation for other taxes, or on some such similar pretence."

"It is further necessary to observe, that this bill lays a foundation for endless vexatious exactions. The minister now very moderately requires only a tenth part of our income; but he establishes a principle, that the Government of this country is entitled to demand a certain part of the income of each individual, and is also entitled, to enforce that compulsive requisition, by the strictest and harshest regulations. Formerly, Sir, our principal taxes, arising from consumption, and not extending to many of the real comforts and necessaries of life, were in a manner voluntary. The exchequer was enriched,
and

and the people were happy ; and the profusion of Government was fortunately checked by the conviction, that, if the taxes were carried beyond a certain length, the produce, instead of increasing, would diminish. But, Sir, if this bill passes, the whole property of the country will in future lie at the mercy of the Minister ; and though he now proposes to exact but a tenth part, what is to hinder him next year, from demanding a fifth, or even a third of our respective incomes ?—Allow me to ask, how long it can be expected, that either the wealth or the industry of the people can hold out, under even the apprehension and terror of such exactions.”

“ Such, Sir, are the objections which have occurred to me, against this fatal measure, one, to which the attention of the House, and of the public at large, cannot be too earnestly and anxiously directed. The only answer likely to be given to these objections, and indeed the only arguments that can be urged in support of the measure itself, are those philippics against the French Directory, with which the Right Honourable Gentleman, and his friends, are accustomed to interlard their orations, and by which they endeavour to inflame the passions, and to perplex the understandings of a partial auditory. Permit me, however, to take the liberty of asking, What have such declamations to do with the present question ? I detest the ambitious projects of the French Directory, as much as that Honourable Gentleman or his friends, and will go as great lengths to resist them. —But because the French Directory are ambitious, must the people of England be oppressed, and must we on that account give way, and submit, even without a struggle, to such a mischievous project as the one now under consideration ; a project, Sir, which could only have been occasioned by the most unbounded profusion, could only have originated in the harshest tyrannical principles, and must either terminate, in the disgrace and ruin of the bold projector, or the destruction of the nation ?”

“ I have thus, Sir, stated at some length, but not longer than the importance of the question demands, my sentiments regarding it ; and I earnestly intreat, that the Members of this

House, divesting themselves of partiality for one individual, and of prejudice against others, will consider the subject itself dispassionately, as one on which depends the future happiness of this country. Let them resolve, instead of taking a measure at this moment blindly upon trust, because it happens to be introduced by a favourite Minister, let them resolve, on the present occasion, to see with their own eyes, to hear with their own ears, and to be directed by their own judgment. Let them be assured, if they suffer this bill to pass, that it will be an event, which they themselves will severely repent of, when it will unfortunately be too late, and which their posterity will have just cause to lament, as one of the greatest calamities that could possibly have befallen that country they were doomed to inherit. Let them also be assured, if such a bill as this meets with their approbation, that the British House of Commons, will no longer be considered as that respectable Senate, whose conduct has formerly been looked up to, with admiration and respect, not only in this country, but in every other, where any vestige of liberty, or freedom of opinion exists; but that it will be accounted, a degraded chamber of commerce and finance, calculated solely for the purpose, of registering the edicts of a Minister, without knowledge of their contents, or conviction of their utility."

The minister having determined to carry through the plan, all opposition was fruitless, and in order to reconcile the minds of the nation to so heavy and so obnoxious a burden, a paper was written by a person connected with Government, who has defended the tax with considerable ability, and endeavoured to refute the various objections which have been urged against it. The impartiality of an historian renders it incumbent upon me, to state the observations of this ingenious writer, leaving the reader to form his own opinion, after having thus

thus had the arguments both for and against the measure laid before him.

“ Under the existing circumstances, a tax upon all income has appeared to the parliament of the country to be the most equal and practicable mode of raising the necessary supplies: that it is practicable, no person has denied; that it is equal, has indeed by a few persons been disputed. We do not mean to contend, that to this as well as to every other work of man, many very plausible objections may not be stated; we do not mean to contend, that in particular cases it will not bear heavily on individuals, much more so certainly than could be wished. The hardship in these cases, however, arises from the necessity of raising the money, and not from the mode in which it is proposed to raise it; for we venture to affirm, that this system is, even upon the face of it, infinitely more equal than any which has ever been adopted, and that, in the progress of the bill, relief has been given in every case in which it was possible to afford it, without affecting the success of the measure.

“ The first objection that has been stated to the bill, is, the injustice of taxing different sorts of income in the same proportion and by the same rule; for that there is a great difference between fixed incomes, uncertain and fluctuating incomes, such as incomes from trade or professions, incomes for life, and incomes for years.

“ That there is a difference between these various incomes no person can deny: this difference the bill finds, and certainly does not propose to remedy; but, by taxing them all in the same proportion, it leaves the different sorts of income in the same relative state in which it found them. Can any reason be stated why the savings and accumulations of some should not contribute their proportionate share, as well as the expenditure of others? This is a measure by which we tax ourselves largely in the present year, to diminish the permanent burden upon ourselves and our posterity. These accumulations and savings, when they come into expenditure (which in the course of a few years *must* be the case), will partake equally in the benefit of the measure, and is it not just therefore that they should contribute

tribute their share towards the success of it. The individual who spends his whole income, in supporting a certain situation in life, is as important a character (though not more so) in the general state of society, as he who saves or accumulates. From him you take a part of his expenditure, from the other a part of his savings and accumulations. The real consequence or vanity of the former, is affected in as great a degree by a diminution of his expenditure, as the same qualities are in the latter, by diminishing his means of accumulation. Their relative situation in society, their advantages or disadvantages, remain in that case precisely the same. The increasing part of the community can certainly contribute their proportion with less present inconvenience or distress to themselves; but this advantage is balanced by the consideration, that the growth of their property is in some degree retarded.

“ But it is urged, that it is not just to tax incomes for life, or for years, in the same proportion in which you tax perpetual incomes. This objection is founded on a mistake of the whole principle of the bill. The only advantage which the individual, whose income is perpetual, possesses over the annuitant is, that he has it in his power to sell or mortgage a part of his property for the purpose of paying the tax. Now the object of this bill is, to raise out of the *income of the year* a certain part of the supplies, without imposing any burden upon posterity; and if individuals should burden a part of their property with a view of paying this tax, in proportion as that should take place, we should incur all the inconveniences of funding: for where is the difference (supposing it to be in the same extent) between the public, in their collective capacity, borrowing the money by loan, and mortgaging it on their posterity, and a number of individuals borrowing the money on their private estates, and mortgaging it on their descendants? But supposing no part of the property to be sold, the only justifiable grounds upon which you could tax the possessor of perpetual property in a greater proportion than the life annuitant is, that he must be supposed to have an interest in his estate after his death. If this is the case, he must be considered, on the other hand, as subject likewise to the burdens of the estate after his decease.

If therefore it should be necessary, from time to time, in periods of national emergency, to have recourse to this measure, the property in which we must suppose him interested will, in all those cases, be subject to the tax. And would it not be unjust, to tax those interests in a greater proportion at present, which, if we consider them only as life-interests, stand exactly upon the same footing as the life-annuities; and, if they are perpetual interests, are exposed to the tax in all future ages, whenever it may be thought necessary to adopt it?

“ The next objection, which has been stated to the measure, is, the injustice of taxing different rates of income in the same proportion; that persons of large income cannot only afford to pay more, but even a greater proportion of their incomes, than those who possess small ones; and that there ought to be, therefore, *a rising scale* applied to incomes of different amount.

“ The object of this bill is not to regulate incomes, but to tax them; and if you take from different incomes the same proportion, you leave them of course exactly in the relative state in which you found them. The principle, on which the objection is founded, might carry you the length of levelling all property, and of not taxing moderate or small incomes at all, till great ones were reduced to the same level; a principle destructive of all idea of property, of all industry and exertion amongst mankind, and of the peace and well being of civil society.

“ But let us inquire how far the effect of this proposition would be charitable and humane.—A person of two or three hundred pounds a year is called upon for the tenth of his income; the tax may bear heavily upon him individually, but he has, proportionably, few persons dependent upon him who will suffer its consequence; he keeps few servants, and employs few tradesmen, &c. &c.; but in proportion as you rise in the scale of income, the number of dependent persons increase. If, then, you tax those who are possessed of large property, in a greater proportion than those who are only in moderate circumstances, you must consider that, in taxing them, you are indirectly taxing all those who depend upon that property, and
live

live from the expenditure of it. The consequence would be, that, whilst in one way you are pretending to relieve the middle and industrious classes of the community, you are bearing at least equally hard upon them in another; so that a rising scale of taxation is not only inconsistent with every principle of property, but would not produce any of the beneficial consequences, or afford the relief it proposed to bestow.

“ These principles of the bill are not *new*; they are those on which the legislature has always acted. In the land-tax, in the poor-rates, in county rates, &c., did we ever hear of a rising scale of taxation? Yet, if it was fair in this instance, would it not have been equally just in all those? In these instances, did we ever hear of any distinction between tenants in fee-simple, tenants for life, and tenants for years? The tax has, in all these cases, been taken in the same proportion, out of the produce of the land in the year, without any consideration of the amount of the property, or the nature of the tenure.”

But these arguments, however plausible, would not satisfy the public. As soon as the war had terminated, there seemed to be an universal anxiety to get rid of such a burden. Petitions were preparing from all quarters of the kingdom, insisting on its repeal, and the new minister, not knowing what might be the effect of attempting to retain it in force, very prudently yielded to the storm, reverted again to the principles of the funding system², and abandoned this new and detested financial speculation.

* See Review of the arguments advanced in the House of Commons, in support of the bill, &c. imposing certain duties upon income. Printed for J. Wright, *an.* 1799.

² By converting the stock charged on the income tax, amounting to £.56,445,000 into an annuity of £.1,713,016 13s. 4d. *per annum*, exclusive of £.25,521 10s. for management.

The

The history of this tax cannot be stated better, ^{s. Convoy Tax.} than in the words of an intelligent author, who has already been occasionally quoted in the course of this work.

“ During the session of 1798, another measure was adopted, for raising, during the war, a considerable sum within the year, of sufficient importance to be noticed here, both as a regulation of public policy and an expedient of finance; we mean the Convoy-Tax, a small per centage on the value of goods exported and imported, with some exceptions, and a small tonnage duty on all ships arriving at or sailing from any port in Great Britain. Our superiority at sea was decided, and complete protection had been afforded to every branch of our trade by convoys, to the perfect satisfaction of the merchants; but their adventurous spirit induced them frequently to send their ships to various parts of the world for an early market, without waiting for protection, from whence it too often happened that valuable cargoes were captured; and, what was of more importance, a number of British seamen were shut up and rigorously treated in the gaols of our implacable enemy; a restraint was therefore imposed on that practice in future, unless licenses should be obtained from the Admiralty. The cheerfulness with which this was acquiesced in by the merchants and manufacturers, exhibited another instance of their zeal and public spirit; for, although in some cases the tax is less than the insurance saved by its operations, a small

advance of capital became necessary, and it was impossible entirely to avoid all inconveniences respecting the shipping the goods."

"As a measure of public policy, accompanied as it is with the regulation above alluded to, it has the effect at once of giving safety to our trade, by protecting it from the depredations of the enemy (almost the only species of warfare left to their exertions), and of depriving them of resources to an immense amount, which they derived from the prizes carried into their ports. As a measure of revenue, it combines ease of collection with security from fraud, arising from the smallness of the duty, compared with the value of the merchandize on which its levied. In almost every case where it was conceived it could be felt as a burden, exceptions were admitted."

"During the short time since the tax took place, in July 1798, its produce has been such as to afford a most satisfactory proof, of the highly prosperous situation of the commerce and navigation of the country. The money paid to the customs, in the half year ending January 5, 1799, amounts to 639,000l.*. which is considerably under the actual produce of the period. In a commercial view, it

* In this sum are not included either the duties due by the East India Company, on their imports, (which are not paid till after their sales,) or the duties which are bonded by the exporters :—and the largest West India fleet of the year arrived a few days before the act took place; the whole property in which escaped the tax.

has also been attended with the very advantageous effect of ascertaining, (contrary to incessant declarations on the subject,) that the real value of our exports exceeds, in the proportion of at least 70 per cent. the former estimates of them."

Nothing but the peculiar circumstances attending the late contest, when we possessed in a manner all the commerce of the universe, could have justified such an imposition. Nor is there any reason to believe, that it was productive of any mischievous consequences *during the war*. But the tax having been quietly submitted to whilst hostilities lasted, the Minister was thence led to imagine, that, to a certain extent, it might be continued as a permanent source of revenue. In vain was it represented by the proprietors of British shipping, "that they had offered no opposition to the tonnage duty, under the convoy act, *as a war tax*, because they found sufficient employment in the government and merchant service, and could then obtain freights that left them a reasonable reward for their industry; but now, the state of shipping is materially altered; they have little trade, and what remains, is not worth acceptance; besides, they have now to contend with many competitors, since the greatest part of Europe is under the dominion or influence of France, who under the specious principle of the liberty of the seas, will use every means in its power, to undermine our strength, by supplanting us in our trade as carriers." These remon-

strances

strances have not yet been abandoned; but hitherto the ship owners have not been able to convince the Chancellor of the Exchequer, of the impolicy and the injurious tendency of the duty in question.

6. Taxes
repealed or
abandoned.

When the immense variety of taxes, which the late Minister brought forward, during the course of his long administration, is considered, it cannot possibly be wondered at, that some of them should be found extremely exceptionable, and consequently were either repealed, or abandoned, after having been proposed to Parliament. Some memorials regarding the principal propositions of that description, it may be proper to preserve in this work, as a beacon to future ministers.

1. Tax on
coals at the
pit.

This improvident and dangerous tax, was suggested by Mr. Pitt, at the commencement of his ministerial career. It was included in the budget he had brought forward on the 30th June 1784. He then proposed to lay a duty of three shillings *per* chaldron, or two shillings *per* ton, on all coals sold either by measure or weight. In order to prevent its being felt by the manufacturers, on whom, in many cases, this tax would not only have been extremely oppressive, but even ruinous, the idea was thrown out, of granting them certain drawbacks, according to the extent of the coals they consumed. But the tax was generally reprobated, and after all, being calculated to produce only at the rate of £.150,000 *per annum*, it was prudently given up, and on the 21st of July following, other sources of revenue were substituted in its room.

It

It is natural for landed gentlemen, to be prejudiced in favour of any tax, that seems to affect merely the mercantile, manufacturing, or monied interests; and hence the shop tax was not unpopular with persons of that description. Whether a tax upon shopkeepers, by means of a moderate license, might not have been imposed, is a different question, but to think of assessing a tax, not according to the *rent received*, but to the *rent paid* by the shopkeeper, or taxing, (as has been well observed,) not the chance of profit, but the certainty of loss, namely, the perpetual and unavoidable burden payable for a shop and house, was highly cruel and oppressive.

The following reasons, drawn up by the committee of shopkeepers in the metropolis, certainly materially contributed to the repeal:

“ 1. That the essence of taxation lies in every man bearing his proportion of the burthens of the state according to his abilities. 2. That the shop-tax is unjust and partial in the extreme, because it will fall upon one particular description of men; while others in far more opulent situations, will not contribute one farthing towards it. 3. That the retail trader, already pays out of all manner of proportion to the exigencies of the state, and far, very far, beyond every other description of men, whose incomes are infinitely greater. 4. That as retail traders are compelled to seek houses in public situations, the rents are extremely high, and as many taxes are collected by a pound rate calculated from

the rent, the retailer is consequently assessed much heavier than persons living in houses not so situated, whether in or out of trade. 5. That the retail trader may very fairly be considered to pay a very heavy shop tax already, because houses in public situations, produce twice the rent they would do, were they situated in private streets, and as the house tax, and many other taxes collected by pound rate, being calculated from the rent, consequently, the retailer contributes more to these taxes, than any other description of men. 6. That the receipt tax is a very heavy impost upon the retail trader, because he is frequently obliged to furnish his customer with a receipt free of expence. 7. That from our experience we are warranted to say, that neither the house or receipt tax have or ever can be laid on the commodity, nor is it possible, in our apprehension, that any tax imposed personally upon traders can ever fall upon the consumer. And, 8. That as it is impossible the retailer can ever lay the intended tax upon shops on the articles he sells, he will be compelled to pay this impost out of his profits, and that such a mode of taxation we conceive to be unequal and unjust."

3. Clock
and watch
tax.

The tax imposed by Mr. Pitt on clocks and watches, was productive of such ruinous consequences^y, that I trust it will never be tried by any other

^y There are twenty different persons employed in the making of every watch, all of whom serve regular apprenticeships to each branch; and there are ten different branches in clock-making.

other Chancellor of the Exchequer, and if it is, that he will fail in the attempt. The minister, unfortunately, could not be prevailed upon to repeal this obnoxious duty, until it was too late, after it had done considerable mischief. In the memorial from the committee of clock and watch makers, by whose efforts the repeal was at last obtained, it is stated, that in less than a year from the commencement of the tax, a diminution exceeding one half of the general manufacture of clocks and watches throughout the kingdom, as well as of the various branches of trade connected therewith, had taken place even in that short period of time ; by which means thousands of deserving men were deprived of employment and support, and induced to emigrate, carrying with them the choicest secrets of the trade, consequently depriving our manufacturers of that unrivalled superiority in foreign markets which they had hitherto enjoyed, a circumstance the more to be regretted, as the manufacture is of great national importance, employed many thousands of workmen, by the ingenious operation of whose manual labour merely, the original value of materials, chiefly British, was so much increased, that the detriment which the loss of this trade would

making. In both, there were many ingenious mechanics, to whom the public were indebted for several valuable inventions, who were driven out of work by the tax, and some of them being compelled to emigrate, would of course instruct other nations in their different arts.

occasion to the commercial interest of these kingdoms, could hardly be estimated.

4. Canal
tax.

The tax on inland navigation, proposed by Mr. Pitt in 1797, fortunately never passed into a law: If it had, it is impossible to foresee the extent of mischievous consequences of which it must have been productive. On that occasion, I felt it my duty to draw up a paper, shortly representing how injurious, in various respects, it must prove to the public interest, a copy of which I subjoin, as I have some reason to believe, that it materially contributed to prevent this obnoxious imposition.

Observations on the Canal Tax, transmitted to Mr. Pitt in June, 1797.

It is impossible too highly to appreciate the advantages of canals. In fact, a nation can neither be rich nor populous without them. Neither China nor Holland, for instance, could furnish produce sufficient to feed the horses that would be necessary to convey, *by means of roads*, the goods which are carried by their canals and inland navigations, were the whole country dedicated to that single object; nor could either of them have ever reached the population or opulence they have attained, without their assistance.—Any check therefore to so essential a source of public prosperity is certainly to be avoided.

In other countries, every encouragement has been given to canals. In Spain they are made at the public expence.—Lewis XIVth gave assistance from the public revenues to the formation of the famous

famous Languedoc canal, and made it the property of the person who formed it, and his posterity for ever: and in Holland, where they have taxed every thing, even corn ground at the mill, garden stuff, and butcher's meat, yet they have always considered a tax upon canals as much more exceptionable than even these heavy and unpopular imposts.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, has, with great propriety, frequently stated in his budget, the sums annually laid out in making canals, as a proof of the increasing wealth and prosperity of the country. But the very idea of a tax, will prevent any material addition to the number of canal bills already past. Most of the canals have been made by the exertions of speculators, who are accustomed to lay out a part of their capital in that line, and selling their shares in the stock of one canal, as soon as an opportunity occurs, are thus enabled to engage in another. But if they are to be taxed, there is an end to all such speculations, at least in this country, and they will go to America or to France, where many plans of the same kind are in contemplation.—Is it worth while, therefore, to run even the smallest risk of checking such useful speculations, and losing such valuable subjects, for so trifling an addition to the public revenue as £. 90,000 a year.—Indeed there is no set of men, who ought to be more cautiously dealt with, than persons of an enterprising and speculative turn, possessed of *personal property only*.

—An emigration to another country is nothing to them, and yet they are, upon the whole, from the nature of their property, and their enterprising spirit, peculiarly useful to any country where they reside. But, however enterprising they may be, it cannot be supposed, that they will lay out their money in a way that will make it liable to be taxed in this country, whenever it exceeds the legal interest, when in other countries, or in other speculations, even in this country, less useful to the public, they might secure to themselves all the profits to be derived from employing it.

There is hardly any canal, that either directly or indirectly does not augment considerably the public revenue. If a canal, for instance, by the fresh supplies of manure it furnishes, only adds a thousand acres to the land cultivated for barley, is not the Exchequer thereby enriched by the taxes on malt and beer; many other results of a similar nature might be pointed out; and if by any tax, such sources of prosperity are diminished, would it not be exactly the story in the fable, "*of killing the hen that lays the golden eggs.*"

It does not seem fair, that the tax should effect the proprietors of canals, whenever they should divide 5 *per cent.*—The fact is, that £. 10 *per cent.* is little enough interest for a commercial speculation. But whatever the fair interest may be, it ought, in strict justice, to be calculated from the commencement of the speculation, and though a canal may pay 10 *per cent.* at one time, yet it may
not .

not have paid 3 *per cent.* from the commencement; nay, after having paid 5 *per cent.*, and consequently become liable to the tax, it may be again reduced to 3 *per cent.* by the diminution of the commerce which it had enjoyed. It would be very unfair therefore, to tax canals at all, unless the public guaranteed their future dividends at 5 *per cent.*

There are other points of view also, in which the subject might be considered, not very favourable to the proposed tax.

For instance, it would be easy to evade it, by laying out any surplus, above £.4:19 *per cent.*, in salaries to the officers, or in improving the navigation itself, either of which the proprietors of the canal would prefer, to paying any share of their profits to the Exchequer.

Besides, in some of the canal bills it is enacted, that when the income exceeds a certain sum, the rate of tonnage shall be reduced, which is much more equitable than that of paying the surplus to the Exchequer, as all canals, though in general advantageous, are attended with some local inconveniencies; property is destroyed and inconveniently divided, many trespasses are committed both by the bargemen and their horses, and the only compensation for such disadvantages, is as cheap conveyance of goods, as the circumstances of the case will admit of.

Lastly, the only fair mode, by which the public could avail itself of the profit to be derived from canals, would be, to purchase that species of pro-

perty from those to whom it belongs at present, and to carry it on like the post-office, or any similar speculation. In that case, the whole country *might be put exactly upon the same footing*. Whereas a tax, like the one proposed, must be partial, bearing hard upon one set of men, whilst another, in the same predicament, would be totally exempted. Such a circumstance would occasion a degree of discontent, that cannot be too cautiously avoided.

It certainly does credit to any minister, to repeal or to abandon injudicious measures of finance, more especially where there is any risk of their diminishing the productive industry of a country; for when the mischief is once done, it is not always possible to repair the evil. Nor is the direct injury alone to be considered, the indirect and circuitous consequences are still more to be apprehended. By injudicious financial oppressions, an imprudent government may not only impoverish itself, but, by the expulsion of active and useful men, may enrich a rival and an enemy.

In the course of Mr. Pitt's administration, some other taxes were repealed or abandoned; but the above are the most important, and I trust, at the same time, the least likely to meet with the sanction of any future minister.

7. Sale and redemption of the land tax, and similar plan regarding tythes.

The idea of selling the land tax, has long been in contemplation. Several years ago, the author received a letter from a most respectable member of the House, (Wm. Lygon Esquire, M. P. for Worcestershire),

Worcestershire), of which the following is the substance :—“ That an idea was then getting abroad, “ that the land-tax, at its present rate, might be “ offered to the respective landholders, at from 20 “ to 30 years purchase. That the money thus “ raised, might be applied in aid of the annual million for redeeming the national debt. That any “ inconveniences which might be stated to arise, “ might be obviated, were a committee to be appointed for the special purpose of considering the “ plan. That the decreasing rate of the interest of “ money at that time, appeared to make the period “ when that letter was written, (September 4, “ 1792), particularly favourable for such an attempt ; and that if I considered the plan as likely “ to be of service to the public, and would have no “ objection to make a motion in the house regarding it, the writer of the letter would take every “ opportunity that might occur, of consulting the “ general sense of the people in his neighbourhood “ on the subject, and of promoting the measure as “ much as lay in his power.”

Notwithstanding the respect to which the opinion of so intelligent a member of the House was justly intitled, I could not approve of the suggestion, for reasons which will afterwards be submitted to the Reader's consideration ; and it is probable that such a plan would never have been seriously thought of, had not an ingenious and plausible scheme been drawn up by a gentleman conversant in financial inquiries, which tended to prove, that

redeeming the land-tax might not only produce some immediate advantage, but might also prove highly beneficial, by raising the price of the funds and supporting the public credit of the country.

Induced by such expectations, and perhaps with ulterior views of still greater moment, (namely, that of extending the same system to tythes,) the minister at last brought forward the idea in parliament. Nothing but the complete controul which he had acquired in all legislative proceedings, could have given him the smallest chance of success in carrying through such a measure; and I am persuaded, that had he foreseen the infinite trouble of which it was productive, the various acts which it was necessary to pass regarding it, the little progress that would be made, notwithstanding every exertion that government could employ in its behalf, and that it would not be in his power to extend it afterwards to tythes, he would not probably have persevered in the attempt.

In every point of view, whether financial or constitutional, it seemed to me essentially necessary to give the plan as much opposition as possible, and felt it my duty therefore, to address the House of Commons upon the subject to the following purport²,

“ Mr. Speaker,

“ I delayed troubling the House with any observations which may have occurred to me, on the plan to which our attention is

² This speech was delivered in the debate on the 9th of May 1798.

once more directed, until this stage of our proceedings, because my objections lay, not to any particular branch of the resolutions which were originally proposed by the Right Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Pitt), but to the general scope and principle of the system; and I now arise to state those observations to the House, in the full conviction, that they will not only sufficiently justify the vote which I shall give this night, but also that they may contribute to awaken the attention of this House and of the public, to the danger of such a bill passing into a law, which, after all the consideration I have been able to bestow upon it, even in its present state of maturity, as ripened in the bill now before us, and brought to all the perfection of which it is probably capable, seems to be *at least* as exceptionable as any measure that, to the best of my recollection, was ever suggested, either by the present, or by any former minister of this country."

" Before I proceed, however, to state the reasons which have induced me to oppose this bill, I think that it may not be improper to submit to your consideration, and that of the House in general, an objection of a preliminary nature, namely, to the legality of our proceedings. It is well known that we have already voted a land-tax of 4*s.* in the pound, *and no more*, for the service of the year 1798, and that an act has passed for carrying that measure into effect. We have therefore precluded ourselves, by the indisputable law of Parliament regarding the form of our proceedings, from again discussing the subject of a land-tax during the present session, unless we have reserved power for that purpose. The House has been accustomed to reserve such a power in two ways, namely; first, a power to repeal the whole; or, secondly, any part of an act. Of the first we have an example, in the 37th Geo. III. c. 4. § 60., the words of which are as follow: " Provided always and be it enacted, that
 " *this act* may be altered, varied, or repealed, by any act or
 " acts to be made in this present session of Parliament." The clause in the Land-tax bill of this year is, however, of a very different nature, and is conceived in the following terms:
 " Provided always and be it further enacted by the authority
 " afore-

“aforesaid, *that any part of this act* may be altered, varied, or
 “repealed, by any act or acts to be made in this present session
 “of Parliament.” Such a clause, I understand, was introduced into the annual Land-tax Bill some years ago, with a view of enabling Parliament to alter, to vary, or to repeal, any of those local regulations with which the act abounds, that might be found oppressive, but it never could be intended to sanction a plan like the present; the object of which is, to overturn, not any particular part, but the whole tenor and principle of the act; and, indeed, by making the present land-tax perpetual, to render any future act, on the same basis, perfectly unnecessary. It was in consequence of this clause alone, that we were justified in permitting a bill to be introduced by an Honourable Gentleman, (Mr. Wilberforce Bird) regarding the Land-tax Commissioners. The object of that act is very properly declared in the title of the bill to be, “to alter and amend
 “*so much* of an act passed in the present session of Parliament
 “(namely, the Land-tax Act,) as relates to the qualification
 “of the Commissioners.” Whereas this is a bill, not for altering any part of the Land-tax Act, which is all we are justified in doing, but for making perpetual a tax, which by an act passed this very session, is only granted for one year and no more. It overturns at the same time a system, that has been uniformly acted upon for above a century, and in which the existence and authority of this House were supposed to have been deeply implicated.”

“I thought it necessary to call your attention to this preliminary objection, from the full conviction, that if we once suffer the forms of the House to be violated, we are not likely long to enjoy the essence and substantial benefits of this Constitution. My objections, however, go, not only to the form of our proceedings, but to the principle of the bill itself. In regard to the first point, namely, the forms of the House, if we wish to preserve the appearance of any respect for them, we must necessarily defer the farther consideration of this bill until another session of Parliament: but if we have any regard *for the real interests of this country*, I hope to make it appear, in the course
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of what I am now about to observe, that we ought never to suffer such a bill as this to be again discussed within these walls."

"The first objection that must strike at once every individual, is the one founded on that important principle of this Constitution, and which has long been considered as essential to the existence and authority of this House, namely, that the taxes on land and malt, which are the surest and most productive branches of the revenue, instead of being permanently granted to the crown, "for supporting," in the words of the act, "*His Majesty's Government*," shall be annually voted. But we are told, that though it is proposed to make the land-tax perpetual, yet that other taxes, even to a larger amount, (though that, by the by, has not been proved,) which are now perpetual, are to have their nature altered, and are to be subjected to the annual vote of Parliament; and certain duties on malt, sugar, tobacco, and snuff, are appropriated, by this bill, for that purpose. There is certainly some plausibility in the idea. At the same time the House will advert to this, that the produce of all taxes on consumption must be fluctuating, and must ever depend on a variety of circumstances which it is not in the power of parliament to controul: for instance, prejudice, caprice, or passion, might, in the space of a few weeks, annihilate the revenue arising from tobacco and snuff: whereas the land-tax must be paid, as long as the territory of the country remains productive. It is impossible, therefore, to listen to this sophistical answer to a plain and, indeed, unanswerable objection. The Right Honourable Gentleman proposes, that the pillars of this Constitution, and the existence and authority of this House, shall rest upon such frail foundations as the contents of a snuff box or of a pipe of tobacco. I wish, on the other hand, to see them remain on their old territorial basis, and that the value of a certain portion of the produce of the country shall be annually voted by the representatives of the people for the maintenance of our fleets and armies, and the other expences of the crown; and that, unless such a grant is made, that the whole frame and fabric of our government shall
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be unhinged. The first is a measure that may suit the narrow mind of a mere financier, who can think of nothing but taxation. The second, which has been sanctioned with the approbation of the greatest statesmen that ever sat within these walls, forms a check, which I hope this House will not rashly hazard or abandon."

"My next objection is of a legal nature, namely, on the effect that such an act must have upon the landed property of the country, and the endless confusion and litigation it must occasion, both in parishes regarding apportioning the land-tax, and among individuals. On the first point there can be no doubt. With respect to the second, nothing can be more desirable for a landed proprietor than to avoid law-suits, and to have every thing connected with the title deeds of his estate as clear and distinct as possible. But how is that to be the case if these resolutions should pass into a law. The land-tax, when purchased or redeemed, is sometimes to be a real estate, sometimes a personal estate, and sometimes to be converted from a personal to a real estate. Is it possible for this House to countenance such confusion; and before we suffer such a bill to proceed one step farther, ought we not to hear what the Attorney General for England, the Lord Advocate for Scotland, and other great luminaries of the law, consider may be the effect of such a system on the landed property of the two kingdoms? The gentlemen of the long robe, though extremely numerous in the House, (for this is far from being a *parliamentum indoctum*,) have in general preserved a cautious silence upon this subject, which was matter of astonishment to me, till I began to consider how much such a bill must benefit the profession, as we may trace in it the foundation of at least ten thousand law-suits, one in each parish, being a very moderate calculation; and thus no inconsiderable share of the remnant of free property, which the landed interest will be suffered to retain in their possession, will be absorbed. Let us take, for instance, the clause for selling a part of an estate for the purpose of redeeming the land-tax: 1. Any part of the manor is to be sold, with the exception of the mansion-house. If not sold by public auction, how is it to be ascertained

ascertained whether the price was a fair one? Here is an abundant source of litigation, more especially as there is no regulation as to the expences attending the sales, nor the purchasing of the 3 *per cent.* stock. 2. The surplus money is to be placed in the Bank of England, in Government or other public securities, and then to be re-invested in land for the like uses, trusts, intents, and purposes, as the estate originally sold. In the course of such transactions, who does not see a plentiful source of litigation, infinite trouble, and endless expence? The right honourable gentleman who brought in this bill was bred to the bar, and having some compassion for his old associates, whose professional profits have been so much impaired by the present unfortunate war, it is natural for him to embrace this opportunity of throwing some crumbs from his plentiful table, and of bestowing a million on Westminster-hall, which is the smallest sum that will accrue to it if such a bill passes into a law; but those who have any regard for the landed interest will advise them to remain as they are. At present they have nothing to do but to pay their annual land tax to the collector; but if they involve themselves in *all the legal labyrinths of redemption*, it is impossible to say when they will get out of them: they may be assured, not without surrendering a considerable part of their property, to those professional friends who will undertake to extricate them."

"The next objection that occurs to me is of a financial nature. We all know that the land tax, as it is now imposed, is extremely unequal: it is the object, however, of the present bill to perpetuate that inequality. Indeed the land tax is not only unequal, but has ever been considered as a very exceptionable impost, and one that ought only to be had recourse to in the most pressing and urgent necessity. In a famous debate, *anno* 1732^a, on the subject of reducing it to one shilling in the pound, we are told, that a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, (Sir Robert Walpole,) whose language was then received with repeated *bearems* and tumults of applause, thus expressed him-

^a See Torbuck's Debates, vol. x. p. 149 and 187.

self: "As to the manner of raising taxes upon the people, it
 " is a certain maxim that that tax, which is the most equal and
 " the most general, is the most just and the least burdensome:
 " When every man contributes a small share, a great sum may
 " be raised for the public service, without any man being sen-
 " sible what he pays; whereas a small sum, raised upon a
 " few, lies heavy upon each particular man, and is the more
 " grievous in that it is unjust. The landholders bear but a
 " small proportion to the people of this, or of any other na-
 " tion, yet no man contributes any the least share to this tax
 " but he that is possessed of a land estate; and yet this tax has
 " been continued without intermission for above these forty
 " years—it has continued so long and lain so heavy, that I may
 " venture to say, many a landed gentleman in this kingdom has
 " thereby been utterly ruined and undone:" and at the conclusion
 of the debate he added, "the land tax is the most unequal, the
 " most grievous, and the most oppressive tax, that ever was
 " raised in this country. It is a tax which never ought to be
 " raised but in times of the most extreme necessity. The best
 " judges, the truest patriots in all countries, have been of opi-
 " nion, that of all taxes, that upon immoveable goods, that
 " upon lands and houses, ought to be the last resource."

"Such were the sentiments of a former Chancellor of the
 Exchequer, in consequence of which he proposed reducing the
 land tax to one shilling in the pound. His successor, who now
 holds that office, follows a very different system, and endea-
 vours to ingratiate himself with the landed interest by different
 means and on different principles. For instance, he is the first
 Chancellor of the Exchequer that ever attempted to keep the
 land tax at its highest rate in time of peace, as well as in time
 of war; that ever ventured to propose rendering that tax per-
 petual; and who not only insists on perpetuating the present
 unequal land tax at its highest rate, but also who threatens the
 landed interest with an unlimited addition to so heavy a bur-
 den. The additional tax, the foundation of which is so evi-
 dently laid in this bill, may at first be low, call it one shilling,
 or even sixpence in the pound; but if the principle is once ad-
 mitted, it will soon be found the readiest resource in all emer-
 gencies.

gencies. We are told, that freehold in office is a better tenure than a freehold estate, and that taxes upon land furnish a security so infinitely preferable to every other, that by converting excise duties into taxes upon land, the public may gain one-fifth additional revenue. Can there be a stronger temptation to throw as heavy a load as possible upon land, and to exempt freehold in office from taxation? Does not the principle of this measure go to prove, that if £. 400,000 can be gained by perpetuating the land tax of two millions, that a million would be gained by laying five millions upon land, two millions by laying ten millions, and that by laying twenty millions four millions would be the profit of the Exchequer? Here is a means of acquiring a great revenue, the practicability of which, *if this plan succeeds*, cannot be questioned, and which, if practicable, the necessities of an extravagant government may soon render indispensable."

"The next objection that struck my mind was one of a political nature, but which I am happy to find is taken away by the amended bill, and therefore it is unnecessary to dwell much upon it. We all know, that by the union between England and Scotland, the proportion of land tax between the two countries is for ever ascertained. The one is to raise at the rate of nearly two millions, and the other about £. 48,000 *per annum*, or in that ratio, for any greater or lesser sum. People are apt to say, that the burden is extremely unequal. It is a part, however, of an indissoluble bargain between the two countries, which cannot now be altered. Besides, it can be proved, that the inequality is altogether owing to the superior agricultural legislation and police of Scotland. Let the English pass a general bill for inclosure, let them modify tithes so as to prevent their being a bar to improvement, let them restrain the poor rates within moderate bounds, let them abolish any obnoxious remnants of the feudal system, and let the tenants have proper leases of their farms, and the land of England will soon be as cheaply taxed as that in Scotland. It is owing to the circumstances above alluded to that the rents of Scotland have proportionably increased more, under all the disadvantages of inferior soil, of an inferior climate, of an inferior capital, and of inferior

inferior markets. Give England the same legal advantages which Scotland at present happily possesses, and its agricultural prosperity would increase in such a ratio, that the land tax it is now subject to would be to the fall as low in England as in Scotland, and there would exist, on that account, no jealousy between the two kingdoms. It is unnecessary, however, to dwell on an objection which has been already happily adverted to and removed ^c."

"Another objection arises from a clause in the amended bill, respecting which the right honourable gentleman had preserved, as long as possible, a cautious and prudent silence. I had remarked from the beginning, that he had never explained the nature of the commissioners whom he had proposed to intrust with the authority of selling the land tax; but the clause he has introduced (see p. 46.) is so exceptionable, that though it might be amended in a Committee, I think it proper to take this opportunity of alluding to it. The Commissioners are to be nominated by the Crown, and are to receive at the rate of threepence in the pound on the amount of the land tax sold by them; that might extend, or be construed to extend, to an one-eightieth part of the £.40,000,000 proposed to be raised by the sale of the land tax, or no less a sum than £.500,000. But that would be too absurd. An one-eightieth part, however, of the two millions, or £.25,000, is an object which will require particular attention, should the bill be recommitted; and is an expence which ought certainly to be avoided."

"But the objection which strikes my mind the most forcibly, is one of an agricultural nature, and it seems to me sufficient of itself to overturn the whole system. The object of the measure is, *to tempt* the country gentleman to lay out any money he may have in his possession, or any sum he can borrow, or can procure, by a sale of part of his estate, or mortgaging the whole of it, in purchasing his land tax. Can there be a more destructive policy, either for the individual, or for the public? If a landed proprietor has any money to spare, the proper mode for him to lay it out is, in the improvement of his estate; in that way he may gain, instead of 5, from 7 to 15, or even

^c The clause, however, was after taken out of the bill.

20 *per cent.* for his money, and by his improvements the public prosperity is, in various respects, infinitely augmented. Population is increased, abundance of provisions is secured, important additions made to the revenue, nay, the great object of the bill itself, an increased price of stock, ultimately secured. All hopes of that sort, however, will be annihilated, at least for some time, if this measure succeeds; and if it does not succeed, are we not holding up delusive hopes to the country? As to the idea of the proprietor borrowing money, or selling a part of his estate to obtain it, I am persuaded that neither of those plans can be much relished by the landed interest. If money can be obtained in either way, let it be expended on improvement; if borrowed at 5 *per cent.*, no advantage can be obtained from the transaction; if under 5 *per cent.*, the money will probably be called up when it becomes scarcer and more valuable, and the proprietor will find himself involved in the greatest pecuniary difficulties. Selling a part of an estate is seldom eligible; it can only be thought of when there are detached spots, and in the case of settled estates, is attended with peculiar, indeed unsurmountable difficulties, and almost endless expence and litigation."

"On the subject of improvement, it may not be improper briefly to state the various measures which have been adopted in different countries for its encouragement or otherwise, and by contrasting the one with the other we shall be able more clearly to see the *hideousness* of the present measure in its real colours."

"The best mode of encouraging improvements, is the one adopted by Frederic the Great, King of Prussia, who expended about two millions of German crowns, or three hundred thousand pounds sterling *per annum*, in promoting the improvement of his country, and the general comfort of its inhabitants. We are told in particular, that he expended considerable sums of money in promoting, even by premiums, the abolition of commons, and the inclosure of lands. What a contrast between such a wise policy and the practice of this country, where the proprietors are not suffered to inclose and cultivate their own land, when they are ready and willing to do so, without being

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previously

previously subjected to a heavy expence ; and instead of grants to encourage them, they are required to pay considerable sums for a permission to begin their improvements ! No wonder, therefore, that we were lately under the necessity of laying out, in public bounties, no less a sum than £. 570,000 to encourage the importation of foreign grain, partly from those very deserts which the immortal Frederic, by his superior policy, brought into a state of cultivation. But he wisely considered expence laid out for promoting improvement to be like manure spread upon the ground, which secured a more abundant harvest, and instead of impoverishing himself by that liberal policy, the result was, that though originally master of a country, naturally barren, and without the advantages of extensive commerce or valuable manufactures, yet he raised it, by his genius and talents, and by his unceasing attention to its internal improvements, to be one of the most powerful countries in Europe ; and though he maintained a numerous army of 200,000 men, and spared no expence in collecting great magazines of provisions, a formidable artillery, and all the other implements of war, yet he left behind him a treasure, *in specie*, of twelve millions sterling.”

“ The second mode of encouraging improvement, is a measure which has been justified by experience in some countries, and which I hope will, some time or other, be adopted here, namely, that of lending money to proprietors of land at a low interest for the purpose of enabling them to improve it. This is a system that cannot be too strongly recommended to the attention of any government that is wealthy enough to attempt it.”

“ The third system is the one that has hitherto been adopted in this country, by which a tax on land has, indeed, been imposed, varying in point of amount from 1s. to 4s. in the pound, but always levying a proportionable sum from the same district. This is an indirect encouragement to improvement ; for the rate being once fixed, any additional value to an estate, in consequence of expensive improvements, goes, with the exception of tithes, into the pocket of the proprietor ; and this circumstance

circumstance has certainly materially contributed to the improvement of this country."

"The next step, to commence the progress of *discouragement*, is the one which the right honourable gentleman has in contemplation, and points out in this bill, namely, that of levying an equal land tax over the whole kingdom, varying according to the alteration of income, or annual value of an estate. It is evident that this must be an almost insurmountable check to every species of agricultural enterprise; for in the face of such a burden, who will venture to lay out his money for the purposes of improvement?"

"But the summit of political absurdity, if the improvement of a country should be considered as an object worthy of consideration, is the measure now under our discussion, by which, instead of granting money to the landed proprietor, or lending him sums at low interest, for promoting agricultural exertion, or imposing no additional burden on improvement, but giving the whole benefit of it to the proprietor, it is proposed to take from him all the capital he has, or all the money he can procure, by any means, for the purpose of redeeming his land tax. A more effectual way of discouraging improvement could hardly be contrived. If it succeeds according to the intentions of the proposer, forty millions sterling would be paid by the landed interest for getting rid of this tax. Instead of that miserable mode of laying out such a sum of money, let us consider for a moment what would be the benefit of laying out forty millions on improving the territory of the country. The effect of such an event would be not only making this country the garden of Europe, but also adding so much to its revenue and general prosperity, that we need not be apprehensive of wanting financial resources, or that our public credit could possibly be impaired. In fact, the difference between the two systems is shortly this: The right honourable gentleman wishes to support the funded at the expence of the landed interest; whereas I wish to promote the improvement of the country without taking away any thing from the funds, perfectly satisfied that, when the country prospers, no apprehension need to be entertained

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tained that the funded interest will not thence derive the most essential benefits."

"I shall next proceed to consider the arguments which have been made use of in favour of this measure, namely, that it may add from £.200,000 to £.400,000 *per annum* to the revenue, and may take 80,000,000 of 3 *per cent.* stock out of the market."

"In regard to these supposed advantages, they entirely depend upon the possibility of carrying the measure into effect; whereas I consider the plan not only highly exceptionable, for the reasons I have already assigned, but, on its present footing, (for the plan might be greatly improved,) perfectly impracticable in itself, were it liable to no objection."

"There are but five descriptions of persons who are likely to purchase the land tax, namely, the landed proprietor himself, public bodies and trustees, wealthy individuals in London, or their foreign correspondents, monied persons in the country, and opulent farmers."

"As to the first, it is on all hands admitted, that in consequence of various circumstances, on which it is unnecessary now to dwell, there are few if any landed proprietors who are in a situation to purchase their own land tax. Public bodies, or trustees acting for others, will hardly venture on such a speculation. Monied men in London, and still more the foreign capitalists with whom they correspond, are not so insensible to their own interests as to take 5 *per cent.* when they can get 6, on security equally good, and infinitely more convenient, from the easiness of transfer, the regular payment of the interest, and the certainty with which it can be sold. In regard to monied men in the country, they are now as conversant in the stocks as the citizens of London themselves, and will not be easily tempted to give them up on terms so disadvantageous; besides, taking up the money in the country would have the effect of diminishing the manufacturing capital, and consequently the commercial prosperity of every part of the kingdom, which, in fact, according to a homely expression, would be killing the hen that lays the golden eggs. In regard to the former, two or three years ago considerable sums were in the possession of
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that body of men, but from the low price of grain, and the importation of such enormous quantities from foreign countries, their profits and their wealth have been considerably diminished: besides it would rather be an awkward circumstance for a proprietor to pay a tax on his own tenants; it would occasion such a jealousy between the two orders as would necessarily be productive of many unpleasant consequences. On these grounds I think the measure so extremely impracticable that, no material advantage, as it now stands, can be expected from it."

"These, Sir, are some of the principal observations which have occurred to me on this important question, and which I have endeavoured to condense as much as I could, not wishing to prevent the House from hearing other gentlemen as early as possible, who may be desirous of stating their sentiments on so interesting a topic; and, on the whole, considering the extent and magnitude of this subject, can the House seriously determine to hurry such a measure through in the course of the present session? The bill is now brought to all the perfection of which probably it is capable. Let it be circulated, in that state over the whole kingdom. If the measure should then meet with general concurrence, let it be passed early in the course of next session. The plan cannot possibly make any progress till the 25th of March next, because it is universally acknowledged that very few proprietors, indeed, can purchase their land tax; and till then, no other party can interfere. Let the 25th of March, 1799, be fixed upon by a resolution of the House as the day when at any rate the proprietor must decide; and if the system is to be carried through, not an hour will be lost. For my part, were I a friend to the measure, I certainly would insist upon this delay as the most likely means of making the public feel any zeal or anxiety in its favour; and, if it were to pass, of rendering it ultimately successful; whereas if we now rashly give it our sanction, the mischief is done, and never can be repaired."

The act having passed, notwithstanding every opposition that could be made to it, insinuations were thrown out in paragraphs and anonymous letters.

letters in the newspapers, that a redemption of tithes, on similar principles, was next in contemplation. That certainly would have been one of the most beneficial measures that could possibly have been adopted. It is to be hoped, therefore, that some public spirited minister will embrace the first favourable opportunity that may occur of carrying it into effect^b.

In regard to the land tax redeemed, notwithstanding every exertion that could be made, and though powers were given to individuals, and to corporate bodies, for selling a part of their property, of which no precedent is extant, yet, instead of from sixty to seventy millions of stock being purchased, as was expected, the total, on the 1st day of February 1802, only amounted to £. 18,001,148, and on 1st February 1803, to £. 19,180,587.

8 System of competition in subscribing to public loans.

During the American war, the money borrowed

^b On this subject I think it proper particularly to refer to a pamphlet, intitled, "Short observations on a Commutation of Tithes for Government Annuities," printed at Hull, anno 1798. This tract discusses, 1. The advantages the clergy would derive from a commutation of tithes for government annuities. 2. The inconvenience of tithes to the clergy and the laity. 3. The nature of the payment of tithes in Scotland, and whence it arises that they are not so oppressive there as in England. 4. Answers to the objections which may be made to a commutation of tithes for government annuities; and concludes with an estimate of the probable value of the tithes in England and Wales, which he calculates, will amount to the sum of full 50 millions sterling, the interest of which, invested in government stock, would furnish an ample income to the clergy.

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by the public, was raised through the means either of *open*, or what were called *close, loans*. In the former case, any person might subscribe: according to the latter plan the loan was confined to a few individuals. As during that war, the stocks fluctuated much more than during the late contest, the minister was under the necessity of allowing a considerable profit to the subscribers, generally from 3 to 4 *per cent.* when the bargain was made; and some fortunate events having happened, after some of these loans had been negotiated, the premium sometimes rose to 8 or 10 *per cent.* and even more. The chance of such profit was much in favour of new loans, as a share in them was supposed to be attended with certain gain, and the public having once been impressed with that idea, it materially contributed to keep up a spirit for lending money to the treasury ever since.

The profit attending the loans during the American war, excited great clamour, as furnishing the minister with an easy means of corrupting the representatives of the people; and the enormous advantages attending them, seemed to indicate, that the interest of the nation had not been sufficiently attended to in the negotiating those bargains. The late minister of finance therefore, resolved to try a different system, namely, that of endeavouring to excite a competition among different parties of the monied interest, with a view of obtaining the loan on as favourable terms for the

the public as possible. The attempt was certainly well intended, and to do justice to the minister, it is proper to state, that he is entirely exempted from all suspicion of having made these loans the means either of personal advantage, or of political corruption. At the same time it is questionable, whether such competitions may not be productive of great inconveniences, and whether a better system may not be suggested.

The inconveniences attending such a plan are three. 1. That it may be impossible to excite a competition at the time, (which was actually the case in the year 1793,) or what is much the same thing, that any apparent competition may be fictitious and ideal, as seems to have been the case regarding the loan of 1800, when three of the parties agreed to offer the same terms, and to divide the amount between them. 2. The second disadvantage is, that this system of competition is only calculated for persons of a speculative turn, and consequently does not suit the character and business of old, respectable, and established houses. The consequence of which is, that such speculators must bring great quantities of stock speedily to the market, which diminishes the value of the new loan, as well as of the old funds, injures the credit of the country, and consequently, though the plan may furnish some temporary advantage, yet ultimately it lowers the price of the funds, and renders it necessary to raise succeeding loans on more disadvantageous

advantageous terms. 3. But the principal disadvantage of this system is, that if by competition you enhance the risk, and diminish the profit of lending money to the public, you may actually discourage the plan so much, that nobody would think of engaging in such a hazardous and unprofitable speculation; and indeed to this circumstance may in a great measure be attributed the difficulty of raising money, which the minister experienced in the year 1797, which rendered it necessary for him to try what was called the loyalty loan, and other measures already discussed for propping up the funding system. Whereas had the preceding loans been given to old established houses, who would have divided it in proportion among their opulent customers, the stock would have been absorbed by persons of real property, the new stock, if sold, would gradually have been brought to market: it would have fetched of course a handsome profit, the knowledge of which would have enabled government to raise, without difficulty, any sum of money the public had occasion for during the following year.

In regard to the best plan for raising public loans, the proper channel seems to me, the bankers of the metropolis, and their correspondence at home and abroad. There are at present above seventy bankers in London, to each of whom, previous to any loan, a letter to the following effect might be addressed, by the Chancellor

cellor of the Exchequer, or the Secretary to the Treasury.

“ GENTLEMEN,

“ I beg to inform you, that it is proposed, in the course of this session of parliament, to raise the sum of _____ for the service of the ensuing year.

“ As it is intended to distribute the whole subscription among the different banking houses in London, (the usual proportion to the bank, and other great corporate bodies always excepted,) it would be proper for you to inform your friends and customers, both at home and abroad, of this intention, and to assure them that every possible impartiality will be observed in distributing the loan.

“ It is proposed, that the subscribers to the new loan, for every £. 100 they subscribe, shall have $\frac{2}{3}$ in the 3 *per cents.* consolidated annuities; and $\frac{1}{3}$ in the 3 *per cents.* reduced. The discount on prompt payment shall be _____ the instalments to be paid as follows:

“ In regard to the terms, it is proposed that they shall be 1 *per cent.* (in critical times it may be found necessary to offer 2 even 3 *per cent.*), under the average market price of the stocks for the month preceding the day when the loan is stated to parliament.

“ The only preference that will be given is, to those who offer to deposit the largest sum with the first instalment, &c. &c.”

I have

I have little doubt, if such a plan were once put into a fair train, that it would be the means of insuring a supply of money, by loans, for the public service, in a manner perfectly unexceptionable, and by spreading the loan over so large a surface, it would prevent the country from being distressed by collecting large sums into few hands. In fact, though a large sum is nominally borrowed at once, yet being paid by instalments, it is properly a series of monthly or periodical loans, the nature of which it may be proper to explain. Let us suppose that twelve millions are borrowed in a year, that is at the rate of one million payable monthly. If the loan is taken by seventy bankers in London, they would only have to pay on an average at the rate of £.14,285 for each house and its customers, *per* month; and so on in proportion to the quantity borrowed. It is hardly possible to suppose, that the bankers of London and their correspondents and friends, would hesitate a moment to undertake to supply the public, not only with that sum, but even at the rate of from £.20,000 to £.30,000 *per* month, (if the loan was made sufficiently profitable;) and the great object which every prudent minister would naturally keep in view is, not a saving of one, or even two *per cent.* upon any particular loan, (more especially if that saving could not be obtained without a risk of depreciating the price of the funds, from the quantity of stock that might be brought to market), but that of securing, in all situations and circumstances, a supply of

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money

money to the Exchequer, without which the public service might not only suffer, but the very existence of the country might be endangered.

And here it may be proper to mention an idea, which may be entitled to some consideration.

In the former edition of the *History of the Revenue*, part 3. p. 272, it was stated, that however dreadful such a heavy load of national debt might appear, yet that it ought to be considered in this respect as beneficial, namely, that it furnished us with the means of amassing a national treasure, preferable to any other mode that could be suggested; for it was evident, that to the utmost extent of that burthen which had been already borne without difficulty, the nation might be safely trusted. Every shilling therefore that could be deducted from that sum was so much treasure gained; and indeed that is the principal source of benefit to be derived from any reduction of the national debt by means of a sinking fund, which must, to a certain extent, oppress the people at present, for the sake of a remote advantage. If this idea is well founded, as soon as any considerable part of the national debt is paid off, say two or three hundred millions, the government of the country, instead of creating new capitals, should sell off, from time to time, as occasion might require, a part of the old debt which it had already redeemed. This seems to me a much simpler and better plan, than that of creating a new capital through the medium of one set of men, and at the same time paying off old capitals

capitals through another channel. It would be unnecessary however to begin that plan, until such a quantity of stock was accumulated by the commissioners for discharging the national debt, as would probably be sufficient for defraying the expenses of any war in which the nation might be engaged.

Among the extraordinary events which took place, connected with the finances of the country, during the course of the late war, there is nothing that will probably appear more astonishing in after-times, than the assistance given by government, amidst the pressure of an expensive contest, to the commercial and colonial interests; and it is fortunately in my power, from the concern I had in these important transactions, to give a more complete account of their nature and origin, than has hitherto been communicated to the public.

9. Loan of Exchequer bills, and assistance given the mercantile and colonial interests.

From the hazard attending mercantile operations at the commencement of a new war, from the difficulty that must be experienced in finding safe and profitable markets for goods, during the course of a general convulsion; and above all, from the universal terror and alarm which spread over Europe, in consequence of the dreadful revolutionary scenes exhibited in France, and some of the adjoining states, such a decay of trade had taken place, and such a want of confidence had arisen, as had hardly ever been felt, in any former period of our history.

The state of the metropolis, in regard to these important particulars, was thus described by a respectable

spectable banker in Westminster, in a letter to the author, immediately before the effect of that great operation, (the issue of the Exchequer bills,) was experienced.

“ The late precarious and uncommon situation
“ of confidence and circulation, hath obliged every
“ individual connected with trade and money
“ transactions, to call forth every resource, and
“ to keep ready unusual means of answering all
“ demands; and of course he must look to him-
“ self, and his partners, with all that care and
“ anxiety, which the unfortunate state of public
“ credit requires. And the misfortune at this
“ juncture is, that every man of money or re-
“ sources, has been straining every nerve for six
“ weeks past, to support himself or friends, and
“ cannot therefore come forward, and lend that
“ support to others, which their public spirit would
“ prompt them to do, on so critical an occasion.”

From the very general acquaintance, which, in consequence of various circumstances, the author was led to cultivate, it was probable that he had more accurate information regarding the distress which was felt in every part of the kingdom, than could fall to the lot of almost any other private individual. An idea therefore had occurred to him, of proposing in parliament, the appointment of a select committee, to take into its consideration the causes of the commercial failures which had already taken place, and the measures which it would be expedient to adopt to prevent their farther extension.

sion. But upon communicating this plan to one of his Majesty's confidential ministers, (the present Lord Viscount Melville,) the author was informed, "that unless something specific was previously arranged, the appointment of any committee, to take up the subject loosely, might produce mischief, with very little prospect of good, but that if he had any specific ideas to state, government would be glad to receive them."

In consequence of this information, I transmitted to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the 16th of April 1793, a paper, of which the following is a copy.

Thoughts on the Means of restoring the Commercial Credit of the Country.

"The causes of the present miserable state of commercial credit are two: 1. that formerly there was an unbounded license of issuing paper currency, whilst at present, there is a difficulty in passing it, and of discriminating between those who have a capital adequate to the demands upon them, and those who have not: and, 2. it may be ascribed to the diminution of the specie of the country, partly owing to the swindling practices of the French, who, by the most dexterous manœuvre ever invented, contrived to get the hard guineas of England exchanged for their paper assignats*. These causes

* In a recent publication, the following account is given of this artful manœuvre.

causes mutually act upon each other, and their force is necessarily augmented by the circumstance of a foreign war."

"Paper circulation, kept within due bounds, is undoubtedly a blessing to a country. If Great Britain, for instance, requires a circulation of eighty millions, if specie alone could be employed as the medium of commerce, having no gold or silver of

"In the year 1792, the Brissotine party then usurping the government of France, formed a conspiracy to drain Great Britain of specie; persuaded that a suspension of cash payments at the Bank, would produce universal bankruptcy, and ruin of our commerce. To this end they authorised agents in London to draw on the *caisse d'escompte*, for whatever sums and at whatever exchange it might be possible to negotiate their bills, and immediately invest the produce thereof in gold and silver, and send the same to France, taking care at the same time to raise the value of the precious metals at Paris, so as to tempt to the utmost the *fraudulent melting and smuggling of guineas*. Our ministers soon caught the alarm, and used every method to stop this mischievous traffic, but the evil had already proceeded to an extent, which in a great measure produced the multitude of bankruptcies of 1793, with all their concomitant misfortunes. And there is little reason to doubt the full effect of the conspiracy, had not Claviere and the rest of his gang been counteracted by others of the party, who did not well understand the business; and had not the monster Robespierre done us one unintentional service, by destroying the party. The truth of this may be seen in Barreire's declarations when in prison next year, accusing the Jacobins of frustrating this great project, and refusing Claviere the sum (about £. 40,000 sterling), which he had stipulated as the price of his agency." See a tract entitled, *Guineas an unnecessary and expensive Incumbrance on Commerce*. - Printed anno 1802. Appendix, p. 22.

its

its own, it must have begun with exporting eighty millions worth of goods, in order to get the valuable metals it wanted. Whereas fortunately, it has been discovered, that thirty millions of specie and fifty of paper answers exactly the same purpose. Thus Great Britain is in regard to capital, fifty millions richer than otherwise it would be, and saves, at the rate of 5 *per cent.* on that capital, £. 2,500,000 *per annum* of interest. Besides, it would sometimes be difficult to get additional specie adequate to the increase of commerce, consequently, the commercial prosperity of the country, would be limited according to the quantity of specie that could be procured. No such boundary, however, to commerce does exist, where paper circulation is established."

"It is not easy to ascertain the extent of paper circulation in Great Britain. In Scotland, according to the best information that can be procured, it amounts to about three millions. In England, the notes payable to bearer, may probably be about ten times as much, and stating the amount of inland bills at seventeen millions, it makes a total of fifty millions of paper currency. Perhaps, however, the amount might be calculated by the tax on notes."

"It is unfortunate for the country, that the importance of paper coinage, *as a national resource*, was not better understood some time ago. Had the coining of paper money belonged exclusively to the public, it must have been equal to a capital of

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thirty

thirty millions sterling, the interest of which, would have rendered any other sinking fund unnecessary. As it is, the only advantage which the public derives from paper circulation, arises from the sum paid by the Bank for the privilege of issuing notes, the stamp duties upon the notes of private bankers, and the benefit the community at large derives from facility of circulation."

"In regard to the present commercial distress, the great cause undoubtedly is owing to this, that persons were suffered to issue notes, without restriction, without capital to carry on their business, or skill in the profession they took up; and it is rather a preposterous idea, that a number of persons should be suffered to coin as much paper money as they please, (because they call themselves bankers,) whilst in the same country, so many unhappy wretches should suffer the severest punishments of the law, for coining a few halfpence."

"To remedy the present commercial distress, it seems to be necessary, in the first place, to check that unlimited power of issuing notes, and to distinguish as much as possible (to make use of a figurative expression), *the sound sheep from the rotten*. Commissioners should be appointed, without a license from whom, no person should be allowed to set up as a banker. The commissioners might be the same with those appointed to redeem the national debt. Let every banking-house place £. 10,000 worth of stock for every partner in it, in the names of those commissioners, as a security
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for their commercial dealings. The principal only to remain as a pledge, the interest being annually paid to them. It is needless to enter into the minute regulations of this plan, unless the general idea were approved of. It is only necessary to add, that landed security ought not to be received by the commissioners, not being of so saleable a nature, and at any rate, subject to so many drawbacks by settlements and intails. Besides, the proprietor can mortgage his landed property if he choose it, and purchase into the funds."

"If this idea were adopted, not only might an act be passed for licensing bankers, but in six weeks time, every one intitled to that privilege might obtain a license, which would re-establish the currency of their notes, and prevent the distresses which must necessarily ensue if the credit of country banks is totally annihilated. Indeed as soon as such licenses are granted, the notes of such bankers ought to be received in payment of taxes, and associations ought to be encouraged, for the purpose of giving them all possible currency and credit."

"In regard to the idea of the Bank of England establishing branches in the country, it requires very serious consideration. 1. The Bank at present seems to have as much business as it can well manage. 2. Monopolies ought to be avoided as much as possible on all occasions. 3. The country stands a chance of being better served by the competition of a number of private bankers, than if all its paper

circulation and commerce in money were ingrossed by any particular set of men."

" 2. The diminution of the specie of the country is a serious evil, particularly as in consequence of the discredit into which paper has got, it is more necessary than ever to have specie in abundance. Some means must however be fallen upon to supply the demands of circulation, with some medium of commerce that will be accepted of, otherwise the most serious consequences may be expected. Already, in some places in the country, have the farmers taken back the cattle they have brought to market, having nothing offered for them but the notes of country bankers. The same may happen with regard to grain, &c. which may occasion the greatest distress. The want of circulation, and the deficiency of consumption, will probably diminish the public revenue, by, from one to two millions, and the present scarcity of specie will probably be much augmented, by the paying of a considerable body of troops on the continent."

" The distress which at present exists, seems to resemble that which took place in the year 1696-7, when exchequer bills were originally issued. They are first mentioned in 8 and 9 Will. 3. cap. 6. The act is not printed; but it appears from the life of Halifax, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, and who had the merit of the invention (p. 43), that exchequer bills were issued *as a substitute for money*, which was extremely scarce at the time, owing to the re-coinage. To render

render these bills more convenient for that purpose, some were issued for £. 10, others only for £. 5, and in fact this seems to be the best expedient that can now be adopted to remedy the present distress; and being thus sanctioned by precedent, it renders the plan less alarming and exceptionable."

"It is almost unnecessary to add, that the public would gain considerably by such a measure, as no interest need to be paid on such bills, at least for the first year; if afterwards 3 per cent. were allowed on them, it would always keep them at or above par. But unless the general idea were approved of, it seems to be unnecessary to detail the further particulars respecting that part of the plan."

"These thoughts are hastily thrown together, with a view of giving rise to discussion, rather than as containing a complete system, to be immediately adopted to the full extent that is proposed. . . Sir John Sinclair was thence induced to suggest the propriety of appointing a committee to take the subject into consideration, that these ideas might be brought to maturity before they were communicated to government."

It was on the 24th day of April that Mr. Pitt informed me in the House, that the measure I had recommended, that of nominating a select committee, to take into its consideration the state of the commercial credit of the country, had been approved of by his Majesty's government, that he

was to give notice on that day of his intention to move for its appointment, and that he particularly wished me to be one of the number. A committee was accordingly appointed on the 25th; a report was made from the committee on the 29th of April; an act passed both Houses and received the royal assent upon the 8th of May following^d, and the whole was carried through with a degree of celerity and judgment, which did infinite credit to the minister, by whom the business was conducted.

The commissioners met and commenced their proceedings, on the very day after the passing of the act; and some progress was made on that and the two following days, in receiving and determining applications, but after preparing every step in order to carry on the business with the greatest expedition, we were informed that the exchequer bills, on the credit of which the whole operation depended, could not be issued till Thursday the 16th of May.

Alarmed least a favourite measure, by this unforeseen delay, might be either disappointed altogether, or at least rendered less efficient than otherwise it would have been, I was induced to try an expedient which, fortunately, was completely successful. It was an application to some of the most respectable banking houses in the metropolis, to the following effect.

“ Sir John Sinclair presents his compliments to Messrs. ———. By the information received from

^d 33 Geo. 3. c. 29.

Manchester and Glasgow, there is every reason to apprehend the most serious consequences, unless some pecuniary assistance is *immediately* sent to those places. On such an occasion, every individual of public spirit, will naturally be anxious to step forward, to prevent the peace of the country from being disturbed by tumults, which, if once begun, it is impossible to say to what length they may be carried. An idea has occurred to Sir John Sinclair, for sending immediate relief to those towns, in perfecting which, he will be happy to be favoured with your assistance. The exchequer bills to be issued under the late act, will not be ready for issuing before Thursday next, but the board of commissioners can, on Monday, grant certificates, directing the exchequer to deliver the exchequer bills to the bearer thereof, to the amount specified; the certificate therefore, is as good a security as the bills themselves. If you could conveniently advance from £. 5000 to £. 20,000 on such certificates, at a discount, call it of 1 *per cent.*, you will have the satisfaction of doing a considerable service to the public, without, it is to be hoped, any material loss or inconvenience."

"The favour of an answer is requested before 12 on Monday. It may be directed either at Whitehall before 10, or at Mercer's Hall from 10 to 12. If you approve of this measure, the persons to whom the exchequer bills are granted, will call at your house at one, with a certificate adequate to the sum you agree to take. The produce
will

will be immediately carried down to Manchester and Glasgow, and will be received at both those places before the bills are issued from the exchequer, a point of great importance, when even a single hour is of consequence."

"Whitehall, Sunday, 12th May 1793."

Nothing could be more satisfactory than the result of this application; notwithstanding the terror and alarm which had not as yet subsided, these public spirited gentlemen, at the suggestion and request of a private individual, advanced no less a sum than £. 70,000 on a few hours notice*, and the money reached Manchester and even Glasgow, before the bills, on the security of which the money was advanced, were issued out of the exchequer. This unexpected supply, coming so much earlier than was at all looked for, operated like magic, and had a greater effect in restoring confidence, than ten times the sum could have had at a later period.

Indeed nothing could turn out more complete and satisfactory than the whole transaction^f. In a report to the treasury, drawn up when the business was concluded, (which was subscribed by Lord

* I have unfortunately lost a note of the names and sums advanced by each banking house, but I recollect that Messrs. Drummond of Charing Cross, Coutts and Co., and Smith Payne and Smith, were of the number.

^f It was the success which had attended this great operation, and the concern which the author had in the formation and conduct, which principally induced the minister to support his plan for the establishment of a Board of Agriculture.

Sheffield,

Sheffield, as chairman, and the other commissioners), the advantages which had resulted from the measure is stated in the following terms:—"That
" the knowledge that loans might have been ob-
" tained, sufficed in several instances to render
" them unnecessary; that the whole number of
" applications was 332, for sums amounting to
" £. 3,855,624; of which, 238 were granted,
" amounting to £. 2,202,000; 45, for sums to the
" amount of £. 1,215,100 were withdrawn; and
" 49 were rejected for various reasons. The whole
" sum advanced on loans was paid; a considerable
" part before it became due, and the remainder
" regularly at the stated periods, without apparent
" difficulty or distress. With the exception of two
" only, who became bankrupts, the parties assisted
" were ultimately solvent, and in many instances
" possessed of great property.

" The advantages of this well-timed measure
" were evinced by a speedy restoration of confi-
" dence in mercantile transactions, which produced
" a facility in raising money that was presently felt,
" not only in the metropolis, but through the whole
" extent of Great Britain.

" The difficulties in which many considerable
" commercial houses were involved were thus re-
" moved, and the fatal effects of those difficulties,
" in other houses who were dependent on them,
" were prevented; nor was the operation of the
" act less beneficial, with respect to a variety of
" eminent manufactures, in different parts of these
" king-

“ kingdoms, who, having in a great degree sus-
“ pended their works, were enabled to resume
“ them, and to afford employment to a number
“ of workmen, who must otherwise have been
“ thrown on the public for support—and per-
“ haps, in some cases, with the loss of the manu-
“ facture.”

The commissioners then referred to the anxious care they had taken to preserve the most scrupulous secrecy, which succeeded so well, that the names of those, who applied for relief, are not known to this hour, except to the commissioners and the sureties for the respective debts.

On this subject Mr. Rose very justly remarks,
“ We doubt if any instance is to be met with,
“ where such essential benefit has been rendered to
“ the commerce and manufactures of a country, in
“ a manner so sudden, so easy in execution, and
“ (what is perhaps the least important considera-
“ tion, compared with the magnitude of the object,)
“ at no expence to the public. It was so managed,
“ that the difference between the interest paid by
“ the borrowers at 5 *per cent.*, and on the exche-
“ quer bills lent to them, for which the public paid
“ twopence halfpenny a day, satisfied all the ex-
“ pences of the commission, and left a profit of
“ upwards of £. 4000 which was paid into the ex-
“ chequer.”

The uncommon success which had attended this operation, induced Government to support a similar application in the year 1797, when, in conse-
quence

quence of the devastations which had been committed in the islands of Grenada and St. Vincent's, not only the planters in those colonies, but also their correspondents at home, and all those either directly or indirectly connected with them, were labouring under great distress. Having taken so active a part on the former occasion, I was prevailed upon to be a member of the select committee, and a commissioner in this second transaction. It must be admitted, however, that this second attempt has not proved so successful. Various acts have been found necessary for prolonging the payment of the different instalments, after they became respectively due; and though no ultimate loss will probably be sustained, yet it evidently appears, that such measures ought not to be too frequently adopted, and when they are, ought to be carried on with the utmost impartiality, and the strictest attention to the public interest.

In ascertaining the causes which contributed to the commercial failures in 1793, and which nothing but the measure above described, (namely, the issue of exchequer bills) prevented from becoming universal over the whole kingdom; there was one circumstance, which I felt it my duty strongly to recommend to the particular attention of the minister, namely, that merchants importing goods from abroad, were put to the inconvenience, and sometimes to the heavy loss, of advancing to government the duties to which such goods were liable

10. The
bonding
system.

liable at the moment of importation, consequently long before the articles themselves were generally sold. This was attended with the following disadvantages to the merchant. 1. He was under the necessity either of borrowing money to pay those duties, or of confining his trade withing narrower bounds, in order that he might be enabled to pay such demands out of his own capital. 2. He evidently lost the interest of the money thus paid for duties long before the sale, unless he raised the price proportionably, which was not always practicable; and 3. When the duties were very heavy, and money was difficult to borrow, he was often under the necessity of selling a part of his goods, at an inferior price, in order to clear off the demands of the custom house.

These circumstances, and a wish to promote as much as possible the foreign commerce of the country, induced the late minister to propose to Parliament, the establishment of the warehousing or bonding system, which, to a certain extent, was carried into effect by that minister, and which is likely to be extended much further under the administration of his successor. By the proposed regulations, the goods of the merchant will be kept under safe custody, without the necessity of paying any duty until there is an opportunity, either of selling them at home, or of sending them to some foreign market. By this plan the payment of drawbacks, (or the repayment of custom house duties

ties formerly paid), -will, in a great measure, be prevented; a fortunate circumstance, as the public was often defrauded in the course of such transactions.

Nothing can be more satisfactory to any friend to the public interest, who endeavours to give a general view of the progress of our financial history, than to record transactions, creditable to the ministers who bring them forward, and advantageous to the country.

The situation of these kingdoms, at the commencement of the year 1797, was in the highest degree alarming. The war was carried on without success, the finances of the country were in the greatest disorder, the enemy threatened us with invasion, and there was no prospect of peace. At that critical emergency, several members of Parliament assembled together on the 26th February 1797, and came to the following resolutions.

11. The
Financial
Committee
of 1797.

“ 1. To propose a parliamentary inquiry into the real state of our finances, as the only measure that can save the country from bankruptcy. It is evident, that palliatives and concealment will avail no longer; that we must know the truth; and the spirit and the resources of England, we have no cause to doubt, will then be found equal to the emergency.”

“ 2. To inquire into the measures that have been, or might still be taken, to preserve this country from invasion, against which there cannot be too many

many precautions, as it affects the lives and fortunes of all, and, if successful, must end in the overthrow of that constitution, which it is the pride and glory of every British subject to protect."

" 3. To ascertain, whether peace on honourable terms, might not still be obtained, before another campaign commences: for there is reason to believe, that France, at this moment, would agree to peace, on terms which a large majority of the people in this country would not consider as inadmissible."

Though the party by whom these sentiments were adopted, did not continue long united together, nor persevere in carrying them through, yet the public declaration of a powerful body of men, had a proper influence on the government of the country. The minister announced in Parliament that a person was empowered to negotiate with the French Republic, which rendered it unnecessary to press the third resolution. Measures were also taken for putting the nation in a better state of security against invasion, and it was in consequence to the first resolution above mentioned, that the most efficient committee, that had hitherto taken the finances of this country under its consideration, was appointed [§].

The

[§] In the Journals of the House of Commons (vol. 29. p. 452. 462. 491, and 527. *anno* 1763,) there are some proceedings regarding the appointment of a select Committee of Finance, which

The committee concluded its labours, the first session of its appointment, on the 20th of July 1797; having laid before the House twenty-two reports, which filled two volumes folio; but as the subject of their inquiries was far from being exhausted, (and indeed the succeeding reports filled two volumes folio more), I could not avoid expressing my astonishment in the House, that the committee was not re-appointed early in the succeeding session. The minister stated that he did not see any particular occasion for it, but being convinced that the additional inquiries of the committee would throw considerable light on the state of our revenue, and would in various respects promote the public service, I persevered in recom-

which is there declared to be, “ *the most proper and effectual method of examining, taking, and stating the publick accounts of the kingdom;*” and various other committees have at different times been nominated for the same important purpose; but their reports have seldom given much satisfaction, being indistinct and voluminous, and generally calculated more with a view of gaining some particular point, than for the purpose of communicating to the House and to the public, just and accurate information respecting the matters referred to them. Such committees ought to consist, not of men in office, to report upon their own conduct, but of independant and unconnected members of the House, who would not be afraid of probing matters to the bottom, or of reporting the circumstances of the country as it appeared to them, after a full and minute examination of the papers laid before them, or, of those which they might think it necessary to call for.

mending the measure, until at last the minister agreed to move for the re-appointment.

It cannot be supposed, that in a work of this nature, it would be possible to give even an abstract of thirty-six reports, comprehending four volumes folio. It may be sufficient to observe, that they contain much information no where else to be met with, and which had not been previously known: a plan for annually stating the public accounts of the kingdom, is there exemplified, which though not perfect, yet is certainly preferable to any that had been formerly adopted, and the same mode of stating the public accounts has since been pursued. Many judicious suggestions were made in those reports, some of which have been already carried into execution, and others will probably yet take place; and on the whole the appointment of that committee, is an event, with which both those who had any hand in promoting it, and still more, those who actually carried it into effect, have every reason to be satisfied.

But notwithstanding the labours of this, and of former committees, including also the reports of the various boards of commissioners for stating the public accounts of the kingdom, for inquiring into the state of the woods and forests, and for ascertaining the fees exacted at the different offices, yet there still remains an ample field for inquiry and retrenchment; a field however, which will probably remain neglected, until the necessities of another war will render farther investigations essential.

tial. Such inquiries might certainly be carried on to more advantage in time of peace, than in time of war; but unfortunately ministers will never take the trouble of anticipating evils, but prefer the odious task of endeavouring to remedy them, after the mischief has been accomplished.

The reader has already seen, the material assistance which it was fortunately in my power to contribute, towards promoting the restoration of commercial credit, in the year 1793. I wish most sincerely, that my suggestions had met with the same attention in 1796 and 1797, in which case, that disgraceful slur on our national pecuniary resources, the stoppage of payment in cash at the Bank of England on the 26th February 1797, either would never have happened, or would have been immediately remedied. Indeed when I consider the many unsuccessful attempts which were made to avert that national calamity, by various communications both to the minister, and to the directors of the bank, I am much inclined to agree in opinion with an intelligent author on this subject, who states, “that the conduct pursued by the Bank of England, for a considerable time previous to the suspension of the payment of its notes, almost warrant the suspicion, that instead of really dreading that suspension as an evil, they rather looked to it as an advantage^b.” There hangs some

12. The suspension of payments in cash at the Bank, and thoughts on circulation and paper currency.

^b See Boyd's Letter to the Right Hon. William Pitt on the stoppage of issues in specie at the Bank of England, 2d edit. p. 70.

dark mystery regarding this great event, which remains still to be developed.

In the paper communicated to government, on the means of restoring the commercial credit of the country, in 1793, it was distinctly stated that the distress at that time was owing to two causes.

1. The number of country bankers, who carried on their business without skill or capital; and, 2. to the want of a sufficient quantity of specie or some other safe and undoubted medium of circulation, for carrying on the general transactions of the nation.

In regard to the first point, it was suggested that all bankers should be required to take out a licence, and to give such unquestioned security to the public, as would prevent any risk of their notes falling into discredit. It was impossible however to prevail upon the minister to take any measures for that purpose. The consequence was, the fatal event now under consideration. For in the words of the secretary to the treasury, "whatever might have been the remote causes, it seems perfectly clear, that the stopping payment in cash of two great banks at Newcastle, owing to a local alarm, which spread rapidly, *was the immediate occasion of the evil* ¹."

But even the neglect of this suggestion, would not have occasioned the disaster, had another mea-

¹ See Rose's Brief Examination, p. 65. also Third Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, p. 526. A full fourth of the country bankers had failed. See Chalmer's Estimate, edit. 1794. Dedication, p. 67.

sure communicated by the author both to the minister, and to the directors of the bank, been properly attended to, namely, the issuing of small notes. The following is a copy of the paper transmitted to Mr. Pitt upon this subject, on the 29th of April 1796.

“ The increased revenue, consumption, and commerce of the country, undoubtedly require a greater quantity of representative signs, or circulating medium, than was necessary three years ago; instead of which, there is reason to believe, that a decrease has taken place, and hence the present embarrassments both at the Exchange and at the Exchequer.”

“ To remedy this evil, there ought to be, an increase either of specie or paper.”

“ Having none of the precious metals within ourselves, an immediate increase of specie is impossible. It is necessary therefore to consider whether an increase of paper money is not practicable.”

“ Perhaps the best mode of attaining that object would be, for the bank to issue *three pound* and *two pound* bank notes.”

“ At present, if a person wants a guinea, he is often under the necessity of changing a ten pound, or at least a five pound note. This makes a greater call for specie than is really necessary, as the bank, and even bankers, must be ready to furnish not only such a quantity of specie as is really
x 3 wanted,

wanted, but must also be prepared for demands not absolutely necessary."

"It is probable that the bank might safely issue a million or two more of paper, if, to that amount, two and three pound notes were put in circulation, the effect of which would soon be felt in every corner of the kingdom."

"The only objection seems to be, the trouble of fabricating such a number of small notes; but if it is likely to be of public service, there is every reason to believe that so public spirited a body as the bank, will not on that account hesitate to endeavour to remove an evil, which in a great measure originates from the prosperity of the country, and which it is in their power to alleviate, at least with safety, if not with profit."

This communication unfortunately proved unsuccessful, which I flattered myself was owing to the certain knowledge possessed by the minister, that no danger was to be apprehended. But happening to be accidentally in London in September 1796, I found the state of the country, in regard to its pecuniary concerns, more alarming than ever, and that all the apprehensions I had so long entertained upon the subject, were likely to be verified. I was thence induced to write a letter to the governor and directors of the Bank of England, of which the following is a copy.

"Gentlemen,

“ Gentlemen,

“ I learn, with infinite regret, the very general distress, which prevails in the commercial world, from the scarcity of money ^k, and the diminution of credit; and it would give me much pleasure, could I furnish any hints, which, improved on by your judgment and experience, could in the smallest degree tend to alleviate such pressing evils. For if they are not checked in time, there is too much reason to apprehend, that they must ultimately be productive of consequences truly serious and alarming.

“ There is certainly more wealth than ever in the country, of a solid and substantial nature. Our lands—our houses—our shipping—our manufactures—our goods of every sort, are greater in quantity, and more valuable in amount, than ever they were before. But our distresses are owing to the want of a sufficient quantity of a circulating medium, either of paper or of specie, adequate to the increased commerce, and the increased revenue of the country; and also adequate to supply the vacuum occasioned by that exportation of money

^k The scarcity of money was easily accounted for, when the real state of the circulation of the bank was explained to the public. It then appeared that the average number of notes circulated in September, 1795, was £. 11,034,790 and in September, 1796, only £. 9,720,440, making a difference in so short a period as one year of £. 1,314,350, the want of which, considering the total sum circulated, must have been severely felt in the money market.

to foreign countries, which has taken place in the course of the war.

“ For remedying the evils in question, I take the liberty of submitting to your consideration, the following hints.

“ I. Would not an increase of the capital of the Bank, enable it to serve more effectually, both the merchant and the public; and would not public credit be much improved, if a certain proportion of the Exchequer Bills, now outstanding, were to be subscribed into the new stock? On various occasions, the capital of the Bank of England has been increased, for the purpose of relieving the country; and by giving the holders of Bank stock, the preference in the new subscription, they would have no just cause for complaint.

“ II. I am persuaded, were the Bank to issue *two pound* and *three pound* Bank notes, that it would be a great public convenience, and that very few of them would be exchanged into specie. Indeed less gold would be required for changing even ten pound notes, which is often done for the sake of getting two or three guineas, the whole sum in coin that may be actually wanted by the holder of the note.

“ III. The increased commerce and revenue of the country, certainly demand a greater increase of a circulating medium. That increase can only take place either in specie, or in Bank paper. Specie, however, cannot be commanded when wanted; and if paper were to be issued by the Bank,

Bank, *in the usual form*, it might be immediately converted into specie, and exported out of the country. Might not, however, the Bank obtain authority from Parliament, to issue a million in notes, neither bearing interest, nor convertible into specie, until twelve months after the date¹; or might there not be a particular sort of note, which, though *issued* on the 1st of January 1796, might be *dated* on the 1st of January 1797, and so on? in which case it could not, till the day of its date, be convertible into specie. Such notes would at once pass, *by consent*, without discount. A union, or understanding, for that purpose, among the merchants and bankers of London, might be established in a very short space of time. The merchants might be told, that the Bank would discount their bills, to any specified amount, for the accommodation of the public, partly payable in notes dated 1st of January 1798, and partly in common convertible notes; and, if the due proportion were not exceeded, such is the want of money at the time, that the one kind of note would pass as readily as the other. If the Bank were *applied to by the merchants* to issue such notes, where could there be an objection to try such a plan, at least during the war?

“ IV. The last point I shall take the liberty of alluding to, relates to the state of the coinage; that

¹ Some, who startled at the idea of issuing a million of such notes, think nothing now of the idea of having fifteen millions not convertible into specie.

of gold in particular. While we continue to make our gold coin so much finer than that of other nations, and almost give *a bonus* to the smelter, by demanding nothing for the expence of the manufacture, it is impossible that our coin should not either be exported abroad, or smelted down at home ; and we must, of consequence, experience all the evils resulting from a diminished currency. Has the bank ever seriously taken that point into its consideration, and represented it to his Majesty's government ?

“ I thought it my duty to trouble you with these hasty observations, on subjects deeply interesting to us all, and should be happy were these hints to prove in any respect useful for obviating evils, of a nature so likely to prove in the highest degree prejudicial to the interests of the country.

“ I have the honour to be,

with great respect,

Gentlemen,

Your faithful and obedient servant,

JOHN SINCLAIR.”

“ Whitehall, 15th September 1796.”

The reader will make every necessary allowance for a letter, written without any intention of publication, and drawn up, rather with a view of suggesting hints for the consideration of the Bank, than of recommending any particular line of conduct to be pursued. Indeed he flattered himself, that the hints thus thrown out would have induced the

directors,

directors, if they did not approve of his ideas upon the subject, to have fallen upon some other means more likely to answer the purpose, unless there was the deepest conviction in the minds of those to whom he had addressed himself, that the evils he had apprehended were not likely to take place.

It is singular that the measure proposed thus early, though seemingly despised at the moment, yet should afterwards be adopted as soon as the mischief was done; and it is some satisfaction to the author to find, that in the opinion of intelligent men, “ *if the Bank had issued these small notes in time, there would have been no occasion for the suspension of payment in specie^m.*”

But as no immediate mischief followed this great catastrophe, the public at large soon became extremely indifferent to the event, and the circumstances which led to it. A plan was proposed, which was sanctioned by the approbation of some of the best informed individuals connected with the monied interest, by which the suspension might have been removed in the space of a few weeks. But as that would not suit the views of the minister it met with no attention. The plan was to the following effect.

“ The necessity of suspending the payment of

^m See Address to the Proprietors of the Bank of England, by Alexander Allardyce, Esq. M. P. 3d edit. p. 153 and 154, printed *anno* 1798. The same opinion is also supported by a most respectable merchant in the city of London, who transmitted a long letter to the author on the subject of the suspension.

cash at the Bank can only be attributed to its having too large a proportion of paper in circulation compared to the amount of its specie. The notes in circulation, let us state, for the sake of round numbers, at ten millions. Let us suppose that the Bank could be re-opened, if instead of ten, it had only five millions of notes in circulation. It has been proposed that government should repay the Bank its advances to that amount: but from the situation of the public, the payment of so large a sum, in addition to all the other demands upon it, cannot be expected; though the more it can pay, the more it will enable the Bank to assist the merchants with discounts. But it will answer exactly the same purpose, if the Bank were to add ten millions to its present capital, to be paid one half in bank-notes, which would thus be taken out of circulation, and the other half, in exchequer bills, and other government securities. The sum would be subscribed in one day, as Bank stock bears an interest of seven *per cent.* *This dividend the public ought to guarantee, during the continuance of its charter, as its advances to the public have undoubtedly occasioned its present difficulties.* It would also be necessary to give the proprietors of the old stock, in proportion to their respective interest, a share in the new subscriptions. By adopting this plan, the Bank of England might be opened in the space of a few weeks^a."

" The

^a As a proof that this plan was not only practicable, but that its effects might have been depended upon, the reader is re-

“ The only objection to this measure is, that five millions of paper, representing property, being thus taken out of the market, some means must be contrived to fill up the vacuum. One mode might be to procure an additional quantity of specie, which however cannot at once be obtained; another, to issue *state notes*, or exchequer bills, on an improved plan, to that amount; but though that would be a productive resource to the government, yet such is the risk of entrusting ministers with the power of coining paper, that hardly any advantage can compensate for the mischiefs it might occasion. It would soon be found, that state notes would be rapidly multiplied beyond all reasonable bounds. The plan, therefore, that I would prefer, would be, that of licensing the bankers of London, and other large towns, to issue notes to that amount, finding proper security to commissioners appointed by the public, like the exchequer bill commissioners, and permitting the notes issued by such licensed bankers to be received in the payment of taxes during the war. This, with the credit to be derived from the security given, would enable them to discount the bills of the merchants, and to keep up the pecuniary circulation of the country.”

ferred to the result of an operation on similar principles, which took place about a century ago, (in consequence of 8 Will. c. 20.) an account of which will be given in the farther progress of this work, when the history of the bank is detailed.

“ In

“ In regard to the third point, that of preventing the risk of such calamities in future, the only mode is, by altering the principles on which our coinage has been conducted, so as to check its being either smelted at home, or exported to other countries.”

The suspension^o having unfortunately taken

^o The order of council was issued on Sunday, February 26, 1797, and was conceived in the following terms: “ Upon the
 “ representation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the
 “ Council, stating that, from the result of the information
 “ which he had received, and of the inquiries which it has
 “ been his duty to make, respecting the effect of the unusual
 “ demands for specie that have been made upon the metro-
 “ polis, in consequence of ill-founded or exaggerated alarms
 “ in different parts of the country, it appears, that unless some
 “ measure is immediately taken, there may be reason to ap-
 “ prehend a want of a sufficient supply of cash, to answer the
 “ exigencies of the public service, it is the unanimous opinion
 “ of the Board, that it is indispensably necessary, for the public
 “ service, that the directors of the Bank of England should
 “ forbear issuing any cash in payment until the sense of Par-
 “ liament can be taken on that subject, and the proper mea-
 “ sures adopted thereupon, for maintaining the means of circu-
 “ lation and supporting the public and commercial credit of
 “ the kingdom at this important conjuncture. And it is
 “ ordered, that a copy of this minute be transmitted to the
 “ directors of the Bank of England; and they are hereby re-
 “ quired, on the grounds of the exigency of the case to con-
 “ form thereto, until the sense of Parliament can be taken as
 “ aforesaid.” The members present on this memorable
 occasion were: The Lord Chancellor, (Wedderburn)—the
 Lord President, (Earl of Chatham)—Duke of Portland,—
 Marquis Cornwallis—Earl Spencer—Earl of Liverpool—Lord
 Grenville—and the Right Hon. W. Pitt, (Chancellor of the
 Exchequer.)

place,

place, notwithstanding every exertion in my power to prevent it, and no measures having since been adopted for the purpose of removing the evil, it has been found necessary to continue the restriction by reiterated acts of parliament, and it is hardly possible to suppose, that the Bank of England, as at present constituted, can ever again open to any effective purpose, as the least rumour of war, or any continuance of an unfavourable state of Exchange, must always compel it to shut again its coffers, and to suspend its payment in cash. In such a situation, it is surely a subject of the most essential importance, to consider what means are the most likely to place our pecuniary resources on the surest and best foundation. Previously however to any attempt to explain the measures that ought now to be pursued, it will be proper to consider the nature of circulation and of paper currency, the principles of which still require additional explanation, notwithstanding the many volumes which have been written upon the subject.

THOUGHTS ON CIRCULATION AND PAPER CURRENCY.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

The wealth of a nation properly consists in the goods or merchandize it possesses, whether arising from the produce of the soil, from manufactures or internal industry,—or from foreign commerce.

Coin

Coin or metals may be described as an article of merchandize, which, by common consent, is essential for three important purposes.

1. For enabling individuals to barter the value of their labour for an article universally exchangeable.

2. For the purpose of transferring property in goods from one individual to another, or from one nation to another, without the trouble of actual barter; and

3. For enabling the government of a country to obtain a revenue: for if the Exchequer were under the necessity of levying its taxes in kind, how could it fit out a fleet, or maintain an army, or defray the various other expences of a state.

Money being the medium of barter, both for labour and goods, and in a manner the source or basis of public revenue, it is necessary to preserve a due proportion between its amount, and 1. The quantity of labour that must be paid for: 2. The quantity of goods or merchandize, the property of which must be transferred; and 3. The total amount of the demands of the Exchequer, whether arising from taxes or loans, or any extraordinary species of contribution.

The quantity of money however instead of being stationary, ought always to be on the increase.

1. To promote a greater quantum of labour, on the increase of which the wealth and prosperity of a country so much depends.

2. To

2. To facilitate the transfer of a greater quantity of goods, among a greater body of people, as the commerce and population of a prosperous country is always augmenting; and

3. To enable the people, should it be necessary, to furnish, without inconvenience, greater supplies to the Exchequer.

We shall proceed to apply these general principles. 1. To the case of an increased quantum of labour or industry: 2. To an increased commerce in, or transfer of, goods: 3. To an increased revenue: and 4. Shall conclude with a general system for establishing the paper circulation of this country on the surest and best foundation.

I. *Increased Quantum of Labour.*

An increased medium of circulation is of more consequence, with a view of facilitating the exchange of labour, and accumulating an extent of capital necessary for that purpose, than perhaps in any other respect. It is certain that labour, properly applied, is the basis of national prosperity; but who will labour, unless by his exertions he can be furnished with the means of subsistence. The wants of every individual, more especially if incumbered with a large family, are, in civilized periods of society, extremely numerous. They cannot therefore be supplied, without being paid at least partly in coin, or in some article equally transferable. If the industry of a nation therefore is on the increase, how can

it be carried on without an increase of that medium of circulation, on the quantum of which it necessarily depends.

Nor is this all; industry must often be carried on by borrowing capital, and if the medium of circulation is limited, or less than the demand, the interest paid for the use of it must be extremely high, which damps the spirit of exertion. But if by prudent measures, what passes for money becomes abundant, the interest of money diminishes. Many branches of industry therefore, yielding perhaps but moderate profit, may then be carried on with advantage, and the prosperity of the country increases with almost incredible rapidity.

Nor is this all; the improvement of a country, by the labour of its industrious inhabitants, can never be carried to its utmost extent, unless money can be procured, not only at a low interest, but even sinking the capital. A temporary command of money may answer for common commercial purposes; but with a view of effecting *lasting improvements*, as roads, bridges, canals, harbours, mines, buildings, together with various branches of agricultural improvement, as draining, watering, enclosing, &c., money ought to be procurable, for a long period of time, on the payment of a moderate interest, otherwise such improvements will not be carried on to the extent that might otherwise be expected.

There cannot therefore be a more mistaken
opinion

opinion than this, that the prosperity of a country depends but little on the quantum of its medium of circulation. In fact, an industrious nation must prosper in proportion to the quantity it possesses or circulates. Let us suppose the total circulation of Great Britain to be 40 millions sterling in coin and in paper, bearing an interest of 5 *per cent.*, if it were reduced to 30 millions, bearing an interest of 6 *per cent.* how much would not the industry of the nation be cramped; whereas were it raised to 50 millions, bearing an interest of 4 *per cent.* and the whole of it actively employed in carrying on laborious occupations, it cannot be doubted, that the prosperity of the country would increase with a rapidity, and be carried to a height, which would not otherwise have been practicable.

II. *Increased Commerce.*

Nothing can be more evident than this, that an increased commerce, or the transfer of an increased quantity of goods, cannot be carried on to advantage, without an increased medium of barter. This, to a certain extent, commerce itself furnishes by means of Bills of Exchange, and the rapid circulation of money which they occasion, more especially where it is the usual practice to discount such bills only for two or three months. But still that accommodation is not sufficient, and cannot always be obtained. Hence commerce has experienced, and must always experience frequent checks, unless there is at all times plenty of money

in circulation, in proportion to its increase or extent.

But we are told, that no increase of circulation is necessary for the merchant. Let him sell his goods cheaper, and he will always find a market. Unless the sale however, is attended, not only with indemnification, but with profit, there must be an end to commerce; and unless the merchant can procure money on loan, until a sale can be made on fair and adequate terms, he may be ruined. Nor is this observation confined to one article of commerce only; it is applicable to all. There is no branch carried on to any extent, or pushed with any spirit, that does not occasionally feel a scarcity of money. It is said, why should the public encourage speculations, or interest itself in their behalf. The answer is obvious. All trade is, properly speaking, speculation, and all the encouragement wished for is, that merchants may have the command of money, at the legal interest of 5 per cent. when they have occasion for it, and can produce good security. This however they cannot always obtain, unless money, the medium of barter or circulation, is increased with the increase of their goods or merchandize.

III. *Increased Revenue.*

The public revenue of a country, unless furnished from property in land, evidently arises from the labour or merchandize, or the value thereof, which the individuals of a nation can furnish, after
supplying

supplying themselves with the necessaries and conveniences of life.

But after a public revenue has reached a certain standard, let us suppose, that ten millions of additional income, is necessary for the public exigences. How is that sum to be raised, without, 1. More goods and wealth; or, 2. A higher price for them; or, 3. A greater facility of barter, by means of an increased medium of circulation.

1. An additional quantity of goods, to a certain extent, may be obtained, by greater industry, and by improvements in agriculture, and other arts: but unless there is a more extended market for them, the price diminishes, and the result will prove on the whole, rather a loss than an advantage to the community.

To explain this doctrine, let us suppose, that the goods annually produced in the united kingdom, are worth 100 millions sterling *per annum*; if the quantity were increased one-fifth, and if the price were lowered in proportion, we should not, *in a pecuniary point of view*, be one farthing richer; and in regard to finance, the people at large, would in fact be less able than before, to furnish supplies to the Exchequer. Those who purchased goods cheaper, and consumed them, might, to a certain extent, be benefited, and be enabled of course to pay more to the public; but all the various classes of the community, by whose industry the goods were made and brought to market,

would not be able to pay near so much as they did before, and would necessarily be impoverished.

2. Let us next suppose, that the quantity of goods remains the same, but that the price increases one-fifth. The amount of the annual income of the nation, would then rise from 100 to 120 millions in value, and there would be a much larger fund for paying the demands of the public.

3. Let us, in the last place suppose, that the price not only increases, but that there is also an additional quantity of the medium of transfer, by which a good market or rapid sale is secured. The country is then in the highest possible state of public prosperity. *Abundance of merchandize, at a high price, and a rapid sale, constitutes the summit of national felicity, in so far as regards income or revenue, and a nation enjoying such advantages, can pay, without difficulty, taxes to an amount, that seems hardly to be credited by nations who have not been placed in the same situation.* Those with fixed incomes, may, in some respects, suffer, but they are sufficiently indemnified, by the certainty and the regularity with which their incomes are paid, and the easiness with which they can obtain credit, or capital, to increase their incomes by industry.

Three things then are essential for public prosperity; namely,

1. An additional quantity of labour or goods, in so far as may be necessary, for internal consumption or foreign export.

2. An

2. An increased price of goods, so as not to hinder consumption at home or exportation abroad; and,

3. An increased medium of barter, so as to secure a rapid sale and a certain market.

Let us consider therefore, how the last, which is by far the most material, can be obtained, for plenty of money will always secure a good price, and good prices will necessarily promote the raising a greater quantity of goods.

4. General system, for establishing the paper circulation of the country on a sure foundation.

In countries where mines do not exist, if the precious metals alone are the medium of circulation, an increase of coin or specie cannot be obtained, except by means of commerce; but in that case, goods must be exported to purchase bullion for the purpose of coinage, and the nation is, to that extent, impoverished, merely to procure a medium of barter.

For instance, if in consequence of additional taxes, ten millions of money should be wanted for additional circulation, were gold and silver necessary for that purpose, ten millions worth of goods must be exported, merely to procure the representative of circulating wealth^p.

Hence therefore the advantages of paper money. Gold and silver represent property actually

^p In the state of coin, it is at first more valuable than in the shape of goods, on account of its transferable nature, but its value is constantly diminishing by wear.

sent abroad, and in the possession of foreign nations: *whereas paper money, when issued on proper principles, represents property at home and in our possession.* Were it possible to keep up a proper proportion between the two, so that the paper issued could always be converted into coin, as foreign or domestic commerce required it, the state of a country, in so far as regards its circulation, must be in the highest degree prosperous.

Paper currency, by which I mean any security payable to the bearer on demand, is of three sorts. The first, issued by the Government of a country; the second, by private individuals; and the third, by corporations erected for that special purpose.

1. To a certain extent paper money might be circulated by the Government of a country, but such a plan is liable to much abuse. When issued like exchequer bills in England, bearing interest, it does not answer the purpose of money, from the uncertainty of its value, varying according to the amount of the interest due. If issued, not as a loan bearing interest, but as actual coin, like the assignats of France, the Government, from the facility of coining it, soon exceeds all bounds; its value rapidly depreciates, and ultimately is reduced to nothing.

2. It has hitherto been the policy of this country, to permit individuals to issue paper money, without any restriction, and it cannot be denied, that this liberty, immediately previous to the commencement of the late war, was attended with useful consequences. Every town in the kingdom became

became the centre of a paper mint, and what passed currently for money abounded. The result was highly satisfactory. The interest of money fell, that sure test of public prosperity. Improvements of every kind were rapidly carried on. The cultivation of a common, the formation of a new canal, the construction of a new harbour, the establishment of a new manufacture, or of a new branch of foreign trade, never stopped for want of capital. The prices of every species of agricultural produce increased, which gave a new fillip to the art of husbandry. The revenue rose to an amount which equalled the expectations of the most sanguine, and the country exhibited the delightful spectacle of comfort, industry, and wealth.

But this pleasing, though baseless fabric, being built on false credit, and defective principles, in a great measure fell to the ground. No sooner was the confidence which the public had given to private banks destroyed, than the absurdity was generally acknowledged, of giving to every individual, who chose to assume it, the privilege of coining paper money. At first, only some of private banks, who traded without sufficient capital, gave way; this threw discredit upon others, however substantial, and the storm at last affected the bank of England itself, in a manner too recent, and too well known, to render any account of it here necessary.

That paper money might be issued by country banks, with much public advantage, if they were
put

put under a proper system of regulation, can hardly be questioned ; but that, without giving any security for the notes they circulate, or obtaining any licence for that purpose, any individual, or any set of men, should be permitted to coin paper, and issue it as money, can hardly be justified on any sound principle of policy.

With a view of laying the foundation of a plan for licensing country bankers to issue notes, which seemed to me so essential for the public interest, I drew up the following outlines of the regulations that might be adopted.

Plan for licensing country bankers.

1. That no individual or company be permitted to issue engraved notes, payable to bearer on demand, without having obtained a licence for that purpose.

2. That such licence be granted by a Board of Commissioners established for that sole object, resembling the one by which exchequer bills were issued for the relief of the commercial interest ; and that similar securities be required either personal, funded, or landed, as may be thought most advisable ; and,

3. That a licence be granted for issuing notes, to double the amount of the sum for which security is given ; such notes either to be subscribed by some persons authorised by the commissioners, or stamped under their authority^a.

^a Proper stamps would be a great security against forgery.

Observations on the above System.

The nature of such proceedings, is now so well ascertained by the experience of two commissioners, that no difficulty would be found, in carrying the above plan into effect, both with respect to the granting a licence, and ascertaining the security to be required.

The whole may be done by one commission assembled in the city of London, for the Exchequer Bill Commissioners, found no difficulty in examining applications from every part of the kingdom.

The licence for issuing notes may be safely granted for double the value of the security given, because there is every reason to suppose that such notes never could be circulated, without receiving for them what was presumed, at the time, to be equivalent to their full value. Indeed a banker must be extremely unskilful, if the effects which he holds in security for the notes he issues, would not produce at least 10s. in the pound, and for the other 10s., the security given to the commissioners would be sufficient. The public therefore, would, on the whole, be completely safe, even though the banker had liberty to issue double the extent of the sum for which security was given, and it certainly, would be a great accommodation to him.

If this plan were to be adopted, the stamp now applicable to notes payable to bearer on demand, ought to be repealed, and a new stamp, under the authority of the new Board of Commissioners, substituted in its room. In that case indeed, even a
higher

higher stamp duty might be imposed, which would defray the expence of the new Board, and which the bankers could well afford to pay, as the additional credit they would derive, when trading under the sanction of such a licence, would be of infinite service to them.

Indeed how can this plan be objected to in regard to private bankers, when the same principles have been already carried into effect, to a greater extent, in the case of the Bank of England. The liberty which that corporation enjoys of issuing notes, is in consequence of a licence granted to it, in consideration of its having advanced to the public a considerable sum, which is responsible for the notes it circulates. Besides which, the bank has occasionally given some premiums to the public, for the renewal of the privileges it has obtained; and as the money it has advanced has, for several years past, remained at a low interest, consequently the public circuitously derives some share of the profits arising from its paper circulation.

It is not proposed, however, that private bankers should be liable to the same burdens, or to the same extent, but it is certainly desirable that none but substantial men should be permitted to issue notes, and that the number of such notes should be ascertained. By adopting that plan, we should enjoy all the advantages of paper circulation, without its concomitant evils. It would be for the interest of the bankers to make the circulation as extensive as possible, and to insure to the public all the benefits to be derived from extent; whilst, at the same time,

time, it would be in the power of parliament, if it were found too extensive, to check the evil, by reducing the quantity of paper permitted to be circulated, within proper bounds.

Corporations for circulating paper money may be of two descriptions, namely, for issuing either great or small notes. On corporations issuing notes.

The bank of England was, till the stoppage of payments in cash, *anno* 1797, a corporation of the first description; and indeed, instead of its issuing small notes, perhaps it would have been better that another corporation had been erected with that special privilege. From the immensity of its transactions, it cannot possibly do justice, in its present state, to the plan of issuing small notes. Such notes, though less in point of value, must always become more in regard to number, than large ones. This leads me therefore to mention a plan, which would probably be acceptable to the Bank of England, and which at the same time would, in various respects, most essentially promote the public interest.

The Bank of England has so long possessed its monopoly, and has been of such important service to the public, that any attempt to establish another

This was actually the case on the 25th of January 1803, when the value of the large notes issued by the bank was £. 12,404,190, and of the small ones, £. 3,280,370, consequently there must have been a greater number of small notes.

Sir Francis Baring thus states the importance of the bank of England. " It has hitherto been beyond the power of human

other bank would not probably be successful, I would therefore recommend an increase of two millions to the capital of the bank, and the establishment of two branches, one to remain where it is situated at present, and to carry on the issuing of large notes, and all the other business to which it was accustomed, prior to the suspension in 1797; and the second branch to be established at Westminster¹, and to have the sole privilege, in so far as regards the metropolis, of issuing notes under £. 5. Each branch to have a separate body of directors, but the profits of both to be consolidated

“ man research to ascertain correctly the causes and mode in
 “ which the immense machine of circulation moves, and yet
 “ the fact is beyond a doubt, that the paper circulation of
 “ fifteen millions and a half helps to move with a facility which
 “ nothing but long experience can reconcile to our belief.
 “ 1. The national income, loans, &c. suppose fifty millions.
 “ 2. The exports. 3. The imports. 4. Internal or domestic
 “ trade. 5. Private circulations to an enormous amount. 6.
 “ Agriculture, shipping, mines, &c. We may consider with
 “ wonder and astonishment the small space which the sun ap-
 “ pears to fill in the firmament, while we know and feel that
 “ every part of our globe benefits by the vivifying effects of
 “ its rays. The Bank of England is, to the agriculture, com-
 “ merce, and finance of Great Britain, its sun; and the circu-
 “ lation of fifteen millions and a half of its paper is the basis
 “ on which its convenience, property, and safety have hither-
 “ to rested.” See Sir Francis Baring’s answer to Mr. Boyd
 on the influence of the stoppage of issues in specie at the bank
 of England, printed *anno* 1801, p. 14.

¹ The King’s Mews would be a proper situation for the proposed establishment.

together, and to be divided amongst the proprietors of bank stock.

If this plan were adopted, even if the suspension of payments in cash, were to be continued, in so far as regards the city branch, and the notes issued there; yet there would be no reason for extending it to the Westminster department. For the whole capital vested in the Westminster branch, ought to be employed in the discounting of bills at two or three months date, by which means the branch would always have the command of its capital; as such bills might be made payable, either in the small notes which it issued, or in specie. Were such a branch also established, there would be no difficulty in pointing out a mode of fabricating its notes, by which all risk of forgery would be prevented.

Such a plan would be attended with a variety of public advantages. It is probable, that instead of three millions of small notes, the bank might increase the quantity, through the medium of its new establishment, to at least five or six millions, without exceeding the demand or overloading the market. Can any means be thought of, that would enable the public better to bear up under any pressure, than such an addition to the circulating medium of the country, when it can be done with perfect safety. What is the foundation of the taxable income of the nation, but the annual sale of goods; and if, by plenty of money, you facilitate the sale of goods or increase their price, do
you

you not augment the income of the people, and consequently enable them, with infinite more ease than otherwise could be the case, to pay their taxes, and to carry on their industry. Let us take, for example, a landed gentleman of £. 5000 a year. His tenants, from a scarcity of money, may not be able to sell their produce, or may be obliged to take an inferior price, or to agree to a distant payment. In that case, how can he receive his rents punctually, or pay regularly the demands of the Exchequer? Increase the circulating medium, and these difficulties will vanish. By an increased price, and readier market, he may be enabled to increase his rents, and to pay even the additional demands of the Exchequer, without materially diminishing his own expenditure, and consequently without much inconvenience. Let us next take persons connected with trade, whose success entirely depends on a command of capital or on credit. Open a shop where the manufacturer, or the merchant, can discount their bills with certainty, when the security is good, and they will find no difficulty in paying the taxes to which they are subject, and extending their commerce. The same observations are applicable to almost all the various other classes of society.

And here it may be proper to remark, that for increasing the income of the people at large, for augmenting their industry and commerce, and enabling them to pay their taxes, the issuing of small notes is to the full as necessary as large ones. The
object

object that ought to be kept in view, is, to facilitate, as much as possible, the immense mass of daily and hourly transactions, for many of which small notes are much better calculated than large ones. But the summit of policy would be, to have one great corporation erected for the purpose of issuing large notes, applicable to great transactions, and another for issuing small notes, with a view of facilitating the multiplied business of common life. It would answer however, much the same purpose, if two separate branches of the same corporation were established, each having a distinct department to carry on.

I shall now briefly state the general results to be drawn from the preceding observations.

General Deductions.

1. That an increase of labour, a more extended commerce, and an increased revenue, require an addition to the circulating medium of a country.

2. That such an increase is best obtained, by means of a well regulated paper circulation.

3. That such a paper circulation is best conducted, when private individuals are prohibited from issuing notes, unless when duly licensed for that purpose, and when either two distinct corporations, or two branches of the same corporation, are established, one for circulating large notes, and the other for small ones.

And, 4. That if the paper circulation of a country is properly regulated, the periodical returns of

commercial distresses, will in a great measure be prevented, and the demands of the Exchequer, however great, will be paid without difficulty or murmur.

I have thus shortly explained the principles of a plan, for placing the paper circulation of this country on the surest and best foundation, which I have no doubt is perfectly practicable, and every objection to which might be easily removed. It would require however, a wise, intelligent, and upright government to carry it into full effect, or even to lay the foundation of so great a system. Were it once fairly established, I trust that it would prove the most important source of wealth, prosperity, and happiness to the people of Great Britain, that had hitherto been brought forward.

CONCLUSION.

Little did I imagine, when this chapter was originally sketched out, that it could possibly have extended to so great a length. I trust however, that any impartial reader, who favours this work with a perusal, will not consider his time and labour misapplied. The author has endeavoured to discuss, the various topics therein treated of, in such a manner, as to enable any person, conversant in such questions, to judge for himself. Much has he to lament, that the want of health, and the impossibility of procuring all the information necessary for the complete elucidation of so many subjects, should have rendered it greatly more defective

tive than otherwise it would have been. At the same time he flatters himself, that, even the greatest political cynic, would prefer seeing the observations and statements contained in this chapter, in their present state, however imperfect, than altogether buried in oblivion.

CHAP. IV.

Of the present State of the public Revenue, and of the different Branches of which it consists.

THE taxes levied in this country at present, are either temporary, or perpetual. The first are annually voted by parliament, or have been imposed for a limited time; the second having been granted in perpetuity, may be legally exacted until annulled by the legislature. Previously to the Revolution, the people of this country had been accustomed to give only occasional aids to the sovereign in times of difficulty and war. The same system it was imagined would have been preserved in, after that event took place. Little was it apprehended, that so many perpetual taxes would have been necessary, and far less that the land and malt taxes, though annually voted, would ever have become in some measure, a part of the permanent income of the crown: nay, that the land

tax should not only be rendered perpetual, but that the proprietors of the landed property in the kingdom, should be required to buy up this tax, at the highest rate, at which it had ever been imposed.

1. Temporary taxes.

The temporary taxes which formerly existed were those on land and malt, and though the former is commuted, and in part redeemed, yet I propose still to continue it under its old head, as the progress made in its redemption has not yet been considerable, as the taxes substituted in its room require no particular explanation, and as the old tax, in so far as regards the tax of four shillings in the pound on pensions and offices, still remains a temporary duty.

1. Land tax.

That branch of the revenue, now known under the name of the land tax, originated, as has already been observed, from those monthly assessments first imposed in the time of the commonwealth. They were likewise occasionally levied in the reign of Charles the Second, and when it became necessary, after the Revolution, to raise considerable sums of money in order to maintain William the Third upon the throne, and to carry on the war against France, this source of national income, being deemed peculiarly productive and efficient, was continued.

The present land tax, though unquestionably a most important branch of the revenue, is nevertheless liable to some objections.

It was originally intended merely as a temporary regulation ; but it has continued, so far as regards
the

the rate imposed upon each district, uniformly the same. So that in places which, from various circumstances, have risen to a flourishing state, (for instance the parish of Marybone in London), when the tax is at the rate of four shillings in the pound, the inhabitants do not pay perhaps sixpence. Whereas in other districts, which have not been equally prosperous, when the tax is at four shillings, perhaps six shillings is demanded by the collector *.

Nay, the tax is not only now unequal, but was so from the beginning; every city and county being in a great measure allowed to assess itself, without almost any check or control upon their proceedings. Hence those who wished well to the revolution, and the government that was then established, gave in a fair state of the property they possessed; whilst others were happy to show their zeal for the exiled family, and to gratify their selfishness at the same time, by reducing their income to as low a rate as could possibly be stated.

The land tax, as it is now called, was also originally intended to be a tax upon income, whether it proceeded from land, or some professional profits. But instead of taxing the real profits of professional men, the duty was imposed on their stocks

* This subject is ably discussed, in a work intitled, "The alteration of the constitution of the House of Commons, and the inequality of the land tax considered jointly," by J. Brand, C. L. M. A. 1 vol. octavo, printed anno 1793. +

in trade only : a regulation in the highest degree unequal, as some professions are very productive where little stock is required ; whereas others with a great stock are far from being lucrative. Attempts have been fruitlessly made to remedy so great a source of inequality *.

As it was proposed to lay a tax of four shillings in the pound on the income of every individual ; it was thought very absurd to exempt those from the tax, who, by the offices they held, enjoyed their income from the public. But this well-designed regulation, from the manner in which it has been executed, has been another source of inequality. For the advantage arising from the tax on public officers has been given, not to the nation at large, but to the particular place in which they are situated. This is a circumstance peculiarly favourable to the capital, the great emporium of office, and to other districts, particularly Cheshire, where there are now many officers in the salt department, a duty that did not exist at the revolution. Nay, it is attended with an additional unfortunate circumstance : for when the salary of the officer is small, though he must pay the land tax duty of four shillings in the pound, yet, in some cases, he is repaid that very duty out of the revenue of the department to which he belongs. Thus the public treasury relieves districts from the payment of certain taxes which they were not only

* See part iii. chap. i. p. 18.

bound, but, which it is more than probable, they were able to defray.

But the circumstance the most to be regretted is, that though the land-tax was supposed to produce, at the rate of four shillings in the pound, a certain income of £.1,989,673 : 7 : 10 $\frac{1}{4}$ for England, and £.47,954 : 1 : 2 for Scotland, making in all £.2,037,627 : 9 : 0 $\frac{1}{4}$, yet it was uniformly deficient, to the amount, at an average, of about £.235,000 *per annum*, varying according to the regularity with which the tax was collected, and the amount of the different charges to which it was liable.

The causes of this deficiency are next to be explained.

The expence of the collection in England (for Scotland must pay its proportion free of all charges into the Exchequer) must first be deducted.

Collectors poundage at 3 <i>d.</i> <i>per</i> pound	
on £.1,989,973	£.24,870
Clerks ditto, at 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ <i>d.</i> <i>per</i> pound	12,435
	<hr/>
	37,305
Receivers poundage on the balance, (after deducting the above sum,) at the rate of 2 <i>d.</i> in the pound, on £.1,952,368.	16,269
	<hr/>
	£.53,574

Thus the expence of collection cannot be complained of, as it is below even three *per cent.*

There is also allowed, under the name of conduct money, a sum of about £.1,260 *per annum* to the

the receivers of the land-tax in Wales, who complain of the great difficulty which they find in remitting the money to London.

The only part of England which claims any relief from this tax is the borough of Lyme Regis in Dorset; to which a deduction of £. 140 : 19 : 6 is annually granted by the treasury, on the footing that the lands on which that sum was assessed have been washed away by the sea.

Before the land-tax is paid into the Exchequer, the expence of the militia, and of apprehending deserters from the army, and conveying them to some place of security, falls also to be deducted, which was calculated by the committee of finance at £. 91,000 *per annum*; but which, by the estimates for the years 1787 and 1788, amounts to £. 116,137.

By 21 Geo. III. cap. 58. clause 8. the bounties payable for the encouragement of raising hemp and flax in England, are directed to be paid by the receivers of the land-tax in the several counties within which the same has been raised. This may occasion a deduction of from £. 10 to £. 15,000 *per annum*.

But the principal cause of the deficiency of the land-tax is, the practice, which has arisen from the public necessities, of empowering government to borrow two millions upon the credit of the tax as soon as it is voted. Exchequer bills are issued for that purpose, upon the security of which the Bank advances the money, which is gradually paid off,
as

as the produce of the tax is transmitted to the treasury. On some occasions very considerable sums were due by the public, on Exchequer bills standing out undischarged; and large sums, unnecessarily detained in the hands of the different receivers, are sometimes lost by their failure and bankruptcy. Such losses might be prevented in future, if proper attention were paid to the security given by the receivers; if by defraying the expence of the militia, and of the bounties above mentioned, from some other fund, no apology was given for any detention of the public money; and if the Bank were to undertake the remittance of the money, upon the payment of a certain moderate poundage from the receivers,

But some have suggested, that instead of attempting to improve the present land-tax, or to make any partial regulations respecting it, it would be better to have a new valuation, and to levy an equal rate over the whole island. Unfortunately, the treaty of union with Scotland is in a great degree an insuperable bar, (unless the consent of that part of the kingdom could be obtained), to any proposition of this nature, at least to a general equalization of the land-tax; and if Scotland were to be exempted, the remote districts of England would have reason to complain. So useful, however, would such a regulation be, that it might be advisable to give to Scotland, for a renunciation of that stipulation, such advantages in regard to the duties of the customs, as, by encouraging its trade,

Equaliza-
tion of the
land-tax.

trade, might prove still more beneficial to that country.

But were this objection removed, a proposal for an equal land-tax might not perhaps be perfectly relished by every individual in England, and might with some appearance of justice be objected to by those, who have lately purchased estates with an idea, that the faith of the public was pledged to admit of no alteration in the rate of assessment.

This objection, however, will not stand the test of a strict examination. It is well known that parliament has never given any real foundation for such an idea. On the contrary, by frequently varying the amount of the tax from one to four shillings in the pound, it evidently reserved to itself a complete power over that important branch of the national revenue.

Besides, this objection can only be made by those who have recently purchased estates, which upon a re-valuation would be found liable to an additional burden: and as every recent purchase is not of that description, the rule would not universally hold good.

Indeed, such is the evident justice of the measure, and the necessity of it has become so very apparent, that perhaps any opposition that is apprehended to such a plan is more imaginary than real; and a point so material to the general interests of the country, might be gained without much unpopularity or clamour, were the new assessment not to take effect immediately, but to commence at
any

any future period ; for instance, ten years after the passing of the act.

Others have recommended to leave the present land-tax as it is. Let it be a perpetual rent-charge, they say, at the rate of four shillings, or of two shillings in the pound, and impose an additional shilling upon land in general on a new valuation. Even this plan, though less exceptionable, is still hardly consistent with the articles of the union.

If ever an equalization is brought about, it has been much disputed at what time it should be carried into execution, and how long it ought to remain unaltered. To continue a tax on landed property at one rate for some time, is undoubtedly not a little favourable to agriculture ; and to that circumstance the great improvement of England is partly owing. For surely if individuals are obliged to pay, for having, at a great expence, made some addition to their annual income, the prudent and the cautious, who are the most likely to improve and better their estates, will not be very apt to expend their money in a manner so unprofitable. Some admirable ideas have been thrown out upon that subject, by a modern political writer^r. Perhaps, on the whole, the best plan would be, to have a new valuation every fifty years ; to allow deductions where the rents had really fallen ; and where they had risen, in consequence of real and expensive improvements, to lay a tax on only one-half of the additional income for a certain number of

^r See Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, vol. ii. p. 426.

years.

years. It would not be difficult to form a plan upon such principles, that might be productive of the happiest consequences.

Of a landed
revenue.

It would be improper to quit this subject, without mentioning an idea which some have contended for; namely, that as the real income of every country originates from the land, all taxes therefore should be at once imposed on that species of property. The saying of Artaxerxes, an ancient king of Persia, is recorded by a great historian as discovering a deep insight into the constitution of government: "The authority of the prince," he said, "must be defended by a military force, " that force can only be maintained by taxes, and " all taxes must at last fall upon agriculture^{*}." The same sentiment has since been enforced by the celebrated Locke^{*}, and has lately been revived in France, and maintained by several ingenious men.

Notwithstanding such great and respectable authorities, both of theoretical and of practical statesmen, the fallacy of such a position can no longer

^{*} Gibbon's History, vol. i, p. 215.

^{*} See Locke's Consideration of the lowering the Interest and raising the Value of Money; (Works, 2d edit. 3 vol. fo. 1722.) where he contends that taxes, however contrived, and out of whose hands soever immediately taken, do, in a country where their great fund is in land, for the most part terminate upon land: nay perhaps it will be found that those taxes which seem least to affect land, will most surely of all other fall upon the rent. He supposed the rent of England, *an.* 1691, only twelve millions.

be questioned. In an inland country like Persia, or in a state where industry does not flourish, as was the case even in England, previously to the revolution, such an idea may, to a certain degree, be well founded. But it can hardly be disputed, that the manufacturer, who by his labour improves the value of the productions of the soil, and hence procures a subsistence for himself and family, and the merchant who raises an income from the profits of exporting those commodities to other nations, depend for their means of livelihood, not upon the produce of the land, but upon the profits of their labour; and from those profits alone are enabled to pay their taxes to the public. Indeed, were it admitted, (though it can hardly be seriously maintained in a commercial country), that the whole income of the nation arose from the cultivation of the soil, yet still by imposing duties upon consumption, a greater revenue may be raised than by a direct tax upon land. By the latter method you only tax the proprietor of the soil, who has only a certain portion of the produce, and a considerable part of which is necessarily taken from him for the subsistence of others. Whereas by the former method, the public shares in the profits of those individuals, who derive any benefit from the soil, by any means, whether directly or indirectly: and hence, whilst the tax of four shillings in the pound on land was severely felt by many individuals in Great Britain, though it yielded only at the rate of two millions *per annum*, a tax on barley,

ley, in all its various stages and modes of consumption, to the amount of about six millions, is levied without difficulty, or any material oppression^b.

Another theory of nearly the same nature, it may be proper briefly to mention.

By the principles of the feudal system, the holders and possessors of land, claimed an exemption from all pecuniary taxes, being bound to personal services in war, and obliged to appear when called upon, either to oppose or to attack the enemies of their country. A modern author has, with great ingenuity, reversed this proposition, and contends, that as the landholders are no longer the defenders of the state, and if they appear in that capacity, are paid for their services like others, they ought therefore to be accounted an *unessential class* in the community, and that the whole pecuniary burdens ought to be imposed upon them^c.

There is undoubtedly much plausibility in this idea. Such expences, it is true, as are necessary to

^b This subject would have required a fuller discussion, had not M. Necker, in his treatise on the administration of the finances of France, vol. i. chap. 6. proved the utter impracticability of converting all the taxes of that country into one land-tax, and assigned reasons for it, applicable to every nation, and which cannot be overturned.

^c See a plan for finally settling the government of Ireland upon constitutional principles. Printed for Stockdale, anno 1785; written by John Gray, Esq. Perhaps the time will soon come when either the landed or the monied interest must be sacrificed; in which event it is not difficult to foresee who will be considered the *unessential class* in this commercial country.

defend our foreign commerce, and the settlements connected with it, that commerce ought to defray, since those by whom our trade is carried on, are principally benefited by it. But nothing would be more politic than to instil it into the minds of our possessors of land, that they are the natural defenders of the country at home, that it is necessary for them to acquire a knowledge in the art of war, and to encourage a military spirit; and that if they become languid and effeminate, and abandon the posts which it is their duty to maintain, they will become an unnecessary and useless class, and ought alone to defray those public charges which their own degeneracy may occasion.

Such were the observations which had occurred to me regarding this subject, *anno* 1790, when the preceding edition of this work was printed; since which period the plan of endeavouring to procure a redemption of the land-tax has been attempted. The general principles of that great alteration in our financial system, have been already discussed in the preceding chapter. Nothing therefore remains, but to state, 1. The progress that has been made in carrying through the plan. 2. The nature of the taxes which are annually imposed in room of the land-tax; and 3. to consider whether some measure might not be pointed out, by which the whole of the old land-tax might be gradually redeemed and extinguished.

The nature of this plan was first announced to the public in an anonymous pamphlet, but supposed

1. Origin and progress of the land-tax redemption.

to come from a respectable quarter, printed in November 1797^d: and considering the low state of publick credit at the time, when with £. 49 in money, you could purchase £. 100 of 3 *per cent.* stock, it is not to be wondered at, that it should attract the attention of the minister, who could hardly be aware, till the experiment was fairly tried, of the difficulties attending it, or the slow progress it would make.

The first act for the redemption of the land-tax, received the royal assent on the 21st June 1798; but though that law was sufficiently voluminous, it has since been found requisite to pass eight acts additional, (some of them of considerable length), and more will still be necessary. After all, the progress made in the sale has fallen far short of the expectations originally entertained of it. Instead of £. 66,666,666 of stock being purchased, the amount on the 1st February 1803, was only £. 19,180,587 : 5 : 2, with very little prospect of any material addition.

2. Substitutes for the land-tax.

As the frequent calling of parliaments, was supposed to depend much, upon the necessity the crown was under, of assembling the two houses for granting the annual taxes on land and malt, (on the produce of which the maintenance of the civil government depended,) when the land-tax was

^d See a proposal for liquidating £. 66,666,666 of the 3 *per cents.* by converting the land-tax into a permanent annuity, with cursory observations humbly submitted to both Houses of Parliament. Octavo, Nov. 10, 1797.

rendered

rendered perpetual, it was thought necessary to convert some of the taxes formerly perpetually imposed into annual grants, and the following branches were pitched upon; namely, the duties on malt, imposed by 27th of Geo. 3. on sugar by 27, 34, and 37 Geo. 3, and on tobacco and snuff, by 29th Geo. 3, the produce of which at the time exceeded that of the land-tax to the amount of about £.400,000 *per annum*. It certainly would have answered the object better in a constitutional point of view, to have had the taxes on houses and windows, and the assessed taxes in general, appropriated for that purpose, rather than duties of a precarious and fluctuating nature. Besides, merchants importing tobacco or sugar, or persons employed in the manufacturing of malt, might be compelled, by a bold and tyrannical government, to pay any demands made upon them, more especially as they might expect to be indemnified by the sale of the article at a price proportionally augmented. But any tax that was only to be annually granted, as a check upon the power of the crown, and as a security to the constitutional rights and privileges of the people, ought to be imposed upon the property of that people at large, and not upon any small number of them, so that the government, if it attempted any illegal exaction, would have the great body of the nation to contend with, or at least a number of its most powerful and opulent subjects. The land-tax was certainly the best article that could have been pitched upon, and the duties on houses and

VOL. II. A A windows,

windows, and other branches of the assessed taxes, would have been the fittest substitute.

3 Plan for
buying up
the land-
tax remain-
ing unre-
deemed.

It is evident that there is little chance of the land-tax being ever redeemed, according to the present system. At the same time, so much progress has been already made, that it is impossible to overturn what has been done, and to establish this tax on its old foundation. As matters therefore have gone so far, and as preserving the remains of this tax, would occasion confusion in our publick accounts, and be attended with other unpleasant consequences, as jealousy between those who are and are not liable to a land-tax, it certainly would be desirable, to get rid of it as soon as circumstances would permit. Perhaps the best plan for that purpose would be, to enact, that all those who did not redeem their land-tax before a given day (say the 1st of January 1804), or at least enter into a contract for that purpose, shall be subject to an additional land-tax, for the purpose of completing the redemption within a given time, according to one or other of the following calculations, giving the parties interested the choice of any of them they might prefer.

When the redemption was originally proposed on the 2d of April, 1798, it was calculated that a transfer of £. 40 of 3 *per cent.* stock should redeem £. 1 of land-tax, consequently £. 100 of land-tax will require £. 4000 stock, or stating the 3 *per cents* at an average price of 75, it would amount to £. 3000 in money. In order to raise
that

that sum, according to the calculations made by Mr. Morgan, persons liable in the land-tax, paying £. 14 : 6 : 8 *per annum* of addition *per* £. 100, would have their land-tax-redeemed, (calculating interest at 5 *per cent.*) in 50 years, or an annual payment of £. 24 : 17 will redeem their land-tax in 40 years, or £. 45 : 3 *per annum* in 30 years.

The public purchasing the stock at 75, would only receive 4 *per cent.* for its money; but if it were made compulsory, it would be right to give the parties taxed the advantage of an additional 1 *per cent.* in the accumulation; and as proprietors are authorised, even in the case of entailed estates, to sell a part of their property, in order to get rid of the tax entirely; such an additional tax as a fund for redemption, can be less objected to.

On the supposition that at an average, an annual payment of £. 20 for every £. 100 of old land-tax, would be the amount of the redemption fund, and that £. 1,400,000 in all would be redeemed by that means, the total fund for redemption would amount to £. 280,000 *per annum*; which sum, properly applied, would redeem the whole of the old land-tax, (according to the price of stocks) in a period of from 30 to 40 years.

The revolution had taken place some time, and the public had experienced the greatest difficulties in raising the supplies, before parliament could be prevailed upon to impose a duty upon malt; together with a proportionable rate on cyder and perry,

4. Old annual malt tax.

perry, and other liquors, the use of which might diminish the consumption of that article.

It was first granted *anno* 1697^e, and it was always supposed would be only a temporary impost. By the treaty of union with Scotland^f, it was agreed, that during the continuance of the duty on malt, which then existed in England, (but which expired on the 4th of June 1707,) Scotland should not be charged with it. Indeed that country was not included in the malt act until the year 1713, and even then it was thought advisable for government to assume a sort of dispensing power, and to give directions that it should not be levied. Nay, the Scots were so impressed with an idea, that they were in a manner for ever exempted from such a duty, by the treaty of union, that when the tax was first enforced in that country, *anno* 1725, it occasioned considerable riots, which were with difficulty suppressed.

The income of this tax for England alone, exclusively of Scotland, at the rate of 6*d.* per bushel, was originally calculated at £. 750,000 a-year, a sum which was far from being exaggerated; for, on the average of eight years, ending midsummer 1724, it produced at the rate of £. 755,000 *per annum*.—It fell off, however, during the American war; and its amount during the year, ending 5th

^e By 8. and 9 Will. III. cap. 22. It had formerly been attempted during the commonwealth.

^f Art. xiii.

January, 1803, deducting the expences of management and collection, was only as follows :

State of the Net Produce of the Annual Malt Tax
for one Year, ending 5th January, 1803.

	Net Produce,
England - - - - -	£. 679,322
Scotland. - - - - -	23,571
Total - - - - -	<u>£. 702,893</u>

If the plan above alluded to of making the assessed taxes annual, instead of the duties on sugars, tobacco, and malt, were to be adopted, the taxes on malt might also be consolidated, including the old annual malt tax, (which would tend to simplify our financial accounts,) and the assessed taxes, producing above three millions *per annum*, would do more than cover the whole.

2. Perpetual Taxes.

For some years after the revolution, when any duty was laid on, it was only granted until the money borrowed upon the credit of the tax was paid off, and then it ceased of course. About the year 1710 a very different system was adopted : perpetual taxes were imposed, and the duty was continued, though the loan borrowed should be repaid. The surplusses, it is true, were reserved for the disposal of parliament; but in a constitutional view, that is far from being a sufficient check. The crown being thus legally invested

with the power of drawing money from the property of its subjects, when once that money is placed in the Exchequer, there must be much less difficulty in prevailing upon parliament to agree to any mode of expenditure which the sovereign may incline to prefer, or to lay it out without the consent of that assembly if it should prove refractory ^s.

The perpetual taxes now levied in this country, may be considered under four general heads:—

1. Customs.—2. Excise.—3. Stamps.—4. Miscellaneous Taxes.

1. Customs.

It is the opinion of many able men, that the imposing of duties upon the importation or exportation of goods, is incompatible with the real interests of a commercial country. Where such a system is adopted, a great increase of capital becomes necessary; because the merchant must advance the duty immediately on the goods being landed, which in fact is locking up so much of his stock that would otherwise be employed in trade, until he is reimbursed^a. Besides, he considers himself as intitled to charge in the price of the commodity not only the tax itself, but also a commercial profit thereon, which increases in all the various hands through which it passes, until the article arrives at the ultimate stage of consumption, whereby the interest and accumulated profits on

^s History of our National Debts, Part iv. p. 8, 9.

^a The warehousing or bonding system, when carried to its full extent, will in a great measure obviate this objection.

the tax, often exceed the amount of the tax itself. This is a strong argument for levying all duties as near the stage of consumption as may be found consistent with the safety of the revenue. The great trade which is carried on by the Dutch, notwithstanding many natural disadvantages, is not a little attributed to the inconsiderable duties that are levied at their ports. It is farther to be observed, that high duties, by holding out a premium to the clandestine trader, encourage smuggling, with all its pernicious consequences. At the same time it is so difficult to raise a great revenue upon principles perfectly unexceptionable, and mankind are so apt to consider taxes levied on consumption as a part of the price, and consequently no tax at all, that I am not surprised to find in almost every country such duties have existed.

The customs may be divided into four branches; Customs on goods imported. customs on goods imported, exported, or carried coastways, and the tonnage duty lately imposed.

Duties on goods imported into a country, were originally laid upon the subjects of the realm, under the pretence of defraying the charges of guarding the coasts from pirates; and upon foreign merchants, for the liberty given them by the sovereign, of trading in his dominions.

Of all the branches of the customs, this is unquestionably the least exceptionable. The duties, however, should be at so low a rate, as to discourage, if not totally prevent, all contraband trade; and taxes upon articles necessary for the

manufactures of the country, or raw materials, the value of which may be greatly improved by the labour of the people, ought to be avoided.

Were it possible consistently with the interests of the revenue, to carry these principles into practice in this country, the wealth and commerce of Great Britain would soon receive very material additions.

Customs on
goods ex-
ported.

Formerly duties were imposed on the exportation of almost every commodity that was sent out of this country. It was contended, that such duties were not paid by the natives, but came out of the pockets of foreigners. Such ideas, however, are now exploded. Experience has ascertained, that foreign nations will not give beyond a certain price for any commodity whatever, and that by taxing goods exported, you either force them to give up the consumption, or to trade with other places for a supply.

The principal tax of that nature still remaining, is the duty upon coals; but such is the superior quality of that article in this country, that it is fully able to bear it. Indeed coals are such a necessary of life, and though abundant, yet undoubtedly capable of being exhausted, that instead of a duty, some have proposed a total prohibition of exportation: a plan which must be adopted, should there ever arise the least well-founded apprehensions of a scarcity of that commodity.

Lead, tin, and alum, are also liable to certain duties on exportation. As lead mines are in ge-
neral

neral found in waste and barren soils, which, were it not for their mineral wealth, would be utterly abandoned, it is questionable how far such a duty ought to be continued.

The other taxes upon goods exported, are not liable to much objection, being principally imposed on raw materials, and intended to give our manufacturers an advantage over rival nations in their respective branches of industry.

But of all the custom-house duties now exacted in Great Britain, there is none so truly exceptionable as that upon coals carried coastways; the tax being equally injurious to the navigation and maritime strength, to the manufactures, the agriculture, and the fisheries of this country.

Customs on
goods car-
ried coast-
ways.

The coal trade, it is well known, is the best nursery for British seamen. Sailors bred up in that trade, can hardly be equalled for skill, spirit, and hardiness in their profession. By taking off the duties upon coals carried coastways, an invaluable treasure of perhaps 10,000 seamen, would be added to the maritime force of the country. Nor would the number of shipwrights, necessary for building the vessels, in consequence of such an additional demand for shipping, be an unimportant circumstance.

It is commonly remarked, that manufactures flourish best wherever coals are the cheapest and most abundant. In so cold a country as Great Britain fuel is a real necessary of life, and is required in fabricating almost all our manufactures.

Whilst

Whilst this tax continues, the various manufacturing advantages resulting from the cheapness of that article, are confined to particular districts. Whereas, by abolishing that duty, all places would be more nearly on a footing; hence industry and commerce would spread over the whole face of the country.

Nor is the duty upon coals less pernicious to agriculture. It renders it necessary, in many parts of the kingdom, to devote considerable quantities of improveable ground to rear wood for the purpose of firing. And in those parts of the island, particularly in the more remote parts of Scotland, where peat and turf can be had, the summer is not spent by the farmer, in procuring manure, in fallowing his fields, or in raising crops to enrich and fertilize the soil, but is principally wasted in collecting firing for the winter seasonⁱ.

If any set of men are entitled to public encouragement, surely those who maintain themselves by fishing only, who procure a subsistence in a manner so truly precarious, who run such perpetual hazard of being lost in the little boats in which they trust themselves, and who form a species of naval militia, whose services the public can at any time command, have by far the best founded pretensions; and of all the encouragements that could be given to them, that of enabling

ⁱ The tax on coal carried coastways, in so far as regards Scotland, has been fortunately commuted.

them to supply themselves with firing at an easy rate would perhaps be the most acceptable. Their whole labour might then be devoted to their own profession; nor would the miserable necessity of procuring a scanty supply of fuel tempt them to waste so considerable a portion of their time in any other occupation.

It is hoped that these considerations will, some time or other, occasion a commutation of this duty, since there is hardly any other tax that could possibly prove equally detrimental; and as, without some substitute, so important a branch of the revenue, producing about £. 600,000 *per annum*, cannot be dispensed with.

In the former edition of this work it was re-
marked, that the custom-house duties at that time Tonnage
duty.
were principally levied either according to the supposed value of the different commodities conformably to particular rates, or in proportion to the size, weight, and measurement of the articles, making some difference according to the country whence the goods were brought; and giving advantages to the ships belonging to and manned by British subjects, over those of a different description. A hint was then thrown out of levying in part those duties on the tonnage, preserving always some distinction between natives and aliens, and giving the former a preference. So great an alteration certainly could not be hazarded at once, or to any great extent; but, perhaps, it might not be impolitic, to lay a small tonnage
duty

duty according to the place whence the vessel came, or to which it was going, and the cargo with which it was loaded, and to levy the rest by a rate *ad valorem*. Such a regulation might contribute to check smuggling by diminishing the temptation, as a tonnage duty could not well be evaded, as other duties are, and by a late act it has been carried into effect, though perhaps on a scale too burthen some on the merchant.

Amount of
the Cus-
toms.

A particular account of this great branch of the revenue, for one year ending the 5th of January 1803, will be found in the Appendix; the gross receipt is as follows.

1. Gross receipt to be accounted for in		
England	-	£. 9,682,336 14 8½
2. Do. in Scotland	-	837,583 18 10½
		<hr/>
Total	-	£. 10,519,920 13 7½

In regard to the branches whence these sums were received, the following statement contains the most important.

1. Net produce of the tax on imports	£. 7,722,677 3 5½
2. Net produce of the tax on exports	262,381 0 0½
3. Net produce of the duties coastways	702,186 12 1½
	<hr/>
	£. 8,687,244 15 7

The above includes the new tonnage duty both outwards and inwards.

In the custom house accounts detailed in the Appendix, will also be found, a sum to the amount
of

of £. 26,825 : 17 : 8½; remitted from the plantations. In consequence, however, of various deductions from the gross receipt on account of discounts, drawbacks, &c. the total net produce applicable to national objects, was reduced to the sum of £. 7,415,726 : 19 : 3½.

It is impossible to read the particular detail of the articles yielding a revenue to the customs, (which will be found in the Appendix), without being struck with the variety of petty objects; as bristles, cork, feathers, human hair, chip hats, lemons and oranges, mats, mitts, bees wax, tapes, &c. which, however trifling in themselves, yet produce a considerable revenue when accumulated together, clearly proving that, in order to raise a great income, the smallest article ought not be overlooked.

It is also proper to remark, that the mercantile principle of raising every article within ourselves we can either manufacture or produce, is not perfectly compatible with the interests of at least this branch of the revenue. For instance, were all the linens, iron, and hemp we consume, produced at home, which is far from being impracticable, our customs would diminish to the amount of about £. 460,000 *per annum*, and we might lose the exportation of goods of equal value, in which our countrymen are as beneficially employed as they would be in any other mode.

Lastly, when the astonishing revenue raised from sugar, groceries, oils, silk, tea, muslins, tobacco, wines,

wines, foreign spirituous liquors, drugs, &c. is considered, we cannot but perceive how much a nation is benefited by foreign commerce, which is not only the source of industry at home, in order to produce the fittest articles for foreign markets, but which also furnishes the means of raising, without difficulty or complaint, a great income, to be applied in any manner the best calculated for the interests of the nation.

2. Excise.

The learned commentator on the Laws of England, (Sir W. Blackstone), has given so full, and at the same time so concise an account of the origin and progress of the excise, and of the principles on which it is founded, that it may be sufficient to refer the reader to his popular and admirable work for information upon the subject. Notwithstanding the plausible objections that may be urged against this tax, particularly on account of the encroachments which it necessarily occasions on the rights and liberties of no inconsiderable body of the people; yet since the necessities of the state require a great revenue, it may be considered on the whole “as the most easy and indifferent levy that could be made upon the public^k.” But, as an explanation of the whole system of the excise laws, and the various regulations, which they contain, would require a volume of itself, it is proposed at present merely to give a general view of the sum which the excise produced for the year ending 5th

^k See Scobell, p. 72. and 452.

January 1803, (the particular detail of which will be found in the Appendix,) and to add such observations upon the different branches of that revenue as may occur to the author.

STATE of the Revenue of the Excise, for one year ending the 5th January 1803.

1. Total gross receipt in England, to be accounted for within the year, including the annual malt	£. 15,526,408	18	7½
2. Do. in Scotland	1,307,377	7	3½
	<hr/>		
	£. 16,833,786	5	11

The net produce applicable to national objects, and to payments into the Exchequer, was as follows.

1. England	£. 13,832,086	2	4
2. Scotland	1,095,452	1	8½
	<hr/>		
	£. 14,927,538	4	0½

To the principal branches of the revenue of excise, namely, the duties upon malt and malt liquors of every kind, including the distillery, there can be no objection, except upon the idea that they have been carried to too great a height, and that the rate ought be diminished. But some have contended, that duties upon the necessaries of life are peculiarly pernicious to a manufacturing country; and others assert, and are perhaps better founded

founded in their opinion, that all duties upon manufactures themselves ought to be abolished.

Consequences of taxing of the necessities of life.

The excises levied on what may be called the necessities of life, exclusively of coals, which has been already taken notice of, and salt, to be afterwards mentioned, but including candles, leather, soap, and starch, are on an average above a million.

It is said that the levying of these duties, so considerable a part of which must necessarily fall upon the poor, has the effect of raising the price of labour, and enables other states, where such taxes do not exist, to sell their goods at a lower rate, and consequently to secure the consumption and market of foreign nations; and it is commonly asserted, that the excises which are levied in Holland proved the means of ruining the manufactures for which that country was once so famous.

Such reasoning, however plausible, may be controverted.

Mankind are far from being naturally fond of laborious occupations; and there are few who, if left to their own inclinations, would not wish to pass away their time in sloth and ease, did not necessity compel them to industry and exertion.

In manufactures also, perfection cannot be acquired or retained without perpetual attention; and if manufacturers, from the cheapness of living, and by being exempted from taxes, could maintain themselves and their families by the labour of only three days in the week, few could resist the temptation,

tion, though in consequence of being idle for the other four, they would become less expert in their profession.

It is remarked in manufacturing towns, that their commerce never flourishes so much, and is never carried on to such advantage, as when, from the high price of provisions, the workmen are compelled to labour with uncommon assiduity.

Though a considerable part of the above taxes is paid by the poor, yet the rich are far from being exempted; and with these taxes, the wages of the former have in some degree increased, though it must be acknowledged in a very unequal proportion.

A total exemption from taxes in favour of the poor, is a system impracticable in a country so loaded as we are at present; and, in a free state, perhaps would be unjust: for there the poor have rights to which they are entitled as well as the rich; and they ought to pay for the privileges they enjoy.

On the whole, though an idea of so humane and beneficent a nature, as that of relieving the burdens of the poor, ought to be attended to, if a proper system for that purpose could be formed; yet I question much, were it practicable, whether it would add in any great extent to their comfort and happiness. I should imagine indeed, could the abolition be afforded, that it were better to continue these taxes as they are, however they may affect the lower ranks of the people, and to divide

what they pay into two parts; appropriating the one to bounties upon exported manufactures, and annually distributing the other among such of the married poor as have families to maintain, in proportion to the number of their children, and giving small annuities to those who, after a life spent in laborious industry, are unable, from sickness or age, to maintain themselves; that thus the situation of that valuable class of men might be rendered as comfortable as the defective state of human nature will admit of.

Consequences of
taxing man-
ufactures.

The different manufactures on which excise duties are levied; namely, paper, glass, wire, and printed linens, have produced of late above a million.

Important as such a sum undoubtedly is, in the present circumstances of this country, yet the propriety of at least attempting to raise it in some other mode can hardly be questioned.

I can conceive that a duty, without risk of loss to the public, might be laid upon a manufacture, with which other nations could not supply us, and with which we cannot properly supply other nations. But taxing manufactures of a different description, ought on no account to be adopted; a greater variety of inconveniencies arising from it than can well be imagined.

The tax upon paper, for instance, not only affects that particular manufacture, but has also occasioned important consequences with regard to the art of printing, which, in regard to beauty at least,

least, is falling off in this country; a circumstance partly at least, to be attributed to the high price of that material¹. Indeed of late the duty has been raised to a height, which tends to injure not only the literature, but the morals of the nation^m.

Such are the natural advantages which this country enjoys for carrying the glass manufacture to perfection, that, perhaps, nothing but the high duties that are imposed upon it, prevents our supplying the greatest part of Europe with almost every species of that article.

The duty upon printed linens might surely be commuted, and levied through the medium of those by whom they are made up. In the present mode, they discourage a very elegant and important manufacture.

It is said that the duties are drawn back upon exportation; and consequently, that they only affect the home consumption. But a drawback can never compensate for the trouble and vexation resulting from the inspection of public officers, who will only attend at times suitable and convenient

¹ Alderman Boydell, in his catalogue of the pictures in the Shakspeare Gallery (Preface, p. 15.) makes the same observation, and flatters himself, by his new edition of our immortal poet, to restore the reputation of this country in regard to the art of printing, "in which," he says, "to our disgrace be it spoken, we are behind every neighbouring nation."

^m See the Report from the committee on the booksellers' and printers' petition, printed 22d March 1802, which states this matter in a very strong light, and proves the necessity of lowering the duty considerably.

to themselves; for the heavy loss which the manufacturer feels from being compelled to advance the money for payment of the duties long before he is reimbursed; and still more from being obliged to pay taxes on goods which are damaged, and consequently unsaleable. Besides, if the usual profit of the manufacturer is 20 *per cent.* he must charge 20 *per cent.* on the duty he advances. Whereas the merchant, who receives the drawback, will only make a deduction in proportion to the sum he receives, and the legal interest. This must render the price of our manufactures much higher, (even when exported, with all the advantages of a drawback), than would otherwise be the case. In manufactures also where great art and skill are necessary, where much depends upon the genius and fancy of the artist, where machinery is perhaps of great importance, and in which the artist has made discoveries he is desirous of keeping to himself, and does not wish that even a hint of them should be communicated to others, any tax, however insignificant, may be productive of the greatest inconveniences to the manufacturer, and may damp his spirit and exertions, without yielding much income to the state^a.

If circumstances, therefore, would admit of such taxes being abolished, or if proper commutations could be contrived, nothing would probably prove

^a The tax on cottons, fustians, &c. imposed by Mr. Pitt, on these grounds, after some struggle was given up.

of more real service to the public. Indeed, if manufacturing industry is at all to be loaded, it would be fair and equitable to make no exception, and instead of taxing particular manufactures, to impose duties upon such articles as all manufactures must consume.

The duty laid on goods sold by auction is another branch of the excise that may be objected to. Tax on auctions. It is a plan borrowed from the Dutch, like many of our recent taxes. The difficulties to which these people were reduced might justify almost any imposition. But if ever the situation of this country would admit of taxes being abolished, the duty on auctions ought unquestionably to be included in the number, unless some means could be contrived to take it out of the pocket of the rich purchaser, instead of the needy seller. At present it has rather a tendency to increase the misery of those who, in all probability, are already sufficiently reduced, than to diminish the riches of the opulent.

Various steps were taken, in the reign of queen Anne, for the purpose of imposing a duty upon the bricks, tiles, slate, lime, and stones, made use of within the limits of the bills of mortality; and it was afterwards proposed to extend the tax to all places within ten miles of the cities of London and Westminster^a. But such a plan, though restricted to the neighbourhood of a wealthy, and, in the opinion of many, an overgrown metropolis, whose Brick tax.

^a Comm. Journ. vol. xvii. p. 131. 157. 159. 173. 197.

increase ought, on that idea, to be checked, was rejected, and certain branches of the stamp duties were substituted in its room^r. As such a tax certainly has a tendency to check the population and improvement of the country, the sooner the nation can be relieved from it, in many respects the more desirable, more especially in so far as regards bricks necessary for draining land, that essential agricultural improvement.

Licences.

In the farther progress of this work it will appear, that measures might be adopted, to render duties in the shape of licences less exceptionable. At present, by confounding the new beginner and the veteran in trade, and by making no distinction between them in regard to the duties they are respectively charged with, competition is necessarily diminished, business naturally falls into a few hands, and consequently the public can never expect to be equally well served.

Salt tax.

I shall now proceed to lay before the reader, some observations on a most important branch of our revenue, namely, the salt tax, which is at present under the management of the excise, the board, to whose care it was formerly entrusted, having been abolished.

The duty levied upon salt took its rise in the Roman republic, where the principles of commerce were far from being understood, and where no attention was paid to its encouragement. Such a tax

might be consistent with the nature of that government, and the situation of that empire; but in Britain, the case is materially different, and it is difficult to estimate the magnitude of the losses which it has occasioned.

It appears from the important and laborious investigation that has been made into the state of the British fisheries, that nothing has had such a tendency to prevent their rising to the height to which it is so desirable they should attain, as the tax upon salt: for without that material the commodity cannot be made fit for exportation; nor can the home consumption become so general and extensive, as otherwise it would prove.

It is a tax that deeply affects the poor, who are obliged, from their situation in life, to consume a greater quantity of salted provisions than their richer neighbours.

It is universally acknowledged, that every plan which tends to augment the price of navigation ought to be avoided; and yet we continue a tax which renders the subsistence of our seamen dearer, and compels not only our merchants, but even the public itself, to procure immense quantities of salted provisions from Ireland, with which we might otherwise supply ourselves.

The rock salt, with which Cheshire abounds, joined to the cheapness and abundance of coal, would enable this country to undersell its commercial rivals, and to supply the greater part of Europe with that necessary article, to the amount per-

haps of a million *per annum*, were it not for this unfortunate duty; and hence, instead of our being able to import salt into other countries, in the manner we might do, France and Ireland at this time contribute to supply our consumption.

The article of barilla, a species of salt made use of in some of our manufactures, is imported into Great Britain to the amount of at least three hundred and fifty thousand pounds *per annum*. Whereas if the duty on salt were abolished, there would be no occasion to apply to any country for that commodity^a.

To many soils, salt is a manure, which might be applied with advantage; but whilst the duty continues, it is impossible to make use of it, at least to any extent.

These circumstances being considered, it cannot well be accounted an exaggerated calculation, that it occasions the introduction of commodities into this country, which would not otherwise be necessary, and prevents the creation of wealth, which might otherwise be acquired, to the amount of at least three millions *per annum*, which are thus sacrificed for the sake of the income derived from this branch of our finances.

^a Barilla is made from the ashes of an herb that grows on the coasts of the Mediterranean, particularly in Spain. It is made use of in making glass and soap, and in bleaching. A preparation from sea salt, if duty free, would be cheaper, and would answer the same purposes.

The objections to the salt tax being very generally felt and acknowledged, an application was made, by a number of respectable gentlemen, to the Right Honourable Henry Addington, soon after he was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer, requesting him to take the subject into consideration and, if possible, to have some other tax substituted in its room. In consequence of that application, the minister, on the 14th May 1801, moved for the appointment of a select committee to enquire into the laws regarding the duties on salt, and the inconveniences arising therefrom, and to report the same, with their opinions thereupon, to the House. The reports of that committee contain much interesting information upon the subject, and the advantages of repealing this tax are clearly pointed out. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the first favourable opportunity will be embraced for that purpose. In the interim, it would be desirable to have a distinct treatise on the subject, under the following general heads. 1. What is the gross produce of the salt tax in England, Scotland, and Ireland? 2. What is the net produce in each kingdom respectively, and the nature and causes of any deduction from the gross receipt? 3. What is the effect of the tax on the price of the article itself, and the probable amount of the additional price paid by the public in consequence of its being taxed? 4. What are its effects in regard to the price of provisions, as bread, cheese, butter, salted meat,

meat, fish, &c.; and does it not particularly affect the food of the middling and lower orders of society? 5. What are its effects on the fisheries? 6. What on the commerce of the country, occasioning the importation of barilla and potash, and preventing the exportation of salt and many other articles connected therewith? 7. What are its effects on our manufactures, as leather, bleaching, paints, &c.? 8. What are its effects on agriculture, in regard to manure, the feeding of cattle, &c.? 9. What are its effects on the revenue, and has it not a tendency to promote smuggling? 10. What are its effects on the public expenditure, and to what extent does it encrease the price of provisions for the army and navy, the expence of transports, &c.? 11. Is it not probable, that the art of manufacturing salt would be greatly improved, if no such tax existed? 12. Would it not tend to promote the health of the people, if abundance of salt could be had at a reasonable price, and of a superior quality? Lastly, What would be the best means of commuting this tax in England, Scotland, and Ireland?

A work that would fully explain all these particulars, would be an inestimable present to the public.

3 Stamps. The origin of the mode of raising a revenue by means of stamps is not a little singular.

In the wars which the Dutch carried on for maintaining their rights and privileges against the
house

house of Austria, they were reduced, as might naturally be expected in so unequal a contest, to the greatest difficulties and distress. Not knowing in what manner to raise money, they offered, by public edict, a considerable sum to any one, who should discover the most useful and the least burdensome mode of adding to the revenue. Such an offer naturally produced many proposals. Among the rest the *vestigal chartæ*, in the Dutch language called *Impost 'van besegelde Brieven*, was suggested, and the idea being approved of, the individual by whom it was proposed received the reward due to his talents and invention.

As the history of this tax is far from being generally known, it may not be improper to give some account of the arguments made use of on each side relative to it, when originally imposed.

The first idea included every thing that has since been suggested upon the subject. It was proposed, that no petitions should be received by the states, by the magistrates of any city or district, or by the judge of any court, unless they were stamped; that no proceedings in law, that no receipts or acquittances, no deeds written by notaries, attornies,

Others trace this tax to a period still more remote. See *Bibliothèque Historique de la France*, par Jacques Le Long, tome second. Liv. 3. Article 5. No. 28, 145. A Paris, an. 1769. *Dissertation sur l'Origine du Papier et Parchemin Timbre*. Elle est imprimée dans les *variétés historiques*. L'Auteur y fait voir, que cette institution, recente parmi nous, étoit connue, et en usage chez les Romains, sous l'empire de Constantin.

scriveners,

seriveners, lawyers, and the like ; and that no instrument of any kind should be received as evidence, or in any manner sustained by a court of justice, unless a certain sum had been paid, under the name of stamp duty, in proportion to the nature, quality, and value of the matters therein contained.

The proposal was supported by the following arguments :

1. That the burden was in itself but small and inconsiderable : 2. That the poor and lower ranks of people, having little or no occasion for such writings, would be almost totally exempted : 3. That the wealthier citizens, having many contracts to make, and many law-suits depending, would have frequent occasion for stamped paper ; and consequently the tax would yield a considerable revenue to the public.

Those who opposed the project said, that such stamps might easily be counterfeited by private persons, and that it would be difficult to detect the fraud : to which it was answered, that this would unquestionably be prevented, if public officers were appointed to subscribe their names to the stamps, it being much easier to counterfeit a seal or stamp, than the hand of any one. And when it was objected, that public stamps might be procured even to counterfeited deeds, and thereby confirm their authority ; it was answered, that by putting the stamp at the side, and not at the bottom, of the page, it would denote, that the public,
by

by such a mark, did not authenticate the instrument, but merely demonstrated, that the parties had fulfilled the orders of the legislature, in making use of such a material*.

Such was the origin of stamp duties in Holland. They were first established in this country *anno* 1671[†]. But so many acts have since been passed upon the subject, that a mere enumeration of the duties fills a volume[‡]. It cannot therefore, be expected that they should be specified in this work. It will be sufficient to give a statement of the income arising from this branch of the revenue, for

* See *Disquisitiones Politicæ*, Hagæ Comitûs *anno* 1651, c. 59. This work was translated into English, under the title of *Arcana Imperii Detecta*, printed at London *anno* 1701. The translation (which was said to have been executed by the famous D'Avenant) is hardly to be met with, and the original is still scarcer.

Another account is given of the origin of stamps, which deduces them from the protocolæ of the Roman notaries, whose example was imitated in France, and became, in the year 1655, a source of revenue in that country. Perhaps the person who proposed this tax in Holland, might have taken the hint from some of the legal proceedings of the Roman law. But it is to be observed, that the book whence the above account is drawn up, was printed *anno* 1651, and that this mode of raising a revenue did not exist in France until four years afterwards. It is more than probable, therefore, that in so far as respects modern Europe, the merit of this tax may be given to the Dutch, to whom indeed many other financial discoveries ought to be attributed.

† By 22 Car. II. cap. iii. See part i. p. 191.

‡ See a complete abridgment of the statutes relative to the stamp duties, in one volume octavo. Printed *anno* 1783.

the

the year ending 5th January 1803; (being the latest account extant,) together with such observations as may occur regarding any particular article in the account.

*Produce of the Duty on Stamps for one Year, ending
5th January 1803.*

1. Total gross receipts in England to be accounted for,	—	£.3,192,052	1	3½
2. Ditto Scotland,	—	202,265	8	9
		<hr/>		
		£.3,394,317	10	6½

More particular information regarding this branch of the revenue will be found in the Appendix.

Tax on receipts.

It appears from the preceding account of the origin of stamps, that a duty upon receipts or acquittances, was recommended by the inventor of this mode of taxation; and such a tax has been long established in different parts of the continent, without being productive of any great inconvenience²; but when it came to be proposed in this country, it encountered a very formidable opposition. That opposition was fortunately resisted, and the tax is now paid without furnishing much cause for complaint. The only well-founded objection

² In Denmark, all kinds of receipts must be written upon stamped paper; the smallest stamp for this purpose is of the value of two pence English, and the highest two pounds eight shillings. See Williams's State of the Northern Governments, vol. i. p. 399.

to it seems to be, that the original idea, by which the duty was proportioned to the greater or smaller value of the articles to which it related, has not been adhered to. Perhaps, if the mode of levying the tax were altered, and if the duty were imposed upon the person who receives the money, and not upon the person who pays it; and if no receipt were to be valid that was not written upon stamped paper, there are few branches of this department that would prove more productive.

It is an unfortunate circumstance for a commercial nation, that the necessities of the state should have given rise to a tax on the intercourse that takes place between one part of the country and another; since there is nothing that tends so much to spread industry, wealth, and civilization, and in short all the pleasures and advantages of society, as an easy and quick conveyance. By such a communication between the capital and the country, the whole society becomes, in a manner, one firm and compacted body, impressed with the same ideas, actuated by the same principles, speaking the same language, animated by the same spirit, and in every respect resembling the fellow-citizens of the same town. The remotest parts of a kingdom, are thus gradually brought to be nearly as valuable and important as those situated in the neighbourhood of the metropolis. The health of the inhabitants also is preserved by travelling about, in surveying and visiting their own country; and improvements

improvements and information of every kind are more rapidly and more easily communicated¹.

But unfortunately a tax on the internal communication of the country has not only been imposed; but a new plan of levying it has been adopted, by farming the tax to publicans²: a mode which has long been deservedly exploded at home; is universally condemned in every part of Europe where the subject of finances is at all known or considered; and has ever been held peculiarly inconsistent with the principles of a free constitution.

It is hardly possible to discover even a plausible reason for so impolitic a regulation. This tax had yielded, at the rate of one penny *per* horse for each mile, the sum of £.140,000 of gross, and £.125,000 of net income. In the budget of 1785, it was stated, that an additional halfpenny *per* mile, would produce £.50,000 *per annum*, and an act for levying that duty was accordingly passed³. Instead of so considerable an addition; however, the gross produce *anno* 1786 amounted only to £.166,199, and the nett to £.148,820. It now produces only

¹ It may be curious to calculate the sum which is annually laid out on posting in England. The gross produce of the tax is about £.220,000. The farmers of the duty probably have £.30,000 of profit; total, £.250,000: and as the tax is at the rate of 3*d.* *per* mile; or one-fourth of the rate charged for post-horses, the people of Great Britain must pay on the whole about a million *per annum* for posting.

² By 27 Geo. III. cap. 26.

³ 25 Geo. III. cap. 51.

at the rate of £.217,657 of net profit. Surely, for such a difference, the principles of our financial system ought never to have been violated; and if it is intended merely as an experiment how far the farming of certain other branches of the revenue can answer, there is no saying to what a noxious extent it may be carried.

Besides, other plans to prevent frauds ought to have been tried, before so pernicious a principle was adopted. A duty to a certain amount, (suppose equal to the produce of one half of the tax), might have been laid on every horse kept for the purpose of being hired for posting, (which could not have easily been evaded, as the stables of an inn-keeper are necessarily open to the inspection of the public,) and the other half might have been levied at the gates. Or the commissioners for hackney coaches might have been entrusted with the charge of levying this duty, giving them a *percentage* on the additional income they were enabled to raise, by their zeal and success in discovering the best mode of checking evasion.

The income derived from the remaining sources of the public revenue, both in England and Scotland, from the 5th January 1802, to ditto 1803, was as follows.

4. Miscellaneous taxes.

Heads of Revenue.	Gross Receipt to be accounted for.	Net Produce.
1. Land and Assessed Taxes -	£. 5,537,348 13 7 $\frac{1}{2}$	£. 5,318,126 13 3 $\frac{1}{2}$
2. Post Office -	1,423,370 4 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,095,353 11 3 $\frac{1}{4}$
3. One Shilling per Pound on Pensions and Salaries	66,102 3 6 $\frac{1}{2}$	65,557 18 9 $\frac{1}{4}$
4. Sixpence per Pound on Pensions and Salaries -	61,820 3 10	60,728 15 11
5. Hackney Coaches	27,697 10 10 $\frac{1}{2}$	25,109 10 5 $\frac{1}{2}$
6. Hawkers and Pedlars -	8,600 19 7 $\frac{1}{2}$	5,725 19 7 $\frac{1}{2}$
	7,122,939 15 9 $\frac{1}{2}$	6,570,602 9 4 $\frac{1}{2}$
<i>Small Branches of the hereditary Revenue of the Crown.</i>		
7. Alienation Fines	12,166 7 4	10,643 10 6
8. Post Fines -	2,737 6 6 $\frac{3}{4}$	2,737 6 6 $\frac{3}{4}$
9. Seizures -	62,073 3 7 $\frac{1}{2}$	62,073 3 7 $\frac{1}{2}$
10. Compositions	1 13 4	1 13 4
11. Proffers -	640 0 0	640 0 0
12. Crown Lands	47,505 5 10 $\frac{1}{4}$	41,812 18 9 $\frac{1}{2}$
Total -	7,248,063 12 6 $\frac{1}{2}$	6,688,511 2 2 $\frac{1}{4}$

Commutation tax.

In the former edition of this work, I gave a very particular account of the origin of the celebrated commutation tax, the substance of which it may not be improper to preserve in this part of the present impression.

The duty of hearth-money had not long been abolished after the revolution, before it was found necessary to levy another tax on houses, in proportion to the number of windows they contained, so that in the language of the time it was said, “ that
“ the

“ the country had got nothing by the swap.” Various other taxes have since been imposed on houses and windows, none of which however occasioned such a diversity of opinion, or gave rise to so much discussion, as the one distinguished by the name of the commutation tax.

It is well known that the great disadvantage attending duties upon consumption is this, that the payment of those duties may be evaded by the introduction of contraband articles, and that the higher the duty, the greater is the temptation to smuggle. An increase in such taxes, therefore, has often occasioned a decrease in the revenue; and Swift's sarcastic remark upon such projects of finance has often been verified; “ that in the arithmetic of the custom-house, two and two, instead of making four, sometimes amounts only to one.”

But of all the articles on which too high a duty was dangerous, perhaps that on tea ought to have been peculiarly avoided; since, notwithstanding the distance whence it was brought, it was impossible to prevent neighbouring and rival nations from importing it any quantity they might incline; and no commodity could be better adapted for an illicit trader, on account of the certainty of a demand, and the small bulk in which considerable value could be carried. Impressed with these ideas, Sir Matthew Decker, one of the most intelligent and public-spirited mercantile characters of his time, strongly urged the necessity of making

c c 2

making some regulation that would check the contraband commerce in tea, since it was the profits upon that article, that enabled the smuggler to carry on a trade of the same kind in other commodities.

The plan he suggested was, to impose a duty on every family in England that drank tea, the highest at the rate of twenty shillings, and the lowest at the rate of five, in proportion to the number of persons in each family; and that all public houses selling tea, should pay £.5 in London and Westminster, and forty shillings in every other part of England^b. But this proposal, according to the confession of the author, was only intended to raise £.130,000 a-year, which was then the amount of the excise duties paid upon that commodity.

The measure proposed by Decker was borrowed from the regulations which still exist in some of the provinces in Holland: but every person in the least acquainted with the government of the two countries will easily perceive, that a system calculated for the one, cannot always be adopted by the other. The strict police and rigid laws established in the United Provinces, would be accounted here the height of tyranny and oppression^c. In Hol-

^b Serious Considerations on the several high duties which the nation in general labours under; third edition, printed 1744.

^c A general account of the mode of levying the inland taxes of Holland will be given in the third volume, affording a better view of that important subject than any hitherto known.

land, any person who attempts to evade the public taxes is punished with the utmost severity; whereas in Britain, it is unfortunately accounted rather a venial trespass.

But though so bold a measure as that of taking off the duties upon tea entirely, could not be adopted, yet the necessity of some regulation, that would check the smuggling of that article, was universally acknowledged. A committee was appointed by the house of commons on the 6th of February 1745, to take this important subject into consideration^d: by whom two reports were drawn up and presented to the house, containing much curious information, and hints which proved not a little serviceable to the revenue at the time^e.

The duties to which teas were then liable were about 14 *per cent. ad valorem*, payable to the customs, and an inland duty of four shillings *per pound* to the excise. On an average of five years (ending Midsummer 1745), only 768,520 pounds of tea had paid duty, and the medium produce of the revenue was at the rate of £.175,222 *per annum*. Such was the situation of this branch of our commerce and revenue, when, *anno* 1745, an act was passed by which the inland duty was re-

^d Commons Journals, vol. xxv, p. 57.

^e The first is printed in Commons Journals, vol. xxv, p. 101. The other report was not suffered then to be read or printed (see p. 180); but was published *anno* 1763, by Sir Stephen Theodore Janssen, in the volume intitled, "Smuggling and open."

duced to one shilling in the pound, and an additional excise duty of 25 *per cent. ad valorem* was imposed, according to the price at which teas were purchased at the public sales of the East India company^f. In regard to the custom-house duty of 14 *per cent.*, it continued at the same rate.

The advantages of this judicious measure, originally proposed by Sir Stephen Theodore Janssen, were soon perceived. The average consumption of the commodity, at a medium of seventeen years and a half, subsequent to the reduction, amounted to 3,957,634 pounds; and the income arising from thence came to £.490,553, being an addition to the revenue of £315,331 *per annum*. This was the first experiment, of any material consequence, in the financial history of this country, which established the important principle, that the lowering of a high duty, upon an article of consumption, might very considerably advance the produce of the public revenue^g.

Unfortunately, however, the plan of retaining only a moderate duty upon teas was not adhered

^f 18 Geo. II. cap. 26.

^g See "Smuggling laid open in all its extensive and destructive Branches, with Proposals for the effectual Remedy of that most iniquitous Practice; by Sir Stephen Theodore Janssen." 1 vol. octavo, printed *anno* 1763. Postlethwayt also, in his Commercial Dictionary (*voce* Tea) has given us the tables of the consumption of tea from 1734 to 1763, copied from that work. It is hardly necessary to add, that the pretensions of modern statesmen, to the merit of discovering that a reduction of duty may increase the revenue, is not perfectly well founded.

to ; for, *anno* 1748, a tax of 5 *per cent.* took place upon dry goods, including teas, and other additions were afterwards made both to the excise and customs, inasmuch that, *anno* 1783, the duties upon tea were as follows :

Customs £.27 : 10 <i>per cent.</i> paid by the company.	} paid by the con- sumer.
Excise £.28 : 15 <i>per cent.</i>	
And 1s. 1d. $\frac{3}{100}$ <i>per</i> gross pound	

It might naturally be expected, that such heavy duties would increase the contraband trade of an article so peculiarly well calculated for the purposes of the smuggler. And a variety of other frauds being known to exist in other branches of the revenue, a select committee of the house of commons was appointed to inquire into the illicit practices so prevalent at that time. The valuable reports drawn up by that committee, are well entitled to the reader's attention ; but the only part of them to which it is proposed at present to refer, relates to the article of tea ^a.

In the third report of the committee, presented the 23d of March 1784, a plan is mentioned (originally suggested by an active and intelligent officer of the East India company¹), the object of which was, a very considerable reduction in the tea duties ; and as the plan would naturally occasion

^a In the Parliamentary Register for 1783, vol. xiv. the three reports presented by this committee are published.

¹ The late William Richardson, Esq. accountant-general of the company.

a diminution of revenue, calculations were drawn up, stating the principles on which such deficiency might be made up, by a tax upon windows. The committee, however, instead of enforcing the idea, very cautiously remarked, that they thought it their duty to suggest the plan to the house, as deserving a serious discussion: and when the subject was first proposed in parliament by the minister, the chairman of the committee stated, “ That the
 “ plan, though possibly not impracticable, was
 “ full of difficulties, liable to create much public
 “ fermentation, and certain to be the subject of
 “ many long debates in that house*.”

The public were prepared for some regulations of that nature, by a paragraph in his majesty's speech on the 19th of May 1784, which recommended the alarming progress of frauds in the revenue, accompanied in so many instances with violence, as a matter which could not fail, on every account, to excite the attention of parliament; and the system formed for that purpose, was stated to the house on the 21st of June following.

The grounds on which this measure was proposed were shortly these: That tea was the staple of smuggling, insomuch that though the East India company sold only 5,500,000 pounds weight for home consumption, there were from twelve to thirteen millions of pounds consumed in the kingdom. That to remove this evil, the best possible

* Speech of the Right Hon. William Eden, Parliamentary Register, vol. xv. p. 236.

plan was, to lower the duty upon tea in such a degree as to take away from the smuggler the temptation to carry on an illegal trade: but as the revenue could not afford any material diminution at present, that it would be necessary to propose a new tax, as a substitute in its room. The sum required would be from £. 700,000 to £. 800,000 *per annum*, £. 169,000 of which was proposed to be raised by a duty of $12\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent*, on the price paid by the purchaser at the public sales of the company¹, and the remaining £. 600,000 by an additional duty upon windows. The happy consequences which were to result from the adoption of this measure, were represented in the most flattering colours: "The public revenue," it was said, "would be considerably a gainer, and yet the people would have no reason to complain of additional burdens, as they would be *favoured by the plan*."²

It would require a volume to give a history of the various debates which have taken place upon this subject, or an account of the arguments for and against the measure which have at different times been urged³. The minister who proposed it

¹ The minister at first proposed a duty of $12\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent*. on bohea, 25 *per cent*. on souchong, 30 *per cent*. on singlo, 40 *per cent*. on congo, &c. ; but, ultimately the same *ad valorem* duty of $12\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent*. was imposed on teas indiscriminately.

² Mr. Pitt's speech, Parl. Register, vol. x. p. 239.

³ See particularly Parl. Register, vol. xv. p. 230. vol. xvi.

it has termed the commutation act “ *gloriously successful*,” whereas his opponents have held it forth as absurd, extravagant, and pernicious^p. The best mode of forming an impartial opinion upon the subject will be, to consider the consequences resulting from it, whether of a commercial, financial, or political nature.

Considered merely as a commercial regulation, many plausible arguments may be urged in its favour. It has certainly increased, in a very considerable degree, the commerce of this country with China, augmented our shipping and seamen in that trade, and produced all the other advantages resulting from a more extended navigation.

Considered also merely as a matter of finance, the exchequer is no material loser by the bargain. It appears from the commutation act^q, that the customs on tea, at an average of five years,

p. 377, and p. 90 in the Debates of the House of Lords in the same volume; also, vol. xx. p. 156. 161. 354, &c. Some very able pamphlets have likewise been written upon the subject, more particularly, Observations on the Commutation Project, by Thomas Bates Rous, Esq.; Mr. Baring’s Principles of the Commutation Act established by Facts; Observations relative to the Taxes upon Windows or Lights, by M. de Lolme; Mr. Twining’s Observations on the Tea and Window Act, &c. &c.

^p Parl. Register, vol. xx. p. 354.

^p Ditto, p. 158.

^q 24 Geo. 3. c. 28.

amounted to £ 348,547 : 6 : 9 and the excise to £.555 917 : 3 : 6 making in all £.904,464 : 10 : 3 which was a larger sum than had been originally supposed. The whole commutation fund for the year, ending Michaelmas, 1788, produced £.781,657 : 9 : 5. The difference is considerable, amounting to £.122,807 but must, in some degree, be made up to the public, by additional duties received on other articles; the checking of smuggling in tea having operated beneficially in preventing illicit practices in other branches of the revenue.

The arguments which have been urged against this measure, considered as a great political operation, are shortly as follows: “ That it encourages an enormous consumption of a foreign commodity, in no respect necessary or useful:— “ That it encourages the consumption of a commodity which there is reason to believe is far from being favourable to the health of the people:—That it encourages commerce with a country but little disposed to take our goods and manufactures in return, but which requires payment in bullion, and thereby diminishes our domestic wealth and circulation:—That it encourages an article which prevents the consumption of the wholesome beverages of our own country, which in every point of view ought to be preferred, more especially as so large a portion of our revenue is derived from them; and “ that for the purpose of obtaining this pernicious “ article,

“ article, at an easy rate, we impose a tax which
 “ materially tends to decrease the number of
 “ houses, and consequently the population of the
 “ country, or at least to render the dwellings of
 “ the people uncomfortable, if not unhealthy.”

In addition to these arguments, it is urged, that by encouraging the consumption of the higher priced teas, we double, and may treble the cost of the article in the market of China, which may totally reverse the balance of our trade, were it ever so much in our favour; and that for supplying the extraordinary demand occasioned by the project, we were obliged to purchase from the companies established by rival nations, no less a quantity than 17,009,877*lb.* weigh, which cost us the enormous sum of £. 2,048,797 : 18 : 2.

The injustice of the commutation tax, in many instances, can hardly be disputed; individuals being compelled to pay the tax who consume no tea, and those who do consume it, not paying in any adequate proportion.

The bargain between the public and the East India Company also has not been adhered to. The tax on windows is regularly exacted, whilst the price of tea continues nearly as high as formerly.

• Windows were originally intended for the free admission of *air*, which our ancestors wisely thought might not a little contribute to the health of the people. Window is in fact a corruption of *windeor*, and this tallies very well with Johnson's explanation of the word, “ An aperture in a building by which
 “ air and light are intromitted.”

Did

Did this profit go into the exchequer, it might be paid without murmur; but enriching, as it does, the speculators and dealers in that commodity, it is naturally complained of.

But the strongest argument against the commutation tax was, that the experiment was unnecessary. It had formerly been ascertained, that the duties, as they stood *anno* 1750, were sufficient to check smuggling, for the consumption regularly increased from that period*. At the duties of the year 1750, 2,700,000*lb.* weight of tea produced £. 372,600. Had the duties been reduced to the same standard (by which smuggling would have been effectually prevented), when the consumption in this country rose to 16,200,000*lb.* weight of tea, (which was under the quantity sold in the year ending September 1787), the income produced would have amounted to the enormous sum of two millions two hundred and thirty-five thousand six hundred pounds, *and no commutation tax could have been necessary*†.

This

* The consumption would never have increased so regularly as it did, had it been impeded by smuggling. But it rose gradually from 2,700,000*lb.* its amount in 1750, to 4,393,983*lb.* the quantity consumed *anno* 1762.

† If by reducing the tax on teas to the standard of the year 1750, there was the least apprehension of smuggling, the custom-house duty of 14 *per cent.* which then existed, might be given up, and the following plan might be adopted:

Let there be a separate department at the India house under the management of three or more directors appointed for that
special

Taxes on
horses em-
ployed in
husbandry.

This perhaps, on the whole, is the most impolitic of all our taxes. To impose a duty upon the instruments by which the food of the people is raised, cannot be justified on any sound principle of policy: and it would be much better to levy ten times the sum in any other way. When the

special purpose.—Let these directors be empowered to dispose of the company's teas *by private sale*, and not by public auction, as by act of parliament must be done at present.—Let certain agents be appointed in all the principal towns in the kingdom, for the purpose of retailing teas for the behoof of the company, at a certain moderate profit; but if any tea is purchased by a licensed retailer, a reasonable discount to be given.—No quantity to be sold by the directors or their agents under half a chest.—The books of the company to be open to the inspection of the treasury, and a duty of one shilling *per lb.* and 25 *per cent. ad valorem*, to be charged to the company for the public behoof. During the space of one year ending September 1787, 16,692,427 *lb.* weight of tea were sold by the India company, and the duty at 12½ *per cent.* came to £. 336,095. A shilling *per lb.* upon that quantity would have produced £. 834,621 and 25 *per cent. ad valorem* £. 672,190 making in all £. 1,506,811 which is the lowest sum at which the revenue to be drawn from tea, with any tolerable management, ought to be calculated. The public sales, by affording the means of speculation and monopoly, encourage smuggling. No contraband trade could exist, were the company permitted to enter into a fair contest with the illicit trader at his own home, even loaded with these duties; and whoever considers the immense business carried on under the management of the commissioners of the excise and of the customs, will see little difficulty in a board of respectable directors conducting the sale of teas consumed in this country, in a manner useful to the company, and *very profitable indeed* to the state.

cultivation

cultivation of the ground is made subject to such impositions, the farmer must either convert his ground to grass, or raise the price of grain, either of which tends to promote the importation of foreign grain, and all the fatal consequences resulting therefrom. Instead of discouraging, every means ought to be thought of, to promote the agriculture of the country, as the best foundation of national strength, and the most likely means of securing every other description of public prosperity.

The miserable state to which the domains of ^{The royal domains.} the crown are reduced, (which at one period or another comprehended so considerable a part of the land in England), is a sufficient proof how little territorial possessions are calculated for being the source of national income. No property could be better guarded, than these possessions were, by innumerable laws against invasion. Yet art and avarice burst through every restraint, and have rendered them so very insignificant in regard to the income they produce, that until their real value was lately made known, they were hardly considered as a part of the revenue of the country intitled to any particular attention. During the thirty-three years of the reign of George the Second, the income they yielded, was, at an average, only £. 5641 *per annum*^u. Their amount during this reign has been equally contemptible. In re-

^u Their produce during the whole reign was only £. 186,263.
gard

gard to their state at present, it is sufficiently explained in the reports of the commissioners appointed to inquire into the condition of the woods, forests, and land revenues of the crown, where the reader will be furnished with ample information on the subject.

The landed possessions of the crown, it is remarked by the commissioners, consist of three distinct branches:—1. Of fee farm and other unimprovable rents. 2. Of landed possessions held of the crown by lease. 3. The woods, forests, parks, and chases.

The fee-farm rents are certain sums paid annually to the crown for lands held in perpetuity by their present possessors, and consequently can never be increased or improved. The following is a state of their amount:

Viscountial rents and seizures	- - -	£. 831 16 5 $\frac{1}{2}$
Rents in South and North Wales	- -	6342 1 2 $\frac{1}{2}$
Rents in several divisions of the counties of		
England	- - - - -	5462 1 5 $\frac{1}{2}$
		<hr/>
Total	-	£. 12,635 19 2 $\frac{1}{2}$
		<hr/>

These are the sums, the receipt of which is actually acknowledged by the different officers. But various other claims are annually made to the amount of £.14,877 : 9 : 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ with so little justice or attention, that the very arrears on that slender revenue have accumulated to the enormous sum of £.437,555 : 7 : 4. Several fee-farm rents have been

been sold in consequence of an act passed for that purpose*. The money which the sale produced has purchased a capital, in the 3 per cent. consolidated annuities, to the amount of £.122,351 : 17 : 3 the interest on which is £.3671 : 11.

The lands held by leases under the crown are an object of greater importance. The old rents are estimated at £.10,563 : 12 : 1. New or additional rents are commencing at different periods to the amount of £.6221 : 0 : 2½. The fines paid at an average of 22 years, are about £.7410 *per annum*, and the real improved value of these estates, at a very moderate estimate, has been calculated at £.102,626 : 14 : 1½ *per annum*.

It is not proposed, however, to enter farther into the discussion of this subject at this time, as in fact this branch of the royal domains, together with the third branch, namely, the woods and forests^y, are rather to be considered as a foundation for future hopes, than as producing an income at present of any material consequence. They will naturally fall to be considered therefore in a subsequent part of this work, in which some account will be given of the national resources. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to give the following abstract of this branch of the public

* 26 Geo. 3. cap. 87.

^y There is every reason to hope, that the royal woods and forests, under Lord Glenbervie's management, will, in due time, furnish a valuable supply of timber to the British navy.

revenue, drawn up by an author, who had official access to information respecting it.

Gross amount of rents	£.36,720	7	1
Fines for leases on an average of ten years	7700	0	0
	<u>44,420</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>1</u>

To be deducted.

Rents granted away, or usually left in arrear	17,530	15	10
Land-tax allowed and deducted from rents received	3505	12	7
	<u>21,036</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>5</u>
Total annual receipt	£.23,883	18	8

Other deductions.

Charges of management	3999	8	3
Perpetual pensions and grants to individuals	4794	17	7
Salaries to the keepers of prisons, castles, &c.	991	0	7
Salaries to the judges and other officers in Wales	1446	10	9
Commissioners of taxes and incidents in their office	1322	0	0
	<u>12,553</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>3</u>
Net produce	£.10,830	1	6

Such is the whole income drawn from 130 manors, about 52,000 acres of arable, meadow, and pasture land, about 1800 houses in London and Westminster, and about 450 houses, mills, and cottages,

^a Observations on the Land Revenue of the Crown, by the Hon. John St. John.

in

in various other parts of England. It is a fortunate circumstance however for the public interest, that the land revenue of the crown, is at present under the care of a most active and intelligent officer, (John Fordyce, Esq. surveyor-general of crown lands,) who labours with unceasing sollicitude, to augment the income of that branch of the revenue, and to surmount those difficulties, which former inattention and mismanagement have placed in his way.

As far back as the year 1662, four hundred ^{Hackney coaches.} hackney coaches were licensed in the cities of London and Westminster^a; but the sum exacted from them, was then appropriated for the purpose of repairing the highways and sewers, and of paving and cleaning the streets of the metropolis; nor was it discovered, until the year 1694, that this might become a branch of the public revenue.

By the first act passed for that purpose^b, permission was given to license a number not exceeding 700 hackney coaches; each licence to continue for 21 years, upon payment of the fine of £.50 and giving security for the additional sum of £.4 *per annum*; and a board of commissioners was appointed for granting licences, and for executing the different powers contained in the act. The number was increased in the reign of Queen Anne, to 800 coaches^c, and the commissioners were also invested with authority to license hackney

^a By 3 and 4 Car. 2. cap. 2.

^b 5 and 6 Will. and Mary, cap. 22.

^c 9 Anne, cap. 23.

chairs, not exceeding 200, at the rate of 10 shillings *per annum*, which number was increased first to 300, and afterwards to 400^d. *Anno* 1770, a thousand hackney coaches were permitted to be licensed, and the sum of 5*s.* *per week*, or £.13 *per annum*, was imposed upon them. That duty has since been doubled, consequently they now pay at the rate of £.26 each *per annum*^e.

It is difficult to comprehend, how so large a sum can be afforded for such a permission. Certain however it is, that there is no want of applications for licences, and consequently the trade must be sufficiently profitable. It furnishes a satisfactory answer to those who complain of the sums in which they are taxed by government for the liberty of carrying on their different professions (as attorneys, dealers in exciseable commodities, &c. ;) for here so high a duty as £.26 a year is paid, after deducting which, the profits of the business must maintain a coachman and two horses, and must contribute to the repairs of the carriage and the maintenance of its owner.

But the principal cause for taking any particular notice of this branch of the revenue, is an idea that has often occurred to the author of this work ; that

^d See 9 Anne, cap. 19. Also, 12 Geo. 1. cap. 12 and 16. Geo. 2. cap. 26. The number of chairs have since been again reduced to 200.

^e 24 Geo. 3. cap. 27.

a transference of the duties upon servants to this office, and intrusting to this board powers over domestic servants, similar to those which they now enjoy in regard to hackney coachmen, would, in various points of view, be an advantageous regulation. The want of police, in regard to servants, is a great public disadvantage. If they knew that there existed a summary jurisdiction, with power sufficient to punish those petty frauds, (which with them is the commencement of every species of crime,) they would be less apt to give way to temptations, which at present they find it difficult to resist. And the good consequences which have resulted from intrusting these commissioners with authority over hackney coachmen, (who would otherwise have been a race of men totally ungovernable), tend to justify the idea, that intrusting the same board with such powers over servants, as might be necessary for their regulation, would be an advantageous measure both to them and to the public^f.

Itinerant retailers, known under the name of ^{Hawkers} hawkers, pedlars, or petty chapmen, have long ^{and pedlars.} been an object of taxation, partly for the sake of revenue, but perhaps principally for the purposes

^f If domestic servants could not be put under the control of this board, it would at least be useful to invest them with some authority over the porters in the city of London, particularly those who carry parcels from inns, who have no bounds in the exorbitancy of their demands.

of police^a. It was *anno* 1697 that a licence duty was first imposed upon them. Persons travelling on foot, were charged with a duty of £.4, and £.4 additional were imposed on such as made use of horses for transporting their merchandise. These duties were doubled by an act passed *anno* 1785^b, by way of a boon to the shopkeepers, and a recompence to them for the burdens to which they were then subjected. But when the tax upon shops came to be repealed, these additional duties fell of course. Ideas were thrown out, when the shop-tax was passed, that the hawkers and pedlars ought to be totally abolished. It was contended that they were a vagrant, and even pernicious race of people, of no possible advantage to the community. It was natural for the shopkeepers to wish for the annihilation of the only set of persons who enter into any competition with them. But however obnoxious the rivalry might be to those who have a permanent residence in towns, whose profits however by this rivalry are restrained within proper bounds, yet still there are many parts of the country, at a distance from market towns, that could not well be supplied with many articles necessary for them, without the assistance of these itinerant dealers, who are thus the means of extending the consumption of our own manufactures, and the sale of goods that might otherwise perish

^a They were first put under the control of the commissioners for transportation.

^b 25 Geo. 3. cap. 78.

in the warehouses of our merchants, or in the shops of the retailer. This tax however is falling off in produce, and as the country improves, and new towns or villages are built, will naturally diminish every year. *Anno* 1723 it yielded £.10,773 of gross, and £.8604 of net income; whereas *anno* 1788, in consequence of the exorbitant taxes demanded from the hawkers and pedlars, and the harsh and cruel regulations to which they were subjected, it fell off to £.2170 of net produce. It yielded in the year ending 5th January 1803, £.5279 of profit to the Exchequer.

The following account will then give a general view of the income of Great Britain, for the year ending 5th January 1803.

Heads of Revenue.	Total Receipt to be accounted for within the Year.			Total Payments applicable to national Objects.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
1. Customs - -	10,519,920	13	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	7,415,726	19	3 $\frac{1}{4}$
2. Excise - -	16,833,786	5	11	14,927,538	4	0 $\frac{1}{4}$
3. Stamps - -	3,394,317	10	0 $\frac{3}{4}$	3,169,363	12	3 $\frac{1}{4}$
4. Miscellaneous taxes - -	7,248,063	12	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	6,688,511	2	2 $\frac{1}{4}$
Total -	37,996,088	2	1 $\frac{3}{4}$	32,201,139	17	9 $\frac{1}{2}$

The lottery, an extraordinary but precarious source of revenue, produced last year no less a sum than £.525,458 of net profit.

It must appear almost incredible, to any person who has not traced the sources of public revenue
in

in general, and more especially the peculiar advantages, of a financial nature, which this country possesses, that it should be competent to the production of so enormous a sum, and that the prospect should be rather in favour of an increase than a diminution.

But the above sum, great as it may appear, is far from being the total amount of burdens to which this country is subjected. A variety of other articles must be stated, in order to give a complete view of the sums levied in these kingdoms for public purposes.

Additional
burdens
upon the
public.

The poor's rates, from the reports of the committee appointed by parliament to consider the returns made by the overseers in regard to the state of the poor, were calculated on a medium of three years, ending *anno* 1785, at £.2,100,587¹, to which there was to be added £.258,710 *per annum* of charitable donations, making in all at that time £.2,359,297. But the amount now, cannot be less than four millions.

The annual income of the public hospitals in England and Scotland, may be stated at £350,000. Greenwich hospital alone receives from 60 to £.70,000 a-year, without sharing in any part of the public income: the sixpenny tax upon seamen, its landed estates and property in the funds, producing that sum.

The money arising from turnpikes in England and Scotland must be very great, amounting to at

¹ This includes certain sums levied for county purposes.

least

least £.600,000 *per annum*; and as many roads are made by assessment, for the benefit of particular districts, for which no toll is demanded, and in some places statute labour is exacted in kind, it is probable that £.100,000 additional is annually expended for similar purposes.

An immense income is enjoyed by the different towns and corporations in England. London alone possesses a revenue of £.120,000 *per annum*. The whole cannot be calculated at less than £.500,000 a year in England, and £.100,000 in Scotland.

A variety of taxes are levied upon the people on navigable rivers, canals, and the ferries, amounting perhaps to £.250,000 a-year.

The expence of lighting and watching the different towns in the kingdom, and the roads in the neighbourhood of the capital, and in making and repairing the streets, is greater in this country than in any other part of Europe, and may safely be calculated at £.300,000 a-year.

The money levied in Ireland, including the charges of collection, the bounties payable in that country, the tolls therein exacted, the estates of the different corporations, and the expence of the poor, of lighting their towns, the public hospitals, &c. will amount to at least £.400,000 *per annum*.

The revenues of the churches of England, Scotland, and Ireland, cannot be stated at less than three millions more.

Hence the money levied for public purposes, in the European part of his Britannic majesty's dominions, may be stated as follows :

CALCULATION of the Sums of Money levied within the Year, for public Purposes, in Great Britain and Ireland.

1. Gross Receipt of all the taxes to be accounted for within the year	- - -	£. 37,996,088
2. Profit of the lottery	- - -	525,458
3. Poor's rates and county expences	- - -	4,000,000
4. Public hospitals, including that of Greenwich*	- - -	350,000
5. Turnpikes in England and Scotland	- - -	600,000
6. Parochial road assessments and statute labour	- - -	100,000
7. Income of towns and corporations in England	- - -	500,000
8. Ditto in Scotland	- - -	100,000
9. Navigable rivers, canals, &c.	- - -	250,000
10. Lighting, watching, and paving streets	- - -	300,000
11. Public taxes, and other burdens payable in Ireland	- - -	4,000,000
12. Revenue of the churches of England, Scotland, and Ireland	- - -	3,000,000
Grand total		<u>£. 51,721,546</u>

Let it not be imagined, that the author has any desire, to exaggerate, in the above statement, the burdens with which these kingdoms are loaded. No man would wish to do so, who has any feeling for his fellow subjects, or any tincture of humanity. On the contrary, by stating how much is already exacted, it will be apparent, that less can

* Chelsea Hospital is paid out of the public revenue; Greenwich out of its own peculiar funds.

be afforded for the future. The more the people are loaded, the less they can bear an addition. The struggle therefore between rival nations, and the boast and glory of their statesmen, ought to be, not who pays the most, but from whom the least is exacted. May such be the great source of competition between France and England! may the rulers of both countries contend for the future, whose administration shall prove the lightest and least burthensome! and may the rivalry never cease, until both nations attain such ease and abundance, that in the memorable words of Henry 4th of France, “*Le plus pauvre pût tous les dimanches, mettre une poule au pot;*” or, in the words of a British sentiment, “*May the poorest labourer enjoy, not only a comfortable dinner with his family on Sunday, but the real necessaries of life, during every other day of the week.*”

[illegible]

A P P E N D I X.

No. I.

STATE of the Revenue of Great Britain for One Year, ending
5th January 1803.

C U S T O M S.

SPECIES OF GOODS.	NET PRODUCE.								
	England.			Scotland.			Great Britain.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Ashes, Pearl - - -	5,859	14	8	465	1	4	6,324	16	—
— Pot - - -	2,248	6	7	2,146	14	9	4,395	1	4
Barilla - - -	44,465	16	4	775	17	—	45,241	13	4
Beads, Coral - - -	1,799	14	10	—	—	—	1,799	14	10
Beer, Spruce - - -	2,489	19	2	—	—	—	2,489	19	2
Books, bound - - -	2,662	10	5	26	19	3	2,689	9	8
— unbound - - -	4,661	1	7	136	15	8	4,797	17	3
Bottles, Glass - - -	5,189	19	1	120	12	3	5,310	11	4
Boxes, Pill - - -	1,237	3	1	—	—	—	1,237	3	1
Brimstone - - -	2,759	12	2	—	—	—	2,706	12	2
Bristles, undrest - - -	9,460	15	11	393	13	7	9,854	9	6
Bugle, Great - - -	1,456	17	10	—	—	—	1,456	17	10
Carpets, Turkey - - -	1,757	18	4	—	—	—	1,757	18	4
China Ware - - -	1,921	3	4	—	—	—	1,921	3	4
Copper, unwrought - - -	3,215	18	4	—	—	—	3,215	18	4
Cordage - - -	2,406	—	6	286	13	8	2,692	14	2
Cork - - -	6,019	7	5	387	15	5	6,407	2	10
DRUGS: { Borax, refined - - -	1,129	19	—	—	—	—	1,129	19	—
Camphire, unrefined - - -	1,142	16	8	—	—	—	1,142	16	8
Cassia Lignea - - -	1,745	9	11	—	—	—	1,745	9	11
Cortex, Peru - - -	3,237	12	1	—	—	—	3,237	12	1
Cream of Tartar - - -	2,063	1	11	12	7	7	2,075	9	6
Ginseng - - -	466	3	6	—	—	—	466	3	6
Gum Guaiaci - - -	1,271	7	—	—	—	—	1,271	7	—
Jalap - - -	1,671	4	10	—	—	—	1,671	4	10

CUSTOMS—continued.

SPECIES OF GOODS.		NET PRODUCE.								
		England.			Scotland.			Great Britain.		
		£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
DRUGS.	Juniper Berries	2,901	1	8	3	14	—	2,904	15	8
	Oil, Palm	3,425	18	6	—	—	—	3,425	18	6
	— Turpentine	3,743	6	6	27	19	2	3,771	5	8
	Opium	2,148	3	10	—	—	—	2,148	3	10
	Quicksilver	23,895	11	4	130	10	—	24,026	1	4
	Rhubarb	3,021	17	2	—	10	5	3,022	7	7
	Saccarum Saturni	2,030	19	2	248	3	8	2,279	2	10
	Senna	2,395	15	10	—	—	—	2,395	15	10
	Succus Liquoritiæ	6,974	5	4	392	7	5	7,366	12	9
	Verdigrease	1,892	15	9	20	19	—	1,913	14	9
DYE STUFFS.	Berries	2,010	—	6	—	—	—	2,010	—	6
	Cochineal	8,073	9	8	—	—	—	8,073	9	8
	Indigo	24,356	3	8	78	16	8	24,435	—	2
	Logwood	1,260	5	8	42	4	11	1,302	10	7
	Maddar	3,434	1	8	324	9	1	3,758	10	9
	— Roots	1,783	7	5	—	—	—	1,783	7	5
	Redwood	1,367	14	9	—	—	—	1,367	14	9
	Shumack	2,570	14	5	121	6	5	2,692	—	10
	Smalts	17,160	11	4	651	8	3	17,811	19	7
	Earthenware, unrated	2,100	9	7	—	—	—	2,100	9	—
	Elephants Teeth	6,822	18	6	76	7	11	6,899	6	—
	Feathers for Beds	7,380	1	10	541	7	6	7,921	9	4
	Fish, Oysters	2,613	9	—	—	—	—	2,613	9	—
	Fruit, Lemons and } Oranges }	19,671	13	11	588	6	2	20,160	—	—
	Nuts, small	2,572	19	11	2	2	3	2,575	2	2
GROCERY.	Glass Plates	8,845	8	3	8	10	2	8,853	18	5
	Almonds, Jordan	2,547	15	6	415	19	1	2,983	14	7
	— not Jordan	1,731	11	4	272	18	7	2,004	9	11
	Anniseeds	376	15	9	40	5	3	417	1	—
	Cloves	4,097	8	5	—	—	—	4,097	8	5
	Cocoa	1,912	3	8	7	16	3	1,919	19	11
	Coffee	17,461	11	1	428	5	1	17,889	16	2
	Currants	122,888	16	2	101	18	1	122,990	14	3
	Figs	5,575	5	11	667	11	9	6,242	17	8
	Mace	987	—	4	—	—	—	987	—	4
	Nutmegs	4,570	—	—	—	—	—	4,570	—	—
	Pepper	48,183	8	—	—	—	—	48,183	8	—
	Prunes	11,394	16	6	1,453	14	2	12,848	10	8
	Raisins, Denia	24,241	16	—	1	19	4	24,243	15	4
	— Lexia	22,031	7	3	2,032	2	11	24,063	10	2
	— Lipari	3,343	4	7	31	19	7	3,375	4	2
	— Smyrna	8,276	10	1	—	—	—	8,276	10	1
	— Solis	32,856	15	—	4,048	9	5	36,905	4	5

CUSTOMS—continued.

SPECIES OF GOODS.		NET PRODUCE.								
		England.			Scotland.			Great Britain.		
		£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
GROCERY.	Rice	599	11	11	413	11	7	1,015	3	6
	Succads	1,386	1	11	73	14	5	1,459	16	4
	Sugar, Brown	2,878,649	5	9	234,263	4	10	3,112,912	10	7
	Tamarinds	822	15	4	84	10	5	907	5	9
	Tea	144,758	13	8	—	—	—	144,758	13	8
	Turmeric	804	—	1	14	14	10	818	14	12
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	Hair, Horse	1,946	12	9	195	12	—	2,142	4	9
	Hats, Chip	4,505	9	6	—	—	—	2,505	9	6
	— Straw	1,557	5	9	—	—	—	2,557	3	9
	Hemp, rough	96,694	16	5	19,149	—	5	115,843	16	10
	Hides, Horse	2,074	15	8	295	12	—	2,370	7	8
	— Indian	2,465	12	2	—	—	—	2,465	12	2
	— Loin	2,995	12	9	—	—	—	2,995	12	9
	— Ox or Cow	3,387	7	6	1,303	8	7	4,690	16	1
	— Tanned	1,422	1	7	193	16	5	1,615	18	—
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	Incle, wrought	2,119	1	11	2	—	10	2,121	2	9
	Iron, Bar	168,185	9	10	21,542	1	—	189,727	10	10
	— Cast	3,780	16	—	400	65	8	4,181	2	5
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	Kelp	949	4	9	—	—	—	949	4	9
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	Lace bone	2,659	6	7	—	—	—	2,659	6	7
LINEN.	Cambrics	13,599	3	2	—	—	—	13,599	3	2
	Canvas, Heffens	17,388	16	3	—	—	—	17,388	16	3
	— Spruce	2,994	12	3	4	2	8	2,998	14	11
	Damask Napkins	983	1	3	—	12	6	983	13	9
	Silefia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Damask Tabling	4,135	9	2	15	3	10	4,150	13	—
	Silefia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Drilling	3,688	8	6	4	13	10	3,693	2	4
	Germany, above	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	36 Inches broad	382	13	9	—	—	—	324	14	8
	Germany, under	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	36 Inches	343	5	7	—	—	—	212	16	2
	Germany, Narrow	41,306	17	6	294	9	5	41,601	6	11
	Russia, Broad,	38,459	19	7	482	13	3	38,942	12	10
	above 22½ Inch.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Russia, Broad,	2,641	4	6	46	13	9	2,687	18	3
	above 31½ Inch.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Russia, Broad,	11,534	13	9	1,334	7	10	12,869	1	7
	above 36 Inch.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Russia, Narrow	13,309	8	1	6	18	3	13,316	6	4
	— Fowelling	1,441	2	3	62	13	11	1,503	16	2
	and Napks	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

CUSTOMS—continued

SPECIES OF GOODS.	NET PRODUCE.								
	England.			Scotland.			Great Britain.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Manufactured and Un- manufactured Arti- cles of India	7,999	5	4	—	—	—	7,999	5	4
Mats, Russia	3 612	1	2	179	13	3	3,991	14	5
Oil, Ordinary	20,101	9	10	157	15	11	20,259	5	9
— Sallad	4 787	5	6	93	—	5	4,880	5	11
— Train	10,216	7	7	1,022	15	10	11,239	3	5
Paper	4,376	17	7	43	12	10	4,420	10	5
Pictures	5,300	1	3	34	8	8	5,334	9	11
Piece Goods of India									
Calicoes	17,571	1	6	—	—	—	17,571	1	6
Mullins	77,003	9	4	—	—	—	77,003	9	4
Nankcens	17,293	4	11	—	—	—	17,293	4	11
Prohibited	11,395	2	6	—	—	—	11,395	2	6
Rags	1,333	11	1	174	17	—	1,508	8	1
Salt	1,034	13	6	179	16	10	1,214	10	4
Seeds, Clover	11,155	11	6	376	4	—	11,531	15	6
— Linseed	11,474	9	9	398	11	10	11,873	1	7
— Rape or Cole	4,896	—	—	—	—	—	4,896	—	—
Shells, Mother of Pearl	3,594	6	7	—	—	—	3,594	6	7
Ships Hulls and Mate- rials	2,785	3	9	—	—	—	2,785	3	9
SILK									
Bengal, raw	76,642	6	9	—	—	—	76,642	6	9
China, raw	19,626	3	10	—	—	—	19,626	3	10
Italian, raw	71,648	12	5	12	7	6	71,660	19	11
Thrown	156,401	4	4	—	—	—	156,401	4	4
Bear, Black	8,220	9	6	71	7	9	8,291	16	11
Beaver	980	7	10	9	13	9	990	1	7
Calf, raw	2,009	4	4	196	17	11	2,206	2	3
— tanned	22,101	13	7	149	11	10	22,251	5	5
Deer, in Hair	5,360	13	2	38	3	3	5,398	16	5
Fox, Ordinary	107	6	—	26	1	2	133	7	2
Goat, raw	2,130	6	10	—	—	—	2,130	6	10
Kid, dressed	4,591	2	9	—	—	—	4,591	2	9
— undressed	3,547	9	4	—	—	—	3,547	9	4
Lamb in Wool	2,269	18	—	—	11	7	2,270	9	7
Martin	367	18	3	174	1	6	541	19	9
Mink	1,107	3	11	69	8	4	1,176	12	3
Otter	620	12	3	32	10	5	653	2	8
Raccoon	672	10	6	—	2	4	672	12	10
Seal	610	8	8	115	7	8	735	16	4
Wolf	1,471	9	8	—	—	—	1,471	9	8

CUSTOMS—continued.

SPECIES OF GOODS.	NET PRODUCE.								
	England.			Scotland.			Great Britain.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Soap, Hard - - -	2,288	—	3	11	5	11	2,299	6	2
Spirits, Brandy - -	81,900	15	4	1,883	11	3	83,784	6	7
— Cordial Water - -	1,121	1	7	11	15	7	1,132	17	8
— Geneva - - -	34,065	12	5	8,437	1	10	42,502	14	3
— Rum - - -	89,946	3	4	22,301	3	10	112,247	7	2
Stones, Blocks of Marble - - - }	1,910	6	4	98	10	—	2,008	16	4
Ta'low - - -	38,879	13	1	4,536	8	9	43,416	1	10
Tar - - -	5,048	—	4	919	5	5	5,967	5	9
Thread, Sisters - -	2,001	17	11	6	—	3	2,007	18	2
Tobacco - - -	284,156	18	1	43,465	2	9	327,622	—	10
Tortoiseshell - -	1,065	6	2	44	6	4	1,109	12	6
Tow - - -	3,216	15	3	2,096	3	10	5,312	19	1
Turpentine - - -	9,309	16	10	1,378	5	—	10,688	1	10
Wax, Bees - - -	10,275	9	1	146	7	7	10,421	16	8
WINE. { Canary - - -	4,126	7	4	—	—	—	4,126	7	4
— Cape - - -	304	—	1	—	—	—	304	—	1
— French - - -	30,084	3	10	4,579	16	8	34,664	—	6
— Madeira - - -	56,924	5	6	912	3	10	57,836	9	4
— Portugal - - -	780,667	18	7	49,659	—	4	830,326	18	11
— Rhenish - - -	4,344	15	10	149	10	11	4,494	6	9
— Spanish - - -	167,913	13	2	18,457	8	5	186,371	1	7
— Other Wines - -	1,942	7	9	—	—	—	1,942	7	9
WOOD. { Balcks - - -	4,292	1	6	5,325	—	5	9,617	1	11
— Battens - - -	16,897	7	6	2,187	16	11	19,085	4	5
— Boards, Paling -	2,107	3	10	97	6	11	2,204	10	9
— — Scale - - -	1,760	2	2	—	—	—	1,760	2	2
— — Wainfcot - -	908	15	—	21	8	6	930	3	6
— Deals - - -	241,439	5	6	20,441	9	1	261,880	14	7
— — Ends - - -	8,316	16	10	1,703	14	2	10,020	11	—
— Lathwood - - -	7,291	9	4	990	15	8	8,282	5	—
— Mahogany - - -	18,984	7	9	1,645	16	11	20,630	4	8
— Mafts - - -	10,722	11	1	762	17	11	11,535	9	—
— Oars - - -	1,248	1	—	—	—	—	1,248	1	—
— Plank, Oak - -	8,598	5	11	1,977	10	6	10,575	16	5
— Staves - - -	23,754	6	8	728	9	1	24,482	15	9
— Timber, Fir - -	156,750	12	11	30,451	17	6	187,202	10	5
— — Oak - - -	3,232	2	10	607	7	6	3,839	10	4
— Uphers - - -	1,933	12	11	63	7	7	1,997	—	6
— Wainfcot Logs -	4,039	10	6	163	15	3	4,203	5	9
Wool, Cotton - - -	152,081	12	3	23,976	10	3	176,058	2	6
Yarn, Cotton - - -	855	12	10	—	6	—	855	18	10
— Mohair - - -	4,023	2	5	—	—	—	4,023	2	5

CUSTOMS—continued.

SPECIES OF GOODS.	NET PRODUCE.								
	England.			Scotland.			Great Britain.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Zaffar	1,887	17	—	—	—	—	1,887	17	—
Duty by the Act 42d of the King, Cap. 43, on Tonnage of Shipping Inwards	56,090	11	9½	7,354	4	2½	63,444	16	—½
Sundry small Articles, the Duties on which have not amounted to £. 1,000 each	154,759	12	5½	22,899	13	7½	177,659	6	—½
	7,153,187	17	4	581,968	13	7½	7,734,915	2	5½
Deduct the Amount of those Sums where the Drawback exceeds the Gross Receipt	9,222	6	5	3,257	1	1	12,237	19	—
Total Duties Inwards	7,143,965	10	11	578,711	12	6½	7,763,444	16	—½
Subsidies collected on									
Alum	2,578	18	7	93	8	7	2,672	7	2
Coals	97,527	14	2½	7,578	8	2	105,106	2	4½
Lead	34,930	12	8½	1,291	6	5½	36,221	19	2½
Tin	4,419	10	6	—	12	6½	4,420	3	—½
Indigo	4,062	12	8	17	16	10	4,080	9	6
Skins, Beaver	599	4	9	—	—	—	599	4	9
Other Articles	13,744	12	8½	154	9	6½	13,899	2	3
Duty by the Act 42d of the King, Chap. 43d on Goods Exported	51,558	1	5½	4,710	7	—½	56,268	8	5½
on Tonnage of Shipping Outwards	36,630	16	3½	2,482	7	—	39,113	3	3½
Total Duties Outwards	246,052	3	10½	16,328	16	1½	262,381	—	—½
Carried Coastways.									
Coals	655,277	1	11	—	—	—	655,277	1	11
Stones & Slates	17,468	6	1½	3,275	17	—½	20,744	3	2½
Wine	1,153	19	4½	126	—	7½	1,280	—	—
One Shilling per Chaldron on Newcastle Coals	24,885	7	—	—	—	—	24,885	7	—
Total Duties Coastways	698,784	14	5½	3,401	17	7½	702,186	12	1½

CUSTOMS—continued.

SPECIES OF GOODS.	NET PRODUCE.								
	England.			Scotland.			Great Britain.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Remittances from the Plantations -	26,825	17	8½	—	—	—	26,825	17	8½
Received { From the Receiver of Fines and Forfeitures for the King's Share of condemned Tobacco -	4,810	11	6½	1	3	6½	4,811	15	—½
From the Inspector of Corn Returns -	1,022	17	—	—	—	—	1,022	17	—
From the Receiver General of the Counties on Account of Windows, by the Act 24th Geo. III. -	856	5	11½	—	—	—	856	5	11½
From the Receiver General of Excise, for Wine sold -	4,111	13	5½	—	—	—	4,111	13	5½
Arrear of Duty by Act 38th of the King, Cap. 76. on Goods and Shipping -	79,715	1	9½	4,072	8	1½	83,787	9	11½
Quarantine Duty on Tonnage 1800 -	7,083	17	—½	245	1	—½	7,328	18	—½
Grand Total - £.	8,213,228	13	8½	602,760	19	—	8,815,989	12	8½

CHARGE.

	England.	Scotland.	Great Britain.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Balance in the Hands of the different Col- lectors, on 5th Janu- ary 1802	18,673 15 9½	19,768 14 4½	38,442 10 1½
Balance in the Hands of the Receiver Ge- neral of Scotland, on 5th January 1802	— —	28,830 6 5½	28,830 6 5½
Bills arising and remit- ted out of the Reve- nue of 1801, but which were not brought to Account until 1802	86,337 4 3½	9,866 15 10½	96,204 — 2½
Amount of Net Pro- duce brought for- ward	8,213,228 13 ¼	602,760 19 —	8,815,989 12 ¾
	£. 8,318,239 13 9½	661,226 15 8½	8,979,466 9 6½

DISCHARGE.

	England.			Scotland.			Great Britain.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
By Bounties	1,790,359	2	3½	136,761	15	9½	1,927,120	18	1
— Repayments on Over Entries and damaged Goods	64,244	11	11½	14,651	10	7½	78,896	2	7
Money impressed in the Hands of different Out Port Collectors	—	—	—	360	—	—	360	—	—
Paid towards the Support of His Majesty's Civil Government in Scotland	—	—	—	56,789	1	4½	56,789	1	4½
Charges of Management Consolidated Customs	490,028	7	3½	59,586	3	6½	549,614	10	9½
Bricks and Tiles 1794	35	2	9½	—	—	—	35	2	9½
Paper — 1794	3,727	18	2½	—	—	—	3,727	18	2½
Slates & Stones 1794	14,621	11	3½	1,470	—	—	16,091	11	3½
Wood, Fruit, and Oil } 1795	104,981	6	10½	9,410	—	—	114,391	6	10½
Coals and Salt 1795	17,099	3	10½	1,030	—	—	18,129	3	10½
Wine — 1796	470,709	4	2	32,970	—	—	503,679	4	2
Sugar and Bricks, including £.5 and £.10 per Cent. } 1796	108,512	4	6½	8,548	—	—	117,060	4	6½
Pepper, &c. 1797	120,558	18	6	5,817	—	—	126,375	18	6
Plate imported 1797	6	11	2½	—	—	—	6	11	2½
Goods and Shipping } 1798	66,513	8	3½	3,580	—	—	70,093	8	3½
Sugar & Coffee 1799	95,530	16	2½	9,198	—	—	104,728	16	2½
Sugar and Malt 1800	407	8	8½	—	—	—	407	8	8½
Do. Do. — 1801	491,074	7	—	—	—	—	491,074	7	—
Wood, Sugar, &c. } 1801	244,188	—	9	30,606	—	—	274,794	—	9
Paper, &c. — 1801	3,697	15	6½	—	—	—	3,697	15	6½
Sugar and Malt 1802	2,314,866	14	9½	110,670	—	—	2,425,536	14	9½
Goods and Shipping } 1802	738,267	14	2½	75,695	—	—	813,962	14	2½
Balance in the Hands of the different Collectors, on the 5th January 1803	22,671	4	8	17,715	5	7½	40,386	10	3½
Balance in the Hands of the Receiver General of Scotland, on the 5th January 1803	—	—	—	42,093	13	—½	42,093	13	—½
Bills arising out of the Revenue of 1802, but which were not brought to Account until the Year 1803	220,609	13	7½	4,969	5	9½	225,578	19	5½
£.	8,318,239	13	9½	661,226	15	8½	8,979,466	9	6½

GENERAL STATEMENT

CHARGE.

	England.	Scotland.	Great Britain.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Balance in the Hands of the different Col- lectors, on the 5th January 1802 - }	18,673 15 9½	19,768 14 4½	38,442 10 1
Balance in the Hands of the Receiver Ge- neral of Scotland, on 5th January 1802 }	— —	28,830 6 5½	28,830 6 5½
Bills arising and remit- ted out of the Re- venue of 1801, but which were not brought to Account until 1802. - }	86,337 4 3½	9,866 15 10½	96,204 — 1½
Gross Receipt within the Year - }	9,577,325 14 7½	779,118 2 1½	10,356,443 16 9½
£.	9,682,336 14 8½	837,583 18 10½	10,519,920 13 7½

OF THE PRECEDING ACCOUNT,

DISCHARGE.

	England.	Scotland.	Great Britain.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
By Drawbacks, Repayments and Bounties of the Nature of Drawbacks	2,326,352 14 11½	228,226 8 6½	2,554,579 3 6
Bounties for promoting National Objects	892,348 — 2½	99,544 1 — ¼	991,892 1 2½
By Money impressed in the Hands of different Out Port Collectors	— —	360 — —	360 — —
Paid towards the Support of His Majesty's Civil Government in Scotland	— —	56,789 1 4½	56,789 1 4½
Charges of Management	490,028 7 3¼	59,586 3 6¼	549,614 10 9½
Payments into the Exchequer	5,730,326 13 11¼	328,300 — —	6,058,626 13 11
Balance in the Hands of the different Collectors	22,671 4 8	17,715 5 7¼	40,386 10 3¼
Balance in the Hands of the Receiver General of Scotland, on 5th January 1803	— —	42,093 13 — ¼	42,093 13 — ¼
Bills arising out of the Revenue of 1802, but which were not brought to Account until the Year 1803	220,609 13 7¼	4,969 5 9½	225,578 19 5¼
£.	9,682,336 14 8¼	837,583 18 10½	10,519,920 13 7¼

EXCISE IN ENGLAND.

DUTIES.		Gross Actual Receipt in Money.			Net Produce of c Article.	
		£.	s.	d.	£.	s.
Auctions	Duty and Licences	145,027	6	3½	144,049	1
Beer	-	2,147,037	2	0½	1,927,267	8
Bricks and Tiles	-	114,865	10	2½	110,799	16
Candles	Duty and Licences	278,548	7	5½	231,797	3
Coaches	Duty and Licences	2,279	0	0	2,212	10
Cocoa Nuts and Coffee	-	40,744	9	1½	35,274	15
Cyder, Perry, and Verjuice	-	40,162	18	0½	37,287	19
Glass	-	209,515	7	2½	139,507	4
Hides, Skins, Vellum, and Parchment	-	279,359	15	10½	251,391	8
Hops	-	246,215	11	1	227,350	18
Metheglin or Mead, and Vinegar	-	26,039	8	7½	26,020	7
Printed Goods	-	612,910	1	2	285,629	5
Soap	-	488,163	7	5½	417,768	17
Spirits	British	671,556	11	3½	658,918	4
	Foreign	1,023,757	18	8½	975,231	14
Starch	-	55,581	7	8½	49,733	15
Sweets	-	12,188	17	9½	12,065	7
Tea	-	240,367	6	¼	210,461	4
Wine	-	348,592	13	3½	301,789	6
Wire	-	4,359	7	3½	3,173	11
Licences to	Dealers in Coffee, Chocolate, and Tea	15,996	2	0½	15,708	19
	Makers of, and Dealers in Exciseable Commodities	44,794	6	10	43,979	17
	Retailers of Spirituous Liquors	170,331	6	8½	168,401	4
	Do. of Wine	32,574	2	11½	31,884	18
	Sellers of Gold and Silver Plate	9,968	4	2½	9,484	9
33 Geo. 3. Ch.	28 British Spirits	108,129	15	6½	108,039	11
34 Geo. 3. Ch.	2 British ditto	109,887	14	5½	109,797	15
	3 Foreign ditto	194,279	11	8½	194,243	7
	4 Foreign ditto	194,461	13	10½	194,425	9
	15 Bricks and Tiles	68,087	9	5	66,976	18
	20 Paper, see below.					
35 Geo. 3. Ch.	27 Glass	76,755	19	4½	55,739	0
	10 Wine	582,415	18	2	526,515	12
	10 Sweets	7,489	1	5½	7,469	10
	11 British Spirits	81,292	7	3	81,244	6
	12 Foreign ditto	192,361	10	0	192,325	9
36 Geo. 3. Ch.	13 Tea	240,059	6	10½	235,399	1
	13 Coffee and Cocoa Nuts	28,420	15	0½	28,392	2
37 Geo. 3. Ch.	13 Tobacco & Snuff	191,241	7	1½	172,798	16
	123 Sweets	7,745	4	5½	7,726	0
	Bricks	38,002	6	3½	37,558	3
37 Geo. 3. Ch. 14	Cocoa Nuts and Coffee	7,890	15	0	7,889	5
	Tea	308,614	13	1	304,822	5
	British Spirits	108,500	14	0½	108,410	9
	Foreign ditto	194,066	15	6½	194,030	11
	Auctions	84,462	11	2½	83,147	2

EXCISE IN ENGLAND—*continued.*

DUTIES.	Gross Actual Receipt in Money.			Net Produce of each Article.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
38 Geo. 3. Ch. { 42 Tea - - -	154,307	6	6½	151,693	4	2½
{ 89 Salt - - -	974,417	19	3½	875,684	12	6½
40 Geo. 3. Ch. 23 { Spirits } British	111,341	15	0	111,250	5	7½
{ Tea } Foreign	194,543	10	9½	194,507	4	9½
41 Geo. 3. Ch. 8 Tea - - -	154,307	6	6½	152,443	18	2½
Paper, see below.	308,614	13	1	303,741	12	6½
42 Geo. 3. Ch. { 38 Beer - - -	160,543	12	0½	160,168	0	1
Hops - - -	21	9	0½	21	9	0½
Malt - - -	633,187	3	1½	632,575	16	8
Irish Spirits - - -	8,837	8	0	8,836	18	0
94 Paper - - -	289,118	18	4½	253,774	2	8½
ANNUAL DUTIES.						
Tobacco and Snuff - - -	452,553	19	10	389,922	12	6½
Malt Comm'd. 26th March - - -	1,219,284	6	10	836,816	7	7
Old Malt, Mum, Cyder, and Perry - - -	767,108	8	9½	679,321	2	5½
£.	15,517,290	16	8	11,784,889	0	8½

ABSTRACT OF THE ACCOUNT.

	£.	s.	d.
CASH resting on 5th January 1802, brought from last Year's Account	9,118	1	11½
RECEIVED between the 5th January 1802 and 3th January 1803	15,517,290	16	8
£.	15,526,408	18	7½
PAID Charges of Management	520,022	13	8
Taxes	31,012	3	1½
Exports	682,166	5	1½
Bounties	24,078	19	8½
Allowances	461,121	14	4½
Pensions	14,000	0	0
Exchequer Payments	13,774,158	8	10½
Cash resting on 5th January 1803, transferred to next Account	19,848	13	9½
£.	15,526,408	18	7½

EXCISE IN NORTH BRITAIN.

DUTIES.		Gross Actual Receipt.			NET PRODUCE.			Remitted to the Commissioners of Excise, London.		
		£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Auctions -	{ Confold -	7,956	9	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	7,670	18	7	7,500	0	0
	{ 1796	4,408	6	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	4,384	8	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	4,500	0	0
Beer, &c. -	{ Confold -	61,002	18	8 $\frac{1}{4}$	21,147	6	5 $\frac{3}{4}$	7,000	0	0
	{ 1802	10,098	14	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	7,472	10	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	7,000	0	0
Bricks & Tiles	{ Confold -	3,442	10	8	3,313	9	5	3,250	0	0
	{ 1794	1,999	10	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,935	12	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	2,000	0	0
	{ 1796	844	6	9 $\frac{3}{4}$	815	8	4	1,000	0	0
Candles -	-	17,107	13	0 $\frac{1}{4}$	13,263	1	5 $\frac{3}{4}$	10,000	0	0
Coaches -	-	59	0	0	59	0	0			
Coffee & Cocoa	{ Confold.	282	1	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	271	1	9 $\frac{1}{4}$	250	0	0
	{ 1795	282	1	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	271	1	9 $\frac{1}{4}$	250	0	0
	{ 1796	13	0	3	13	0	3			
Glass -	{ Confold.	29,449	12	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	10,739	12	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	4,250	0	0
	{ 1794	6,514	1	4 $\frac{1}{2}$						
Hides -	-	23,058	14	10	18,823	3	2	13,000	0	0
Paper -	{ Confold	10,953	19	4 $\frac{1}{4}$	9,880	1	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	10,250	0	0
	{ 1801	10,977	19	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	10,419	13	5 $\frac{3}{4}$	10,750	0	0
	{ 1802	9,861	15	11	9,849	16	11	8,750	0	0
Printed Goods -	-	103,550	13	7	66,707	0	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	50,500	0	0
Sope -	-	76,201	15	10 $\frac{3}{4}$	64,413	12	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	49,250	0	0
Starch -	-	4,347	5	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,860	4	0	500	0	0
Salt -	-	57,655	8	9	49,946	19	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	52,000	0	0
Malt, Additional -	1802	30,354	3	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	30,354	3	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	30,000	0	0
Do Consolidated -	-	14	18	5	10	18	3	500	0	0
Distillery -	1800	256,268	8	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	249,026	4	5	250,250	0	0
Foreign Spirits	{ Confolidated & 1791	160,651	5	10 $\frac{3}{4}$	130,036	18	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	55,000	0	0
	{ 1794	25,679	16	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	25,667	4	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	35,000	0	0
	{ 1795	25,679	16	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	25,667	4	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	25,750	0	0
	{ 1796	25,679	16	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	25,667	4	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	25,750	0	0
	{ 1800	25,179	16	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	25,667	4	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	25,000	0	0
Wine -	{ Confold	26,823	14	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	22,795	16	9 $\frac{1}{4}$	22,000	0	0
	{ 1795	45,038	2	0 $\frac{3}{4}$	36,808	0	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	37,250	0	0
	{ 1796	134	12	9 $\frac{1}{2}$						
Tobacco -	{ Old									
	{ Confold							510	0	0
	{ 1795	26,603	18	0	26,525	15	3	24,740	0	0
Plate -	{ Licences }	350	7	0	333	5	0	250	0	0
Spirit -		24,160	12	8	23,182	13	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	22,500	0	0
Tea -		1,513	1	0	1,407	19	0	500	0	0
General		2,476	0	0	2,435	10	0	1,750	0	0
Fines, &c. -	-	13,163	7	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	9,968	16	6 $\frac{1}{4}$			
TOTAL Excise -		1,130,339	19	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	938,673	16	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	824,500	0	0

EXCISE IN NORTH BRITAIN—*continued.*

DUTIES.	Gross Actual Receipt.	NET PRODUCE.	Remitted to the Commissioners of Excise, London.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Malt, 23 June - - -	22,461 14 4	10,389 5 8½	6,250 0 0
Do 25 March - - -	30,847 6 7	23,571 18 9½	24,250 0 0
Tobacco, 25 March - -	62,871 8 1¼	61,960 1 10¼	59,000 0 0
TOTAL Malt & Tobacco } Ann^l	116,180 9 0¼	95,921 6 5¼	89,500 0 0
GRAND TOTAL - -	1,246,520 8 2	1,034,595 2 6½	914,000 0 0

A GENERAL STATE of the foregoing ACCOUNT.

	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Cash remaining to be accounted for, on 5th January 1804 }	60,856 19 1¾		
Gross Receipt, from 5th January 1804 to 5th January 1803 }	1,246,520 8 2		
		1,307,377 7 3¾	
Charges of Management	117,980 13 10		
Exports - - -	75,208 13 11		
Allowances - - -	18,735 17 10½		
		211,925 5 7½	
ACCUMULATED NET } PRODUCE - - - }	— —		1,095,452 1 8½
DISPOSAL of the NET PRODUCE:			
Bounties on Fish ex- ported - - - }	1,423 7 5		
Buys and Barrel Boun- ties paid on Defi- ciency of Money in the Customs }	40,543 5 4		

EXCISE IN NORTH BRITAIN—*continued.*

	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Paid per Treasury Warrant. { To (Mr. A. Monro for behoof of) Dr. Jas Jaffray, for Enquiries into Distilleries & Salt Works -	1,338	10	4						
Paid per Excise-quer Precepts. { To the Agent for the Equivalent Company -	5,300	0	0						
{ To the Receiver General of the Crown Rents, &c.	68,915	15	0½						
				117,520	18	1½			
Remitted to the Commissioners of Excise, London -	914,000	0	0						
Resting to be accounted for, on 5th Jan. 1803 -	63,931	3	6½						
				977,931	3	6½			
							1,095,452	1	8½
ABSTRACT:									
Cash resting to be accounted for, on 5th January 1802 -	—	—		60,856	19	1½			
Gross Receipt, from 5th January 1802 to 5th January 1803 -	—	—		1,246,520	8	2			
CHARGE -	—	—					1,307,377	7	3½
Charges of Management, Exports, and Allowances -	—	—		211,525	5	7½			
Disbursements out of the Net Produce -	—	—		117,520	18	1½			
Remittances to London -	—	—		914,000	0	0			
Resting to be accounted for, on 5th Jan. 1803 -	—	—		63,931	3	6½			
DISCHARGE -	—	—					1,307,377	7	3½

3. STAMPS. ENGLAND.									
HEADS OF DUTY.				GROSS PRODUCE.			NET PRODUCE.		
				£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Consolidated Stamp Duties	-	-	-	614,468	18	4	525,826	3	—
ance	-	-	1782	169,136	19	4½	160,015	17	4
and Silver Plate	-	-	1784	29,611	17	10½	24,620	17	1
Horse	-	-	1784	739	1	—	573	12	—
Horse	-	-	1785	217,916	1	2½	215,304	14	10
cine	-	-	1785	21,070	7	7	9,293	17	9
-	-	-	1785	56,049	—	11½	52,060	18	3
anies Licences	-	-	1785	34,885	8	5	34,354	9	1
brokers Do.	-	-	1785	4,695	9	9	4,480	13	4
mery	-	-	1786	52	18	9	50	16	11
ry Stamps and Licences	-	-	-	6,748	2	10	997	8	8
tional Game	-	-	1791	27,339	6	11	26,140	4	7
of Exchange	-	-	1791	142,279	3	8½	137,844	12	2
pts	-	-	1791	58,070	2	6½	51,814	2	5
nik's Articles	-	-	1794	26,347	19	6½	25,659	6	—
tional Duties	-	-	1795	37,093	17	9	36,231	3	9
Powder Certificates	-	-	1795	1,268	11	6½	1,253	16	9
tional Receipts	-	-	1795	10,750	15	3½	9,978	16	1
nsurance	-	-	1795	105,381	9	5½	100,701	9	4
- Dealers Licences	-	-	1795	161	9	11½	225	—	2
ry Duty	-	-	1796	128,518	5	9½	125,306	10	5
Duty	-	-	1796	41,862	18	5½	36,401	16	6
tional Stage Coach	-	-	1797	56,666	16	2½	56,075	1	7
s, &c.	-	-	1797	727,765	5	7½	684,567	5	8
arial Bearing Certificates	-	-	1798	591	13	3½	563	16	6
. Notes	-	-	1799	14,188	3	10	14,054	16	1
ts	-	-	1801	489,242	10	5	475,232	7	6
cine	-	-	1801	16,243	3	7½	14,011	2	10
				£.	3,039,195	19 11½	2,823,680	16	8½

GENERAL STATEMENT.

CHARGE.

DISCHARGE.

1802. Jan. 5th.	CHARGE.	£.	s.	d.	1803. Jan. 5th.	DISCHARGE.	£.	s.	d.
	Balance in Bills outstanding					Parliamentary Allowances	86,118	3	1½
	D° - - of Cash in the Hands of the several present Distributors in England	3,126	9	2		Debentures	6,468	4	3
	D° - - of Cash due from sundry Distributors who have died or gone out of Office since January 5th, 1800	103,919	2	6½		The Two Universities for Almanacks	1,250	—	—
	D° - - of Cash in the Hands of the Receiver General, as per Lottery Account of January 5th, 1802	21,628	7	11½		Charges of Management	74,792	17	3½
	Gross Produce	3,039,295	19	11½		Incidents	38,230	8	—
						Imprest	5,385	—	—
						Parchment, Paper, and Blanks, for the Use of the Country	15,370	10	7
						Exchequer Payments	2,836,139	16	5
						Balance in Bills outstanding	3,815	19	—
						D° - - of Cash in the Hands of the several present Distributors in England	94,977	10	5
						D° - - of Cash due from sundry Distributors who have died or gone out of Office since January 5th, 1800	17,412	10	6½
						D° - - of Cash in the Hands of the Receiver General	91	1	8
							3,168,052	1	3½

SCOTLAND.

HEADS OF DUTY.	GROSS PRODUCE.			NET PRODUCE.			Remittances paid into the EXCHEQUER.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
Consolidated Stamp Duties }	35,486	12	8½	30,459	15	6½	30,939	18	6
Insurance - 1782	2,826	—	10	2,712	7	6	2,715	—	—
Gold & Silver Plate 1784	1,141	18	5	1,077	8	2½	1,297	—	—
Race Horse - 1784	20	6	—	20	5	7	37	—	—
Post Horse - 1785	2,534	1	10	2,358	10	3½	2,357	15	7
Medicine - - - 1785	100	6	9	—	—	4	235	—	—
Game - - - 1785	3,585	1	6	3,372	11	8	3,389	—	—
Attornies Licences 1785	3,711	12	—	3,549	5	4	2,534	—	—
Pawnbrokers - 1785	—	—	—	4	7	8	29	—	—
Additional Duty in Scotland } 1786	1,631	7	11	1,563	8	2	1,666	—	—
Ditto - - - Game 1791	1,866	19	6	1,820	6	5	1,797	—	—
Bills of Exchange 1791	10,648	1	5	19,308	12	9	18,881	—	—
Receipts - - - 1791	3,814	14	1	3,631	4	8	3,442	—	—
Additional Duties 1795	123	11	6	124	14	7	134	—	—
Ditto - - - Receipts 1795	546	1	—	565	8	9	558	—	—
Sea Insurance - - 1795	8,163	8	9	7,831	14	—	7,467	—	—
Legacy Duty - 1796	6,683	1	11½	6,049	17	2	5,883	—	—
Hat Duty - - - 1796	971	—	6	832	12	4	877	—	—
Additional Stage Coach } 1797	2,534	1	10	2,262	10	3½	2,357	15	7
Deeds, &c. - 1797	48,824	8	10	44,690	14	5½	44,099	—	—
Small Notes - 1799	3,303	16	3	2,907	4	11	2,906	—	—
Additional Duties 1801	33,381	7	6	31,891	14	—	31,710	—	—
Medicine Duty 1802	204	9	9	204	9	9	50	—	—
	182,100	—	3	167,376	5	8½	165,183	7	3
			[B 2]						

GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE ACCOUNT, INCLUDING THE BALANCES.

CHARGE.	DISCHARGE.
£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Balance in the Hands of Alex ^r Mensies, Receiver General for Scotland, Jan. 5th 1802	Parliamentary Al- lowances } 3,141 9 3 Debentures - - - 5 19 5
Gross Receipt with- in the Year } 182,100 - 3	Incidents - - - 2,650 - 3½
	Charges of Manage- ment } 8,956 5 7
	Remittances paid into the Exchequer } 165,183 7 8
	Balance of Cash in the Hands of Alex ^r Mac Lean, Receiver Ge- neral for Scotland, Jan. 5th 1803 } 22,358 6 0½
<u>£. 202,265 8 9</u>	<u>£. 202,265 8 9</u>

OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

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4. LAND and ASSESSED TAXES; ENGLAND.

GROSS PRODUCE, being the Gross Receipt An. 1802.				NET PRODUCE, being the Payments into Exchequer and Receiver General of the Customs.			
	£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.
Land Tax	1,548,574	18	5½	Land Tax	1,378,771	5	8½
Assessed Taxes	3,372,882	19	8	Assessed Taxes	3,221,276	4	—¼
Income Duty	2,977,161	8	2¼	Income Duty	2,893,856	15	7½
Aid and Contribution Tax	44,989	4	3	Aid and Contribution Tax	44,125	11	7¼
Commutation (Customs)	276	14	11¼	Commutation (Customs)	276	14	11¼
	£. 7,943,885	5	6½		£. 7,538,305	11	11¼

SCOTLAND.

GROSS PRODUCE, being the Gross Receipt An. 1802.				NET PRODUCE, being the Payments into Exchequer and to Receiver General of Customs.			
	£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.
Land Tax	32,312	18	—	Land Tax	36,000	—	—
Assessed Taxes	163,784	19	5	Assessed Taxes	147,000	—	—
Income Duty	256,405	15	5	Income Duty	339,000	—	—
Aid and Contribution Tax	3,917	—	8	Aid and Contribution Tax	3,000	—	—
Commutation (Customs)	—	—	—	Commutation (Customs)	—	—	—
	£. 456,420	13	6		£. 525,000	—	—

HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC REVENUE

5. POST OFFICE.

	Gross Produce.			Management.			Returns.			Packet Establishment.			Captured and Extra Packets.			Irish, with £ 4,000 per Annum.			Irish Ireland Postage.			Total.		
	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.
England, Letters	9,43,168	6	3	188,322	7	4	33,193	4	6	22,650	4	3	7,779	8	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	683,270	15	3
Foreign ditto	153,747	12	3	22,709	1	16	427	5	8	19,289	-	-	16,898	13	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	113,363	11	6
Twopenny Post	98,909	10	1	23,892	3	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35,077	6	8
Scotland	121,700	13	6	18,692	19	4	7,620	19	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	95,397	5	1
Ireland	1,219	1	8	-	-	-	2,798	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,138	12	10	7,693	15	5	19,561	13	-
	1,219,118	3	11	253,616	11	10	44,050	19	7	32,549	11	3	24,618	1	8	9,138	12	10	7,698	15	5	947,010	11	3

6. DUTIES ON SALARIES AND PENSIONS.

ENGLAND.

Gross Produce of the One Shilling per £. Duty on Salaries and Pensions from 5th January 1802 to ditto 1803. -

£. s. d.
47,457 10 6

Declared Balance on 5th January 1802 - - -

- 6 10½

Total Charge - - - £.

47,457 17 4½

DISCHARGE.

By Cash paid into the Exchequer during the Period of the Account - - -

£. 47,156 - -

By Poundage on £. 47,457. 10. 6. at 1½ per £.

296 12 2

By Fees paid at the Exchequer, and on attesting the Account - - -

4 13 6

47,457 5 8

Balance due by Mr. Lane on the 5th January 1803 - - -

£.

- 11 8½

SCOTLAND.

Balance in the Hands of the Receiver General on the 5th January 1802 - - -

£. s. d.
11,983 1 5

Gross Produce, Year ended 5th January 1803 £. 3,163 16 3

Payments thereout on Account of Management

213 6 9

Net Produce Year ended 5th January 1803 - - -

2,950 9 6

Payments into the Exchequer - - -

14,933 10 11

14,900 6 5

Balance in the Hands of the Receiver General on the 5th January 1803 - - -

33 4 6

HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC REVENUE

SIXPENNY DUTY.

	£.	s.	d.
ENGLAND—Gross Produce of the Sixpenny Duty on Salaries, Pensions, and Incidents, from 5th January 1802 to 5th January 1803	59,264	17	6½
SCOTLAND—Do - - - Do - - - Do - - -	2,554	9	9
	61,819	7	3½
Declared Balance of the Account, ended the 5th January 1802	—	16	6½
Total Charge	61,820	3	10

DISCHARGE.

	£.	s.	d.
By Cash paid into the Exchequer during the Period of the Account	60,728	—	—
By Poundage on £.61,819 7s. 3d½ at 1½ per £.	386	7	5
By Fees paid at the Exchequer, and on attesting the Account	5	—	6
By One Year's Compensation paid to Thos Astle Esq. late Receiver General of the Sixpenny Deductions, per Treasury Warrant	700	—	—
	61,819	7	11
Balance due by Mr. Lane, on the 5th January 1803	—	15	11

7. HACKNEY COACH OFFICE.

Actual Receipt in Money.	Net Produce.	Payments into the Exchequer.	Charges of Management.	Balance in Hand, 5th January 1803.
£. s. d. 27,697 10 10¾ 325 — 10¾ 27,372 10 —	£. s. d. 25,109 10 5¼	£. s. d. 24,975 — —	£. s. d. 2 588 — 5½	£. s. d. 134 10 5¼

8. HAWKERS and PEDLARS.

	Gross Receipt.	Net Produce.	Net Payments into the Exchequer.	Charges of Management.
Year ending 5th January 1803	£. s. d. 2,500 19 7½	£. s. d. 5,725 19 7½	£. s. d. 5,279 — —	£. s. d. 2,875 — —

9. ALIENATION OFFICE, 22d February 1803.

Remaining in the Hands of the Receiver General at the End of Hilary Term 1802	£5,709 — 8	£. s. d.
Paid into the Receipt of His Majesty's Exchequer in the above Year	2,941 5 4	
		2,767 15 4
Received on Writs of Covenant and Writs of Entry, to the End of Easter Term 1802	£2,120 3 4	
- - - - on the like, to End of Trinity Term following	909 10 —	
- - - - on the like, to End of Michaelmas Term following	2,028 6 8	
- - - - on the like, to End of Hilary Term 1803	1,399 6 8	
Gross Produce	£6,457 6 8	
Paid Charges of Management, for Easter Term 1802	£313 3 5	
- - - the like, for Trinity Term following	317 2 —	
- - - the like, for Michaelmas Term follow- ing	289 1 3	
- - - the like, for Hilary Term 1803	295 6 8	
- - - the Amount of a Treasury Warrant for an Allowance to G. Cour- thope and C. Luxmore, Esquires	308 1 6	
	1,522 16 10	
Paid the Clerk of the Hanaper, at the End of Easter, Trinity, Michaelmas, and Hilary Terms — £500. per Term	2,000 — —	
	3,522 16 10	
		2,934 9 10
Net Produce		
Remaining in the Hands of the Receiver General at the End of Hilary Term 1803	£5,702 5 2	

10. POST FINES.

	£.	s.	d.
Balance in the Hands of the Receiver General on the 5th of January 1802 - - - - -	2,535	10	6½
Receipt within the Year ending the 5th of January 1803 -	201	16	—
Balance in the Hands of the Receiver General on the 5th of January 1803 - - - - -	£2,737	6	6½

11. ALUM MINES and other INCIDENTS.

	£.	s.	d.
Rent of Alum Mines - - - - -	960	—	—
Rent of Light Houses - - - - -	6	13	4
Seizures of Uncustomed and Prohibited Goods, - -	62,073	3	7½
Compositions - - - - -	1	13	4
Profers - - - - -	640	—	—
	£	63,681	10 3½

A P P E N D I X:

No. II.

ACCOUNT of the Prices of the different Stocks from the 1st January 1731, to the 1st January 1803.

The following Abstract is drawn up in order to give a general View of the Variations in the Price of the different Funds, and consequently of the State of our public Credit, since the Year 1730. Those who are desirous of procuring more accurate Information upon the Subject, may have their Curiosity gratified by consulting the different periodical Publications, and the Books kept at the Stock Exchange, whence this Account is taken. The Reader will please to observe, that where a Blank is left it denotes that there is no Variation from the preceding Month; and that the Price is in general stated at a medium Rate, neither the highest nor the lowest.

Year.		India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S. S. Stock.	S. S. Ann.	3 per.Cents.
1731.	January	189	144	103	106	95
	February	190	145	101	107	94
	March	198	147	103	108	96
	April	194	—	104	106	—
	May	196	145	102	—	—
	June	—	146	103	107	99
	July	194	147	—	108	95
	August	—	146	—	—	96
	September	—	148	—	—	—
	October	174	145	102	109	94
	November	175	146	103	110	95
	December	181	148	—	108	97
1732.	January	178	149	101	110	96
	February	177	—	98	—	97
	March	175	150	99	—	—
	April	178	148	98	108	—
	May	177	147	—	—	—
	June	168	148	97	109	—
	July	163	150	98	110	98
	August	157	152	104	112	99
	September	—	—	—	—	—
	October	155	149	—	—	—
	November	154	—	—	109	101
	December	156	—	—	—	—

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S S. Stock.	S.S. Ann.	1 per Cent.
733- January	159	150	105	110	100
February	158	151	102	110	100
March	158	150	102	110	100
April	162	150	103	111	102
May	163	150	106	110	103
June	160	150	105	109	100
July	152	145	104	108	97
August	151	143	80	107	97
September	140	132	73	102	92
October	136	130	72	102	92
November	141	137	81	102	92
December	136	133	75	100	92
734- January	135	132	76	99	92
February	136	132	75	100	92
March	142	134	76	104	94
April	146	137	80	104	94
May	141	136	79	104	93
June	142	140	78	105	93
July	146	140	81	106	94
August	141	135	79	104	92
September	149	139	83	106	94
October	149	139	83	106	94
November	147	140	82	106	92
December	149	141	81	107	92
735- January	148	138	82	105	92
February	146	140	80	104	92
March	145	140	80	104	92
April	147	140	82	107	92
May	147	140	82	107	92
June	147	140	82	107	92
July	147	140	82	107	92
August	147	140	82	107	92
September	147	140	82	107	92
October	147	140	82	107	92
November	147	140	82	107	92
December	147	140	82	107	92
736- January	146	138	82	105	92
February	145	140	80	104	92
March	147	140	82	107	92
April	147	140	82	107	92
May	147	140	82	107	92
June	147	140	82	107	92
July	147	140	82	107	92
August	147	140	82	107	92
September	147	140	82	107	92
October	147	140	82	107	92
November	147	140	82	107	92
December	147	140	82	107	92
737- January	146	138	82	105	92
February	145	140	80	104	92
March	147	140	82	107	92
April	147	140	82	107	92
May	147	140	82	107	92
June	147	140	82	107	92
July	147	140	82	107	92
August	147	140	82	107	92
September	147	140	82	107	92
October	147	140	82	107	92
November	147	140	82	107	92
December	147	140	82	107	92
738- January	146	138	82	105	92
February	145	140	80	104	92
March	147	140	82	107	92
April	147	140	82	107	92
May	147	140	82	107	92
June	147	140	82	107	92
July	147	140	82	107	92
August	147	140	82	107	92
September	147	140	82	107	92
October	147	140	82	107	92
November	147	140	82	107	92
December	147	140	82	107	92
739- January	146	138	82	105	92
February	145	140	80	104	92
March	147	140	82	107	92
April	147	140	82	107	92
May	147	140	82	107	92
June	147	140	82	107	92
July	147	140	82	107	92
August	147	140	82	107	92
September	147	140	82	107	92
October	147	140	82	107	92
November	147	140	82	107	92
December	147	140	82	107	92
740- January	146	138	82	105	92
February	145	140	80	104	92
March	147	140	82	107	92
April	147	140	82	107	92
May	147	140	82	107	92
June	147	140	82	107	92
July	147	140	82	107	92
August	147	140	82	107	92
September	147	140	82	107	92
October	147	140	82	107	92
November	147	140	82	107	92
December	147	140	82	107	92

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	U.S. Stock.	U.S. Ann.	3 per Cent.
April	180	145	102	108	105
May	181	147	103	110	—
June	182	146	—	111	107
July	174	143	—	110	105
August	176	145	101	111	106
September	—	—	—	—	—
October	—	142	—	—	—
November	—	—	—	—	—
December	—	143	—	110	—
1738 January	174	140	101	110	106
February	176	141	—	111	—
March	174	—	100	111	105
April	—	—	—	—	—
May	173	142	101	110	—
June	—	—	—	—	—
July	162	140	99	109	102
August	170	143	101	111	105
September	171	145	103	113	—
October	173	142	—	111	—
November	—	141	—	—	—
December	121	142	104	112	106
1739 January	121	143	103	112	104
February	168	—	97	111	—
March	—	144	100	112	105
April	—	142	—	113	—
May	169	—	—	111	—
June	159	138	95	109	100
July	153	137	94	108	98
August	154	139	93	—	99
September	155	134	94	—	99
October	—	135	—	106	97
November	157	138	96	109	98
December	159	139	97	110	100
1740 January	154	138	96	109	98
February	—	139	95	—	99
March	—	141	98	111	100
April	—	139	—	—	101
May	162	141	100	—	—
June	164	140	101	112	100
July	159	142	—	—	—
August	104	144	—	—	101
September	—	—	95	—	100
October	153	—	—	108	99
November	—	—	98	110	—
December	—	138	—	109	—
1741 January	157	140	102	111	98
February	—	142	101	111	99
March	—	—	102	111	—
April	164	143	104	113	101
May	159	140	103	111	—
June	160	141	—	—	—

OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

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Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S.S. Stock.	S.S. Ann.	3 per Cent.
July	155	141	103	111	99
August	—	—	101	—	98
September	157	—	103	112	99
October	159	140	104	111	99
November	161	138	105	112	101
December	—	135	104	111	100
1741. January	—	136	—	112	98
February	157	—	103	111	99
March	—	129	105	113	100
April	159	137	—	111	101
May	161	—	106	113	—
June	172	142	109	114	102
July	174	—	111	—	100
August	173	143	109	—	101
September	172	—	—	—	100
October	174	140	110	113	—
November	178	143	111	—	101
December	—	—	—	114	102
1742. January	—	145	112	114	101
February	—	—	110	—	100
March	—	—	—	—	—
April	186	146	111	113	101
May	195	148	115	114	103
June	—	147	114	103	102
July	189	—	—	105	103
August	—	—	110	115	102
September	—	148	111	115	101
October	194	146	113	114	102
November	—	—	—	—	—
December	—	147	—	—	—
1743. January	194	148	—	113	99
February	182	145	—	110	96
March	18	142	103	108	90
April	—	—	105	—	93
May	172	—	—	—	—
June	178	144	108	111	—
July	176	146	109	112	—
August	—	147	—	110	—
September	178	—	—	—	—
October	—	144	109	—	—
November	—	—	105	111	—
December	—	146	—	—	—
1744. January	180	145	109	110	89
February	182	—	106	—	—
March	—	147	107	—	—
April	—	—	—	—	92
May	187	146	109	—	93
June	186	—	—	111	92
July	181	—	—	—	90
August	174	143	103	108	87
September	170	141	—	102	85

HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC REVENUE

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S.S. Stock.	S. S. Ann. 3 per Cents.	
October	172	138	100	105	86
November	169	133	98	103	—
December	163	127	—	100	—
1746. January	176	125	94	97	76
February	154	—	—	93	75
March	156	—	—	—	—
April	167	124	97	97	82
May	—	—	—	96	—
June	174	127	—	97	83
July	178	133	105	102	85
August	—	136	106	106	89
September	184	135	—	—	88
October	180	131	—	104	85
November	—	126	103	101	83
December	—	128	104	—	84
Bank 4 per Cents.*					
1747. January	180	127	103	95	83
February	177	128	99	97	84
March	175	129	102	96	86
April	157	128	104	97	85
May	151	126	103	96	86
June	155	125	102	97	—
July	156	122	103	95	—
August	161	125	104	93	82
September	160	126	100	—	—
October	—	121	99	—	—
November	162	119	100	—	—
December	161	120	99	—	81
1748. January	160	118	100	95	79
February	157	119	94	90	82
March	156	120	92	89	76
April	157	122	105	93	80
May	170	124	106	96	88
June	176	126	110	100	90
July	184	127	107	97	89
August	178	—	106	—	90
September	180	128	—	98	88
October	183	129	107	99	91
November	178	—	—	97	90
December	175	126	106	96	89
1749. January	176	127	107	98	91
February	174	129	106	101	94
March	175	131	107	102	95
April	177	128	—	—	—
May	179	134	114	105	100
June	185	136	115	106	99
July	186	137	116	105	100

This Stock is now known under the Name of the 3 per Cent Reduced, in consequence of the reduction of interest, from 4 to $3\frac{1}{2}$, and afterwards to 3 per Cent, during the Administration of Mr. Pelham.

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S.S. Stock.	Bank 4 per C.	3 per C.
August	189	140	115	104	100
September	191	139	117	104	101
October	190	138	115	105	102
November	189	135	112	104	99
December	188	133	111	104	100
1750. January	186	134	110	102	98
February	187	132	111	100	99
March	188	134	109	102	100
April	185	131	110	103	100
May	184	133	112	104	101
June	188	134	112	105	101
July	187	132	111	103	100
August	186	135	113	104	101
September	184	133	112	103	99
October	185	134	113	103	99
November	187	136	113	103	99
December	188	136	113	103	99
1751. January	185	135	112	100	97
February	186	136	110	101	98
March	187	139	112	102	99
April	189	137	113	103	100
May	192	138	114	104	99
June	195	141	115	104	99
July	190	140	116	103	103
August	184	139	113	104	100
September	187	142	115	105	99
October	188	140	117	104	100
November	190	142	113	103	102
December	189	143	117	103	102
1752. January	187	141	118	104	101
February	188	144	116	105	102
March	187	145	117	104	103
April	189	143	118	107	104
May	190	146	120	106	105
June	192	147	121	109	106
July	186	148	120	108	105
August	188	147	119	107	104
September	191	144	121	107	104
October	192	143	122	108	106
November	194	143	123	107	105
December(18)	195	143	123	108	106
Reduced to $3\frac{1}{2}$.					
1753. January	191	144	122	107	106
February	192	143	121	106	104
March	193	141	120	106	105
April	194 *	138	121	107	103
May	195	137	122	107	103
June	197	138	120	107	103
July	193	138	120	107	103
August	192	138	120	107	103

* Dividend reduced to $4\frac{1}{2}$ per Cent.

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S.S. Stock.	Bank 4 per C.	3 per C.
September	191	137	120	107	104
October	193	136	119	105	—
November	194	135	120	—	—
December	193	136	121	104	105
1754. January	187	135	—	103	104
February	188	134	118	104	102
March	186	133	117	—	—
April	189	132	118	105	103
May	190	133	119	104	—
June	192	134	—	105	104
July	187	133	—	—	—
August	188	130	118	—	—
September	187	132	—	—	—
October	185	131	116	104	103
November	183	132	—	103	102
December	182	129	117	101	—
1755. January	180	130	114	102	100
February	176	129	113	100	101
March	173	131	112	99	99
April	171	129	109	98	98
May	171	126	111	99	97
June	174	127	112	93	99
July	167	126	104	92	—
August	165	127	103	93	92
September	166	123	104	—	90
October	148	122	103	92	93
November	149	123	104	93	91
December	150	120	105	—	92
Bank 3½ per Cent.					
1756. January	145	121	104	92	89
February	143	119	101	91	—
March	142	120	100	90	—
April	141	118	102	—	90
May	140	117	101	89	89
June	135	116	100	—	—
July	133	117	—	—	87
August	134	116	99	88	89
September	133	117	100	89	88
October	—	115	99	90	—
November	135	116	—	88	89
December	136	115	100	87	88
1757. January	133	116	101	88	86
February	135	117	100	89	87
March	137	119	99	91	89
April	139	116	101	90	88
May	142	119	—	89	89
June	140	113	102	—	90
July	133	119	—	—	88
August	120	120	—	90	89
September	138	—	100	—	91
October	141	119	—	89	—

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S. S. Stock.	Bank 4 per C.	3 per C.
November	142	117	104	90	89
December	140	118	—	—	90
1758. January	141	119	103	—	91
February	145	121	104	92	94
March	146	122	106	93	—
				3 per C. Consol.	
April	147	119	105	—	93
May	148	121	—	—	94
June	146	122	106	—	95
July	140	120	107	—	97
August	132	118	108	—	90
September	135	—	101	—	89
October	134	117	102	—	90
November	136	—	100	—	91
December	137	—	—	—	98
1759. January	133	116	98	—	82
February	135	117	97	—	86
March	134	—	95	—	82
April	129	—	93	—	80
May	128	113	92	—	—
June	126	114	—	—	79
July	123	111	—	—	—
August	125	110	94	—	82
September	126	112	—	—	81
October	130	—	95	—	—
November	134	111	96	—	84
December	141	113	97	—	—
1760. January	134	114	96	—	82
February	—	112	90	—	81
March	135	110	—	—	82
April	137	—	92	—	—
May	136	109	94	—	—
June	138	110	—	—	—
July	140	111	93	—	83
August	139	—	—	—	—
September	141	—	—	—	82
October	142	110	—	—	83
November	139	107	90	—	80
December	140	106	88	—	76
1761. January	137	105	86	88	74
February	136	104	—	89	73
March	135	107	87	90	76
April	143	115	88	100	88
May	144	114	96	102	87
June	143	—	—	101	86
July	141	115	—	—	81
August	134	112	90	94	76
September	133	111	88	92	74
October	128	—	84	88	72

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S S. Stock.	Bank 4 per Cents.	3 per Cent. Confol.
November	127	103	83	86	71
December	123	98	81	81	66
1762. January	115	94 *	76	74	63
February	114	95	75	78	68
March	115	96	78	77	67
April	117	97	79	81	70
May	118	98	81	85	73
June	—	—	—	83	72
July	116	100	84	84	75
August	134	108	95	95	79
September	145	102	91	91	81
October	139	109	94	92	80
November	153	110	98	100	86
December	157	119	101	97	87
1763. January	158	120	102	100	90
February	169	126	105	105	93
March	170	131	106	108	96
April	172	126	—	107	92
May	170	123	—	105	91
June	171	122	104	106	—
July	165	118	—	100	89
August	162	114	95	97	87
September	159	116	94	95	84
October	154	111	92	94	—
November	155	112	94	96	83
December	157	113	93	—	—
1764. January	158	114	94	95	82
February	159	116	93	—	84
March	152	117	95	97	86
April	154	115	—	98	83
May	149	114	—	99	—
June	145	113	—	—	—
July	147	—	93	94	81
August	146	—	92	—	82
September	148	122	—	—	83
October	150	123	95	93	80
November	153	127	—	94	82
December	151	122	—	98	83
1765. January	152	126	96	97	85
February	—	130	—	98	87
March	—	—	—	—	—
April	154	—	—	—	—
May	—	—	—	97	—
June	—	129	—	98	86
July	156	133	102	100	—
August	—	136	—	101	87
September	163	—	—	—	89

* On the 29th January 1762, Bank Stock was as low as 91, the lowest Price known.

Year.		India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S. S. Stock.	Bank 4 per Cents.	3 per Cent. Consol.
	October	163	136	102	99	91
	November	—	—	—	102	92
	December	—	135	—	104	90
1766.	January	162	134	101	102	89
	February	—	—	—	100	87
	March	—	—	102	103	88
	April	178	—	—	101	89
	May	189	135	—	102	90
	June	—	—	—	—	—
	July	—	—	—	—	88
	August	207	139	—	103	90
	September	223	—	—	—	87
	October	218	—	—	101	89
	November	217	136	—	—	—
	December	—	140	—	—	—
1767.	January	220	141	101	102	88
	February	234	142	—	—	89
	March	246	—	—	—	88
	April	254	—	—	100	—
	May	248	144	104	101	—
	June	250	147	102	103	87
	July	253	148	104	102	—
	August	267	150	105	—	—
	September	270	152	107	—	88
	October	273	158	108	101	90
	November	268	155	—	—	91
	December	265	158	109	102	90
1768.	January	260	161	108	103	91
	February	261	163	106	104	92
	March	262	165	107	108	93
	April	272	166	108	103	—
	May	271	167	110	104	—
	June	269	168	—	101	92
	July	275	164	—	103	90
	August	276	166	105	99	89
	September (6)	276½	167	—	100	—
	October	275	162	—	—	—
	November	271	160	104	101	88
	December	272	161	—	—	89
1769.	January	275	162	103	102	88
	February	276	163	—	—	—
	March	275	165	—	—	—
	April	273	164	106	—	—
	May	264	166	105	99	89

* India Stock on the 1st of May was 273½ but unfavourable accounts from the East Indies caused a remarkable fall in the course of the month; on the 29th it was 250, and on the 31st 230. In consequence of the alarm a General Court was held 1st June, when extracts from the last advices from India being read, the

A P P E N D I X:

No. II.

ACCOUNT of the Prices of the different Stocks from the 1st January 1731, to the 1st January 1803.

The following Abstract is drawn up in order to give a general View of the Variations in the Price of the different Funds, and consequently of the State of our public Credit, since the Year 1730. Those who are desirous of procuring more accurate Information upon the Subject, may have their Curiosity gratified by consulting the different periodical Publications, and the Books kept at the Stock Exchange, whence this Account is taken. The Reader will please to observe, that where a Blank is left it denotes that there is no Variation from the preceding Month; and that the Price is in general stated at a medium Rate, neither the highest nor the lowest.

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S. S. Stock.	S. S. Ann.	3 per Cent.
1731. January	189	144	103	106	95
February	190	145	101	107	94
March	198	147	103	108	96
April	194	—	104	106	—
May	196	145	102	—	—
June	—	146	103	107	99
July	194	147	—	108	95
August	—	146	—	—	96
September	—	148	—	—	—
October	174	145	102	109	94
November	175	146	103	110	95
December	181	148	—	108	97
1732. January	178	149	101	110	96
February	177	—	98	—	97
March	175	150	99	—	—
April	178	148	98	108	—
May	177	147	—	—	—
June	168	148	97	109	—
July	163	150	98	110	98
August	157	152	104	112	99
September	—	—	—	—	—
October	155	149	—	—	—
November	154	—	—	109	101
December	156	—	—	—	—

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S. S. Stock.	S. S. Ann.	3 per Cent.
1833- January	159	150	105	110	100
February	158	151	102	110	100
March	158	150	102	110	100
April	162	150	103	111	102
May	163	150	106	110	103
June	160	150	105	109	100
July	152	145	104	108	97
August	151	143	80	102	97
September	140	132	73	102	92
October	136	130	72	102	92
November	141	137	81	102	92
December	136	133	75	100	98
1834- January	135	132	76	99	98
February	136	132	75	100	98
March	142	134	76	104	94
April	146	137	80	104	94
May	141	136	79	104	93
June	143	140	78	105	93
July	146	140	81	106	94
August	141	135	79	104	92
September	149	139	83	105	94
October	149	140	82	106	94
November	149	141	81	107	94
December	148	138	83	105	94
1835- January	146	140	82	106	94
February	145	140	80	106	94
March	147	146	90	108	98
April	167	146	90	108	98
May	169	145	93	109	98
June	169	145	93	109	98
July	169	147	95	109	100
August	174	149	99	111	102
September	176	150	98	111	102
October	176	150	98	111	102
November	176	150	98	111	102
December	176	150	98	111	102
1836- January	176	150	98	111	102
February	176	150	98	111	102
March	176	150	98	111	102
April	176	150	98	111	102
May	176	150	98	111	102
June	176	150	98	111	102
July	176	150	98	111	102
August	176	150	98	111	102
September	176	150	98	111	102
October	176	150	98	111	102
November	176	150	98	111	102
December	176	150	98	111	102
1837- January	177	149	111	112	103
February	179	151	112	112	103
March	181	147	101	107	103

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S. S. Stock.	S. S. Ann.	3 per Cent.
April	180	145	102	108	105
May	181	147	103	110	—
June	182	146	—	111	107
July	174	143	—	110	105
August	176	145	101	111	106
September	—	—	—	—	—
October	—	142	—	—	—
November	—	—	—	—	—
December	—	143	—	110	—
1732 January	174	140	101	110	106
February	176	141	—	111	—
March	174	—	100	111	105
April	—	—	—	—	—
May	173	142	101	110	—
June	—	—	—	—	—
July	162	140	99	109	102
August	170	143	101	111	105
September	171	145	103	113	—
October	173	142	—	111	—
November	—	141	—	—	—
December	121	142	104	112	106
1733 January	121	143	103	112	104
February	168	—	97	111	—
March	—	144	106	112	105
April	—	142	—	113	—
May	169	—	—	111	—
June	159	138	95	109	100
July	153	137	94	108	98
August	154	139	93	—	99
September	155	134	94	—	95
October	—	135	—	106	97
November	157	138	96	109	98
December	159	139	97	110	100
1734 January	154	138	96	109	98
February	—	139	95	—	99
March	—	141	98	111	100
April	—	139	—	—	101
May	162	141	100	—	—
June	164	140	101	112	100
July	159	142	—	—	—
August	104	144	—	—	101
September	—	—	95	—	100
October	153	—	—	108	99
November	—	—	98	110	—
December	—	138	—	109	—
1741 January	157	140	102	111	98
February	—	142	101	110	99
March	—	—	102	111	—
April	164	143	104	113	101
May	159	140	103	111	—
June	160	141	—	—	—

OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

31

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S.S. Stock.	S.S. Ann.	3 per Cent.
July	155	141	103	111	99
August	—	—	101	—	98
September	157	—	103	112	99
October	159	140	104	111	89
November	161	138	105	112	101
December	—	135	104	111	100
1741. January	—	136	—	112	98
February	157	—	103	111	99
March	—	129	105	113	100
April	159	137	—	111	101
May	161	—	106	113	—
June	172	142	109	114	102
July	174	—	111	—	100
August	173	143	109	—	101
September	172	—	—	—	100
October	174	140	110	113	—
November	178	143	111	—	101
December	—	—	—	114	102
1742. January	—	145	112	114	101
February	—	—	110	—	100
March	—	—	—	—	—
April	186	146	111	113	101
May	195	148	115	114	103
June	—	147	114	103	101
July	189	—	—	105	103
August	—	—	110	115	102
September	—	148	111	115	101
October	194	146	113	114	102
November	—	—	—	—	—
December	—	147	—	—	—
1743. January	194	148	—	113	99
February	182	145	—	110	96
March	18	142	103	108	90
April	—	—	105	—	93
May	172	—	—	—	—
June	178	144	108	111	—
July	176	146	109	112	—
August	—	147	—	110	—
September	178	—	—	—	—
October	—	144	109	—	—
November	—	—	105	111	—
December	—	146	—	—	—
1744. January	180	145	109	110	89
February	182	—	106	—	—
March	—	147	107	—	—
April	—	—	—	—	92
May	187	146	109	—	93
June	186	—	—	111	92
July	181	—	—	—	90
August	174	143	103	108	87
September	170	141	—	102	85

HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC REVENUE

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S.S. Stock.	S. S. Ann. 3 per Cents.	
October	172	138	100	105	86
November	169	133	98	103	—
December	163	127	—	100	—
1746. January	176	125	94	97	76
February	154	—	—	93	75
March	156	—	—	—	—
April	167	124	97	97	82
May	—	—	—	96	—
June	174	127	—	97	83
July	178	133	105	102	85
August	—	136	106	106	89
September	184	135	—	—	88
October	180	131	—	104	85
November	—	126	103	101	83
December	—	128	104	—	84
Bank 4 per Cents.*					
1747. January	180	127	103	95	83
February	177	128	99	97	84
March	175	129	102	96	86
April	157	128	104	97	85
May	151	126	103	96	86
June	155	125	102	97	—
July	156	122	103	95	—
August	161	125	104	93	82
September	160	126	100	—	—
October	—	121	99	—	—
November	162	119	100	—	—
December	161	120	99	—	81
1748. January	160	118	100	91	79
February	157	119	94	90	82
March	156	120	92	89	76
April	157	122	105	93	80
May	170	124	106	96	88
June	176	126	110	100	90
July	184	127	107	97	89
August	178	—	106	—	90
September	180	128	—	98	88
October	183	129	107	99	91
November	178	—	—	97	90
December	175	126	106	96	89
1749. January	176	127	107	98	91
February	174	129	106	101	94
March	175	131	107	102	95
April	177	128	—	—	—
May	179	134	114	105	100
June	185	136	115	106	99
July	186	137	116	105	100

This Stock is now known under the Name of the 3 per Cent Reduced, in consequence of the reduction of interest, from 4 to $3\frac{1}{2}$, and afterwards to 3 per Cent, during the Administration of Mr. Pelham.

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S.S. Stock.	Bank 4 per C.	3 per C.
August	189	140	115	104	100
September	191	139	117	—	101
October	190	138	115	105	102
November	189	135	112	104	99
December	188	133	111	—	100
1750. January	186	134	110	102	98
February	187	132	111	100	99
March	188	134	109	102	—
April	185	131	110	103	100
May	184	133	—	104	—
June	188	134	112	105	101
July	187	132	—	102	—
August	186	135	111	103	100
September	184	—	113	104	—
October	185	133	112	—	101
November	187	134	—	—	—
December	188	136	113	103	99
1751. January	185	135	112	100	97
February	186	136	110	101	98
March	187	139	112	102	99
April	189	137	113	103	100
May	192	138	114	104	99
June	195	141	115	—	101
July	190	140	116	103	103
August	184	139	113	104	100
September	187	142	115	105	99
October	188	140	117	104	100
November	190	142	113	—	101
December	189	143	117	103	102
1752. January	187	141	118	104	101
February	188	144	116	105	102
March	187	145	117	104	—
April	189	143	118	—	103
May	190	146	120	107	104
June	192	147	121	106	105
July	186	148	—	109	106
August	188	147	120	108	105
September	191	144	119	107	—
October	192	143	121	106	104
November	194	142	122	107	—
December(18)	195	143	123	108	106½
Reduced to 3½.					
1753. January	191	144	122	107	106
February	192	143	121	—	104
March	193	141	120	106	—
April	194 *	140	—	—	105
May	195	138	—	—	—
June	197	137	121	—	—
July	193	—	122	107	—
August	192	138	120	—	103

* Dividend reduced to 4½ per Cent.

Year.		India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S.S. Stock.	Bank 4 per C.	3 per C.
	September	191	137	120	107	104
	October	193	136	119	105	—
	November	194	135	120	—	—
	December	193	136	121	104	105
1754.	January	187	135	—	103	104
	February	188	134	118	104	102
	March	186	133	117	—	—
	April	189	132	118	105	103
	May	190	133	119	104	—
	June	192	134	—	105	104
	July	187	133	—	—	—
	August	188	130	118	—	—
	September	187	132	—	—	—
	October	185	131	116	104	103
	November	183	132	—	103	102
	December	182	129	117	101	—
1755.	January	180	130	114	102	100
	February	176	129	113	100	101
	March	173	131	112	99	99
	April	171	129	109	98	98
	May	172	126	111	99	97
	June	174	127	112	93	99
	July	167	126	104	92	—
	August	165	127	103	93	92
	September	166	123	104	—	90
	October	148	122	103	92	93
	November	149	123	104	93	92
	December	150	120	105	—	92
Bank 3½ per Cent.						
1756.	January	145	121	104	92	89
	February	143	119	101	91	—
	March	142	120	100	90	—
	April	141	118	102	—	90
	May	140	117	101	89	89
	June	135	116	100	—	—
	July	133	117	—	—	87
	August	134	116	99	88	89
	September	133	117	100	89	88
	October	—	115	99	90	—
	November	135	116	—	88	89
	December	136	115	100	87	88
1757.	January	133	116	101	88	86
	February	135	117	100	89	87
	March	137	119	99	91	89
	April	139	116	101	90	88
	May	142	119	—	89	89
	June	140	113	102	—	90
	July	133	119	—	—	88
	August	120	120	—	90	89
	September	138	—	100	—	91
	October	141	119	—	89	—

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S. S. Stock.	Bank 4 per C.	3 per C.
November	142	117	104	90	89
December	140	118	—	—	90
1758. January	141	119	103	—	91
February	145	121	104	92	94
March	146	122	106	93	—
				3 per C. Consol.	
April	147	119	105	—	93
May	148	121	—	—	94
June	146	122	106	—	95
July	140	120	107	—	97
August	132	118	108	—	90
September	135	—	101	—	89
October	134	117	102	—	90
November	136	—	100	—	91
December	137	—	—	—	98
1759. January	133	116	98	—	82
February	135	117	97	—	86
March	134	—	95	—	82
April	129	—	93	—	80
May	128	113	92	—	—
June	126	114	—	—	79
July	123	111	—	—	—
August	125	110	94	—	82
September	126	112	—	—	81
October	130	—	95	—	—
November	134	111	96	—	84
December	141	113	97	—	—
1760. January	134	114	96	—	82
February	—	112	90	—	81
March	135	110	—	—	82
April	137	—	92	—	—
May	136	109	94	—	—
June	138	110	—	—	—
July	140	111	93	—	83
August	139	—	—	—	—
September	141	—	—	—	82
October	142	110	—	—	83
November	139	107	90	—	80
December	140	106	88	—	76
1761. January	137	105	86	88	74
February	136	104	—	89	73
March	135	107	87	90	76
April	143	115	88	100	88
May	144	114	96	102	87
June	143	—	—	101	86
July	141	115	—	—	81
August	134	112	90	94	76
September	133	111	88	92	74
October	128	—	84	88	72

HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC REVENUE

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S S. Stock.	Bank 4 per Cents.	3 per Cent. Consol.
November	127	103	83	86	71
December	123	98	81	81	66
1762. January	115	94 *	76	74	63
February	114	95	75	78	68
March	115	96	78	77	67
April	117	97	79	81	70
May	118	98	81	85	73
June	—	—	—	83	72
July	116	100	84	84	75
August	134	108	95	95	79
September	145	102	91	91	81
October	139	109	94	92	80
November	153	110	98	100	86
December	157	119	101	97	87
1763. January	158	120	102	100	90
February	169	126	105	105	93
March	170	131	106	108	96
April	172	126	—	107	92
May	170	123	—	105	91
June	171	122	104	106	—
July	165	118	—	100	89
August	162	114	95	97	87
September	159	116	94	95	84
October	154	111	92	94	—
November	155	112	94	96	83
December	157	113	93	—	—
1764. January	158	114	94	95	82
February	159	116	93	—	84
March	152	117	95	97	86
April	154	115	—	98	83
May	149	114	—	99	—
June	145	113	—	—	—
July	147	—	93	94	81
August	146	—	92	—	82
September	148	122	—	—	83
October	150	123	95	93	80
November	153	127	—	94	82
December	151	122	—	98	82
1765. January	152	126	96	97	85
February	—	130	—	98	87
March	—	—	—	—	—
April	154	—	—	—	—
May	—	—	—	—	—
June	—	129	—	97	—
July	156	133	102	98	86
August	—	136	—	100	—
September	163	—	—	101	87
				—	89

* On the 29th January 1762, Bank Stock was as low as 91, the lowest Price known.

Year.		India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S. S. Stock.	Bank 4 per Cents.	3 per Cent. Consol.
	October	163	136	102	99	91
	November	—	—	—	102	92
	December	—	135	—	104	90
1766.	January	162	134	101	102	89
	February	—	—	—	100	87
	March	—	—	102	103	88
	April	178	—	—	101	89
	May	189	135	—	102	90
	June	—	—	—	—	—
	July	—	—	—	—	88
	August	207	139	—	103	90
	September	223	—	—	—	87
	October	218	—	—	101	89
	November	217	136	—	—	—
	December	—	140	—	—	—
1767.	January	220	141	101	102	88
	February	234	142	—	—	89
	March	246	—	—	—	88
	April	254	—	—	100	—
	May	248	144	104	101	—
	June	250	147	102	103	87
	July	253	148	104	102	—
	August	267	150	105	—	—
	September	270	152	107	—	88
	October	273	158	108	101	90
	November	268	155	—	—	91
	December	265	158	109	102	90
1768.	January	260	161	108	103	91
	February	261	163	106	104	92
	March	262	165	107	108	93
	April	272	166	108	103	—
	May	271	167	110	104	—
	June	269	168	—	101	92
	July	275	164	—	103	90
	August	276	166	105	99	89
	September (6)	276½	167	—	100	—
	October	275	162	—	—	—
	November	271	160	104	101	88
	December	272	161	—	—	89
1769.	January	275	162	103	102	88
	February	276	163	—	—	—
	March	275	165	—	—	—
	April	273	164	106	—	—
	May	264*	166	105	99	89

* India Stock on the 1st of May was 273½ but unfavourable accounts from the East Indies caused a remarkable fall in the course of the month; on the 27th it was 250, and on the 31st 230. In consequence of the alarm a General Court was held 1st June, when extracts from the last advices from India being read, the

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S.S. Stock.	Bank 4 per Cents.	3 per Cent. Consol.
June	237	166	105	100	89
July	225	—	—	—	—
August	228	168	104	—	—
September (5)	227	168½	—	101	88
October	226	160	—	98	—
November	224	159	102	93	84
December	220	150	—	94	—
1770. January	217	152	—	96	85
February	213	153	—	95	87
March	227	151	—	—	—
April	—	154	—	—	—
May	—	148	—	96	86
June	220	150	—	—	84
July	217	145	—	—	83
August	219	138	—	94	78
September	196	137	—	95	—
October	197	133	—	95	—
November	181	132	—	88	—
December	—	134	—	—	84
1771. January	214	148	—	87	86
February	213	—	—	93	85
March	216	146	—	97	87
April	223	155	—	98	88
May	228	153	—	95	81
June	—	155	—	—	86
July	—	—	—	96	—
August	217	—	—	—	—
September	218	144	—	—	87
October	216	149	—	—	—
November	217	148	—	93	—
December	—	150	—	—	86
1772. January	219	152	—	—	87
February	215	—	—	—	—
March	—	153	—	—	—
April	213	149	—	—	88
May	223	150	—	—	—
June	224	151	—	—	—
July	223	—	—	—	95
August	208	149	—	—	89
September	194	148	—	—	—
October	181	147	—	—	88
November	165	144	—	—	—
December	167	145	—	—	—

Court, to quiet the minds of the Proprietors, ordered a paragraph to be inserted in the public papers, stating, "that the affairs of the Company were in a flourishing situation, and that there was no real cause for the alarm which had lately happened." This produced a temporary rise of the Stock, but it soon declined again.

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S. S. Stock.	Bank 4 per Cents.	3 per Cent. Consols.
1773. January	160	143	102	93	87
February	162	142	—	—	—
March	153	143	—	—	—
April	145	139	—	—	86
May	142	140	—	—	—
June	143	—	—	—	87
July	142	—	—	—	—
August	152	142	—	—	—
September	154	143	94	92	—
October	149	—	—	90	86
November	144	141	—	—	—
December	140	—	—	91	—
1774. January	139	140	93	90	87
February	140	139	—	91	86
March	141	141	—	—	—
April	147	139	—	—	—
May	152	—	94	—	87
June	151	145	—	—	—
July	150	143	—	—	88
August	148	141	—	—	—
September	147	142	—	93	—
October	149	—	96	—	—
November	150	143	—	—	89
December	152	145	—	—	—
1775. January	153	146	98	92	90
February	155	142	—	—	—
March	159	144	—	—	87
April	157	142	99	—	88
May	156	—	—	91	—
June	151	—	—	—	—
July	—	—	—	—	—
August	153	—	—	90	89
September	156	141	—	—	—
October	155	144	98	—	—
November	165	140	97	91	88
December	164	142	—	—	—
1776. January	163	143	96	90	90
February	165	142	95	—	89
March	162	141	—	—	87
April	155	—	—	—	86
May	—	—	—	—	85
June	160	138	—	—	84
July	—	—	94	88	82
August	—	137	—	87	—
September	—	—	—	—	83
October	163	134	—	83	81
November	167	135	—	—	—
December	—	—	—	—	82

Year		India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S S. Stock.	Bank 4 per Cents.	3 per Cent. Confol.
1777.	January	169	136	93	84	80
	February	—	138	—	—	78
	March	—	—	—	—	79
	April	165	—	—	—	—
	May	—	134	—	—	—
	June	—	132	—	—	76
	July	—	—	—	—	—
	August	158	139	—	—	—
	September	—	—	—	—	78
	October	163	129	—	—	—
	November	165	130	—	—	—
	December	167	—	—	—	76
1778.	January	164	120	—	—	72
	February	158	117	—	—	70
	March	144	113	—	—	64
	April	137	107	—	—	61
	May	129	109	—	—	—
	June	—	—	—	—	62
	July	134	—	—	—	61
	August	136	115	—	—	63
	September	—	114	—	—	64
	October	—	113	—	—	66
	November	139	110	—	—	63
	December	141	—	—	—	62
1779.	January	140	107	—	—	60
	February	148	109	—	—	59
	March	—	—	—	—	61
	April	155	—	—	—	64
	May	151	—	—	—	63
	June	—	112	—	—	60
	July	—	—	—	—	59
	August	—	108	—	—	61
	September	—	111	—	—	—
	October	144	—	—	—	—
	November	—	—	—	—	—
	December	—	—	—	—	60
1780.	January	150	113	—	—	61
	February	—	114	—	—	—
	March	—	—	—	—	—
	April	156	112	—	—	60
	May	157	—	—	—	—
	June	150	113	—	—	—
	July	—	116	—	—	63
	August	—	114	—	—	—
	September	—	—	—	—	—
	October	—	—	—	—	61
	November	—	111	—	—	—
	December	—	—	—	—	—

Year.		India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S. S. Stock.	4 per Cents	3 per Cents.
1781.	January	146	108	—	—	57
	February(1)	148	105½	—	—	58
	March	—	112	—	—	59
	April	—	—	—	—	—
	May	—	113	—	—	—
	June	—	116	—	—	57
	July	—	—	—	—	—
	August	—	114	—	—	—
	September	140	110	—	—	56
	October	139	111	—	—	—
	November	—	—	—	—	—
	December	—	—	—	—	—
1782.	January	130	110	—	—	—
	February(27)	—	—	—	—	52½
	March	—	112	—	—	54
	April	—	114	—	—	57
	May	—	115	—	—	59
	June	—	—	—	—	60
	July	—	114	—	—	58
	August	—	—	—	—	56
	September	—	—	—	—	57
	October	134	115	—	—	58
	November	—	—	—	—	59
	December	—	—	—	—	61
1783.	January	140	117	75	—	64
	February	145	126	—	85	66
	March	141	134	—	—	68
	April	138	135	—	—	—
	May	—	133	—	—	—
	June	—	131	—	86	66
	July	—	126	—	84	67
	August	—	127	—	83	—
	September	141	—	—	—	66
	October	125	118	—	—	63
	November	120	115	—	—	62
	December	119	112	—	—	58
1784.	January(14)	118½	113	—	75	57
	February	123	116	—	76	56
	March	124	118	—	74	55
	April	—	115	—	—	56
	May	—	114	—	75	57
	June	122	—	—	73	—
	July	—	116	64	74	55
	August	125	117	—	—	54
	September	126	111	—	—	—
	October	—	112	—	70	—
	November	—	110	—	—	55
	December	128	112	—	—	—
1785.	January	132	116	—	71	56
	February	130	115	—	—	55

Year.	India Stock.	Bank Stock.	S. S. Stock.	4 per Cents	3 per Cents.
March	131	117	—	—	59
April	133	112	—	73	58
May	134	115	—	—	—
June	136	117	—	—	—
July	140	118	—	74	—
August	142	120	—	—	59
September	147	112	66	75	65
October	149	129	—	76	66
November	—	130	—	82	70
December	156	129	—	87	71
1786. January	155	140	70	88	70
February	156	139	—	89	69
March	158	140	—	—	—
April	159	138	78	—	—
May	161	137	—	87	70
June	162	143	—	90	71
July	164	146	81	—	72
August	166	149	—	91	73
September	168	151	—	92	74
October	168	158	—	96	76
November	166	150	—	98	78
December	—	148	—	95	74
1787. January	163	149	—	92	73
February	164	150	—	93	70
March	166	152	—	95	74
April	168	153	—	96	76
May	169	154	—	92	77
June	171	156	—	93	73
July	169	150	—	94	70
August	159	147	80	91	72
September	163	148	—	88	69
October	169	146	—	91	70
November	173	149	—	96	72
December	175	154	—	95	75
1788. January	174	156	84	97	76
February	176	158	—	—	75
March	175	160	—	96	—
April	—	166	—	94	—
May	—	171	—	—	—
June	170	173	—	—	76
July	169	171	—	—	—
August	—	178	—	96	74
September	167	172	—	—	—
October	170	173	—	94	—
November	169	172	—	—	—
December	168	171	83	93	73

* The above is copied from the former edition. During the remaining fourteen years, it is thought most expedient to alter the arrangement, beginning with the lowest rate of interest, namely the 3 per Cents. and inserting the price of the 5 per Cents. instead of the South Sea Stock. The averages are calculated by Mr. Grellier of the Royal Exchange Assurance Office.

Year.	3 per Cent. Consols.	4 per Cent. Consols.	5 per Cents.	Bank Stock.	India Stock.
1789. January	72	93	110	170	—
February	73	94	111	172	163
March	74	96	113	175	167
April	—	94	—	173	168
May	75	95	115	175	169
June	77	97	116	178	170
July	—	91	115	181	172
August	78	99	116	187	176
September	80	101	119	189	177
October	—	99	118	187	—
November	78	97	117	182	176
December	—	98	118	—	173
1790. January	78	100	117	186	171
February	—	—	—	—	—
March	—	—	118	185	—
April	80	—	119	186	173
May*	73	94	112	170	155
June	—	—	114	172	157
July	—	95	111	171	156
August	77	99	116	183	164
September	—	98	—	181	165
October	74	93	111	173	154
November	79	99	118	183	168
December	80	100	120	185	169
1791. January	80	102	119	188	170
February	—	—	118	—	160
March†	81	103	119	188	168
April	78	99	117	182	162
May	81	100	119	184	164
June	82	101	120	186	166
July	81	102	119	187	165
August	86	105	120	196	180
September	89	104	118	200	190
October	88	—	116	201	192
November	87	101	118	195	186
December	89	102	119	199	—
1792. January	90	102	116	202	186
February	94	104	119	213	200
March	96	—	—	216	211
April	95	102	—	210	210
May	92	99	118	202	207

* The probability of a rupture with Spain in consequence of the transactions at Nootka Sound, caused a considerable depression of the Stocks: 3 per Cent. Consols which on the 30th April were 80½, had fallen on the 1st May to 70, but soon recovered a little, the average of the month being not less than above stated

† Towards the end of March when the subject of the claim of Government to the use of the unreceived Dividends was in discussion, Stocks declined considerably, 3 per Cent. Consols. being on the 26th March at 75½, but soon after recovered a little.

Year.	3 per Cent. Consols.	4 per Cent. Consols.	5 per Cents.	Bank Stock.	India Stock.
June	91	100	119	205	208
July	92	101	118	204	209
August	91	102	117	206	206
September	90	101	—	200	204
October	—	100	—	—	210
November	88	98	116	195	205
December*	76	90	110	175	—
1793. January	77	91	106	175	181
February†	72	87	101	166	176
March‡	75	88	105	170	200
April	73	89	109	175	212
May	76	—	107	165	211
June	77	90	109	168	210
July	—	92	107	176	213
August	—	94	108	177	210
September	74	92	106	172	206
October	75	90	—	168	—
November	74	88	107	165	207
December	—	89	108	167	209
1794. January	70	86	101	161	202
February	67	83	—	157	200
March	—	—	—	161	201
April	69	84	103	163	203
May	70	—	—	167	207
June	—	—	104	166	—
July	67	83	101	164	199
August	—	84	—	—	198
September	66	85	—	—	195
October	64	80	100	152	188
November	67	84	103	157	191
December	65	82	102	155	189
1795. January	63	80	97	153	187
February	62	79	96	152	183
March	—	—	94	153	182
April	63	77	96	154	187
May	65	79	97	159	192
June	67	80	—	166	199
July	68	82	—	169	197
August	—	84	99	170	200
September	69	85	100	169	199

* The probability of war, caused a rapid fall of the Stocks; 3 per Cent. Consols which on the 12th November were 90½, had fallen on the 3d December to 74.

† 3 per Cent. Consols, which on the 15th January were 78½ declined with the other Funds, as the proceedings in France appeared to render war certain, and on the 11th of February were at 71.

‡ The great rise of India Stock was occasioned by the agreement with government for the renewal of the Charter, which arrangement included an increase of the Dividend.

Year.	3 per Cent. Consols.	4 per Cent. Consols.	55 Cents.	Bank Stock.	India Stock.
October	68	82	100	167	198
November	68	84	102	166	200
December	70	86	102	173	205
1796. January	69	85	100	177	216
February	68	84	—	175	212
March	—	85	—	174	214
April	67	82	99	167	210
May	65	81	97	160	205
June	63	79	95	154	194
July	62	78	89	152	185
August	59	—	88	151	182
September	56	74	83	139	176
October	58	75	87	146	178
November	56	73	85	144	175
December	57	74	87	—	176
1797. January	54	73	81	140	167
February*	53	70	79	139	160
March	50	—	75	136	152
April	—	63	—	124	150
May	48	61	—	119	149
June	50	62	—	123	—
July	53	65	77	130	160
August	52	64	76	—	159
September†	50	—	74	—	156
October	49	59	72	118	151
November	48	58	—	—	149
December	49	59	73	117	—
1798. January	48	59	69	112	146
February	49	60	70	121	—
March	50	62	73	122	148
April	49	59	72	127	—
May	48	—	74	118	—
June	49	61	75	119	150
July	48	62	74	123	144
August	49	65	76	128	150
September	50	—	77	131	148
October	51	66	80	130	153
November	55	69	85	137	167
December	52	66	82	136	161
1799. January	53	67	81	138	161
February	—	69	82	140	162
March	54	71	83	—	166

* On the stoppage of cash payments at the Bank 27th February 3 per Cents. rose from 50½ to 52½; 4 per Cents. from 46 to 67½; and 5 per Cents. from 76½ to 77½, this was the natural consequence of the inability to procure *Cash* for Bank paper, which put a stop to selling out for that purpose.

† On the 20th September the day of Lord Malmesbury's arrival from Lisle, 3 per Cent. Consols fell to 47½ which was a lower price than they had ever been at before.

Year.	3 per Cent. Consols.	4 per Cent. Consols.	5 per Cents.	Bank Stock.	India Stock
April	54	69	84	131	168
May	55	—	86	132	169
June	59	74	88	148	179
July	62	79	93	160	183
August	65	83	96	170	199
September	64	84	—	171	200
October	60	74	90	156	190
November*	61	75	91	158	191
December	62	77	94	156	192
1800. January	61	77	90	155	195
February	—	78	91	156	200
March	62	81	94	162	201
April	63	—	97	161	202
May	—	80	98	162	210
June	62	81	—	161	—
July	63	82	97	163	206
August	64	84	—	167	203
September	65	85	98	171	207
October	64	82	99	167	206
November	—	81	—	165	205
December	63	79	98	161	203
1801. January	60	79	93	159	192
February	57	77	91	152	187
March	56	75	91	153	—
April	59	77	95	163	193
May	60	78	96	168	200
June	61	79	—	167	201
July	60	80	95	168	195
August	—	—	—	—	—
September	—	81	—	—	—
October†	67	86	101	182	212
November	62	84	100	189	215
December	67	—	98	187	216
1802. January	68	85	98	189	213
February	69	86	100	192	214
March	—	—	101	182	213
April	76	92	105	195	226
May	75	90	102	190	220
June	—	88	103	183	212
July	73	89	101	190	215
August	69	87	100	185	207
September	—	—	101	183	203
October	62	85	100	186	205
November	—	83	101	180	202
December	—	86	102	187	—

* In consequence of the change that had taken place in the French government and their supposed pacific intentions, 3 per Cents rose on 18th November from 6 to 64½, but soon declined again.

† The signing of Preliminaries of Peace was made known on 2d October, and naturally caused a great rise of the Stocks; 3 per Cent. Consols which the preceding day were 59½ got up to 67½, and on the 5th to 69½.

The reader will please to observe, that the Dividend on India Stock at present is at the rate of $7\frac{1}{2}$, on Bank Stock at the rate of 7, and on South Sea Stock at the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per Cent. The accounts that will be given of these different Companies will explain what was the amount of former Dividends.

The above abstract may be of some use to such persons as may be desirous of making calculations respecting the real or comparative value of the different funds. But it would be worthy the attention of government, in a country like this, whose prosperity and power depend so much upon the wisdom with which it raises the supplies for public purposes, to have a complete and regular account drawn up and published, of the prices of every species of funded property, as far back as they can now be traced. It would furnish the means of ascertaining in future times, which is the most eligible mode of borrowing money, whether perpetual or temporary Annuities—whether annuities for one or for more lives, whether borrowing from Companies and bodies corporate, or from unconnected individuals—and whether a great capital with a lower interest, or a low capital with a higher interest, ought to be preferred. Nor is this a trifling object; for even a small saving upon so enormous a debt as that to which we are now subject, is not beneath the attention of the wealthiest and most powerful nation.

From an attentive examination of the preceding tables, the following observations may be deduced :

1. That as the 3 per Cents. bore on the 18th of December, 1752, the highest price known in this country (namely $106\frac{3}{4}$ per Cent.); whereas on the 27th February, 1782, the credit of Great Britain was consequently then at its greatest height : the same stock bore little more than one half of that price (namely $53\frac{1}{2}$). An amazingly rapid decline in the value of the same property, in the short space of about thirty years; and tends to prove how much the public creditors are interessed in promoting wise and judicious plans for redeeming the national debt; since in the same proportion, their property, if in three per cent. stock, in thirty years more, might have sold at little more than 26 per Cent. whereas were the public burdens put in a fair way of being gradually diminished and paid off, they might have risen, in the very same space of time, to 106 per Cent. again. During the course of the late war, the 3 per Cents. were still lower than $53\frac{1}{2}$, for on the 20th September, 1797, they fell to $47\frac{1}{2}$.

2. The highest price which the stocks have borne since the year 1730, has been as follows;

India Stock	-	6th September, 1768,	$276\frac{1}{4}$
Bank Stock	-	5th September, 1769,	$168\frac{1}{2}$
South Sea Stock	-	20th May, 1768,	111
Bank 4 per Cents.	-	16th March, 1768,	$105\frac{3}{4}$
Three per Cents.	-	18th December, 1752,	$106\frac{3}{4}$

The lowest prices were also as follow :

India Stock	-	14th January, 1784,	$118\frac{1}{2}$
Bank Stock	-	29th January, 1762,	91
South Sea Stock	-	22d February, 1782,	$62\frac{1}{4}$
Bank 4 per Cents.	-	8th March, 1782,	$68\frac{1}{2}$
Three per Cents.	-	27th February, 1782,	$53\frac{1}{2}$
Ditto	-	20th September, 1797,	$47\frac{1}{2}$

And the following seems to have been the greatest fall in the Price of any Stock during that period :

India Stock, 30th of May, 1772, was sold for	-	226
On the 21st of January, 1774, fetched only	-	$137\frac{1}{2}$

Total difference in eighteen months	<u>$88\frac{1}{4}$</u>
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It is farther evident, from comparing the prices of the different Stocks in the years 1768 and 1769, with the years immediately preceding, that property in the funds then reached its highest price, or, at least, its steadiest level; and hence that it requires seven or eight years of profound peace, before the public credit of the country naturally arrives at the greatest pitch of which it is capable

N.B. The reader who may wish to know the real quantum of Interest that is drawn according to the prices of the different Stocks, may consult the table of equation in Mortimer's Every Man his own broker, and the comparative view of the funds, subjoined to Blewert's tables for calculating the value of Stocks and Annuities. It is sufficient at present to remark, that the same interest, to wit, £ 5 per centum per annum is received, if £ 60, in money, is paid for One hundred pounds of 3 per cent. Stock; or 80, in money, for £ 100 4 per cents; or £ 100, in money, for £ 100 5 per cents; or £ 120, in money, for £ 100 6 per cents; or £ 140, in money, for £ 100 7 per cents; or £ 160, in money, for £ 100 8 per cents.

A P P E N D I X.

No. III.

Hints regarding the Value of Money at different Periods, and the Depreciation thereof.

IT is not proposed here to discuss the advantages or inconveniencies attending the depreciation of money, respecting which I have already stated the result of my reflections; but it is not only a curious, but an important subject of enquiry, to ascertain what has been the real progress and extent of that depreciation in the successive periods of our history.

It is with much pleasure that I mention upon this occasion, first, the valuable and laborious researches of one of the most respectable members that has ever sat in parliament (Sir George Shuckburgh Evelyn, Bart. Member for Warwickshire), and next, the work of an ingenious author, (John Wheatley, Esq.) who has lately printed his remarks on Currency and Commerce *. The former has published in the Philosophical Transactions, (1798, part i. p. 176), a table, which exhibits, in a comprehensive view, the value of money, in arithmetical proportions, from the Conquest to the present time, of which the following is a copy.

Proportion of the Value of Money from the Conquest to the present Time.

Year.								Rate.
1050	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26
1100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34
1150	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43
1200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51
1250	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60
1300	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	68
1350	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	77
1400	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	83
1450	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88
1500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	94
1550	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
1600	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	144
1650	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	188
1675	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	210
1700	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	238
1720	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	257
1740	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	287

* In one volume 8vo. printed by Cadell and Davies. An. 1803.

Year.								Rate.
1750	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	314
1760	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	342
1770	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	384
1780	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	427
1790	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	496
1795	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	531
1800	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	562

The latter (Mr. Wheatley) has drawn up various calculations, founded on the principle of the above table, giving an account of the comparative value of the revenue during the 18th century. For these the reader is referred to the work itself, but, as a specimen of them, there is herewith subjoined an estimate of the value of a pound sterling, during every ten years of the preceding century.

In 1700	-	-	-	0	8	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	} Were equal to a Pound Sterling of 1800.
1710	-	-	-	0	8	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1720	-	-	-	0	9	14	
1730	-	-	-	0	9	8	
1740	-	-	-	0	10	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1750	-	-	-	0	11	2	
1760	-	-	-	0	12	2	
1770	-	-	-	0	13	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1780	-	-	-	0	15	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1790	-	-	-	0	17	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1800	-	-	-	1	0	0	

A P P E N D I X.

No. IV.

An Antidote to Despondency ; or, Progressive Assertions from respectable Authority, tending to prove that the Nation was ACTUALLY UNDONE, prior to the Revolution in 1688 ; and that it has remained in a continued State of Ruin, or Decay, ever since that memorable Era.

IT has often been remarked, that the English are more inclined than any other nation to view the dark side of the prospect ; to fear every thing, and to hope for nothing. In the month of November in particular the state suffers exceedingly ; and whoever seriously sits down to consider, in that gloomy season of the year, the situation of the country, concludes, after mature reflection, *that the country is undone* ; or that matters are so bad, that the business of government cannot possibly be carried through another Session*.

As any ideas of that nature are, in a particular manner, contrary to the interests of a state that depends upon credit for supplying the means of defending itself, or of annoying its enemies, it is thought that a greater benefit cannot be conferred upon the public, than by proving how groundless such opinions are, in the first place, from the infinite resources of which the nation is actually possessed, which, it is hoped, are not easily to be exhausted, and which have hitherto stood many a severe trial : and secondly, from its appearing to be an indisputable fact, that similar desponding apprehensions have been publicly avowed by persons of respectable authority for above a century past, during which period it is well known that the nation has enjoyed no inconsiderable degree of happiness and prosperity.

It is, therefore, proposed to lay before the reader some extracts from works of authority in political questions, containing progressive assertions of the miserable state of the nation for above a century past, though the event has proved that it has continued to prosper, notwithstanding the melancholy apprehensions which many able and intelligent individuals entertained of a very opposite nature.

Anno 1680. I. " It may be undeniably and uncomfortably observed, that whilst every one hath eagerly pursued his private interest, *a kind of common consumption hath crawled upon us*, since our land rents are generally much fallen, and our home commodities sunk from their late price and value ; our poor are vastly increased, and the rest of the people generally more and more feel the want of money.

* See the World, No 95, 21st of November, 1754.

This disease, having grown upon us in times of peace, when no foreigners have exhausted us by warlike depredations, may very justly amaze us; and the more, when at the same time we observe that some of our neighbouring nations, lately our equals, or much our inferiors (I mean the French and Dutch), are become so prodigiously rich and powerful on a sudden. Certainly these mighty productions must have some great and vigorous causes, which have been very furiously working of late years, and such as have not fallen under common observation." —*Britannia Languens; or, a Discourse of Trade*. Printed An. 168c. Introduction, p. 1.

1689. "I fear the author doth too truly tell us, that the trades of tillage, grazing, dairy, clothing, fulling, &c. that formerly enriched the occupiers of them, have in these latter years been the usual shipwrecks of men's stocks and estates; that we have in a manner lost the East-land and the Northern Trades; that the cheapness of interest doth not proceed from the plenty of money, but the scarceness of security; and that no new improving manufacture is to be heard of in England, but that of Perriwigs."—*A discourse of the Growth of England, &c. by way of letter to a person of honour*. Printed An. 1689. P. 184.

1694. II. "I think it past dispute, that there is not one man of an hundred who would in any manner have contributed to this revolution (Anno 1688), if they could have foreseen that thereby we should have been engaged in so durable, expensive, and destructive a war, in defence of the Dutch and other confederates; not only to the eternal scandal of our loyalty, religion, honesty, justice, honour, and morality, but to the waste and consumption of our stores of arms and ammunition, the loss of our ships and men, the inundation of foreign force, to the very inflaming the nation to their interest, councils, and conduct, and the utter beggaring of ourselves, by the decay of traffick and unsupportable taxes."—*England must pay the piper*. By Sir R. W. Printed Anno 1694.

1699. III. "Unless this can be compassed (namely, reducing the revenue of the crown to the sum of £ 2,300,000 per annum), it will be found that, in no long course of time, we shall languish and decay every year, by steps easy enough to be perceived by such as consider of these matters. Our gold and silver will be carried off by degrees, rents will fall, the purchase of land will decrease, wool will sink in its price, our stock of shipping will be diminished, farm-houses will go to ruin, industry will decay, and we shall have upon us all the visible marks of a declining people."—*An Essay upon the probable methods of making a People Gainers in the Balance of Trade*. By Dr. D'Avenant. Originally printed Anno 1699. See also his Essay on the Balance of Power, "I will venture to say, from the time of the Norman invasion we never had a more dismal view before us." Originally published An. 1701: printed in his works vol. iii. p. 302.

1710. IV. "Are we not almost driven to the very brink of destruction? Our treasures are riotously wasted, our constitution in danger of being subverted, and the nation almost in general corrupted! Yet is it not a strange and wonderful thing, that while the nation is almost bankrupt, wealthy men should shoot up in several offices like mushrooms; and while the Government was endangered to be beggared, that all its servants should riot in such wealth and plenty, that the bare handling of a brush in any office was the ready way to a plentiful fortune, as if the public treasury had

had been thrown in there only for the officers to brush it into their own pockets?—*A Letter touching the Rise of all the Embezzlements and Mismanagements of the Kingdom's Treasure, from the Revolution to the present Parliament.* Printed Anno 1710.

1720. V. "It is evident from the immediately preceding state, that near one moiety of the duties therein mentioned ariseth from the customs; and it is too well known, and a sad truth it is, that the balance of trade has been for some time past considerably against us. That our silver coin is grown very scarce; and that it is impossible our gold can stay at home, till an advantageous turn is given to our trade. And under these unhappy circumstances, and that of our public debts, the nation, I think, can never be justified to run into any new expence for a reason of less importance than that of an immediate preservation of the religion and liberties thereof.—*A Collection of Treatises.* By Archibald Hutcheson, Esq. Printed Anno 1721.
- 1722 VI. "Can it be proved that a free people can taste the high enjoyments that flow from property and liberty, when loaded with numerous duties and immersed in debts of such a magnitude, that the discharging thereof is almost impracticable with the safety of the nation? And that our credit and reputation is growing and increasing, notwithstanding we are likely to be driven to the unavoidable choice of two melancholy extremes, viz. The blotting out of our books, and an effacing, as irretrievable, an infinite number of creditors, who have lawful and just claims upon us; or, the paying off debts by the virtue of wild schemes, and by that means to sink under a final bankruptcy. Ought not such a people to reflect with horror and anguish of heart at any who either by mismanagement or villainy have reduced them to so terrible an ebb."—*The nature and weight of the national taxes.* By T. Gordon, Esq. In the Collection of Trenchard and Gordon's tracts, printed Anno 1751. Vol. I. p. 366.—Originally printed Anno 1722.
1727. VII. "Is there not already a land-tax upon our estates as large as can be reasonably desired in time of peace? Are not all our ordinary expences burthened with duties; or, is there any considerable branch of commerce which does not pay its custom? Is there scarce any thing that we eat, drink, wear, or in any manner use, which does not contribute to the necessities of the Government? Are not many things doubly, trebly, and even quadruply laden? Is not this generally lamented by all people? What, therefore, shall we say to a man who lays plans for future ministers to oppress his fellow-subjects with such grievous burthens, as neither we nor our children shall be able to bear!"—*Remarks on a late book, entitled, An Essay on the public Debts of this Kingdom.* Printed An. 1727.
1736. VIII. "The vast load of debt under which the nation still groans, is the true source of all those calamities and gloomy prospects of which we have so much reason to complain. To this has been owing that multiplicity of burthensome taxes, which have more than doubled the price of the common necessities of life within a few years past; and thereby distressed the poor labourer and manufacturer; disabled the farmer to pay his rent; and put even gentlemen of plentiful estates under the greatest difficulties to make a tolerable provision for their families. From this have proceeded those infinite swarms of locusts and caterpillars in office, who not only prey on the vitals of industry, but render even

even our liberties precarious, and dependent on the will of those, who have the sole nomination and direction of them. And to this we must likewise ascribe that ruinous spirit of luxury, corruption, and venality, which hath infected the whole nation, and almost effaced the very marks of frugality and public virtue amongst us."—*The Craftsman*, No. 502, 14th of February, 1736.

1737. IX. "For my part I do not know any one necessary of life upon which we have not some tax or another, except water; and we can put no ingredient I know of into water, in order to make it palatable and cheerful, without paying a tax. We pay a tax for air, and for the light and heat of the sun in the day-time, by means of our tax upon windows; and for light and heat in the night-time, by means of our duties upon coals and candles; we pay a tax upon bread, meat, roots and herbs of all kinds, by means of our salt duty; we pay a tax upon small-beer, by means of the malt tax; and a heavy additional tax upon strong-beer, by way of excise. Nay, we cannot have any clean thing to put upon our backs, either of woollen or linen, without paying a tax, by means of the duty on soap, &c.—See *Turbuck's Debates*, Vol. XV. p. 209.
1739. X. "What are then the circumstances of this kingdom and of France?—On one side mortgaged revenues, credit sunk at home and abroad, an exhausted, dispirited, discontented people. On the other, a rich and popular government, strong in alliances, in reputation, in the confidence and affection of its subjects.—Our well-equipped fleets and well-drest troops give, to be sure, an air of magnificence; but then it is well known *that we owe almost Fifty Millions*, and have been forced to apply the Sinking Fund, not to discharge that debt, *but to furnish out these Shrows*; whilst in most parts of England gentlemen's rents are so ill paid, and the weight of taxes lies so heavy upon them, that those who have nothing from the court can scarce support their families.—*Considerations upon the present State of our Affairs at Home and Abroad. In a Letter from a Member of Parliament to a Friend in the Country.* By George Lord Lyttelton. See his Works, Edition 1774, Vol. I. p. 64 and 65.
1745. XI. "I shall conclude with asking this question—Whether we think ourselves able, under a great load of annual taxes, increasing debts, mortgaged and anticipated funds, a visible decay of both trade and money, to continue for any foreign interest whatsoever, either the bullies or paymasters of all the other powers in Europe? And whether it would not better demonstrate our wisdom and economy, and that love we profess to our country and posterity, if we confined our quarrels more to that element on which our insular situation gives us an advantage, and to that measure of expence *which suits our present declining circumstances*.—*A Survey of the National Debts.* Inscribed to Sir John Phillips. Printed Anno 1745.
1749. XII. "Our parliamentary aids from the year 1740, exclusively, to the year 1748, inclusively, amount to £55,522,159 16s. 3d. a sum, that will appear *incredible to future generations*, and is so almost to the present—"Till we have paid a good part of our debt, and restored our country in some measure to her former wealth and power, it will be difficult to maintain the dignity of Great Britain, to make her respected abroad, and secure from injuries, or even affronts on the part of her neighbours."

neighbours?"—*Some Reflections on the present State of the Nation.* By Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke. Edition 1773. Vol. IV. p. 137 and 147.

1756. XIII. "It has been a general received notion, among Political Arithmeticians, that we may increase our national debt to *One Hundred Millions*; but they acknowledge that it must then cease, by the debtor becoming bankrupt.—But it is very difficult to comprehend, if we do not stop at *Seventy-five Millions*, where we shall stop.—*A Journal of Eight Days Journey, &c. in Letters.* By Samuel Hannay, Esq. Printed An. 1756, in one Volume Quarto, p. 318.

1757. XIV. "The great bane of our trade is the high price of our commodities. And must not the augmentation of our debts and taxes still enhance their price? And must not this at length prove the ruin of our whole commerce? In order to ease our trade, and to prevent its total destruction, must we not at any rate get rid of our debts and taxes? Since the more we run in debt, the less able shall we be to pay them, can we get rid of them without the absolute ruin of all the public creditors? And what a scene of confusion and horror must this produce in the kingdom?"—*Great Britain's True System.* By Malachy Postlethwayt, Esq. p. 48.

1761. XV. "The first instance of a debt contracted upon parliamentary security occurs in the reign of Henry the Sixth.—The commencement of this pernicious practice deserves to be noted; a practice the more likely to become pernicious the more a nation advances in opulence and credit. The ruinous effects of it are now become apparent, *and threaten the very existence of the nation.*"—*Hume's History of England.* Octavo Edition of 1778, Vol. III. p. 215.—But originally printed Anno 1761.

1765. XVI. "Thus much is indisputably certain, that the present magnitude of our national incumbrances very far exceeds all calculations of commercial benefit, and is productive of the greatest inconveniences, by the enormous taxes that are raised upon the necessaries of life, for the payment of the interest of this debt, &c. &c.—And lastly, they weaken the internal strength of a state, by anticipating those resources which should be reserved to defend it in case of necessity."—*Blackstone's Commentaries.* Vol. I. p. 328. Edition 1773.*.

1774. XVII. "I am grieved to observe, that we have many taxes more hurtful to individuals, than advantageous to the public revenue. Multiplied taxes on the necessaries of life, candles, soap, leather, ale, salt, &c. raise the price of labour, and consequently of manufactures. If they shall have the effect to deprive us of foreign markets, *which we have reason to dread*, Depopulation and Poverty must ensue."—*Kaim's Sketches of the History of Man.* First Edition, Vol. I. p. 484.

1776. XVIII. "I suppose there is no mathematical, still less an arithmetical demonstration, that the road to the Holy Land was not the road to Paradise; as there is, that the endless increase of National Debts is the direct road to National Ruin. *But having now completely reached that goal*, it is needless at present to reflect on the past. It will be found in the

* See also Preliminary Discourse to Postlethwayte's Dict. on the wretched state of our Finances. 3d Edit. An. 1766.

present year 1796, that all the revenues of this island, North of Trent, and West of Reading, are mortgaged or anticipated for ever. Could the small remainder be in a worse condition were those Provinces seized by Austria and Prussia? There is only this difference, that some event might happen in Europe which would oblige these great Monarchs to disgorge their acquisitions. But no imagination can figure a situation which will induce our creditors to relinquish their claims, or the public to seize their revenues. So egregious indeed has been our folly, that we have even lost all title to compassion in the numberless calamities that are waiting us."—*Hume's History of England*. Vol. V. p. 475. Note B.

1776. XIX. "Great Britain seems to support with ease a burden, which half a century ago nobody believed her capable of supporting. Let us not, however, upon this account rashly conclude, that she is capable of supporting any burden; nor even be too confident that she could support, without great distress, a burden a little greater than what has been laid upon her."—*An Enquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations*. By Adam Smith, &c. Vol. II. p. 363.

1777. XX. "We are now involved in another war, and the public debts are increasing again fast; the present year (1777) must make another great addition to them; and what they will be at the end of these troubles, no one can tell.—The union of a foreign war to the present civil war might perhaps raise them to *Two Hundred Millions*, but more probably it would sink them to *Nothing*.—*Additional Observations on the Nature and Value of Civil Liberty*, &c. By Richard Price, D.D. Third Edition. P. 148.

1783. XXI. "If the premises are just, or nearly just, and nothing effectual is done to prevent their consequences, the infallible, inevitable conclusion that follows, is, That the state is a bankrupt, and that those who have trusted their All to the public faith, are in very imminent danger of becoming (I die pronouncing it) Beggars." *An argument to prove that it is the indispensable Duty of the Creditors of the Public to insist that Government do forthwith bring forward the consideration of the State of the Nation*. By John Earl of Stair. Printed An. 1783.

It would not be difficult to make considerable additions to the above extracts, were it necessary to adduce any farther proof, that even the ablest men may entertain ill-founded and groundless apprehensions respecting the Political Strength and Financial Resources of the Nation. The sentiments of the Author, upon these points, have ever been very different. Even as early as the year 1783, in the midst of much terror and despondency, he hesitated not to assert, "That our distresses were too deeply coloured, that our financial resources were not totally destroyed, and that Britain might still retain *its elevated rank* among the Potentates of Europe." However visionary such ideas were considered at the time, they have since been amply verified: a circumstance which must prove the source of pride and exultation to every real friend to the happiness of his country. Indeed, nothing but the grossest mismanagement, or the vilest degeneracy and corruption, can possibly effect the ruin of so powerful an empire, inhabited by a race of people, distinguished for strength, for courage, and for ability.

APPENDIX.

No. IV. TO 220250.

General View of a proposed Analysis of the Sources of Public Revenue.

THE Author of this publication has it in contemplation, as soon as other avocations will admit of it, to submit to the consideration of the public, a general and systematic Analysis, of the Sources of Public Revenue, and the Principles on which they are respectively founded: and a variety of materials for that extensive undertaking are already collected. But an attempt of that nature cannot be hastily completed; for it requires a thorough investigation into the revenues of every nation both ancient and modern, and an attentive consideration of the various works which have been written in the different languages of Europe upon the subject of Finance: and as many circumstances may occur, which may prevent him, for a considerable space of time, from carrying into full effect an object requiring such labour and researches, he must content himself, for the present, with publishing an Abstract of his intended Analysis, and with requesting that the Reader, who may be conversant in such enquiries, would favour him with any observations which may occur upon an attentive perusal of it, either respecting the Table itself, or the manner in which the particular Sources of Public Revenue are therein arranged.

T A B L E

OF THE

SOURCES OF PUBLIC REVENUE.

I. *Property vested in the Public.*

1. Lands	-	-	-	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Forests. 2. Pasture lands. 3. Arable lands. 4. Gardens and vineyards.
2. Buildings	-	-	-	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. For private habitation. 2. For public entertainments. 3. Public baths.
3. Fishings	-	-	-	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. In fresh water. 2. In salt water. 3. Of pearls.
4. Mines	-	-	-	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Of metals. 2. Of salt and minerals. 3. Of precious stones.
5. Peculiar Productions	-	-	-	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Bitumen. 2. Balm of Gilead. 3. Alum. 4. Terra Sigillata. 5. Mineral waters.

II. *Rights or public lucrative Prerogatives intrusted to the Government of Country.*

1. Right of Seignory	-	-	-	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Non entry. 2. Relief. 3. Wardship. 4. Marriage. 5. Fine of alienation. 6. Aids. 7. Escheat. 8. Purveyance. 9. Pre-emption.
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|----------------------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------------------|
| | { | 1. Rona vacantia. |
| | { | 2. Treasure trove. |
| | { | 3. Waifs. |
| 2. Right to unappropriated Property | { | 4. Estrays. |
| | { | 5. Goods wrecked. |
| | { | 6. Goods not inherited. |
| | { | 7. Goods of deceased foreigners. |
| | { | 1. Plunder in War - { 1. At sea. |
| | | 2. On land. |
| 3. Right of declaring Peace or War. | { | 2. Tributes from other nations. |
| | { | 3. Subsidies. |
| | { | 1. Judging and determining causes. |
| 4. Judicial Rights | { | 2. Fines and pecuniary punishments. |
| | { | 3. Confiscation. |
| | { | 4. Registers. |
| | { | 5. Stamps. |
| 5. Rights as the Fountain of Honour of Office, &c. | { | 1. Sale of honours. |
| | { | 2. Sale of offices. |
| | { | 3. Sale of franchises, &c. |
| | { | 1. Commerce carried on by agents. |
| | { | 2. Monopolies farmed out. |
| | { | 3. Monopolies granted. |
| | { | 4. Lotteries. |
| 6. Rights as the Arbitrator of Commerce | { | 5. Post office. |
| | { | 6. Monopoly of posting. |
| | { | 7. Coinage { 1. Of metals. |
| | | 2. Of paper. |
| | { | 8. Tolls and passage taxes { 1. At sea. |
| | | 2. On land. |
| | { | 9. Port duties. |
| 7. Rights as the Guardian of Morals | { | 1. Sumptuary taxes. |
| | { | 2. Taxes on public amusements. |
| | { | 1. Custody of temporalities. |
| | { | 2. Right of corody. |
| | { | 3. Extra parochial tithes. |
| 8. Rights as the Head of the church | { | 4. First fruits and tenths. |
| | { | 5. Religious revenues belonging to the church. |
| | { | 6. Religious revenues belonging to laymen. |

III. Voluntary Contributions.

- | | | |
|----------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Voluntary Contributions by Citizens | { | 1. In time of peace. |
| | { | 2. In time of war. |
| 2. Gifts from Strangers | { | 1. In cases of unforeseen disaster, as an earthquake, &c. |
| | { | 2. In time of war. |

IV. Involuntary Contributions or Taxes on Individuals.

- | | | |
|-------------------------|---|--------------|
| 1. Of personal Services | { | 1. In peace. |
| | { | 2. In war. |

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|------------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 4. Of taxes on real Property | - | 2. On buildings | { 1. Hearth money.
2. Window tax.
3. On tiles.
4. On gates. |
| | | 3. On fisheries. | |
| | | 4. On mines. | |
| 5. Of Taxes on personal Property | | 1. On the Interest of money. | |
| | | 2. On plate. | |
| | | 3. On carriages. | |
| 6. Of Taxes on Property when transferred | | 1. By auction. | |
| | | 2. By private sale. | |
| | | 3. By will. | |
| 7. Of Taxes on Income | | 1. From different professions. | |
| | | 2. From the public. | |
| 8. Of Taxes on Consumption | | 1. Customs. | |
| | | 2. Excise. | |

V: Public Loans.

- | | | |
|---------------------|---|----------------------------------------------|
| 1. Compulsive Loans | - | 1. Of provisions, carriages, &c. |
| | | 2. Of money. |
| | | 1. On valuable pledges. |
| | | 2. On the personal credit of the government. |
| | | 3. On the security of the public funds. |
| 2. Voluntary Loans | - | 4. On the produce of particular taxes. |
| | | 5. By granting—temporary annuities. |
| | | 6. ————— annuities on live estates. |
| | | 7. ————— contingent annuities. |
| | | 8. ————— perpetual annuities. |

Which last is the climax of Financial Invention.

A P P E N D I X.

No. VI.

On the Bankruptcies which have taken place since the Year 1748, and more especially of the Country Bankers An. 1793.

IN the third chapter of this work, a variety of observations were made on the failure of credit and the number of Bankruptcies in the year 1793: in order to enable the reader to form a more perfect idea of this subject, it is proposed to give 1. A List of Bankruptcies, from the year 1748 to the year 1797; and, 2. A List of the Country Bankers that flopt in the year 1793.

A LIST OF BANKRUPTCIES,
From the Year 1748 to the End of the Year 1797.

<u>Year.</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Year.</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Year.</u>	<u>No.</u>
1748	130	1765	239	1782	558
1749	91	1766	342	1783	531
1750	169	1767	360	1784	521
1751	172	1768	351	1785	502
1752	153	1769	344	1786	510
1753	242	1770	397	1787	509
1754	238	1771	433	1788	707
1755	223	1772	523	1789	502
1756	279	1773	507	1790	585
1757	274	1774	337	1791	583
1758	315	1775	350	1792	636
1759	254	1776	435	1793	1802
1760	221	1777	535	1794	816
1761	182	1778	656	1795	708
1762	230	1779	522	1796	760
1763	243	1780	458	1797	869
1764	322	1781	458		

Total Amount from 1748 to 1797 - - - - - 21,645

This Table shews the dreadful pre-eminence, in point of Bankruptcies, of the year 1793, above every other.

The following is the List of the Country Bankers that stopt in the Year 1793 ;
drawn up by Mr. Chalmers*.

<u>County.</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>County.</u>	<u>No.</u>
In Yorkshire - -	12	In Kent - - -	2
Northumberland -	7	Nottingham - -	1
Lincoln - - -	7	Hereford - - -	1
Sussex - - -	6	Essex - - -	1
Lancashire - - -	5	Buckingham - -	1
Northampton - -	4	Hants - - -	1
Somerset - - -	4	Berkshire - - -	1
Warwick - - -	3	Cornwall - - -	1
Stafford - - -	2	Durham - - -	1
Worcester - - -	2	Carmarthen - -	1
Shropshire - - -	2	Dorset - - -	1
Cheshire - - -	2	Wilts - - -	1
Monmouth - - -	2		
			<hr/> 71 <hr/>

Is it not to be lamented, after so decisive a proof of the disadvantages and dangers attending the unrestrained privilege of Country Banking, that no proper system should have been formed for its future regulation, which exposes the nation to another return of similar calamities.

* "An Estimate of the Comparative State of Great Britain," by Geo. Chalmers, Esq. edit. 1794; Dedication, p. 67.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

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